The resignation of president Ishibashi Nobuyasu and the founding family's course correction (1999)
The centripetal force of the founding family in an owner-managed company
The core of this removal can be seen not in the title of president but in the substantive power of decision that the founder himself continued to hold. Nobuyasu had climbed the internal ladder in good order, from director to executive vice president, and his accession was taken as settled; even so, the large orientations of the business still required the final sign-off of Nobuo, by then a senior adviser. Even a natural son, if he moves too fast on reforms that run against the founding spirit of aggressive expansion, may find his position unstable — the dynamics peculiar to an owner-managed company are visible in this personnel decision.
The way the affair was settled, through Nakabō Kōhei as an outside third party, is equally characteristic of this company. Nobuo took in the voices of his board, but would not deliver the verdict to his own son with his own mouth, entrusting it instead to a lawyer he had long known. The turn toward efficiency was in itself a rational response to the long headwind of a declining birthrate; that it was overturned because it was pursued too radically makes this an episode in which the speed of change and the building of consent were questioned more searchingly than the content of the change itself.
Revenue and net margin, FY1994–FY2004
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY1999 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Daiwa House Industry
- 1976 Entering the roadside store business — diversifying beyond housing (1976)
- 1990 The hotel business: rapid expansion, and a brand that never came into focus (1990)
- 2000 Daiwa House's turn to “zero interest-bearing debt” (2000)
- 2025 The ¥460 billion IES acquisition and vertical integration into data-centre construction (2025)
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
Disclaimer
- This page is provided for general information only and is not investment advice, nor a recommendation to buy or sell any security.
- Figures are compiled independently and include our own estimates, approximations and machine-processed data; we make no warranty as to their accuracy or completeness.
- Sources are primarily each company’s securities reports and other public filings, but errors and omissions may remain.
- Any use of this information is at the reader’s own risk. Past performance does not indicate future results.
- Company names, logos and other marks belong to their respective owners.
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|---|---|---|
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