Terumo — Company History

Financial history 1962–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1921
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
1982 · TYO: 4543
Founder
Kitasato Shibasaburo and fellow physicians
Former names
Sekisen Ken-onki 赤線検温器 (1921–1974)
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$7.2B (¥1.13tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$859.3M (¥136bn)
Terumo: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1921The home-made thermometer, and a forty-year run-up to medical disposables

  1. 1914The First World War cuts off imports of German clinical thermometers
  2. 1921Sekisen Ken-onki founded at Shitaya-ku, Tokyo, with capital of ¥500,000
  3. 1922The company's clinical thermometer goes on sale
  4. 1963Disposable plastic syringe launched
  5. 1964Fujinomiya plant opens
  6. 1970Ashitaka plant opens

Terumo was created in 1921 for a single purpose — to make in Japan the clinical thermometer that the First World War had cut off at source — and for more than four decades that one product remained the whole of the business. When the company finally broke out of it in 1963, with a plastic syringe meant to be thrown away, it did so by carrying the volume-manufacturing habits of the thermometer into a product that consumed itself.

A start in import substitution, backed by Kitasato Shibasaburo

In September 1921, Sekisen Ken-onki Co., Ltd. was incorporated at Shitaya-ku in the city of Tokyo with capital of ¥500,000. Behind it lay the First World War, which had severed imports of clinical thermometers from Germany and left Japanese medicine needing a domestic supply. Dependence on a single country had shown its fragility in wartime, and a movement to raise a substitute source at home spread, led by medical scientists. The company was launched with the support of Kitasato Shibasaburo (北里柴三郎) and other medical scientists, and in February 1922 it put its thermometer on sale. Localising the manufacture of one product, the clinical thermometer, was the starting point of the business, and it remained the company's mainstay for more than forty years from its founding. This was a business structure resting on an external condition — import substitution — and after the war, holding its position as a domestic thermometer maker remained the central task of management.

Through the war and the years that followed it, Terumo's business stayed within the bounds of measuring instruments and medical disposables built around the thermometer. Shortages of raw materials in wartime and the controls on medical goods after it left little capacity for developing new products, and no strength to move abroad or diversify. A long stretch followed in which production rose in step with the growth of the domestic medical market; the name was still Sekisen Ken-onki, and forty years after its founding the company had yet to become anything more than one maker of medical disposables. That long run-up prepared the ground for the turn that came next. Domestic demand for thermometers alone had a visible ceiling, and widening the product line by taking in a new technology — plastics moulding — was an unavoidable theme for management.

Betting on the plastic syringe, and making the market for it

In January 1963, Terumo launched a disposable plastic syringe. In the Japan of that time it was normal practice to boil glass syringes and use them again, and single-use products met strong resistance from hospitals as costly and as generators of waste. Operating on the premise of re-use was embedded deep in hospital custom, equipment and economics, and switching away from it required strong outside pressure. Re-using a syringe, however, carried the risk of transmitting infections such as hepatitis, and in Europe and the United States the move to disposables was already under way. Terumo turned the volume-manufacturing know-how it had accumulated in thermometers to plastics moulding, and moved as the domestic first mover to create the market. It was a judgement in which an idea that ran against common sense — throwing the thing away — earned its logic on a single point, infection risk.

Going disposable was not simply a new product; it was a change in the structure of the business. Moving the main product from a durable good that could be used for decades, as a thermometer was, to a consumable premised on being discarded put demand on a stable and rising base. The Fujinomiya plant opened in 1964 and the Ashitaka plant in 1970, one after the other, and the range widened into plastic medical instruments such as syringes and infusion sets. The passage from domestic thermometer maker to maker of medical disposables was, in substance, complete within that decade. The name Sekisen Ken-onki nevertheless remained, so that to the outside world the image of a thermometer company persisted, and the gap with what the business actually was widened year by year. What was needed next was to put the name, and the overseas bases, in order.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1963Overseas bases and M&A assemble a full-line medical device maker

