Nojima

Company history

Financial history 2004–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1959
Head office
Sagamihara, Kanagawa, Japan
Listed
2016
Founder
Nojima Kinuyo
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$6.2B (¥983bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$246M (¥39bn)
Nojima: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1959A shop opened by a housewife, and a son who waited twenty-one years

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1959Nojima Kinuyo opens an electrical shop in Sagamihara
  2. 1962Incorporated (joint-stock company from 1982)
  3. 1991Renamed Nojima; Nojima Hiroshi becomes executive vice-president
  4. 1994Hiroshi becomes president; shares registered OTC in December

Nojima begins in August 1959, when Nojima Kinuyo opened a small electrical shop in Sagamihara, Kanagawa. The founder was not a businessman but a housewife; her eldest son Hiroshi was eight years old and in primary school. In the high-growth years the neighbourhood electrical shop was the channel through which the “three sacred treasures” — television, washing machine, refrigerator — reached ordinary households, and this was a textbook example of one: a small store in a town of workshops, sitting where the housing met the factories. That a woman founded it stands out sharply against the male founders of the other chains that would later dominate the trade, and it is the origin of the emphasis on promoting women that runs through the company under her son.

The shop incorporated as a limited company in 1962 and only became a joint-stock company in 1982 — twenty years later. There was no hurry. What mattered more was that Nojima stayed unaffiliated: in a market carved up between shops flying the banners of Matsushita, Toshiba and the rest, it belonged to no manufacturer’s keiretsu. Its home ground, the belt of Kanagawa where central Tokyo meets the industrial coast, gave it the geography for a metropolitan chain; within twenty years of founding it had reached Yokosuka, Yokohama and Kawasaki.

Hiroshi joined his parents’ shop in 1973, became a director in 1978, executive vice-president in 1991 — the year the company took the name Nojima — and president in 1994 at forty-three. Six months later, in December 1994, the shares were registered for over-the-counter trading. The timing was not incidental. The industry was entering the era of price destruction, and Yamada Denki’s advertising was consolidating the national market; Nojima chose to narrow rather than spread, confining itself to Tokyo and Kanagawa and competing on the sales floor instead. The formula later summarized as “consulting sales, no quotas whatsoever” — staff paid to ask what a customer needs rather than to hit a number — was born here, as a way of not being drawn into a discount war it could not win.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1995Governance ahead of the industry, and probing the edges

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2004 · consolidated
Revenue$906M
Net income
Net margin
FY2014 · consolidated
Revenue$2.1B
Net income$42M
Net margin2%
  1. 2003Converts to a company with committees — rare in the trade
  2. 2007Merges Shinden — the first integration of another firm’s people
  3. 2010Listed on JASDAQ
  4. 2013Enters Cambodia

In June 2003, a year after the commercial-code revision that created the form, Nojima converted to a company with committees — the board structure then being adopted by Sony, Toshiba and Hitachi, and almost unheard of among mid-sized retailers. What makes the move interesting is what it did not change. Ownership stayed concentrated in the founding family: as of the year ended March 2006, three Nojimas held 36.7% of the shares between them, with family asset-holding companies close behind. Supervision and execution were separated by statute; ownership and management remained one. That combination — modern machinery, undiluted control — is what later let the company execute acquisition after acquisition without asking anyone’s permission.

The business meanwhile kept testing its edges, mostly by building rather than buying. A PC retailer was set up in 1998, a telecom-equipment subsidiary in 2000, absorbed back into the parent in 2011. The first real acquisition came in March 2007 with Shinden, a mid-sized electronics chain in the northern Kanto region — modest in scale, but Nojima’s first experience of integrating another company’s employees, the problem that would define everything after it. In April 2010 the shares moved to the JASDAQ market.

For all that, the company was still a single-line business. In the year ended March 2012 consolidated revenue was $2.6B (¥211bn) with net profit of $26.4M (¥2bn), and over ninety per cent of sales came from consumer-electronics stores; equity of $280.7M (¥22bn) against total assets of $822.2M (¥66bn) quietly assembled the balance sheet that the next decade would spend. Two moves hinted at the wider ambition: a Cambodian subsidiary in 2013 — early for a mid-sized Japanese retailer, and planted as a long-term seed rather than a short-term earner — and a shopping mall in Yokosuka in 2014, developed and run by the retailer itself.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2015Buying a company larger than itself

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2015 · consolidated
Revenue$2.0B
Net income$30M
Net margin1.5%
FY2022 · consolidated
Revenue$4.3B
Net income$197M
Net margin4.6%
  1. 2015Acquires ITX for about $702.4M (¥85bn); carrier shops become the larger pillar
  2. 2016Moves to the TSE First Section
  3. 2017Acquires Nifty, the Fujitsu-owned ISP
  4. 2019Acquires Courts Asia; becomes Suruga Bank’s largest shareholder
  5. 2022Alliance with Suruga Bank dissolved

In March 2015 Nojima acquired ITX, an operator of docomo and SoftBank carrier shops, for roughly $702.4M (¥85bn) — a target with more revenue than the buyer. The effect was immediate and structural. Consolidated revenue went from $2.0B (¥244bn) to $4.2B (¥455bn) in a single year; within the segments, consumer-electronics stores and carrier shops swapped places, the latter becoming the larger business. A company that had been an electronics chain with a sideline was now a two-pillar business, and the number-three seller of mobile handsets in Japan. Nojima’s stated test for a deal was never the price of the asset but whether it could rebuild the target’s employee culture — whether its own way of selling would transplant.

Listing on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange followed in June 2016, fifty-seven years after the shop opened. By then Amazon, Rakuten and direct-from-manufacturer sales were making it futile to answer the market with more stores, and Nojima answered instead with more businesses. In April 2017 it bought Nifty, the Fujitsu-owned internet service provider — a consumer-electronics retailer buying a major ISP, with no precedent in the industry — and later floated part of it separately. In February 2019 a voluntary tender offer brought in Courts Asia, an electronics chain across Singapore and Malaysia; the overseas segment went from negative to $436.4M (¥47bn) of revenue in one year. Four pillars now stood: electronics stores, carrier shops, internet, overseas.

The one experiment that did not hold was financial. In October 2019 Nojima raised its stake in Suruga Bank — then rebuilding under a regulatory improvement order after a share-house lending scandal — to 18.5% and became its largest shareholder, an unheard-of pairing on both sides. A capital and business alliance followed in 2020 and was dissolved in March 2022, less than two years later, with the shares sold down over the following years. What the episode showed was less a failure of judgement than the metabolism of a founder-controlled company: it could enter a bank and leave it again inside thirty months.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2023Six pillars, and a manufacturer of its own

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2023 · consolidated
Revenue$4.5B
Net income$166M
Net margin3.7%
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$6.2B
Net income$246M
Net margin4%
  1. 2023Acquires Conexio (about $607.8M (¥85bn)) and Money Square Holdings
  2. 2025Acquires 93.2% of VAIO; record profit of $215.8M (¥32bn)

In February 2023 Nojima took over Conexio, the Itochu-affiliated mobile-phone dealer and one of the largest operators of docomo shops — its biggest acquisition, valued at some $607.8M (¥85bn). Consolidated revenue for the year ended March 2024 rose 21.6% to $5.0B (¥761bn), and carrier shops, at $2.3B (¥345bn), became 45% of the group. The logic was contrarian: handset dealers were shrinking as tariff cuts and lower sales commissions squeezed the economics of each store, and most operators were closing shops. Nojima concluded that a shrinking market is exactly where consolidation pays, because scale hands you control of the closures and the efficiencies.

