KADOKAWA

Company history

Financial history 2015–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1945
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
2014
Founder
Kadokawa Gen’yoshi
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$1.8B (¥283bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$8.2M (¥1bn)
KADOKAWA: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1945A scholar’s publishing house

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1945Kadokawa Shoten founded in Tokyo by Kadokawa Gen’yoshi
  2. 1949Kadokawa Bunko paperback line launched
  3. 1967Gen’yoshi hands day-to-day management to his son Haruki

Kadokawa Shoten was founded in Tokyo in November 1945, months after the surrender, by Kadokawa Gen’yoshi — a scholar of classical Japanese literature who believed Japanese culture could be rebuilt through publishing. The list was accordingly severe: national history and literature, scholarly monographs, dictionaries, textbooks. In 1949 he added the Kadokawa Bunko, a cheap paperback line carrying the classics and foreign literature to a mass readership, and it grew into a pillar beside the reference books. Kadokawa Tsuguhiko would later call these years the company’s “literary publisher” era.

Gen’yoshi was a publisher and an academic at once, lecturing at Keio and Kokugakuin. Compiling dictionaries and encyclopaedias takes years and capital and can only be attempted by a house that means to stay; the work earned Kadokawa a reputation a 1976 profile summed up as おカタい本屋さん — the stiff, serious bookshop of textbooks and reference works. That credit, accumulated on hard books, was the capital the company would later spend on entertainment.

His second son, Kadokawa Haruki, was the temperamental opposite — boxing and kendo at university, work as a labourer by day and a bartender by night after it, four disownments as a student, and by his own account a man who had “never properly read a book.” Yet around 1967 Gen’yoshi remarked that “a man stops making progress at fifty-five,” kept the president’s title, and handed the running of the business to his twenty-five-year-old son. What he passed over was a loss-making operation to fix and the freedom to remake a serious publisher into something else.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1975Colour covers, and the media mix

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1975Gen’yoshi dies; Kadokawa Haruki becomes president
  2. 1975Colour paperback covers; passes Shinchosha in bunko share
  3. 1976The Inugami Clan with Toho — the media mix begins
  4. 1982Weekly The Television — magazines as a third pillar

Gen’yoshi died in October 1975 and Haruki formally took the presidency. His first move broke a taboo: colour covers on paperbacks, in an age when a bunko was expected to look as plain as an Iwanami volume. Alongside them came image advertising aimed straight at the young — “there are journeys you take because you want to read” — selling a mood rather than a title. Two devices, and the stiff old house of dictionaries became a publisher that moved readers with paperbacks and entertainment.

The numbers followed. Paperback print runs rose from 25 million copies in 1972 to 45 million in 1975; Kadokawa drew level with the long-dominant Shinchosha in 1974 and passed it 6:4 the following year. By 1976 bunko accounted for roughly 70% of sales, and Haruki could say that turnover had roughly tripled and recurring profit quintupled in five years. The “Yokomizo Seishi comeback fair,” reissuing the mystery writer in paperback, sold 2.5 million copies in two months.

He then carried the boom into film. Partnering with Toho, Kadokawa produced The Inugami Clan and released it in October 1976 to coincide with the Yokomizo fair. The reasoning was plain: foreign titles the company licensed had sold because films sold them, so it would run the same effect on works it owned outright. Film sold the paperback, the paperback sold the film, and the advertising budget was split between the publishing and film sides — a method without precedent in Japanese publishing. What Kadokawa now sold was not a book but a work that could be sold again in changed form, and in 1982 it opened a third front with Weekly The Television, a listings magazine that reached 1.3 million copies a week by the late 1990s and was followed by game, anime and city titles such as Tokyo Walker. The model worked because one outsized personality drove it, which was also why it would not transfer easily.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1993Tsuguhiko: listing, holding company, and one company

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1993Haruki arrested and ousted; Tsuguhiko becomes president
  2. 1998Lists on the TSE Second Section
  3. 2003Converts to a holding company, Kadokawa Holdings
  4. 2011Acquires Media Factory from Recruit
  5. 2013Nine operating subsidiaries merged; renamed KADOKAWA

Kadokawa Tsuguhiko joined the firm out of Waseda in 1966 and rose through editorial to sales director, executive vice-president and vice-president, but his quarrel with his brother over the company’s direction ended in his resignation in 1992. In February 1993 his backers set up a rival publisher, MediaWorks, with Tsuguhiko as president. That same year Haruki was arrested under the narcotics control law and forced out; Tsuguhiko returned as an adviser and became president in October 1993. The younger brother who had left over strategy was called back by the elder’s arrest.