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1963 · unconsolidated
Revenue$2M
Net income
Net margin
FY2010 · consolidated
Revenue$3.6B
Net income$464M
Net margin12.9%
  1. 1971Terumo Europe NV established in Belgium
  2. 1971Kimble Terumo established in the United States
  3. 1974Renamed Terumo Corporation
  4. 1983Kofu plant opens
  5. 1985Listing moved up to the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
  6. 1989Research and development centre opens
  7. 1991Suruga plant opens
  8. 1995Wachi Takashi (和地孝) becomes president
  9. 1995Terumo Medical Products (Hangzhou) established in China
  10. 1999Cardiopulmonary bypass business bought from 3M of the United States
  11. 2002Vascutek of Britain acquired
  12. 2005Mission Medical of the United States acquired
  13. 2006MicroVention acquired
  14. 2007Prosthetic heart valve business taken over from Kohler of Germany

From 1971 Terumo placed its own companies in Europe and the United States, and in 1974 changed its name to match what the business had already become. The decisive move came in 1999, when it bought 3M's heart-lung business outright: from that point, buying a treatment area rather than developing one became a standing method, and within a decade catheters, neurovascular devices and prosthetic heart valves had all been added the same way.

A change of name that ratified what the business had become

In May 1971 Terumo Europe NV was established in Belgium, and in October of the same year Kimble Terumo in the United States, giving Terumo footholds in the European and American markets at once. Choosing local subsidiaries over exports was early for a mid-sized Japanese manufacturer of the day, but disposable medical instruments are bound by each country's pharmaceutical regulation, sterilisation standards and logistics, so selling and securing conformity on the ground was indispensable. Europe was covered from Belgium and the United States through the joint venture with Kimble — a local base placed in each principal market. In October 1974 the company changed its name to Terumo Corporation. The old name, which announced thermometers and nothing else, had come adrift from what the business was, and the change of name was a declaration of the turn towards a full-line medical device maker.

At home the Kofu plant opened in 1983, the research and development centre in 1989 and the Suruga plant in 1991, one after another, putting production and research bases in place. In May 1985 the listing was moved up to the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, giving the company the capacity to raise money in the capital markets. In the course of the passage from thermometer maker to medical device maker, three foundations — plant, listing and overseas bases — were put in place at the same time, and that became the precondition for the overseas acquisitions of the next stage. No one of them could on its own have carried the money and the executing strength an acquisition demands, and the fact that the three came together only in the second half of the 1990s is one reason the 3M deal of 1999 had to wait that long. A period of stacking up, in order, the elements that expansion required ran to this point.

Buying 3M's heart-lung business — stepping into cardiovascular

In June 1999, Terumo bought the cardiopulmonary bypass business from 3M of the United States and established Terumo Cardiovascular Systems. Before the purchase, Terumo was centred on general-purpose disposables such as infusion sets and syringes, and had not entered cardiovascular at all. A field as difficult and as high-value as the heart-lung machine is one where building up research, clinical trials and regulatory work in-house takes time measured in decades and a large sum of money. Emerging as 3M pressed on with tidying its healthcare businesses, this deal gave Terumo the opportunity to acquire in one movement a treatment area that its own development could not reach. The cardiovascular business would later, combined with interventional products such as catheters, become the base from which a leading company of the group grew.

Entering the 2000s, Terumo raised both the frequency and the size of its acquisitions. It took Vascutek of Britain in 2002, Mission Medical of the United States in 2005 and MicroVention of the United States (cerebrovascular treatment devices) in March 2006, and in 2007 took over the prosthetic heart valve business from Kohler コーラー社 of Germany. Catheters, cerebrovascular devices, prosthetic heart valves — all lay in treatment devices rather than on the old disposables line, and a pattern took shape of buying in, piece by piece, the fields in-house development could not reach. MicroVention would later become the core of the neurovascular area and, together with the purchase of Sequent Medical in 2016, grew into a driver of growth. Beginning from the 3M purchase of 1999, Terumo made buying businesses and connecting them a normal instrument of management.

CaridianBCT establishes a blood systems business

In April 2011, Terumo acquired CaridianBCT of the United States, a leader in blood component collection and processing. The price was among the largest Terumo had ever paid, and the deal came with a temporary fall in the equity ratio. Taking CaridianBCT allowed Terumo to make its transfusion and blood-related product range into an independent company, the blood systems business, completing a structure of three treatment areas alongside hospital and cardiovascular. It was the point at which the very scale of its acquisitions changed — from a method of filling in areas with individual purchases to one of taking an adjacent field of the existing business whole. A company that had begun with a single thermometer rebuilt its business portfolio into one holding three treatment areas — cardiovascular, blood and plasma, and hospital — and this purchase is where that happened.

