Terumo

Company history

Founded
1921
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
1982
Founder
Kitasato Shibasaburo and fellow physicians
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$6.9B (¥1.04tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$781.2M (¥117bn)
Terumo: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1921A thermometer maker

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
  1. 1921Sekisen Ken-onki K.K. founded in Tokyo with the backing of Kitasato Shibasaburo
  2. 1922First domestically made clinical thermometers shipped

Terumo began in September 1921 not as an entrepreneur’s venture but as an answer to a supply shock. The First World War had cut off imports of clinical thermometers from Germany, on which Japanese hospitals depended, and a group of physicians led by the bacteriologist Kitasato Shibasaburo — who had trained under Robert Koch — put their names behind a domestic maker. Sekisen Ken-onki K.K., the “Red-Line Thermometer Company,” was incorporated in the Shitaya district of Tokyo with ¥500,000 in capital and shipped its first thermometers in February 1922. Its authority came less from any technology than from the scientists who vouched for it; its market came from the wartime failure of a single foreign supplier.

That origin fixed the company’s shape for four decades. It made one thing — thermometers — and made them because the country needed a home-grown substitute for imports, not because it had invented anything. Through the war economy and the controlled markets of the postwar years there was neither the capital nor the freedom to develop new products or expand abroad; the firm simply raised output as domestic demand grew, still trading under the Red-Line Thermometer name. More than forty years after its founding it remained a single-product measuring-instrument maker — and the finite domestic thermometer market was a hard ceiling. Escaping it, by taking up the new craft of plastic moulding, became the unavoidable strategic question of the years that followed.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1963From durable good to disposable

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY1963 · unconsolidated
Revenue$2M
Net income
Net margin
FY1998 · consolidated
Revenue$1.1B
Net income$109M
Net margin9.6%
  1. 1963Plastic disposable syringe launched — Japan’s first mover
  2. 1971Terumo Europe (Belgium) and Kimble-Terumo (US) established
  3. 1974Renamed Terumo Corporation
  4. 1985Moves to the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange

The change came in January 1963, with a plastic disposable syringe. Japanese hospitals then sterilised glass syringes by boiling and reused them; a throw-away product looked expensive and wasteful, and the idea met real resistance. But reuse carried a cost the ledger did not show — the transmission of hepatitis and other infections — and on that single point Terumo overturned the convention, as Western hospitals already had. It carried the high-volume manufacturing it had learned making thermometers into plastic moulding and moved first in Japan, in effect creating the market it then led.

Disposability was not one more product but a change in the kind of business Terumo was in. It shifted the mainstay from a durable good used for decades — the thermometer — to a consumable used once, and with it came demand that was both steady and structurally rising. New plants at Fujinomiya (1964) and Ashitaka (1970) scaled up syringes, infusion sets and other plastic devices, and within a decade the thermometer maker had become, in substance, a maker of disposable medical devices.

The name and the map lagged the reality, and the company set about aligning them. It planted its own subsidiaries in the two markets that mattered — Terumo Europe in Belgium and a US venture with Kimble, both in 1971 — early for a mid-sized Japanese manufacturer, but disposables had to clear each country’s device rules and sterilisation standards on the ground. In October 1974 the firm finally dropped “Red-Line Thermometer” and became Terumo Corporation; a move to the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange followed in 1985, giving it the standing to raise capital. Plant, listing and an overseas footing, assembled in sequence — the three things a company needs before it can begin buying other companies.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1999Buying into treatment

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY1999 · consolidated
Revenue$1.4B
Net income$130M
Net margin9.2%
FY2010 · consolidated
Revenue$3.6B
Net income$464M
Net margin12.9%
  1. 1999Acquires 3M’s heart-lung business — Terumo Cardiovascular Systems
  2. 2002Vascutek (UK) acquired
  3. 2006MicroVention (US) acquired — into neurovascular
  4. 2007Heart-valve business acquired from Germany’s Kohler

In June 1999 Terumo bought the heart-lung (oxygenator) business of America’s 3M and folded it into a new subsidiary, Terumo Cardiovascular Systems. Until then Terumo had been a maker of general consumables — infusion sets, syringes — with no presence in cardiovascular treatment, a field where building the research, clinical trials and regulatory approvals from scratch takes a decade and a fortune. 3M’s retreat from healthcare put the business in play, and Terumo took the shortcut: it bought a treatment area it could not have built in time. That deal set the template for everything after it.

