Fuji Oil

Company history

Financial history 1968–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1950
Head office
Izumisano, Osaka, Japan
Listed
1978
Origin
Wholly funded by Itochu (C. Itoh & Co.)
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$4.9B (¥772bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$77.8M (¥12bn)
Fuji Oil: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1950The ground nobody was standing on

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1950Founded with capital wholly from Itochu; buys the Fuji Sanshi Osaka mill
  2. 1951Japan’s first combined pressing and solvent extraction
  3. 1955Japan’s first hard butter (Melano Butter)
  4. 1961Lists on the Osaka Stock Exchange Second Section
  5. 1967Vegetable cream; isolated soy protein

Fuji Oil was incorporated in October 1950 with $8,333 (¥3m) of capital supplied entirely by Itochu, which wanted an operating company for the oils and fats it traded, and it bought the Osaka mill of Fuji Sanshi to get into the business. Japan’s edible oil industry was already occupied — Nisshin, Honen, NOF, Yoshihara, all prewar firms. Fuji Oil was the last entrant, with no scale and no brand, and its attempt to sell cooking oil against them failed even with advertising behind it.

What that failure left was the ground the majors did not want: tropical fats that set at room temperature, and the technique of separating fats by melting point. In February 1951 the company started pressing copra and became the first in Japan to succeed with combined pressing and solvent extraction; in January 1954 it ran Japan’s first serious palm-kernel crushing; and in September 1955 a solvent fractionation unit at the Osaka works began producing Japan’s first hard butter, sold as Melano Butter. Three national firsts in five years, none of them in a market anyone was contesting.

Hard butter is a cocoa butter equivalent — a vegetable fat that stands in for imported cocoa butter in chocolate — and by refining it from palm and palm-kernel oil Fuji Oil created a market of its own supplying confectioners, starting with the Kansai makers served from the Kobe plant opened in August 1955. The same fractionation skill then travelled upward: chocolate for Western-style confectionery from 1963, vegetable cream from 1967 as a plant-based answer to dairy cream, and in December 1967 isolated soy protein, used to improve the texture of processed meats. Vegetable fat and vegetable protein — the two axes it still runs on — were both in place by the end of the 1960s.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1968Hannan, the main markets, and the first plants abroad

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1968 · unconsolidated
Revenue$48M
Net income$222K
Net margin0.5%
FY1994 · unconsolidated
Revenue$837M
Net income$26M
Net margin3.1%
  1. 1969Hannan plant opens (Osaka works closed 1971)
  2. 1973Osaka Stock Exchange First Section
  3. 1978Lists on the TSE First Section
  4. 1981Fuji Oil Singapore — the first overseas plant
  5. 1986Palmaju Edible Oil in Malaysia
  6. 1992Enters Europe (later Fuji Oil Europe)

In 1968 the company bought some 192,000 square metres in the Izumisano food industrial complex; the Hannan plant opened in 1969, was extended in 1971, and the original Osaka works was closed and moved into it. That land was what made scale possible in both fats and soy protein. The listing followed the growth — Osaka First Section in 1973, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange First Section in October 1978, seventeen years after the initial Osaka Second Section listing. Twenty-eight years after entering last, Fuji Oil was a national listed oil maker built on three proprietary lines.

President Nishimura Seitaro put the method plainly in 1981: the root of fats processing is fractionation — take a blended oil apart, pull out the fraction with a distinct character, and build a product on that character. Chocolate fats, vegetable cream, fats for vegetable cheese all came from the same technique, and it was portable. Fuji Oil Singapore, established in October 1981, was the first move abroad; Palmaju Edible Oil in Malaysia followed in 1986, putting refining at the source of palm oil, then US subsidiaries in 1987 and, in February 1992, a Belgian company that became Fuji Oil Europe. In eleven years a domestic miller became a multinational on three continents.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1995A holding company, and buying a region at a time