Integration after the purchase was not easy. Segment figures for FY11 show the blood systems business running at a low level, $43.9M (¥4bn) of profit on sales of $900M (¥72bn), and there were periods when it turned to loss — a loss of $11.6M (¥1bn) in FY15 and of $26.6M (¥3bn) in FY16. Building a structure of three areas and earning a profit in those areas are separate problems. The burden of goodwill amortisation, the cost of integrating local organisations, the tidying of product lines, the rebuilding of sales structures market by market — these came together, and the integration burden exceeded what had been assumed when the deal was announced. Profit recovered to the ¥15bn level after the move to IFRS in 2017, but the fact that making the blood business pay took close to ten years shows that M&A does not produce results at once.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2011Growth areas filled in by acquisition, and production recast into three blocs

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2011 · consolidated
Revenue$4.1B
Net income$405M
Net margin9.8%
FY2024 · consolidated
Revenue$6.1B
Net income$702M
Net margin11.5%
  1. 2011CaridianBCT of the United States acquired
  2. 2016Sequent Medical of the United States acquired
  3. 2017Haemostasis device business bought from St. Jude / Abbott
  4. 2017Bolton Medical of the United States acquired
  5. 2017Sato Shinjiro becomes president and CEO
  6. 2018Essen Technology of China acquired, strengthening production inside China
  7. 2022GS26 medium-term management plan launched
  8. 2022Rika automated blood collection device enters limited launch
  9. 2023Production policy recast from optimal global siting into three blocs
  10. 2024Sixty centres rolled out with Rika
  11. 2024Samejima Hikaru (鮫島光) becomes president and CEO
  12. 2024Terumo Ventures, a corporate venture capital arm, established

The decade after CaridianBCT ran the same method at higher speed: Sequent Medical, the St. Jude haemostasis business and Bolton Medical were taken in within nine months of one another, and consolidated sales rose from $3.7B (¥328bn) in FY10 to $6.6B (¥922bn) in FY23. What changed alongside them was where the products had to be made, and how long each purchased business took to pay.

Neurovascular and aortic — growth areas assembled by acquisition

In April 2017 Sato Shinjiro (佐藤慎次郎) became president and CEO, and strengthening the global management structure became the central theme of management. Across the transition — Sequent Medical of the United States (devices for treating cerebral aneurysms) in July 2016, the haemostasis device business from Abbott/St. Jude of the United States in January 2017, Bolton Medical of the United States (aortic stent grafts) in March 2017 — Terumo took one carve-out after another out of the medical device industry. The timing was one in which the large medical companies were pressing selection and concentration on their business portfolios and putting non-core areas up for sale, a movement that had strengthened worldwide, and Terumo stood as the buyer taking in what the sellers were shedding. The neurovascular area grown from MicroVention, and the aortic area centred on Bolton, were both fields where entry through in-house development had fallen behind.

The growth areas assembled by acquisition appeared directly in the results. Consolidated sales expanded from $3.7B (¥328bn) in FY10 to $5.2B (¥588bn) in FY17 and $6.6B (¥922bn) in FY23, and operating profit reached $967.4M (¥109bn) in FY17, an operating margin of 18.5 per cent. Accounting differences from the move to IFRS are included in those figures, but the structure can still be read out of them: high gross-margin products in the cardiovascular area pulled the results. Measured against the level of profitability in the era when general-purpose disposables dominated, the change in business mix contributed directly to lifting the margin, and that can be read out of the FY17 operating margin of 18.5 per cent. In the not quite twenty years counted from the 3M purchase of 1999, Terumo ran M&A as a standing instrument of its growth strategy, and settled a pattern of management that fills in, one after another, the treatment areas its own development cannot reach.

From “optimal global siting” to a three-bloc structure

At the FY2023 results briefing, President Sato stated plainly that the former principle of siting production wherever in the world was optimal would be revised, and production rearranged into three blocs — Japan and Asia, the United States and Costa Rica, and inside China. What the phrase “optimal site” had taken as its premise was a world in which components and finished goods could be moved freely across borders. Behind the change lay the fracturing of supply chains that COVID-19 brought to the surface, the geopolitical risk between the United States and China, and the spread of volume-based procurement (VBP) in China, all of which raised the need to secure production capacity close to the point of demand. The strengthening of production inside China through the 2018 purchase of Essen Technology, and the expansion of the Costa Rica base in the 2020s, are both this three-bloc structure taking concrete form.