The rest of the portfolio was assembled in the same two years. Money Square Holdings, an independent FX brokerage, was bought in January 2023 — finance now owned outright rather than allied with; Thunder Match Technology extended Southeast Asia into Malaysia in July 2023; and in January 2025 Nojima acquired 93.2% of VAIO for about $74.2M (¥11bn). Everything bought until then had distributed other companies’ products. VAIO was manufacturing — chosen, in Nojima’s telling, because a company built on quality of workmanship matched a retailer built on quality of service — and it gave the group, for the first time, a route from what customers say on the shop floor back into product design. Six pillars now: electronics stores, carrier shops, internet, overseas, finance, products.

The financial answer arrived late, as it usually does. The year of the Conexio acquisition brought revenue growth but a 9.0% fall in operating profit, personnel costs up 42.1%. The following year, ended March 2025, revenue reached $5.7B (¥853bn) with operating profit of $323.4M (¥48bn) and net profit of $215.8M (¥32bn), both records — integration paying out one to two years behind the deal. Consolidated headcount had gone from 3,251 in the year ended March 2015 to 11,868 ten years later. A shop opened by a housewife in 1959 now employs an army, and the question it has set itself is whether an army can be taught to sell the way the shop did.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2014

Buying ITX — a second pillar larger than the first (2014)

Buying not to add scale but to move a strength

The heart of this acquisition lies less in the enlargement itself than in a judgement about which market Nojima’s own strength should be applied to. The company had put distance between itself and the war of attrition fought on price in electronics retailing, and it carried its own form — salaried employees serving customers — into mobile-phone selling, a floor that demands expertise. President Nojima’s remark that he “did not agonize over it” reads as the confidence of someone who had already identified the ground on which he could win. That the target was bigger than the buyer meant, if anything, a wider span over which to transplant that form.

That said, an acquisition of a company larger than yourself, funded by borrowing, carries the hazard of integration. Nojima has said it limits M&A to cases where it is confident it can raise quality and rebuild the acquired workforce’s culture in the course of integration. ITX passed that disciplined screen, and became the first success in a run that would continue through Nifty to Conexio. Buying not to chase scale but to relocate a strength — this single move fixed the pattern by which Nojima changed from a single-line electronics retailer into a diversified operating company.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2022

The Conexio tender offer: consolidating a shrinking market (2022)

Scale, and the quality of service, at the same time

The core of this acquisition is that it pursued scale in a market heading for contraction. For mobile-phone dealers, tariff reductions and the reworking of sales commissions had thinned the economics of each store, and most operators were moving to cut shop counts. In the middle of that, Nojima absorbed a major competitor whole, unified the operations, and vaulted to the front rank of docomo-shop operators. Bind scale together precisely when the wind is against you and you hold the initiative on consolidation and efficiency — this was the logic of same-industry roll-up that runs from ITX, pushed through at the largest scale yet.

Even so, growing bigger and keeping the service-first shop that Nojima has upheld as an independent do not automatically go together. How to root its own manner — no sales quotas, choosing the product together with the customer — in the many stores and staff added by acquisition is a question that outlasts the moment when the figures caught up a year later. Can it consolidate scale and still operate without letting quality slip? Whether the Conexio deal succeeds depends not only on the recovery of margins but on how it keeps answering that.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Nojima full history in Japanese →

  1. Nojima Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports), FY2006 through FY2025, including the corporate-history and segment sections.
  2. Nikkei Business — 日経ビジネス (Nikkei BP): electronic edition, 5 Dec 2014; Nojima Hiroshi, “We set no quotas whatsoever.”
  3. Crucibles of the Chief Executive『経営者の修羅場』, Nikkei BP.
  4. Nihon Keizai Shimbun — 日本経済新聞: 19 Nov 2014; 22 Dec 2022.
  5. Toyo Keizai Online — 東洋経済オンライン: 27 Dec 2014; 15 Apr 2023.
  6. Diamond Online — ダイヤモンド・オンライン: “Nojima aims for third place in mobile sales with the ITX acquisition.”

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Nojima’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/7419/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/7419/history.json History overview
GET /api/7419/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/7419/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/7419/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/7419/executives.json Executives
GET /api/7419/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/7419/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/7419/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/7419/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/7419/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/7419/workforce.json Workforce