He revived Kadokawa’s film business from 1995 with hits including Lost Paradise and Ring, and by 1999 was describing an ambition to push the “soft mix” — novel into film into game — onward into a “net mix” fused with the internet, the idea that would eventually produce the Dwango merger. He read the company’s past as three successive business models — literary publisher, paperback-and-film media mix, magazines — and declared he would find a fourth. In November 1998 Kadokawa listed on the Second Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the first full-scale publisher to do so, on sales of $602M (¥79bn) for the year to March 1998, up 16.4%.

As the Japanese book market shrank after its 1996 peak, Kadokawa alone prospered: in fiscal 2008 Kodansha and Shogakukan posted operating losses of ¥7.6bn and ¥6.3bn while Kadokawa’s operating profit rose from ¥3.5bn toward ¥5.0bn and it led all three on sales. Paperbacks earned nearly 60% of publishing gross profit and light novels about 60% of that; The Melancholy of Haruhi Suzumiya (2003) reached 5.8 million copies, and president Sato Tatsuo called the pattern of pushing a book out into film, magazines, games and overseas “Kadokawa’s golden formula.” The structure was rebuilt to match — a holding company in 2003, renamed Kadokawa Group Holdings in 2006, ASCII Media Works formed in 2008, Media Factory bought from Recruit in 2011 — and then, in October 2013, nine operating companies were absorbed into one and the group renamed itself KADOKAWA.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2014Dwango, IP, and the Sony alliance

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2015 · consolidated
Revenue$831M
Net income$117M
Net margin14%
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$1.8B
Net income$8M
Net margin0.5%
  1. 2014Merger with Dwango; KADOKAWA・DWANGO lists on the TSE First Section
  2. 2015~300 voluntary redundancies; group renamed Kadokawa
  3. 2019Re-consolidated into a single company, renamed KADOKAWA
  4. 2020Tokorozawa Sakura Town opens
  5. 2024Ransomware attack; ¥3.6bn special loss
  6. 2025Sony invests ~$334.1M (¥50bn) for ~10% and becomes largest shareholder

On 14 May 2014 Kadokawa announced a merger with the video platform Dwango, and on 1 October the joint holding company KADOKAWA・DWANGO listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The ratio was 51 Dwango to 49 Kadokawa even though Kadokawa’s latest revenue of $1.4B (¥151bn) was more than four times Dwango’s $339.2M (¥36bn) — the smaller party placed above the larger. Tsuguhiko wanted a content platform without parallel anywhere; more than that, he wanted Dwango’s chairman Kawakami Nobuo as his successor.

What followed looked less like fusion than friction. In January 2015 KADOKAWA sought about 300 voluntary redundancies, roughly a tenth of its permanent staff, thinning the publishing side first; in October the group renamed itself Kadokawa. The transitional six-month period to March 2015 showed sales of ¥100.6bn and operating profit of ¥1.4bn, with net profit of ¥14.1bn propped up by negative goodwill. The name Kadokawa Shoten, carried since 1945, disappeared from the organisation, and critics predicted the pair would be “divorced or sunk together inside five years.”

Recovery came by pulling the pieces back together: in July 2019 the holding company absorbed its operating subsidiary and took the name KADOKAWA outright, and in August 2020 it opened Tokorozawa Sakura Town outside Tokyo, built around Kuma Kengo’s Kadokawa Culture Museum. The business model settled into vertical integration — generate intellectual property in publishing, then work it through the group’s own anime, games and merchandise. The year to March 2024 produced some 6,000 new IPs against an archive of 130,000; Re:Zero was designed for anime before it was even a book, the games subsidiary FromSoftware’s ELDEN RING became a global hit, and licensing income approached ¥40bn. Sales reached $1.8B (¥255bn) in the year to March 2023 with operating profit of ¥25.9bn, the best since the merger.

Then, on 8 June 2024, a ransomware attack by the Russia-linked group BlackSuit took down Niconico and much of the group’s systems; about 1.5 terabytes of internal data was stolen, including personal information on N High School students and Dwango staff. KADOKAWA booked a ¥3.6bn special loss in the year to March 2025 and net profit fell from ¥11.4bn to ¥7.4bn — this on top of Tsuguhiko’s arrest in September 2022 over bribery in the Tokyo Olympics sponsorship selection and his 226 days in detention. The answer was an alliance: agreed with Sony Group in December 2024, and in January 2025 Sony took roughly 10% of the voting rights for about $334.1M (¥50bn) through a third-party allotment to become the largest shareholder. Early reports of an outright acquisition proved wrong. The business Kadokawa Shoten began by moving a story from paperback to screen continues — with Sony as the partner and the world as the market.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1976

Entering film with Toho — The Inugami Clan (1976)

Not an invention — the rights-holder crossing the line

What Haruki said his aim was, in 1976, was this: handling foreign titles in translation had shown him that a work sells when a film sells it, so he would run the same effect on the works he already held. This was not a novel idea but the reproduction of a phenomenon other studios’ films had already demonstrated. The character of the move lies elsewhere — in the fact that the party holding the source material went and seized control of the production budget and the release date. As with the colour paperback covers, the wager was placed precisely where the existing division of labour was ignored.

