SAKURA internet

Company history

Financial history 2005–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1996
Head office
Osaka, Japan
Listed
2005
Founder
Tanaka Kunihiro
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$223.2M (¥35bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$1.3M (¥200m)
SAKURA internet: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1996A dormitory server becomes a company

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1996Tanaka Kunihiro starts renting server space from a college dormitory
  2. 1999Incorporated in Osaka as SAKURA internet Inc.
  3. 2000Absorbs two firms; adds housing and connectivity
  4. 2004Reverts to the SAKURA internet name

SAKURA internet begins on 23 December 1996, when Tanaka Kunihiro, then a student at the Maizuru National College of Technology in Kyoto Prefecture, started renting out server capacity. He had been running a server in the college dormitory; lending space on it to acquaintances drew enough word of mouth that requests started arriving from outside the school. Japan’s households were only just going online, and hosting — selling a slice of a server cheaply to individuals and small firms that wanted a website — had few takers. Tanaka launched a shared rental-server service, Sakura Web, and ran it as a sole proprietorship for nearly three years.

In August 1999 the business was incorporated in Chuo-ku, Osaka, as SAKURA internet Inc., capitalised at $87,843 (¥10m), to provide rental and dedicated server services. In April 2000 it absorbed two companies, S.R.S. Corporation and Inforest Ltd., renamed itself SRS SAKURA Internet, and added housing — hosting customers’ own machines — and internet connectivity. The shape of the company was set here: a back-office business of the internet, running everything from the circuit to the data center, with server rental at its core. In July 2004 it took the name SAKURA internet back, and that December moved its head office to Minamihonmachi in Chuo-ku, Osaka.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2005Listing, buying spree, insolvency

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2005 · unconsolidated
Revenue$17M
Net income$908K
Net margin5.3%
FY2007 · consolidated
Revenue$40M
Net income-$4M
Net margin-10.6%
  1. 2005Lists on TSE Mothers
  2. 2006Acquisitions, a US arm and an online-game venture
  3. 2007Game write-down of $3.3M (¥391m); negative net worth
  4. 2007Tanaka Kunihiro takes over as president

In October 2005 the company listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s Mothers market, under president and CEO Sasada Ryo. It was small but profitable — sales of $17.5M (¥2bn) and ordinary profit of $1.2M (¥132m) in the year to March 2005 — and broadband was pushing demand for rental servers up as personal sites and online shops multiplied. With the credibility and the cash the listing brought, SAKURA internet went for scale.

Acquisitions and new ventures followed immediately: X-Phase in December 2005, Kairos in January 2006, a web-production arm and a US subsidiary, SAKURA Internet (USA), in 2006, and then an online-game operation. Sales reached $39.9M (¥5bn) in the year to March 2007 — 2.4 times the level of two years earlier — but the growth carried no profit with it, and the same year brought an ordinary loss of $2.9M (¥346m) and a net loss of $4.2M (¥494m). Stacking up revenue through acquisition and diversification had run into a wall within two years.

In the half-year to September 2007 the company wrote down $3.3M (¥391m) on the exclusive licence for the online game The Lord of the Rings Online and others; the interim net loss reached $4.9M (¥575m) and SAKURA internet fell into negative net worth. Game licence fees and running costs had outgrown the membership they attracted, draining the profit the hosting business earned. In November, Sasada resigned to take responsibility, and the founder, Tanaka Kunihiro — until then executive vice president — became president. He shed the acquired companies one after another: X-Phase had already gone in July 2007, Kairos followed in January 2008, and the web-production and US subsidiaries in March. Each was sold roughly two years after being bought or founded, and what remained was the business the company had started with: rental servers and data centers.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2008Sojitz money, and the bet on Ishikari

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2008 · consolidated
Revenue$63M
Net income-$6M
Net margin-9.2%
FY2015 · unconsolidated
Revenue$88M
Net income$4M
Net margin4.7%
  1. 2008Sojitz takes 28.26%; negative net worth cleared
  2. 2011Sojitz becomes the parent company
  3. 2011Ishikari data center opens; SAKURA Cloud launches
  4. 2014Sales pass $94.5M (¥10bn) as the second building runs
  5. 2015Moves to the TSE First Section

