Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (1952–85) · Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (1985–2025)
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$91.1B (¥14.41tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$6.6B (¥1.04tn)
NTT: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)
1952Thirty-two years as a public corporation: clearing the backlog, and the case for monopoly unravelling
1952Takes over the telegraph and telephone business as a state public corporation
1953Telephone tariffs revised
1956Telephone subscribers reach 2.4 million
1964Subscribers reach 6.33 million — third in the world after the US and UK
1966The backlog of uninstalled telephones reaches 1.6 million
1981Shinto Hisashi becomes president of the public corporation
1984INS model trials begin in the Mitaka and Musashino districts
For thirty-two years NTT was not a company at all but a state public corporation, and its brief was singular: put a telephone within reach of every household in Japan. It succeeded so completely — clearing a waiting list that had once run to 1.6 million lines — that by the early 1980s the success itself had dissolved the argument for keeping the monopoly.
The public corporation's mission: a telephone everywhere in the country
In August 1952 the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (日本電信電話公社) was established, taking over the telegraph and telephone business from the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of Telecommunications. In September of the following month the Kokusai Denshin Denwa Act came into force, fixing an arrangement under which the public corporation carried domestic communications and Kokusai Denshin Denwa carried international traffic. In 1953 telephone tariffs were revised and a rational, efficient management structure for the telegraph and telephone business was established. The largest problem the corporation carried was that the 積滞 — the backlog of applications for a telephone that could not be installed — persisted for a long period. Business lines were installed as a priority, but for households a wait of two or three years after applying was not unusual. Long-distance circuits were also few, and for a long time callers waited several hours after placing a request with an operator.
Through the first to the third five-year plans, total telephone subscribers rose from 2.4 million in 1956 to 6.33 million by the end of 1964 — third in the world in number of telephones, after the United States and the United Kingdom. Even so, rising living standards and the concentration of population in the cities brought a flood of applications, and the number of telephones that could not be installed reached 1.6 million in 1966. The introduction of automatic exchanges at telephone offices gradually reduced the work of operators connecting circuits. As exchanges spread, the areas where subscribers could dial direct without going through an operator also expanded rapidly. By the late 1970s an installation pace of five million telephone terminals a year had cleared the backlog, and supply and demand reversed.
Clearing the backlog, and the case for monopoly unravelling
Clearing the backlog brought on a debate that reopened the question of what the public corporation existed for. Once anyone who applied could subscribe at once, voices grew louder that the mission of a public corporation building infrastructure under monopoly had ended. That telephone charges were high compared with the United States also became an issue: long-distance rates in Japan were said at the time to stand at nine against one for the United States. The argument of the liberalisers was that Japanese companies would lose their international competitiveness if they had to pay such high costs for communication. In the late 1970s, as the corporation's installation pace slowed, new subscriptions fell sharply to about two million a year, roughly half the previous level.
Re-examination from inside the corporation ran in two directions. On one side it aimed at expanding into wireless mobile telephony, including car telephones and mobile phones; on the other, taking the view that telephone-centred communications services had limits to their demand growth, it looked at computer communications, facsimile communications and video communications such as the videophone. Research and development was concentrated in particular on the Information Network System (INS), which unified telephone, image and computer information in digital form. In September 1984 the corporation began INS model trials in the Mitaka and Musashino districts of Tokyo. This carried the meaning of opening to the world the digital communications technology the corporation had accumulated as the service that would come after the telephone.
Shinto Hisashi takes charge, and the market is prepared for opening
In 1981 Shinto Hisashi (真藤恒) became president of the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation. Shinto had graduated from the Faculty of Engineering of Kyushu Imperial University in March 1934 and joined Harima Shipyard that April, becoming a managing director of Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries in December 1960 and its representative director and president in January 1972. He continued to stand at the head of the business after privatisation, taking office as representative director and president of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation in April 1985. At the listing in February 1987 the executive vice-presidents included Kitahara Yasusada (北原安定), and the board included Sejima Ryuzo (瀬島龍三), who came from Itochu.