Through the 2000s the acquisitions grew more frequent and reached further from the old consumables line: Vascutek of Britain (2002), Mission Medical of the US (2005), the neurovascular specialist MicroVention (2006), and a heart-valve business from Germany’s Kohler (2007). Each brought a category — catheters, brain-vessel devices, heart valves — that Terumo bolted on rather than grew. MicroVention in particular, later joined by Sequent Medical, would become the core of a neurovascular franchise. From the 3M deal onward, “buy the business and connect it” became not an exception but Terumo’s standing method of growth.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2011Three treatment areas — and the cost of integration

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2011 · consolidated
Revenue$4.1B
Net income$405M
Net margin9.8%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$6.9B
Net income$781M
Net margin11.3%
  1. 2011Acquires CaridianBCT (US) — a stand-alone Blood Systems company
  2. 2016Shinjiro Sato becomes president & CEO; Sequent Medical acquired
  3. 2017Bolton Medical (aortic) and an Abbott/St. Jude haemostasis line acquired
  4. 2022GS26 mid-term plan; Rika blood-collection system in limited release
  5. 2024Hikaru Samejima becomes president & CEO
  6. 2025Buys WuXi Biologics’ Leverkusen fill-finish plant — into pharma CDMO

In April 2011 Terumo made its largest acquisition yet, buying the American blood-processing leader CaridianBCT. The deal briefly dented its balance sheet, but it let Terumo stand up a free-standing Blood Systems company and complete a three-part structure — cardiovascular, blood and plasma, and hospital care — that still frames the group. It also exposed the other face of the acquisitive method: integration is slow and costly. The blood unit earned only about ¥3.5bn on ¥71.8bn of sales in its first year and slid into the red in the mid-2010s, and it took the better part of a decade to make the business pay.

Under Shinjiro Sato, president from 2016, the buying continued — Sequent Medical (2016), a haemostasis business from Abbott/St. Jude and the aortic-stent maker Bolton Medical (both 2017) — filling out neurovascular and aortic lines the company had been slow to build itself. Revenue climbed from about $3.7B (¥328bn) to roughly $6.9B (¥1.04tn), and operating margin reached 18.5% in the year to March 2017 as high-margin cardiovascular products took over the mix. But the same long ramps recurred: the Rika automated blood-collection system, in limited release from 2022, took more than four years to approach break-even, held back by the plant-by-plant pace of installing and certifying machines in customer centres.

Two later shifts show the method turning outward. From the year to March 2024 Sato replaced “produce in the world’s optimal location” with a three-bloc plan — Japan and Asia, the US and Costa Rica, and inside China — as the pandemic, US-China friction and China’s volume-based procurement made supply chains that crossed borders freely a liability rather than an efficiency. Then in 2024 Hikaru Samejima took over as president, and in 2025 Terumo bought WuXi Biologics’ fill-finish plant in Leverkusen, Germany — its first use of the buy-and-connect reflex outside medical devices, aimed at contract drug manufacturing built around its own PLAJEX polymer prefilled syringes.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1963

From durable good to disposable: the plastic syringe (1963)

One argument — infection — that remade the business

The heart of this decision was not a better syringe but a change in what Terumo sold and how demand behaved. For forty years the company had lived off the thermometer, a durable good bought once and kept for decades — a business with a hard ceiling, since the domestic market was finite and each unit rarely sold twice. The plastic disposable syringe inverted that: a device used once and discarded generates demand that recurs and compounds. Against a hospital culture that boiled and reused glass syringes and saw throw-away goods as wasteful, Terumo had only one argument, but it was decisive — reuse spread hepatitis and other infections, and no economy of reuse was worth that. On that single point the convention gave way.

What the switch really created was a manufacturing base and a demand curve Terumo would build on for half a century. The high-volume moulding skill carried over from thermometers, the plants at Fujinomiya and Ashitaka, the widening line of infusion sets and disposable devices — these turned a single-product measuring-instrument maker into a maker of consumables whose sales rose with the sheer volume of medical care. Every later Terumo — the catheters, the blood systems, the prefilled syringes — is an extension of the disposable-device franchise begun here. The company’s technical depth in things used once and thrown away starts with this decision.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1999

Buying into cardiovascular: the 3M heart-lung deal (1999)

The shortcut into treatment — and the decade it costs

The point of this decision was to enter a treatment area Terumo could not have built in time. Oxygenators and the heart-lung business around them sit in high-difficulty, high-value cardiovascular care, where developing the technology, running the clinical trials and clearing the regulators in-house would have taken ten years and a great deal of money. When 3M pulled back from healthcare and put the business up for sale, Terumo bought its way in instead — acquiring Terumo Cardiovascular Systems whole rather than growing it. It was a clean break from the general-consumables company it had been, and it fixed the method Terumo would run on ever after: buy the treatment area, then connect it.

That method became the engine of Terumo’s growth and, in the same motion, its recurring cost. From 1999 the deals multiplied — MicroVention in neurovascular, CaridianBCT in blood, Bolton in aortic stents — and lifted the company into high-margin fields it had entered late; revenue and operating margin both climbed as the mix shifted toward cardiovascular devices. But each acquisition then demanded years of integration: the blood business bought in 2011 ran losses well into the decade, and products such as the Rika collection system took four years and more to pay. The strength and the liability are the same act — Terumo grows by buying what it cannot build fast enough, and then spends the better part of a decade making each purchase earn its price.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Terumo full history in Japanese →

  1. Terumo Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Terumo Corporation — Terumo 60-Year History (『テルモ60年史』), the source of the early single-entity revenue and headcount figures.
  3. Terumo Corporation — earnings briefings (決算説明会), including the year-ended-March-2025 fourth-quarter Q&A. Q4 FY2025 briefing Q&A (PDF).

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →