Open House Group

Company history

Financial history 2013–2025 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1997
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
2013
Founder
Arai Masaaki
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$8.9B (¥1.34tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$672.9M (¥101bn)
Open House Group: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1997The plots nobody wanted

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1997Founded in Shibuya, Tokyo; brokerage of new detached houses
  2. 1997Franchise agreement with Century 21 Japan
  3. 2001Starts selling its own houses; acquires the builder Soken Build
  4. 2006Open House Development — land to construction to sale in one company
  5. 2010Subsidiaries in California and Shanghai
  6. 2012Ends the Century 21 franchise

Open House began in September 1997 as a Shibuya company of a few people with $82,631 (¥10m) of capital, brokering the sale of newly built detached houses; a month later it signed on as a franchisee of Century 21 Japan. The timing looked poor — public housing-loan finance was being wound back and land prices were still falling — and the majors and the big prefabricated housebuilders were walking away from anything whose economics they could not read. Arai Masaaki chose precisely that residue: cramped, triangular, trackside and cemetery-adjacent plots, bought cheaply because nobody was bidding against him.

The selling method mattered as much as the buying. In what the company came to call gensen eigyō — canvassing at source — staff approached passers-by on the street and walked them to the property. Because seven or eight out of ten people moving house choose somewhere near where they already live, Open House concentrated its offices on prominent street corners in the districts it sold in and painted prices across the windows. The method resisted being written into a manual, which is why the large developers never copied it; sticking to conventional timber framing rather than standardized panels gave it a flexibility the prefab makers could not match either.

Then it reversed the usual order of the industry. In February 2001 it began selling houses it had developed itself, and that September bought the builder Soken Build outright — renamed and, by 2006, folded into Open House Development — so that land buying, design, construction and sale all sat inside one company. Most developers hold land and buildings first and work out how to sell them later; Open House had the buyers first and made the product afterwards. In 2012, after fifteen years, it ended the Century 21 franchise to sell under its own name, and moved its registered head office from Shibuya to Marunouchi.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2013Listing, and the first bolt-on

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2013 · consolidated
Revenue$994M
Net income$58M
Net margin5.9%
FY2017 · consolidated
Revenue$2.7B
Net income$221M
Net margin8.1%
  1. 2013Lists on the TSE First Section
  2. 2015Acquires Asakawa Home (later Open House Architect)
  3. 2015Net profit $104.1M (¥13bn) — 2.2× the listing year
  4. 2017Revenue $2.7B (¥305bn)

In September 2013, sixteen years after it was founded, Open House listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange with revenue of $993.9M (¥97bn) and net profit of $58.4M (¥6bn). What followed was an unbroken run of higher sales and higher profit every year: revenue reached $2.7B (¥305bn) by FY2017, more than three times the listing year in four years, as the efficiency of street canvassing met the cost control of an in-house construction arm.

Growth by opening more offices had a limit, and in January 2015 the company bought Asakawa Home, a timber-frame housebuilder in Tsukuba with a position in the outer Kanto suburbs; it contributed $176M (¥21bn) of segment revenue in its first year and was renamed Open House Architect in 2016. By then condominiums and income-producing property were each earning double-digit margins alongside the detached-house business, and the four-segment shape that the group still runs on was in place.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2018Buying supply: Hawk One and Presance

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2018 · consolidated
Revenue$3.5B
Net income$288M
Net margin8.1%
FY2021 · consolidated
Revenue$7.4B
Net income$634M
Net margin8.6%
  1. 2018Acquires Hawk One for $247.3M (¥27bn)
  2. 2019Revenue $5.0B (¥540bn) — “Hop Step 5000” met a year early
  3. 2020Takes 31.9% of Presance Corporation
  4. 2021Presance consolidated; revenue $7.4B (¥811bn)

In July 2018 Open House paid $247.3M (¥27bn) for Hawk One, a Tokyo-area housebuilder shipping more than 2,000 houses a year — its largest acquisition to that point, taken to 100% by a share exchange in October. Goodwill of only about $20.8M (¥2bn) showed it had bought real assets and real earnings at an honest price. What it had actually bought was time: the offices, staff and tradesmen it would otherwise have spent years recruiting and training.

The mid-term plan “Hop Step 5000,” aiming at $4.6B (¥500bn) of revenue, was cleared a year early — FY2019 revenue was $5.0B (¥540bn) — and the pandemic, far from denting demand, pushed buyers toward suburban houses as remote work spread. FY2020 revenue rose again to $5.4B (¥576bn).

The next purchase took the company outside its home ground for the first time. In May 2020 it took 31.9% of Presance Corporation, the largest supplier of compact condominiums in the Kansai region, whose shareholder base had been shaken when its then president was arrested in a case unrelated to the company’s operations (he was ultimately acquitted in 2023). In January 2021 Open House raised the stake to 64.45% and consolidated it, booking $161.2M (¥18bn) of negative goodwill; group revenue jumped 41% to $7.4B (¥811bn).

Read the full history in Japanese →


2022Past ¥1 trillion, and the founder steps back

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2022 · consolidated
Revenue$7.3B
Net income$593M
Net margin8.2%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$8.9B
Net income$673M
Net margin7.5%
  1. 2022Converts to a holding company; renamed Open House Group
  2. 2023Revenue $8.2B (¥1.15tn) — past ¥1 trillion
  3. 2023Tender offer for Sanei Architecture Planning (renamed Meldia, 2024)
  4. 2025Presance taken fully private for $404.9M (¥61bn)
  5. 2025Fukuoka Ryosuke becomes president; Arai stays on as Founder

In January 2022 the company converted to a pure holding company and took the name Open House Group, leaving detached houses, condominiums, income-producing property, construction and US real estate to run as operating companies while the holding company allocated capital between them. Its stated target — $7.1B (¥1tn) of revenue by the year to September 2023, under a plan whose name translates as “Let’s go, one trillion” — was passed with room to spare at $8.2B (¥1.15tn), with operating profit of $1.0B (¥142bn). In an industry whose top tier descends from the prewar zaibatsu, an independent founded in 1997 had reached the trillion-yen line in twenty-six years.

Scale then came from a rescue. Sanei Architecture Planning, a Tokyo housebuilder shipping over 3,500 houses a year, had seen its banks turn cautious after a regulatory recommendation in June 2023; Open House launched a tender offer that August, took the company private that November and renamed it Meldia in 2024. FY2024 revenue rose to $8.6B (¥1.3tn), but operating profit fell short of the year before — the gap between scale and profitability that absorbing a distressed peer opens up.

From 2025 the emphasis shifted from buying to digesting. In April the group spent $404.9M (¥61bn) taking Presance fully private, judging that a listed subsidiary could not move fast enough; in the year to September 2025 it retired the Meldia segment and folded it into the detached-house business. On 1 October 2025 Arai handed the presidency, after twenty-eight years, to Fukuoka Ryosuke, an internal appointment who had joined in 2002, and stayed on the board as Founder rather than cashing out. FY2025 revenue of $8.9B (¥1.34tn) and operating profit of $974.9M (¥146bn) were records for a twelfth straight year.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2001

From brokerage to buying land and building houses (2001)

The selling came first; the thing to sell was made in-house afterwards

Vertical integration is hardly a novel idea in real estate. What is striking about this decision is the order. Where most developers hold the land and the building first and work out how to sell them afterwards, Open House built a brokerage network that caught customers on the street and then made in-house the product to push through it. If you can buy land with the buyer already in view, the fear of carrying inventory recedes. That order is what allowed the company to give up the commission business as early as four and a half years after its founding.

Integration is not all upside, of course. A fall in land prices or an unsold house lands on your own books, and you take the swings in construction labour and material costs directly. That Open House kept the structure anyway is presumably because it judged that unless it kept pricing and the handling of difficult sites in its own hands, it could not compete on the ground it had chosen — cramped urban plots. Even after the later decisions to buy supply capacity from outside, with Hawk One in 2018 and Sanei Architecture Planning in 2023, the recurring question of how to wire an acquired company into that integrated model is a measure of how much the 2001 choice still weighs.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2018

Buying Hawk One to widen supply capacity (2018)

What time costs when you buy it

$247.3M (¥27bn) is not extraordinary set beside the $428.4M (¥47bn) of operating profit Open House earned in the year to September 2018. It was called the company’s largest acquisition to date because until then it had grown by opening its own offices. Against the constraint of a machine that worked but lacked people, buying a company that came complete with offices, staff and tradesmen can be read as converting the years of recruiting and training into a sum of money. That goodwill came to only about $20.8M (¥2bn) indicates a transaction in which tangible assets and real earning power were bought at an honest price.

What the buyer acquired, though, was not only depth of supply. Keeping the two firms’ sales territories separate — central Tokyo and the inner suburbs — and adding unit volume while leaving the acquired company’s name and president in place became the template for the group’s later deals. Across the very different situations of Presance Corporation in 2020 and Sanei Architecture Planning in 2023, how far that template carries has produced a different answer each time. Buying time is fast; what the price tag does not specify is how the time you bought will be used.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2023

A tender offer for Sanei Architecture Planning (2023)

Choosing to buy a weakened competitor

This acquisition was different in character from Hawk One in 2018. That was a healthy, growing company bought through negotiation at a market price; this was a company with strains in its funding and its trading relationships, taken over and carried all the way to a delisting. A price set 26.48% above the previous close is hard to describe as beating down a weakened counterpart. It is rather that the circumstance — the seller needing to part with its shares as a condition of its own rebuilding — governed both the price and the procedure.

For the buyer, taking in a company with that much supply capacity at that moment was no small thing. But credit with trading partners and with banks is not an asset you can buy; it can only be rebuilt afterwards. In the year to September 2024 revenue grew to $8.6B (¥1.3tn) while operating profit fell below the prior year, and closing that gap between scale and profitability remains unfinished business. Whether a company that has repeatedly used the instrument of buying up its own competitors can bring what it buys around to its own way of selling — under a management that has now taken over from the founder, that answer is still to come.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Open House Group full history in Japanese →

  1. Open House Group Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports) and earnings materials (決算説明資料).
  2. Open House Group Co., Ltd. — tender offer and share acquisition disclosures: Hawk One (2018), Presance Corporation (2020, 2021 and the 2025 going-private offer), Sanei Architecture Planning (2023).
  3. Weekly Toyo Keizai — 週刊東洋経済 (Toyo Keizai Inc.), 2020 features on the company’s canvassing-led sales model and its push into the Kansai market.
  4. Weekly Toyo Keizai — 週刊東洋経済 (Toyo Keizai Inc.), 2010, on the rise of narrow-plot detached housing in Tokyo.
  5. Open House Group Co., Ltd. — mid-term management plans “Hop Step 5000” (2018) and 行こうぜ1兆!2023 (2021).

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Open House Group’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/3288/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/3288/history.json History overview
GET /api/3288/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/3288/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/3288/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/3288/executives.json Executives
GET /api/3288/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/3288/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/3288/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/3288/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/3288/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/3288/workforce.json Workforce