The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications set out deregulation that broke the corporation's monopoly and greatly relaxed the restrictions on using communication circuits. Its representative service was the value-added network (VAN), which resold circuits leased from a carrier with added value attached. In 1984 VANs for small and medium-sized enterprises were approved ahead of the rest. In that same year Daini Denden (DDI) was founded by a group of younger business figures around Inamori Kazuo (稲盛和夫) of Kyocera; Japan Telecom, out of the national railways, was also established, and together with Teleway Japan, in which Toyota Motor and others invested, they waited for approval. The first VAN licence went to Intec, a computing-services company based in Toyama Prefecture, the second to Fujitsu, followed by the Japan Research Institute, NEC and Hitachi Information Networks.
1985Privatisation and the new carriers: fourteen years from the arrival of competition to the break-up debate
1985Privatised as Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, wholly owned by the state
1985Daini Denden, Japan Telecom and Teleway Japan end the telephone monopoly
1987Lists on the Tokyo and seven other stock exchanges on 9 February
1987The share price climbs into the ¥3 million range
1988Data communications transferred to NTT Data Communications Systems
1988Chairman Shinto Hisashi resigns over the Recruit scandal
1991The share price falls below ¥1 million
1992Mobile communications transferred to NTT Mobile Communications Network, nicknamed DoCoMo
1993Employment adjustment begins with a call for voluntary redundancies
1994Long-distance charges cut for the eighth time since privatisation; NYSE listing
1995NTT Data Communications Systems lists on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
1998NTT Mobile Communications Network lists on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
Privatisation on 1 April 1985 turned the public corporation into a joint-stock company on almost the same day competition arrived, and the flotation that followed drew queues of retail investors to securities houses across Japan. Within four years the chairman who had driven privatisation was under arrest, the share price had begun a long slide, and NTT had started carving its data and mobile businesses out into separate companies.
The public corporation goes private, and three new carriers bring competition
On 1 April 1985, under the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Act, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation was established with the entire property of the public corporation contributed as capital. Shares issued totalled 15,600 thousand and capital stood at $3.3B (¥780bn), with every share held by the Minister of Finance. In April of the same year the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications revised the Telecommunications Business Act, opening the communications market widely and permitting entry by companies other than NTT and KDD. With privatisation, bureau chiefs at head office were retitled department heads, telephone offices around the country became sales offices, and the head of a telephone office became a sales-office manager. The company established a range of subsidiaries connected to the telephone business, pursuing a campaign to raise entrepreneurial spirit from within.
In June 1985 Daini Denden, Japan Telecom and Teleway Japan began operating as telephone companies. In 1986 they launched leased-line services for businesses, and in September 1987 general long-distance telephone service. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications had NTT carry both costly local service and long-distance circuits, while the new carriers started as companies specialising in long-distance circuits, where the cost burden was relatively light. The new carriers' long-distance charges were set below NTT's, a deliberate policy move to grow them. The level of the access charges the new carriers paid when using the local network was always a source of major dispute.
The frenzy of the listing, and the stall brought by the Recruit scandal
On 9 February 1987 NTT listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, listing simultaneously on the Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Niigata and Sapporo exchanges. The offering was of 1,650,000 shares, and the share of ¥50,000 par value was priced at $8,230 (¥1m) when sold. Helped by the stock boom of the day it proved enormously popular, and on the first day applications were taken long queues formed outside securities houses from early in the morning — though in the end the shares were allocated by lottery. The price then rose rapidly, jumping into the ¥3 million range in 1987.
NTT's long-distance charges were cut eight times between privatisation and 1994. A three-minute weekday daytime call between Tokyo and Osaka fell from ¥400 at the time of privatisation to ¥180, less than half. The new carriers answered with cuts of their own, the same call falling from ¥300 when their service began to ¥170 in 1994. As margins thinned in the price war, the debate over breaking NTT up surfaced and unsettled the stock market. In 1988 the Recruit scandal broke, and chairman Shinto Hisashi, who had driven privatisation, was arrested. The share price kept sliding, falling below ¥1 million in 1991.
