NISSHA

Company history

Financial history 1971–2025 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1929
Head office
Kyoto, Japan
Listed
1961
Founder
Suzuki Naoki
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$1.3B (¥195bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$6.7M (¥1bn)
NISSHA: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1929The hardest kind of printing

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1929Nigyokudo founded in Kyoto — fine-art printing by photoengraving
  2. 1942Nihon Shashin Insatsu established by the Kyoto photoengraving association
  3. 1946Merged with Nigyokudo to form Nihon Shashin Insatsu Co., Ltd.
  4. 1952Begins supplying Matsushita Electric

The company began in 1929 as Nigyokudo, a small Kyoto shop founded by the first-generation Suzuki. Kyoto at the time had a steady appetite for books and plates reproducing Nishijin textiles and the art of its temples and shrines, and Nigyokudo aimed at exactly that narrow market. The founding line — anyone can set type and print; we will do the high-grade printing nobody else will touch — was a deliberate refusal of the commodity trade. Letterpress publishing was easy to enter and therefore fought on price; photoengraving depended on skilled hands, and a latecomer could charge for it precisely because so few could do it.

Wartime consolidation gave the business its corporate shape. A Kyoto photoengraving trade association set up Nihon Shashin Insatsu in 1942, and in December 1946 that company and Nigyokudo merged into Nihon Shashin Insatsu Co., Ltd., with Suzuki Naoe leading the combination — the beginning of family control that would run for most of the company’s history. Through the high-growth decades it stayed what it had been: a mid-sized Kyoto printer known for the quality of its art books, winning commissions such as the Mainichi Shimbun’s National Treasures (1962) and Shogakukan’s Japanese Art in Full Colour (1966).

Two ordinary-looking sales calls decided the next fifty years. The company began supplying Mainichi Shimbun in 1950 and Matsushita Electric in 1952. The Matsushita account started as plain commercial printing, but having a manufacturer as a customer put an idea within reach: that printing was not only a way to make pages, but a way to decorate the surface of an industrial product.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1961From pages to product surfaces

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1971 · unconsolidated
Revenue$12M
Net income$694K
Net margin5.8%
FY2006 · consolidated
Revenue$709M
Net income$77M
Net margin10.9%
  1. 1961Lists on the Osaka Stock Exchange Second Section
  2. 1967Wood-grain transfer foil (IMD); Yachiyo plant site acquired
  3. 1979Moves to the First Sections in Tokyo and Osaka
  4. 1985Develops a resistive transparent touch sensor
  5. 1993Overseas moulding and film production in Malaysia

Listing came first — Osaka Second Section in October 1961, Tokyo Second Section in 1969, both First Sections in 1979 — but the capital structure stayed closely held, with the second-generation president Suzuki Shozo the largest shareholder at 12.17% as of December 1968. What changed the business was the wood-grain transfer foil developed in 1967. Through the Matsushita relationship it won work decorating television cabinets, and a technique for putting wood grain and metallic finishes on moulded plastic — printing married to injection moulding — turned out to be exactly what appliance makers needed to differentiate their products. In December 1967 the company bought 18,000 square metres in Yachiyo, Chiba, for a Kanto plant; the Kyoto-and-Yachiyo pair would carry the shift from paper to film.

The second transplant followed the same logic. In 1985 the company developed a resistive transparent touch sensor — transparent electrodes printed onto film — which went into appliance control panels, industrial equipment and, later, mobile phones and game consoles. A Nagoya office (1987) brought it closer to central Japan’s carmakers, and a Malaysian plant (1993) paired decorated film with moulding for volume production abroad. In twenty years a commercial printer had become a supplier of surfaces and interfaces to the appliance, automotive and mobile industries.

Furukawa Hiroshi, the third president and the only one from outside the founding family, ran this expansion from 1992 to 2007 as a bridge between Suzuki Shozo and the founder’s great-grandson. In December 2006 the company committed capital to industrial materials as a third pillar beyond decorated film and touch sensors. Seventy-seven years after its founding, art printing survived inside the group but no longer earned its keep.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2007The smartphone bet, and its bill

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2007 · consolidated
Revenue$753M
Net income$145M
Net margin19.3%
FY2018 · consolidated
Revenue$1.9B
Net income$39M
Net margin2.1%
  1. 2007Suzuki Junya becomes president
  2. 2013Approves $258.9M (¥27bn) of touch-sensor capacity at Himeji and Kaga
  3. 2016First serious loss; acquires Graphic Controls (US medical devices)
  4. 2017Renamed NISSHA Co., Ltd.
  5. 2018Record sales of ¥207.4bn; exits Tokyo commercial printing

In June 2007 Suzuki Junya, the fourth-generation family president, took over — a Keio commerce graduate who had spent his early career at Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank before joining in 1998. Smartphones were then just beginning to scale in North America, Europe and Asia, and the company aimed its film touch-sensor know-how squarely at that demand. Revenue passed ¥100 billion for the first time in the year to March 2008.

In April 2013 it made the largest capital commitment in its history: $258.9M (¥27bn) across the Himeji and Kaga plants in fiscal 2014, all of it for smartphone touch sensors. For two years it looked right — the device segment earned ¥13.5 billion of segment operating profit in the year to March 2015 — and then the market matured. New sensor architectures took share, prices fell, and concentration in one customer left nowhere to hide. Device segment operating profit went from ¥14.6 billion in the year to March 2016 to roughly zero the following year, and the group posted an operating loss of ¥3.9 billion and a net loss of ¥7.4 billion — its first serious loss. Diversification had always meant spreading one technology across many uses; the 2013 investment had bound market, customer and technology into a single bet.

The answer was to rebuild the portfolio by purchase. The fifth medium-term plan (from April 2015) set an explicit target of 35% of sales from new products and businesses, and the acquisitions came fast: a Belgian metallized-paper maker for food packaging in 2015 (about $123.9M (¥15bn)), the American medical-device manufacturer Graphic Controls in September 2016 (about $129.5M (¥14bn)), and the German touch-sensor firm Schuster the same month. The commercial printing business — the founding trade — was hived off into a subsidiary in 2015 and sold its Tokyo-area operations to Kyodo Printing in 2018. In October 2017 the company dropped the name it had carried since 1946 and became NISSHA. Sales reached a record ¥207.4 billion in 2018, but goodwill from the acquisitions had begun to accumulate on the balance sheet.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2019Rebuilt around medical

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2019 · consolidated
Revenue$1.6B
Net income-$38M
Net margin-2.4%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$1.3B
Net income$7M
Net margin0.5%
  1. 2019¥15.8bn of impairments; Yachiyo plant site sold
  2. 2020About 250 voluntary redundancies
  3. 2021Sequel and RSS acquired — medical becomes the third pillar
  4. 2023Goodwill write-downs push the group back into operating loss
  5. 2024Eighth medium-term plan prioritises medical for capital allocation

The reckoning arrived in 2019. Smartphone touch-sensor exports fell 18%, utilisation at Himeji and Kaga collapsed, and NISSHA wrote down ¥15.8 billion — ¥10.6 billion in devices, ¥5.2 billion in industrial materials — for an operating loss of ¥16.3 billion. In February 2020 it offered voluntary retirement to about 250 employees, and in 2019 it sold the Yachiyo site bought in 1967, booking a ¥4.9 billion gain. Closing the plant that had produced decorated film and touch sensors for half a century was the clearest possible statement about which businesses were now the future.

That future was medical. Starting from Graphic Controls, NISSHA bought its way into catheter contract manufacturing in Europe, pharmaceutical CDMO work in Japan (Sonneboad Pharmaceutical, later Shiga Pharmaceutical in 2025), and precision medical machining in the United States — Sequel and RSS in 2021, Isometric (about $68.6M (¥10bn)) and Cathtek in 2024, with a Vietnamese acquisition announced for 2026. Medical technology reached ¥45.6 billion of sales in 2024 and ¥47.1 billion in 2025, drawing level with the device business. Suzuki Junya has set the target at half of group sales from medical.

Growth by acquisition brought its own arithmetic. As European and American interest rates rose in 2022 and 2023, higher discount rates forced write-downs of the goodwill those purchases had created: the 2023 year closed with an operating loss of ¥3.8 billion. NISSHA has replaced a volatile consumer-electronics market with a steadier medical one, but has taken on, in exchange, a balance sheet whose value depends on how well each acquisition is integrated.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2013

Betting {{money:27400000000:2014}} in one year on smartphone touch sensors (2013)

The strength of betting on a growing market, and the weakness of leaning on it

At the centre of this decision lies the very pattern the company has repeated: take the technology inherited from the founding trade and stake it on a large market. Applying photoengraving to decoration, and decoration to touch sensors, and then concentrating resources on demand of a wholly different order of magnitude in smartphones, shows a consistency recognisably Nihon Shashin Insatsu’s own. But where earlier diversification had distributed one technology across several uses, the 2013 investment was different in kind: it bound market, customer and technical format into one. The strength of betting on a growing market and the weakness of leaning on it were the two faces of the same decision.

When that weakness surfaced as impairments and voluntary redundancies, NISSHA turned the same instinct toward contract manufacturing for medical devices and pharmaceuticals. Choosing a market less exposed to the business cycle, and putting the precision converting learned in printing to work in it, is a shift built on what the touch-sensor experience taught. Yet medical, grown by successive acquisitions, carries a different weight of its own — the risk of goodwill impairment. The cost of concentrated investment prompts the next move, and that move brings new problems of its own; whether the company can keep turning change into evolution remains an open question.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2016

Pivoting to medical: the CDMO shift that began with Graphic Controls (2016)

Choosing to swap the market itself

The core of this decision can be read as turning the danger of entrusting all earnings to a single market into a replacement of the earnings source itself. A company that had carried its technology from printing to decoration, and from decoration to touch sensors, this time carried the market across — into healthcare, which is far less shaken by the business cycle. In the way it converted the injury taken in smartphones into a motive for finding the next mainstream business, one can see the character of a company that has treated continual change as a virtue.

Growth built on repeated acquisition, however, comes back to back with the weight of goodwill. When interest rates move, carrying values must be reconsidered, and the cross-shareholdings being unwound to fund the purchases will one day run out. Whether the goal of earning half of group profit in healthcare can be reached while carrying that load depends on the quality of the acquisitions still to come and the skill with which they are integrated. Whether a printing company can put down deep roots as the unseen supplier behind medicine — that answer still looks open.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— NISSHA full history in Japanese →

  1. NISSHA Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports) and quarterly results releases.
  2. NISSHA Co., Ltd. — corporate history, 成長の軌跡 (official site).
  3. NISSHA Co., Ltd. — medium-term management plans, 5th (2015–2017) through 8th (2024–2026).
  4. Nihon Keizai Shimbun — 日本経済新聞, February 2021 (interview with President Suzuki Junya on reducing dependence on consumer electronics).
  5. 会社年鑑 (company yearbooks) for pre-consolidation financial figures.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

NISSHA’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/7915/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/7915/history.json History overview
GET /api/7915/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/7915/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/7915/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/7915/executives.json Executives
GET /api/7915/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/7915/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/7915/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/7915/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/7915/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/7915/workforce.json Workforce