TIS

Company history

Financial history 2004–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1971
Head office
Osaka, Japan
Listed
1987
Founder
Jointly funded by 60 Sanwa Bank–affiliated companies
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$3.8B (¥597bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$294.6M (¥47bn)
TIS: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1971A computer centre owned by sixty companies

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1971Toyo Information Systems founded by 60 Sanwa-group companies
  2. 1975Absorbs Toyo Computer Service; opens a Tokyo branch
  3. 1984Tokyo First Center opens
  4. 1987Listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange, second section
  5. 1991Moves to the first sections of the Tokyo and Osaka exchanges

Around 1970 a mainframe cost anywhere from a few hundred million to well over a billion yen, which made owning one alone hard to justify and sharing one obvious. In April 1971 sixty companies grouped around Sanwa Bank put up $1.7M (¥600m) of capital to create Toyo Information Systems — a joint computing centre that began life running batch work for the Sanwa group. The parentage was the business plan: from day one the company inherited the bank’s customers, and an early relationship with the card issuer JCB that would become the root of its later strength in credit-card and consumer-credit systems. It was an independent integrator standing on a banking, card and consumer-finance base it had not had to win.

The first correction came quickly. The company had been built around think-tank and research work, and when the 1973 oil shock sent clients hunting for cost cuts that demand thinned out. In October 1975 Toyo Information Systems absorbed Toyo Computer Service, moving its centre of gravity to the clerical data processing that keeps running whatever the economy does — and in the same month opened a Tokyo branch, taking the business beyond its Kansai keiretsu customers. A Tokyo First Center followed in 1984.

The 1980s mainframe boom did the rest. Sales went from $27.4M (¥6bn) in the year to March 1980 to $342.1M (¥47bn) in the year to March 1989 — seven and a half times in a decade — reaching $386.7M (¥56bn) the following year. The company listed on the second section of the Osaka exchange in November 1987, added the Tokyo second section in 1990, and moved to the first sections of both in September 1991, less than four years after its debut.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1991The lost decade, and the JCB fire

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2004 · consolidated
Revenue$1.6B
Net income$51M
Net margin3.2%
FY2007 · consolidated
Revenue$1.8B
Net income-$7M
Net margin-0.4%
  1. 1993First decline in revenue as ERP packages displace custom development
  2. 2000Acquires Komatsu Soft (now Qualica) to add manufacturing clients
  3. 2001Renamed TIS Inc.
  4. 2004Wins JCB’s core-system replacement, JENIUS
  5. 2007$43.3M (¥5bn) loss provision; first net loss

Revenue fell for the first time in the year to March 1993. The cause was structural: large Japanese companies were abandoning custom in-house systems for packaged ERP, and a firm whose main line was supporting in-house development took the shrinkage head on. The slump ran through the late 1990s while the company felt its way toward ERP customisation. In April 2000 it bought Komatsu Soft (today Qualica) from the construction-machinery maker — deliberately buying its own blind spot, since a company raised inside a bank group was strong in finance and weak in manufacturing, and the deal brought both the know-how and Komatsu itself as a large user.

In January 2001 the company dropped Toyo Information Systems for the abbreviation it was known by and became TIS Inc., using the rename to mark the end of the slump. President Funaki Takao, in the company’s thirtieth year, set out to lift roughly $576M (¥70bn) of sales first to $1.2B (¥150bn) and then to $4.1B (¥500bn) by 2010; Agrex, an outsourcing specialist, was bought up into consolidation in February 2002 as the second step in that expansion.

In 2004 TIS won the job of replacing JCB’s decade-old core system — JENIUS, built on IBM System z with Java online and some COBOL batch — and mobilised more people on it than on any project in its history for a client worth $184.9M (¥20bn) to $277.4M (¥30bn) a year. The new president, Okamoto Susumu, was betting on volume and quality together as the way an independent survives an era of pricing pressure from Chinese offshore rates. Instead the project ran years late: the year to March 2007 carried a $43.3M (¥5bn) provision for contract losses and a net loss of $6.9M (¥810m), with the extra development cost eventually reported at $67.9M (¥8bn), and the system only went live in November 2008. Having survived the 1990s, TIS had run into a different failure mode — and shown the whole industry what a single ¥10-billion-plus contract can do to an independent’s balance sheet.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2008Scale as the answer