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1995 · unconsolidated
Revenue$911M
Net income$16M
Net margin1.7%
FY2018 · consolidated
Revenue$2.8B
Net income$124M
Net margin4.5%
  1. 1995First Chinese subsidiary
  2. 2014Head office moves to Izumisano
  3. 2015Acquires Harald in Brazil; becomes a pure holding company
  4. 2018Acquisitions in Australia and the United States

China came in 1995 with a Zhangjiagang subsidiary, then soy protein in Tianjin in 2004, Thailand in 2010 and an Asian regional headquarters in Singapore in 2012. At home the Tsukuba R&D centre opened in 1990 and four plants — Hannan, Kanto, Rinku and Chiba — carried domestic capacity, with an industrial chocolate line added at Kanto in 2001. In July 2014 the head office moved to Izumisano, next to the Hannan works.

Then the structure changed. In June 2015 Fuji Oil bought Harald, Brazil’s leading industrial chocolate maker, and in October 2015 it converted itself into a pure holding company, Fuji Oil Holdings, spinning the operating business into a new Fuji Oil Co., Ltd. Authority went to regional headquarters, and the pace of deals rose accordingly: a Malaysian chocolate company in 2016, plants in China, a palm supply-chain joint venture in Malaysia in 2017, a New Orleans company and an Australian acquisition in 2018.

The largest came in January 2019, when Fuji Oil acquired Blommer Chocolate, the biggest industrial chocolate maker in North America, at an enterprise value of about $777.9M (¥85bn) — the largest deal in its history. It bought a customer base, a third pillar to stand beside fats and soy protein, and third place in industrial chocolate worldwide. Acquisition costs cut reported profit in the year to March 2019, and management framed the charge as the price of building the pillar.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2019Blommer, and undoing the holding company

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2019 · consolidated
Revenue$2.8B
Net income$106M
Net margin3.9%
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$4.9B
Net income$78M
Net margin1.6%
  1. 2019Acquires Blommer Chocolate for about $777.9M (¥85bn)
  2. 2021Sakai Mikio becomes president; “Reborn 2024” names plant-based food the third pillar
  3. 2024Blommer restructuring announced, including the Chicago plant closure
  4. 2025Reverts to an operating holding company; Omori Tatsuji becomes CEO

Under Sakai Mikio, president from April 2021, the mid-term plan “Reborn 2024” named plant-based food the third business alongside vegetable fats and industrial chocolate, and set the company explicitly against its own habit of chasing volume: differentiation through sustainability and added value, quality over quantity. The portfolio was pruned as well as extended — a US joint venture and the purchase of Oilseeds International in 2022, but also the disposal of the New Orleans fixed assets and the Chinese soy protein business. Consolidated sales rose from ¥414.7 billion in the year to March 2020 to ¥564.0 billion four years later, though currency, raw material costs and Blommer’s deteriorating margins pulled results in different directions.

In March 2024 the company announced a five-year restructuring of Blommer including the closure of its Chicago plant. The equipment it had bought came from a company founded in 1939, and its age came with it; when cocoa bean prices surged, that scale converted directly into earnings volatility. Sales reached a record ¥671.2 billion in the year to March 2025, with the American chocolate business still unfixed.

In April 2025 Fuji Oil absorbed its own operating subsidiary and reverted to an operating holding company, taking back the name Fuji Oil Co., Ltd. — ending the pure holding structure after roughly nine and a half years. Omori Tatsuji became CEO the same month, arguing for a manufacturer’s perspective, problem-solving built on technology, and one company running fats, industrial chocolate and soy protein across Japan, the Americas and Southeast Asia without a boundary between headquarters and the floor. That September he came back to where the company started: the motto that you cannot survive doing what everyone else does still, he said, runs in the staff as DNA.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1950

Founded on Itochu capital with the purchase of the Fuji Sanshi Osaka mill (1950)

On choosing a field from a position of weakness

What this founding settled can be seen as less the creation of a company than the question of where not to fight. The mainstream of Japanese oil milling — tempura oil — could not be entered even with money spent on advertising. What remained after that failure was the territory nobody then regarded as the main battleground: southern fats that solidify, and the technique of separating those fats by differences in melting point. The conditions of being last and small appear, in the event, to have forced the choice of a business mix that did not overlap with the majors. That it began not from a strong company’s rational diversification but from a process of elimination in a weak position is what marks the character of this judgement.