Repairing the balance sheet required outside capital. In December 2007 SAKURA internet agreed a capital alliance with the trading house Sojitz, and a third-party share issue that February left Sojitz holding 28.26% as the largest shareholder. Negative net worth was cleared and the risk of failure receded. The return to the core business worked quickly too: the year to March 2009 brought sales of $75.9M (¥7bn) and net profit of $4M (¥374m), and operating cash flow reached $22.8M (¥2bn) a year later. In March 2011, through a tender offer and a shareholders’ agreement with Tanaka’s asset-management company, Sojitz became the parent. Internally the company was pruning in parallel — the Honmachi data center closed in August 2010 and the Ikebukuro site was scheduled for closure with a write-down — consolidating scattered small urban rooms and committing to running everything, from service development to operations and maintenance, in-house.

The turning point was Hokkaido. Data centers in the 2000s were built near the big cities, but on expensive land around Tokyo and Osaka the trading and property companies could outspend anyone, and Tanaka concluded that the company “was becoming unable to win in the urban model.” Betting instead on the spread of cloud computing, he chose a site where vast land was cheap: a suburban-scale data center in Ishikari, Hokkaido, deliberately sized so that investment could be added in small increments on land left deliberately empty. It was financed with long-term borrowing and began operating in November 2011.

The opening came with SAKURA Cloud, virtual servers rented online. Front-loaded costs pushed ordinary profit down in the year to March 2012, but earnings recovered as utilisation climbed, and sales passed $94.5M (¥10bn) in the year to March 2014, when the second building came online. In November 2015 the company moved from Mothers to the First Section of the TSE. Sojitz still held 40.29%. Backed by a trading house’s balance sheet, a rental-server company was turning into a cloud and data-center infrastructure business.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2016Growth without profit

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2016 · consolidated
Revenue$111M
Net income$6M
Net margin5%
FY2022 · consolidated
Revenue$152M
Net income$2M
Net margin1.5%
  1. 2016GPU rental service Koukaryoku launches; third Ishikari building
  2. 2017Sojitz ceases to be the parent company
  3. 2019Net profit thins to $843,959 (¥92m)
  4. 2021Resources concentrated on cloud services
  5. 2022Moves to the TSE Prime market; ISMAP registration

In 2016 SAKURA internet began renting GPU servers under the name Koukaryoku — “high firepower” — computing. Launched in the first wave of the deep-learning boom, this AI service became the foundation of the generative-AI cloud that followed; Tanaka would later point out that the business dated “from 2016.” The same year brought the security firm Gehirn into the group, an IoT platform with an embedded communications module, a Chinese subsidiary to take it overseas, and, in December, the third building at Ishikari. In January 2017 the company acquired a systems-operations firm later renamed ITM, picking up the enterprise customer base it had lacked. That March, a public offering combined with a secondary sale by Sojitz and the ending of the shareholders’ agreement removed Sojitz as parent, and the company became substantially independent again. Acquisitions for technology and customers continued — Bitstar in Hokkaido in 2017, the storage-software firm IzumoBASE in 2018.

Sales grew from $124.8M (¥14bn) in the year to March 2017 to $205.1M (¥22bn) three years later. But the cost of extending Ishikari, of acquisitions and of hiring ran ahead of the revenue, holding operating profit in a band of roughly $5.5M (¥600m) to $9.2M (¥1bn), and net profit in the year to March 2019 thinned to $843,959 (¥92m). Investment continued regardless — a joint venture with SoftBank, BBSakura Networks, in 2019, and Tellus, running the government satellite-data platform, in 2021. Scale and thin margins had become the settled condition, and how to restore the balance between investment and return was the open question.

In 2021 the company declared it would concentrate its resources on cloud services. Expiring housing contracts made the year to March 2022 a year of falling revenue, but a head-office move premised on remote work and a smaller Tokyo branch lightened the cost base. In April 2022 the TSE’s market restructuring put the company in the Prime section. SAKURA Cloud was registered under ISMAP, the government’s security assessment scheme for information systems, and entry into the government cloud within a few years was written into the growth strategy. Accepting a fall in revenue in order to swap out what it sold was something the company had not done since the divestments of 2007.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2023Generative AI and the government cloud

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2023 · consolidated
Revenue$147M
Net income$5M
Net margin3.4%
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$223M
Net income$1M
Net margin0.6%
  1. 2023METI certification; $92.5M (¥13bn) GPU programme
  2. 2023First Japanese firm conditionally picked for the government cloud
  3. 2024~2,000 GPUs live at Ishikari; $118.8M (¥18bn) raised
  4. 2025Record sales of $209.9M (¥31bn)
  5. 2026Formal selection as a government-cloud provider

From late 2022 the generative-AI boom set off a worldwide scramble for GPUs. Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry treated the shortage of compute as an economic-security problem and, in a cloud programme announced in January 2023, offered to subsidise up to half the cost of data-center construction and GPU purchases; SAKURA internet and SoftBank were the first two certified. The company committed roughly $92.5M (¥13bn) over three years, subsidy included, to buy about 2,000 NVIDIA H100 units and serve them from Ishikari — then, on the strength of demand, said in August that it would pull the plan forward by a year.

The commitment kept growing. By June 2024 some 2,000 GPUs were running in Ishikari, and by Tanaka’s account “all 2,000 sold the moment they went on sale.” Successive certifications in 2023 and 2024 lifted the maximum state support to about $376.2M (¥57bn), against a plan to invest some $745.9M (¥113bn) in roughly 10,000 GPUs. To house servers that run this hot, the company adopted container-type data centers that can be installed in about four months, and liquid cooling. GPU cloud revenue reached $42.4M (¥6bn) in the year to March 2025, in only its second year of sale.

In November 2023 SAKURA internet became the first Japanese company conditionally selected to supply the government cloud, the shared platform for national and local administration — the first domestic entrant since the Digital Agency chose Amazon Web Services and other foreign providers in 2021. With the political argument for a home-grown cloud behind it, the market re-rated the company: the share price rose from around ¥500 at the start of 2023 to a peak of ¥10,980 in March 2024, and market capitalisation multiplied roughly tenfold in five years. A June 2024 offering raised $118.8M (¥18bn) for GPUs and for meeting the government-cloud requirements. Tanaka had long told staff the goal was to become “the most used and best-known cloud in Japan, after Amazon and Microsoft,” and he treated the government contract as the way in — starting from 1–2% of the market and aiming, over a decade, for 30–40%.

The year to March 2025 set records: sales up 43.9% to $209.9M (¥31bn), operating profit of $27.7M (¥4bn), and 997 employees group-wide. Tanaka nonetheless stayed wary of building large data centers alone, announcing a strategic partnership with the US operator Equinix in October 2024 and signalling that facilities could be leased rather than owned. In March 2026 SAKURA Cloud met the conditions attached three years earlier and became the only domestic provider formally selected for the government cloud; in the same year it supplied about 1,100 of NVIDIA’s newest B200 units to large Japanese customers, with GPU cloud revenue up a further 20.3%. Sojitz sold part of its holding that year, ending some eighteen years of capital ties. A rental-server business born in a college dormitory had, in thirty years, become the domestic operator of the country’s digital foundations.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2007

A change of president after insolvency, and the unwinding of every post-IPO subsidiary (2007)

A rebuilding plan with nothing to add

What was settled in November 2007 was not who would run the company but what it would stop owning from the following year. The list Tanaka Kunihiro set out in his inaugural message was: a return to the data-center business, a review of unprofitable businesses and subsidiaries, the sale of part of the business, and a strengthening of capital. Not one item proposed adding anything. A company that in two years since listing had piled up acquisitions, new subsidiaries and an online-game venture would spend the next two doing only two things — pushing assets out and filling holes. That the man folding it up was the man who had spread it out, and that his message opened with an apology, is what gives this handover its character.