Splitting off mobile and data, and DoCoMo's listing
In July 1988 the business belonging to the Data Communications Division was transferred to NTT Data Communications Systems. That company operated the online foreign-exchange settlement system linking banks, and became the representative example of an industry VAN. NTT Data Communications Systems listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in April 1995 and changed its trade name to NTT Data in August 1998. In July 1992 the business covering car telephones, mobile phones, maritime telephones, aircraft public telephones and radio paging was transferred to NTT Mobile Communications Network. The mobile company took the nickname DoCoMo and used the brand as a weapon in a sales offensive on the car- and mobile-telephone market. DoCoMo was taken from the Japanese for from anywhere and to anywhere — a name that suggests the aim of raising entrepreneurial spirit through the spin-off had hit its mark.
In 1993 NTT began to move into employment adjustment, including a call for voluntary redundancies. It employed 230,000 people at the time, and voices continued to argue that a break-up should shrink the scale of the organisation. In April 1994 the sale of mobile handsets was liberalised, allowing telecommunications-equipment makers and consumer-electronics makers to sell terminals directly to users. As each maker pushed miniaturisation and lower prices, mobile subscriptions expanded rapidly. Supply of semiconductor components could not keep up with the unexpected surge in demand, producing a boom in which handsets ran to a wait of several months.
On 22 October 1998 NTT Mobile Communications Network, the mobile subsidiary 95 per cent owned by NTT, listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The public offering and sale raised $16.2B (¥2.13tn) in total from markets at home and abroad, and market capitalisation at listing reached about $30.6B (¥4tn). Yamaichi Securities, originally designated lead manager in Japan, had wound itself up voluntarily, so Nikko Securities took over; the offer price was ¥3.9 million a share. NTT booked a gain on the sale of about $6.5B (¥850bn). Against the Fair Trade Commission's guidance to reduce its holding, NTT set out a policy of keeping control, saying it would not go below 50 per cent.
1999The holding-company design, and what decentralisation cost
Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2002 · consolidated
Revenue$93.2B
Net income$1.9B
Net margin2%
→
FY2010 · consolidated
Revenue$116B
Net income$5.6B
Net margin4.8%
1999Reorganised into a pure holding company; local service split into NTT East and NTT West
1999NTT Communications founded to take inter-prefectural services
1999The acquisition of International Digital Communications is abandoned
2000NTT Mobile Communications Network renamed NTT DoCoMo
2000Verio of the United States taken fully in-house
2000Trial provision of FTTH begins; new pi-system work halted
2001NTT West falls into an operating loss
2001The union votes to accept the redeployment of about 110,000 people
2001Vast write-downs arise on overseas investments
2002NTT DoCoMo lists in London and New York
2004NTT Urban Development lists on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
2006Miura Satoshi becomes president
2010NTT Data makes a tender offer for Dimension Data of South Africa
In July 1999 NTT took itself apart into a pure holding company sitting above NTT East, NTT West and NTT Communications — a shape meant to satisfy the demand for competition without giving up the benefits of scale. Consolidated revenue of $93.2B (¥11.68tn) in the year to March 2002 had eased to $116.0B (¥10.18tn) by the year to March 2010, and the design left the group with listed subsidiaries, damaged overseas investments and a hundred thousand people to redeploy.
Reorganisation into a pure holding company, and the splitting of local and long-distance
The revision of the Antimonopoly Act in December 1997 permitted pure holding companies for the first time in fifty years, and the conditions for reorganisation were in place. In July 1999 NTT carried out a reorganisation making itself a pure holding company. The business of intra-prefectural communications services was transferred to the wholly owned subsidiaries Nippon Telegraph and Telephone East and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone West, and inter-prefectural communications services to the equally wholly owned NTT Communications. Under Miyazu Junichiro (宮津純一郎), a line was drawn under the separation and break-up debate that had run for fourteen years since privatisation in 1985. Shareholders and the president carried over unchanged to the holding company.