That said, it did not simply stay in the field elimination had chosen. The policy of extending the technique gained in fractionation vertically — from chocolate fats to vegetable cream to soy protein — was supported by a way of reading margins characteristic of a trading-house-funded firm: absorb raw-material price swings on the side nearer the finished product. This 1950s idea of raising the degree of processing until you reach ground where prices are stable reappears in the later overseas acquisitions in industrial chocolate and in the investment in plant-based food. That the phrase “don’t imitate anyone” still comes from the mouth of a president seventy-five years later shows the weight of this first choice.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2015

Converting to the pure holding company Fuji Oil Holdings (2015)

What changing the structure moved, and what it did not

What Fuji Oil gave up in this transition can be seen as the premise that headquarters holds the individual business judgements. By handing authority to regional headquarters and creating a structure in which each area buys and builds for itself, the pace of acquisitions — Brazil, Malaysia, Australia, the United States in succession — did indeed rise. Sales grew nearly two and a half times in ten years. That it moved in the order of changing the shape of the organization first and then passing deals through it is consistent with the ten-year roadmap president Shimizu had set out.

But to the extent that matters were entrusted to the regions, the ability to look across the businesses themselves weakened. Until the deterioration in earnings in North American industrial chocolate began to drag down group profit, the thinness of management along the business axis appears to have been hard to see. The 2025 decision to revert to an operating holding company shows the difficulty of reconciling, within a single organization, moving fast by area and managing deeply by business. The shape of an organization changes the speed of management, but does not determine the content of the business — a structural change that went out and came back over ten years gives material for re-examining where that line falls.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2018

Acquiring Blommer, North America’s largest industrial chocolate maker (2018)

Buying a rank, and holding a business

What the Fuji Oil group obtained in this acquisition was a North American customer base and the position of third in the world in industrial chocolate. It was a judgement that, at the end of a way of proceeding by buying up companies region by region, secured large-scale plant in the largest market with the biggest investment in its history, and it can be seen as consistent with the logic that a materials maker improves its purchasing terms through scale. That sales more than doubled in five years also shows the size of the business taken in.

But the plant it bought was what a company founded in 1939 had accumulated, and its obsolescence came with it. When cocoa bean prices surge, scale converts directly into the amplitude of profit and loss. The course of events — closing the Chicago plant five years after the acquisition and shifting equipment to Canada — shows that gaining a rank and continuing to hold that business in a form that earns are separate problems. Improving North American earnings has now been handed down through three successive presidents, and the verdict on this acquisition appears not yet to have settled.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Fuji Oil full history in Japanese →

  1. Fuji Oil Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports) and earnings briefings (決算説明会), including the “Renaissance Fuji 2018” and “Reborn 2024” mid-term plans.
  2. Shoken Toshi — 証券投資, March 1973. NDL Digital Collections.
  3. Securities Analysts Journal — 証券アナリストジャーナル, April 1981 (interview with president Nishimura Seitaro). NDL Digital Collections.
  4. Nikkei Business — 日経ビジネス (Nikkei BP), August 2018 (interview with president Shimizu Hiroshi).
  5. Japanese full edition, with detailed sources and audit notes: the-shashi.com/tse/2607.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Fuji Oil’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/2607/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/2607/history.json History overview
GET /api/2607/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/2607/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/2607/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/2607/executives.json Executives
GET /api/2607/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/2607/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/2607/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/2607/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/2607/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/2607/workforce.json Workforce