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2008 · consolidated
Revenue$1.9B
Net income$41M
Net margin2.1%
FY2017 · consolidated
Revenue$3.5B
Net income$145M
Net margin4.1%
  1. 2008IT Holdings created with Intec Holdings
  2. 2011TIS absorbs Solan and Ufit; Kuwano Toru becomes president
  3. 2012Group Tokyo offices consolidated in Nishi-Shinjuku
  4. 2015Agrex taken fully private
  5. 2017Group Vision 2026; mobile wallet with Toppan

The answer TIS reached for was size. In December 2007 it agreed to combine with Intec Holdings, and in April 2008 the two created a joint holding company, IT Holdings, by share transfer and listed it on the first section in Tokyo. Intec, founded in 1964 in Toyama and strong in manufacturing and distribution, was the complement to a Sanwa-bred TIS strong in finance and cards. As systems grew larger, only the biggest houses could win the profitable work, and consolidation among the mid-sized players had become the obvious move; Okamoto said he had hurried the deal for fear of being reshuffled by someone else, and while he denied any link to the JCB overrun, the logic of spreading one project’s failure across a bigger group was plain enough.

Assembling the group took another three years. Nine TIS subsidiaries were moved under IT Holdings by corporate split in October 2008; Solan was taken over by tender offer in December 2009 and made wholly owned in 2010. In April 2011 TIS absorbed Solan and Ufit, and Kuwano Toru — a lifer who had joined Toyo Information Systems in 1976 and had been the executive over the JCB project — became president the same month. The restructuring that came with the three-way merger cut some 400 jobs and produced a $98.4M (¥8bn) extraordinary loss in the year to March 2012; in February 2012 nine group companies’ Tokyo offices were folded into a single building in Nishi-Shinjuku, the physical solution to duplicated head-office functions.

From there the numbers recovered. Agrex, still a listed subsidiary running the group’s business-process outsourcing, was squeezed out by tender offer and made wholly owned in March 2015; the year to March 2015 brought $3.0B (¥361bn) of sales and $174.4M (¥21bn) of operating profit. In May 2017 the group set a ten-year Group Vision 2026 — “Create Exciting Future” — built on investing and partnering in fintech and payments, and launched a mobile wallet service with Toppan Printing. The year to March 2017 delivered 8.8% ROE against a plan of 8%, a year early. The decade from the 2008 holding company to the 2026 vision was, in substance, one long clean-up: writing off the JCB legacy and stripping out the overlaps between the companies it had bought.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2018Payments, Southeast Asia, quantum

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2018 · consolidated
Revenue$3.7B
Net income$187M
Net margin5.1%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$3.8B
Net income$334M
Net margin8.7%
  1. 2020Acquires Sequent Software (US) and MFEC (Thailand)
  2. 2021Okamoto Yasushi becomes president
  3. 2022Moves to the TSE Prime Market
  4. 2024Group Vision 2032; ~$660.1M (¥100bn) of growth investment
  5. 2025Record year: $3.8B (¥572bn) of sales

The fourth medium-term plan, from 2018, raised the total payout ratio to 40%, set aside up to $724.6M (¥80bn) for software and acquisitions, and managed the business by the share of high-value work in the mix; the segments were rebuilt in 2019 into BPO, service IT, industrial IT and financial IT. The old problem had not gone away — in March 2019 came reports of a $116.5M (¥13bn) damages claim over a core-system replacement for Mitsubishi Shokuhin — but the plan’s targets were met a year early, with the year to March 2020 bringing $4.2B (¥444bn) of sales and $419.6M (¥45bn) of operating profit.

The money went abroad and into payments. TIS bought the American fintech Sequent Software in February 2020, then took control of MFEC of Thailand by tender offer in October, converting a long-held equity stake into a Southeast Asian foothold. Okamoto Yasushi, who had joined in 1985, became president in April 2021 under a new brand line, “Let’s make society’s wishes come true with IT”; Kuwano moved to a non-representative chairmanship. The pruning continued in both directions — the government-sector business was handed to Intec, Chuo System was sold out of the group in November 2021 for a $45.7M (¥6bn) gain because small-business software did not fit a company built on large-enterprise work, and Nihon ICS was bought outright in 2023 to strengthen healthcare IT.