As a pure holding company, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone narrowed its functions to corporate planning, financing and basic research and held itself to 3,500 staff. The regional companies NTT East and NTT West had about 60,000 employees each, while NTT Communications — released from the constraints of the NTT Act and fully private — sat alongside them with revenue of $11.9B (¥1.35tn). NTT initially put the acquisition of its business partner International Digital Communications (IDC) at about $263.5M (¥30bn) and approached it at a total equity value of $274.1M (¥31bn), but as it built its own global ATM services and international optical-fibre network, the view inside the company that we do not need IDC grew stronger. In the end Cable & Wireless of Britain acquired IDC at a total equity value of $606.1M (¥69bn), and NTT chose the do-it-yourself path.
Abandoning the shared pi system and switching to fibre straight into the home
When subscriber lines were opened to new entrants at the end of 1999, xDSL operators appeared one after another, faster and cheaper than ISDN. The pi system introduced in fiscal 1997 was a shared design in which a single fibre core was shared among several households; it could not support broadband, and fibre to the home had barely advanced at all. NTT East and NTT West halted new pi-system installation work in the summer of 2000 and, at the end of that year, began trial provision of FTTH running one or two fibre cores directly into each home. Nihon Koshinmo, a venture whose dark-fibre negotiations with NTT East had broken down, applied to the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications for arbitration in that same summer of 2000.
While it held an oligopoly over the last mile, NTT was placed in a position where it had to see out the end of ISDN without recovering the capital investment made since its commercial launch in 1988. The telephone-network-style FTTH technology developed since the 1980s with the enormous research spending of the NTT laboratories also entered an age in which it was comprehensively beaten by the Ethernet equipment on sale in Akihabara. The FTTH offered by Usen, which was laying its own optical fibre, ran at 100 megabits per second for ¥6,100 a month, completely overturning the assumption NTT had once made of 1.5 megabits per second at ¥10,000 a month. NTT's own B Flet's began to shift to the Ethernet method.
A hundred and ten thousand redeployed, and the limits of decentralisation
In 2001 the regional company NTT West fell into an operating loss, and the earnings of NTT East and NTT Communications also deteriorated. At the fourth regular national convention of the NTT Workers' Union, held at the end of August that year, delegates resolved to accept a restructuring plan covering about 110,000 people. The company's proposal was to second 110,000 staff — 60,000 from NTT East and West and 50,000 from NTT-ME and others — to regional outsourcing companies to be set up at 33 locations nationwide, retiring and re-employing them. Those aged 51 and over who retired and were re-employed took pay cuts of 15 to 30 per cent, and an estimated 58,000 people were affected.
Against the operating loss, the cash flow NTT East and West generated from their core business exceeded $14.0B (¥1.7tn) a year. Depreciation, which involves no cash outlay, ran to more than $9.9B (¥1.2tn) a year and worked as a self-financing function. Fixed-line contracts numbered about 60 million including corporate lines, and the fixed communications market — voice telephony at $45.3B (¥5.5tn), data transmission networks at $2.1B (¥260bn) and leased lines at $8.2B (¥1tn) — came to about $56.0B (¥6.8tn). Abroad, in May 2010 the listed subsidiary NTT Data made a tender offer of about $3.3B (¥286bn) for Dimension Data of South Africa. Global expansion led by a listed subsidiary rather than by the parent was the shape of the overseas business in this period.
Investment abroad took its wounds in the same period. In the spring of 2000 NTT put about $5.6B (¥600bn) into a tender offer for Verio of the United States, completing the buy-out in September that year. Verio was one of the world's largest web-hosting companies, with customers in more than 170 countries. The worldwide telecommunications slump sent its results sharply lower, however, and a goodwill balance of a little over $4.1B (¥500bn) became subject to write-downs. NTT DoCoMo had also made overseas investments totalling $14.8B (¥1.8tn) over the previous eighteen months and carried vast unrealised losses. Unrealised losses on the shares of AT&T Wireless of the United States, in which it had invested a little over $8.2B (¥1tn), reached close to $4.1B (¥500bn), and it had put about $3.3B (¥400bn) into KPN Mobile of the Netherlands, positioned as the base for exporting i-mode to Europe.
2011Regrouping, and rewriting the NTT Act that framed everything
Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2011 · consolidated
Revenue$129B
Net income$6.4B
Net margin4.9%
→
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$91.6B
Net income$6.7B
Net margin7.3%
2013The company name is written as NTT DoCoMo in Japanese script
2018Sawada Jun becomes president
2018NTT Inc. established as a wholly owned subsidiary for the overseas businesses
2019The IOWN next-generation communications platform is announced
2019NTT Ltd. established, taking Dimension Data Holdings and the overseas businesses
2020Tender offer announced for NTT DoCoMo at ¥3,900 a share
2020NTT DoCoMo becomes a wholly owned subsidiary and is delisted
2022NTT Communications and NTT Comware moved under NTT DoCoMo
2022Net profit passes ¥1 trillion for the first time
2022Shimada Akira becomes president
2023The review of the NTT Act begins
2024The amended NTT Act abolishes the duty to disclose research results
2025Tender offer announced for NTT Data Group at ¥4,000 a share
2025The trade name is changed to NTT; NTT Data Group is delisted in September
The 2010s and 2020s reversed the direction of travel: rather than divide itself further, NTT spent about $44.1B (¥6.6tn) buying back the two subsidiaries it had floated, and rewrote the 1985 law that had defined what it was permitted to be. Consolidated revenue climbed from $129.2B (¥10.3tn) in the year to March 2011 to $91.6B (¥13.7tn) in the year to March 2025.
A second attempt abroad, and consolidation into 'One NTT'
Sawada Jun (澤田純), who became president in June 2018, set about a reorganisation to bind the scattered overseas businesses into one. In November that year NTT created a wholly owned subsidiary, NTT Inc., beneath itself and transferred NTT Communications, Dimension Data Holdings, NTT Data and others to it. In July 2019 it created a further wholly owned subsidiary, NTT Ltd., beneath NTT Inc., and moved the overseas businesses of NTT Communications and Dimension Data Holdings into it. The intermediate holding companies were placed outside the NTT Act, and foreign executives were brought onto their boards.
Behind the reorganisation was a ceiling at home. NTT DoCoMo, which earned about 60 per cent of group operating profit, faced a plateau in domestic mobile subscriptions and government pressure to cut charges, so its earnings were expected to thin. After DoCoMo's overseas mobile investment of $16.7B (¥1.8tn) across 1999 and 2000 ended in complete withdrawal, corporate cloud services and systems integration were chosen as the new axis of overseas growth. The medium-term management plan set a target of raising overseas revenue in fiscal 2023 to US$25 billion, about 30 per cent above the fiscal 2017 result. In May 2019 NTT announced IOWN, a next-generation communications platform built on photonics-electronics convergence: replacing electronic signal processing with light to cut power consumption to a hundredth, raise transmission capacity 125-fold and cut latency to a two-hundredth, with realisation targeted for 2030.
Taking DoCoMo back in with a ¥4 trillion tender offer
On 29 September 2020 NTT announced that it would make a tender offer at ¥3,900 a share for its listed subsidiary NTT DoCoMo, in which it held about 66 per cent. The total purchase price of about $39.8B (¥4.25tn) was the largest tender offer for a Japanese company made up to that point. Buying the shares of general shareholders at some 40 per cent above the previous day's close, the offer succeeded in November and lifted the holding to 91.46 per cent. In December that year NTT made NTT DoCoMo a wholly owned subsidiary and DoCoMo was delisted. Twenty-eight years after the separation of 1992, the mobile business had returned to direct control by the parent. Twenty-two years after the listing of 1998, the round trip of buying back its own biggest earner was complete.