Narrowing to the core, though, reduced the number of ways to earn to one — and the number of choices to one as well. Net profit returned to $4M (¥374m) in the year to March 2009 because only the monthly-billed rental servers and data centers were kept and the cash-draining ventures were pushed outside. The four companies acquired or founded after the listing disappeared in sequence between July 2007 and March 2008; by the same stroke, every means of generating cash other than housing and running servers disappeared with them. A rebuild that folds a company back onto a single line holds only for as long as that line is growing. That the operating cash flow restored to $22.8M (¥2bn) in the year to March 2010 went into land and buildings in Ishikari was, in all likelihood, because there was nothing else left to feed.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2007

Clearing insolvency with a third-party share issue to Sojitz (2007)

Eighteen years from 28.3% to the exit

What this share issue moved was not the sum of ¥999.99m but the question of who would decide the capital structure that came after. Priced at ¥78,628 a share — cut to the single yen so that the total stopped just short of ¥1bn — the stake settled at 28.3%, near the bottom of the range indicated in the basic agreement. Far from a majority, and yet SAKURA internet became an equity-method affiliate of Sojitz and took one director from it. What Sojitz brought was not only money but a general trading house’s customer network and a sales channel for ASP and SaaS services. For the hole that was filled, the company gained one more party to whom it had to explain what it intended to grow.

The years in which that stake rose, however, were also the years in which the company grew most. In March 2011, through a tender offer and a shareholders’ agreement, Sojitz became the parent; by the end of the year to March 2016 it held 40.29%. In between, the Ishikari data center opened and added its second and third buildings, and in November 2015 the company moved from Mothers to the First Section of the TSE. A hole filled from outside with capital can only be filled back with capital. It took eighteen years for the trading house that came in at 28.3% to step out of the shareholding, and across all of it Tanaka Kunihiro never left the president’s chair. Deciding whom to admit as a shareholder in order to survive an emergency binds the capital structure long after the business has recovered.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2010

Abandoning the urban model for a suburban mega data center in Ishikari, Hokkaido (2010)

Buying the floor you will not use

What was bought at Ishikari was not land but floor area that would go unused for years. Against a site of 51,448 square metres, the first building covered only 3,850; on 15 November 2011, the day it opened, just 200 of a planned 4,000 racks were in place. What dictated that shape was not a long-range vision but a shortage of strength. Tanaka Kunihiro has said that a young company had no capacity to invest all at once, and that the merit of the design lay in investing little by little and ending up with a large facility. The part it could not afford to build is, in effect, exactly the area it left empty.

It took time, though, for empty area to turn into value. Sales passed $94.5M (¥10bn) only in the year to March 2014, when the second building came online; and by June 2024, with generative AI bidding up compute, some 2,000 GPUs stood at Ishikari and sold out the moment they went on sale. But slack pays only while the demand that arrives next can be measured on the same yardstick. Outside-air cooling cannot keep up with the heat of GPU servers, and the next $112.2M (¥17bn) goes not into land but into liquid cooling. How far the room created by what the company could not buy will carry it depends on whether the next demand asks for width or for heat.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— SAKURA internet full history in Japanese →

  1. SAKURA internet Inc. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. SAKURA internet Inc. — integrated reports (統合報告書), FY2024–FY2026.
  3. SAKURA internet Inc. — earnings releases and presentation materials (決算短信 / 決算説明資料).
  4. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry — cloud programme (クラウドプログラム) certifications, 2023 and 2024.
  5. Digital Agency — government cloud (ガバメントクラウド) provider selection, 2023 (conditional) and 2026 (formal).

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

SAKURA internet’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/3778/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/3778/history.json History overview
GET /api/3778/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/3778/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/3778/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/3778/executives.json Executives
GET /api/3778/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/3778/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/3778/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/3778/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/3778/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/3778/workforce.json Workforce