That said, the verdicts of Shochiku’s executive vice-president Okuyama Toru — that Kadokawa did not know the market — and of Nikkatsu’s Nemoto Teiji — that it had no exhibition network — were not wide of the mark. Kadokawa owned no cinemas, and The Inugami Clan could not have been released without the tie-up with Toho. The coexistence in one man of a temperament that spent ¥50 million of his own money on an ancient ship and an abacus that counted paperback print runs was also hard for other firms to imitate. Owning a work and owning the place that delivers it are different things; the 1976 entry was a test of whether the first alone could buy a way into the second.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2013

Absorbing nine operating subsidiaries into one KADOKAWA (2013)

What it means to become a single company

The explanation that this was a tidying-up of duplicated back offices does not account for the merger. What Tsuguhiko, chairman and CEO, dismantled was the very mechanism that had carried the group’s profits through the late 2000s: Kadokawa Shoten and ASCII Media Works competing for the same authors while only their sales operations were pooled. Whoever hesitates over the cloud gets left behind; however big a success has grown, you have to be willing to throw it away — the words he used in 2010, now applied to his own company’s winning formula.

That said, what actually became one was the legal entity and the sign above the door. Pay scales remained divided by the firm each employee had come from, several labour unions carried on side by side, and fifteen months after the merger 232 people left through voluntary redundancy. The eight brand companies were reshuffled within two years, and the Kadokawa Shoten name vanished from the organisation. Making a company one thing and making its people and systems one thing proceed at different speeds; the nine-company merger carried that gap straight into the next merger.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2014

The joint share transfer with Dwango and the KADOKAWA・DWANGO holding company (2014)

Handing over a company to obtain a person

The slogan of the day — the fusion of old media and new — misses the core of this merger. That the side with four times the revenue accepted the minority of a 51:49 split, and that the share-transfer ratio valued Dwango the more highly, cannot be explained as a multiplication of businesses. What chairman Kadokawa Tsuguhiko led with at the press conference was not synergy either, but a single line: that he had at last got hold of “a young manager called Kawakami.” It can be read as the judgement of a seventy-one-year-old who put up the whole company in order to bring in a successor from outside it.

That said, facts remain that the successor-procurement reading does not settle. As president, Kawakami Nobuo opened a correspondence high school in 2016 built on the mechanics of Niconico, a business neither company had had before. Meanwhile what moved three months after the merger was 232 voluntary redundancies on the KADOKAWA side, and the plan for ¥18–20bn of operating profit in the year to March 2018 ended at ¥3.1bn. A merger to obtain a person and a merger to grow a business do not, it appears, advance at the same speed.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— KADOKAWA full history in Japanese →

  1. KADOKAWA Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports) and results materials.
  2. Nikkei Business — 日経ビジネス (Nikkei BP): November 1990 (series on Kadokawa Haruki); January 2001 (Kadokawa Shoten’s multi-media strategy and alliances).
  3. Weekly Toyo Keizai — 週刊東洋経済 (Toyo Keizai Inc.): 16 Feb 2002; 14 Sep 2002; 19 Sep 2009 (paperbacks and the group’s outperformance); 3 Oct 2014; 12 Dec 2014; 23 Jan 2015 (the 300-person redundancy call); 22 May 2015 (cover feature, “the adrift merger of the century”); 15 Oct 2016 (interview with Kawakami Nobuo); 13 Jul 2024 (the IP value-maximisation model); 7 Dec 2024 (Sony and KADOKAWA); 1 Nov 2025.
  4. Securities Analysts Journal — 証券アナリストジャーナル, 20 January 1999 (Kadokawa Tsuguhiko on Kadokawa Shoten).
  5. The Cloud Era and the “Cool Revolution”『クラウド時代と〈クール革命〉』 by Kadokawa Tsuguhiko, 2010.
  6. Proof of the Man: 226 Days in Detention and My Right to Live『人間の証明 勾留226日と私の生存権について』 by Kadokawa Tsuguhiko, 2024.
  7. The Devil of the Media Mix: Inoue Shin’ichiro’s History of Otaku Culture『メディアミックスの悪魔 井上伸一郎のおたく文化史』, 2025.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

KADOKAWA’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/9468/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/9468/history.json History overview
GET /api/9468/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/9468/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/9468/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/9468/executives.json Executives
GET /api/9468/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/9468/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/9468/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/9468/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/9468/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/9468/workforce.json Workforce