The immediate trigger for taking DoCoMo fully in-house was tariff policy. As the government of Suga Yoshihide (菅義偉), formed in September 2020, showed its appetite for lower mobile charges, DoCoMo — which had begun handling the iPhone in September 2013 — had fallen back to third among the big three in revenue and profit despite leading the domestic market in subscriber share. Without a cheap sub-brand, and in the position of a listed company owing consideration to general shareholders, it could not easily move to a further round of price cuts. Taking it fully in-house brought into the parent the more than 30 per cent of DoCoMo's net profit that had been leaking out of the consolidated accounts as minority interests. The design also bound the thin corporate business together with NTT Communications and NTT Comware, strengthening direct co-ordination within the group.
The effect of the buy-back showed in the numbers. Consolidated operating revenue for the year to March 2022 was $92.5B (¥12.16tn) and profit attributable to owners of the parent $9.0B (¥1.18tn), the first time net profit had passed ¥1 trillion. In January 2022 NTT Communications and NTT Comware were moved under NTT DoCoMo, binding the corporate business to mobile. Consolidated operating revenue for the year to March 2023 grew to $93.5B (¥13.14tn) and net profit to $8.6B (¥1.21tn), and the year to March 2024 recorded net profit of $8.4B (¥1.28tn). In June 2022 Shimada Akira (島田明) became president.
Revisiting the NTT Act, and completing the regrouping
The NTT Act was enacted in 1985 with the privatisation of the public corporation, and obliged three companies — NTT together with NTT East and NTT West — to provide a fixed-line telephone network across the whole country including remote areas, to disclose the results of research and development, and to obtain the approval of the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications for reorganisations and business plans. In June 2023, after the sale of the government's shareholding was raised as an option for securing defence funding, examination of an amendment began, developing under the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party into a debate that went as far as repeal of the law. On 19 October that year KDDI, SoftBank and Rakuten Mobile held a joint press conference to declare their opposition to repeal. The three rivals also submitted a petition against repeal of the NTT Act signed jointly with 180 organisations including regional cable-television operators.
What the three rivals feared was a merger of NTT East and West with NTT DoCoMo. NTT East and West hold the optical-fibre network, exchange buildings and other facilities inherited from the public corporation, and in the great majority of cases competitors had no choice but to use those facilities to run mobile services or FTTH in Japan. If the constraints of the NTT Act disappeared and the two were made one, the business would become internal transactions and oversight would struggle to reach it. Against this, Shimada Akira stated that there was absolutely no thought of merging DoCoMo with East and West. In April 2024 the amended NTT Act was passed, and the obligation to disclose research results was abolished.
On 8 May 2025 NTT announced that it would launch a tender offer for the shares of its listed subsidiary NTT Data Group. The purchase price of ¥4,000 a share carried a premium of 33.71 per cent over the previous day's close of ¥2,991.5, and the purchase consideration was about $15.8B (¥2.37tn). The holding rose from 57.73 per cent to 81.75 per cent through the offer, and after a share consolidation the company was delisted on 26 September. The funds committed to taking DoCoMo and NTT Data fully in-house came to about $44.1B (¥6.6tn) in total. Consolidated operating revenue for the year to March 2025 was $91.6B (¥13.7tn), profit attributable to owners of the parent $6.7B (¥1tn), consolidated employees numbered 341,321 and total assets stood at $200.9B (¥30.06tn).
The turning points, read in full: what was at stake, what was chosen and what the revenue did around it. The Japanese edition is the edition of record and carries the sourced dossier behind each decision — background, options weighed, outcome — linked under every decision.
Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1998
Key decision · 1998
DoCoMo's listing: turning the biggest earner into cash while keeping control through a majority stake (1998)
Between control and capital efficiency
The DoCoMo listing was the first answer NTT gave to the question of what to do with its biggest earner. Turn it into cash in the market and make its value visible, while holding management control through a majority stake — in a design that reached for capital efficiency and control at the same time, a calculation can be seen at work: deflect the argument about monopoly without letting go of the fruit. The double structure of a listed subsidiary carries the permanent instability of consideration for minority shareholders and the parent's unified management pulling against each other, but the NTT of the day chose to go forward carrying that tension.
What is interesting is that this judgement was turned inside out some quarter of a century later. In 2020 NTT took the same DoCoMo fully in-house with a tender offer of about ¥4.3 trillion, undoing the listed framework it had itself built. Nineteen ninety-eight, which gave priority to raising cash from the market, and 2020, which gave priority to unifying control, face each other as answers from different eras to the same question of which comes first, control or capital efficiency. In the round trip of carving out the biggest earner and then buying it back, the difficulty of the management judgement surrounding listed subsidiaries can be seen.
Reorganising the privatised NTT into a pure holding company, with local and long-distance split off (1999)
Where the design of splitting and binding led
What this reorganisation showed was a judgement to fit a vast telecommunications entity into the form of a break-up while, in the reality of management, not letting go of unity. It can be called a design that reconciled the demerger the system demanded with the managerial logic of protecting the benefits of scale, by means of a holding company. Yet that reconciliation also carried the aspect of deferring the task of securing fair conditions for competition, and the effectiveness of the wall separating the regional companies from the long-distance company was questioned from immediately after the transition. In setting sail without fixing its position on either control or competition, the instability of the design can be seen.
The design of splitting and binding chosen in 1999 appears to have shaped NTT's course for a long time afterwards. Taking DoCoMo fully in-house in 2020 and regrouping NTT Data Group in 2025 were moves to pull businesses once split off back under the holding company, and can be read as the original thinking of substantive unity being carried forward in a changed form. The question of finding the best shape between division and integration remains open even now, while the review of the NTT Act is under debate.
Halting the shared pi system and switching the fixed network to FTTH running fibre straight into each home (2000)
Fibre laid for efficiency, and the investment to lay it again
At the centre of this judgement is the fact that a first design meant to distribute fibre at low cost was overturned by changes in competition and technology. With installation work accounting for most of the cost of laying fibre, the pi system had economised on the number of cores, and it lost its role once the material cost of optical fibre fell and demand of the order of 100 megabits per second arrived. NTT East and West took on a second investment, redrawing shared fibre into fibre connected directly to the home. In a technology choice that put efficiency first being pushed back by outside competitors and the regulator alike, the weight of an infrastructure company misreading a long-term technology can be seen.
In the short term, fibre straight into the home was pushed back by ADSL and SoftBank's offensive, and take-up fell far short of the target. But the platform of running fibre all the way to every household later made NTT East and West the dominant providers of FTTH in Japan, and became the ground on which the next-generation network and the IOWN concept would ride in later years. The first fibre roll-out aimed at low cost, and the second investment that redrew it — the question of which technology to build the fixed communications platform on appears to have moved slowly towards a settlement, within a long contest over tariffs and regulation.
Integrating the overseas systems-integration business and building the 'One NTT' structure (2018)
A judgement to move where the money is made
An NTT that had gone out into the world with mobile telephony and come to nothing now took on the world through a different entrance, systems integration for corporate customers — what 'One NTT' set out to rearrange can be seen as the place where the money is made itself. With the domestic mobile market mature and DoCoMo's earnings visibly thinning, NTT bound the overseas businesses it had bought up into a single company and sought to face the world's giants with brand and scale. It was a judgement that put efficiency and unified management first.
Even so, the road to extending its axis abroad remains hard. The overseas share of revenue stayed at around 20 per cent, and the integrated NTT Ltd. continued to work through low-margin businesses. NTT's name recognition abroad is not high either. The more it pursued scale and efficiency, the more repeatedly two things were questioned: the institutional frame of an NTT Act under which only Japanese nationals could serve as directors, and whether running the group as one was right at all. The integration of 2019 stands at the entrance to a regrouping that continued into taking DoCoMo fully in-house in 2020 and NTT Data Group fully in-house in 2025. It appears to have been not a business judgement completed in a single integration, but the beginning of a long process of questioning the shape of the group itself.
Taking NTT DoCoMo fully in-house — the largest domestic tender offer, at ¥4.3 trillion, ends the parent-subsidiary listing (2020)
The paradox of unwinding a listing
At the centre of this judgement lies a paradox: NTT itself unwinding the design of the 1990s, which had raised capital efficiency by listing its biggest earner. The form of a listed subsidiary had made two demands live together — discipline from the market, and unified management of the group. When the government pressed for lower charges, that cohabitation reached its limit. If consideration for general shareholders binds a price cut, it is quicker to buy the shareholders out and undo the binding — the ¥4.3 trillion purchase, the largest in Japan, can be seen as standing on that piece of decisiveness.
Even so, taking DoCoMo fully in-house does not restore its competitiveness as it stands. Financial headroom may make a price cut possible, but what brings back lost contracts is the strength of products and services. That Ii Motoyuki (井伊基之), the president, spurred employees on by saying there had been no hit since i-mode appears to have been the reverse side of that difficulty. Ending the listed subsidiary became one step in a reorganisation folding mobile into the parent, but whether growth to match the structure the great ship had assembled could be drawn depended on the strength of its products thereafter.
Regrouping the group by taking NTT Data Group fully in-house (2025)
What remains once you close the companies you split off
The break-up of 1999 was the work of cutting a single company into several for the sake of fair competition. A quarter of a century on, NTT is gathering the operating companies it had split off back beneath the holding company, and redrawing itself as a comprehensive IT company built on communications. In the changeover by which the Data Group, once the maverick, moved to the head of the order while Communications, once called the blue blood, stepped down from the marquee, forty years of change — the market's main battlefield shifting from voice to information systems — can be seen concentrated. Rearranging the organisation was also the work of fitting the institution, after the fact, to the reality of the business mix.
Whether the regrouping leads to results, however, rests on the profitability of the overseas business from here. The plan to lift an overseas operating margin of 3.6 per cent to 9.5 per cent assumes the tailwind of demand for AI data centres, and leaves room to waver depending on the load of integration and changes in the competitive structure. At home, opposition from rivals and verification by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications await, and the task of how to grow the substance after rearranging the organisation remains. What the NTT that has closed the structure it once split apart will produce beyond that is still not visible.
This English edition follows the Japanese one chapter by chapter. The Japanese edition remains the edition of record: it carries the source-by-source citations, the financial tables and the shareholder and executive records. 日本語版(詳細)— NTT full history in Japanese →
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities report), 40th term (year to March 2025), including the 沿革 corporate-history section and the section on directors and officers.
日本産業史 (A History of Japanese Industry, Nikkei Inc., 1994): vol.2 and vol.4, Information, Communications and Services — the chapters on transport and communications (facilities that could not keep up with demand) and on the birth of the information and communications industry; and the general industrial chronology in vol.4.
Shukan Toyo Keizai — 週刊東洋経済 (Toyo Keizai Inc.): 27 Sep 1997 on the coming DoCoMo listing; 24 Oct 1998; 27 Feb 1999 on the NTT reorganisation plan; 10 Jul 1999, Miyazu Junichiro on the IDC affair; 2 Dec 2000 on the broadband strategy; 29 Sep 2001, the study of NTT's 220,000 employees, including the article on overseas write-downs at NTT Communications and DoCoMo; 19 Nov 2005; 16 Mar 2019 on the overseas growth strategy; 10 Oct 2020 on the ¥4 trillion DoCoMo buy-out; 11 Nov 2023 on the NTT Act review; 12 Oct 2024, Shimada Akira interview; 25 Oct 2025 on the regrouping of the NTT group.
証券 (Shoken), 1987, vol.39 no.4 (no.457): the new-listing profile of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation.
NTT DoCoMo — press release of 29 September 2020 on the board's endorsement of, and recommendation to tender into, the parent's tender offer; NTT DoCoMo official announcement on beginning to handle the iPhone, September 2013.
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation — announcement of 8 May 2025 on the commencement of the tender offer for the shares of NTT Data Group (TSE 9613); the IOWN initiative pages on the NTT group website.
Nihon Keizai Shimbun — 日本経済新聞 (Nikkei Inc.), 29 Aug 2025, on the NTT Data Group share consolidation approved at an extraordinary general meeting and the delisting of 26 September.