In May 2024 the group set Group Vision 2032 and, with it, a plan to concentrate roughly $660.1M (¥100bn) of growth investment over three years in three areas: payments, Southeast Asia and quantum computing. Okamoto credited the shift to collaboration across the group finally taking hold, sixteen years after IT Holdings was formed. The year to March 2025 was a record — $3.8B (¥572bn) of sales, $461.1M (¥69bn) of operating profit and $334.1M (¥50bn) of net income — alongside $280.7M (¥42bn) of buybacks. A company that started as sixty companies’ shared mainframe now allocates capital, deliberately, outside the domestic contract-development business that made it.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1975

Absorbing Toyo Computer Service: making contract processing the core (1975)

The month a company sheltered by its keiretsu went outside

Measured by size, the merger of October 1975 is a small event. Set it beside the fact that the company opened a Tokyo branch in the same month, though, and what the decision chose becomes easier to see. Rather than stay in the safe position of a joint computing centre for sixty affiliated companies, it would take on clerical processing — the daily grind of a client’s operations — and go out selling beyond the keiretsu. This can be read as the month a four-and-a-half-year-old company decided where to put the foundation of its earnings.

That choice carried a long way. The skill of holding a customer’s operations and keeping them running without a stop became the strength in credit-card and consumer-credit systems in the 1990s — and, at the same time, became the exposure of carrying a huge project alone. Deciding what you will take on is also deciding which failures you will take on. The record of the merger is a single line, but the direction that line pointed to would be confirmed again and again in the company’s later history.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2000

Buying Komatsu Soft to correct a finance-heavy customer base (2000)

Buying the imbalance in order to fix it

What distinguishes the Komatsu Soft acquisition is neither its price nor any novelty of technology, but the fact that the target chosen was the one that filled the buyer’s own weakness exactly. The banking and card customers handed down by its Sanwa parentage were the company’s strength and, at the same time, a reason it found it hard to move outside them. Taking on a manufacturer’s IT subsidiary whole meant acquiring customers and engineers at once — and also taking on a low-margin organisation. When President Funaki described his criteria as “customer base and technology,” that can be read as a statement of sequence: look at what is missing before you look at the price.

That way of choosing largely set the shape of TIS afterwards. Widening the industries it served by acquisition, and using scale to reach for the prime-contractor position, runs unbroken from here to the 2008 combination with Intec Holdings. Each time, the question of how to lift the acquired company’s profitability was left standing. Managing by buying what you lack is fast; raising what you have bought to your own level is not a problem speed can solve. How to handle the gap between the two is the question that began in this period.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2007

Creating IT Holdings by joint share transfer with Intec Holdings (2007)

What being equals cost

What stands out in this combination is that it went after scale while choosing a form in which neither side became the other’s subsidiary. Creating a new holding company and setting both firms beneath it is procedurally heavier than an acquisition, and it leaves a double layer in place afterwards. In practice the rearranging went on for years after the launch — dissolving the intermediate holding company, shifting nine subsidiaries, merging the operating companies — and it took eight years to become a single operating company. The “pride of an independent” that President Okamoto spoke of can be read as what that effort and that time were paid for.

On the other side of the motive for scale lay a bitter recent experience. For a company of a size where the delay of one large project reverses the year’s results, the bigger the project the higher the stakes of the wager. Even taking at face value the explanation of the day that the combination had nothing to do with the JCB project, the task itself — building a body able to withstand ever-larger contracts — remains. Scale dilutes the effect of failure; it does not reduce failure. The question the 2007 choice answered, and the question it did not, would be returned to with every medium-term plan that followed.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— TIS full history in Japanese →

  1. TIS Inc. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Weekly Toyo Keizai — 週刊東洋経済, 7 September 2002: industry report on the M&A wave in the information-services industry and the aims of the three leading mid-tier houses (Hara Eijiro).
  3. Weekly Toyo Keizai — 週刊東洋経済, 18 December 2004: “The Talk” — Nakazawa Masayuki and Okamoto Susumu.
  4. Weekly Toyo Keizai — 週刊東洋経済, 29 December 2007: news front line — telecoms, IT, transport, autos.
  5. Nikkei xTECH — 日経クロステック (Nikkei BP), July 2024: interview with President Okamoto Yasushi on Group Vision 2032.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

TIS’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/3626/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/3626/history.json History overview
GET /api/3626/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/3626/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/3626/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/3626/executives.json Executives
GET /api/3626/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/3626/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/3626/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/3626/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/3626/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/3626/workforce.json Workforce