President Sato also acknowledged the difficulty that came with rearranging production: The Hangzhou plant is still in substance continuing production for Japan. Switching it to a new portfolio within a short period is the most important theme (results briefing, FY23 Q2). Switching the product portfolio at Hangzhou is the same thing as launching a new range of products for the Chinese market, work that includes the time needed for approvals and for opening up customers. The idea of overseas production, which had run on since local subsidiaries were placed in Europe and America in 1971, changed its meaning in the 2020s to production at the point of demand. Within a business structure in which more than seventy per cent of sales come from outside Japan, this can be called the period in which the geopolitical optimisation of where production sits was set back at the centre of management's agenda.

Rika and the long game of plasma innovation

Rika, the automated blood collection device at the core of the blood and plasma company, began a limited launch in 2022. Disrupted supply and a delayed ramp-up squeezed margins at first, and at the FY22 results briefing the position was explained as margin deterioration having reached its bottom. Because a collection device brings with it, case by case, training in operation at the customer's facility, approval, and replacement of existing machines, the pace at which centres are rolled out directly governs how revenue comes up. As of 2024 sixty centres had been rolled out, and the plan is that with the full rollout to CSL from spring to summer 2025 the exclusivity period ends and deployment to other customers begins. At the border centre in Texas in the United States, a facility able to collect from sixteen donors a day has also gone into operation. The length of the timeline from launch to full contribution is what characterises how this product is run.

Rika required more than four years from launch to full contribution, and became a case showing how long the lead time is in a medical device from launch through volume production to profitability. The company's explanation is that Rika's profit contribution starts in FY2025, and it is expected to reach break-even at that point (results briefing, FY24 Q3), and the plan is for it to account for more than half of the growth of the blood and plasma business as a whole in FY25. Counted from the CaridianBCT purchase to Rika's full contribution, rather more than fourteen years will have passed — and the flow of taking a business acquired by purchase, raising it again on the company's own products and volume-production processes, and making it pay over a timescale approaching ten years has settled in as the standard pattern of how Terumo runs its businesses. The rebuilding of the blood business is the type case of that pattern, tracing the same timeline as the integration of the 3M heart-lung business and of MicroVention.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

The turning points, read in full: what was at stake, what was chosen and what the revenue did around it. The Japanese edition is the edition of record and carries the sourced dossier behind each decision — background, options weighed, outcome — linked under every decision.

Key decision · 1921

The founding of Terumo: physicians and businessmen join to localise the thermometer after German imports stop (1921)

What a collective founding with the roles divided left behind

What this founding shows is the character of a vehicle company for import substitution, raised not by a single entrepreneur but by medical scientists and businessmen who divided the roles between them. An external event, the severing of imports by the First World War, lifted the localisation of the clinical thermometer above the commercial opportunity of any one operator into a question of medicine and public health, and medical legitimacy on one side, capital and distribution on the other, were supplied by separate hands. The distinguishing feature of this founding lies less in individual talent than in the framework that gathered people of differing positions around a shared problem.

A second thing that comes into view is the weight of the founding purpose — the localisation of one item, the clinical thermometer — being kept as the company's name for the next half century. That the name Sekisen Ken-onki was retained until 1974, long after the substance of the business had moved to disposables in general, shows how long the mission set at the founding continued to define the company's understanding of itself. A company that set out from the demand of its age for import substitution can be said to have carried its origin as its name for a very long time.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1995

Key decision · 1995

Wachi Takashi and the Terumo Business Unit: reforming the corporate culture (1995)

The author's view

Terumo's decade here can be seen as distinctive in that, before replacing the substance of the business, it first changed the way employees moved. The TBU was a cumbersome mechanism, a design with many faults if efficiency alone is measured, but it was also a device that forced on employees the experience of judging for themselves between two superiors. Wachi's method of withholding the answer and making people think, however much confusion it caused in the short run, appears to have had the effect of dissolving a wait-for-instructions constitution from the inside. It can be called a reform that bet on how people would move within the structure rather than on the elegance of the organisation chart.

At the same time, it is difficult to measure the results of something called culture by business figures alone. The growth in sales and net profit mixes in the growth of the markets themselves, catheters among them, and the contribution of the later overseas acquisitions. How far TBU was a direct cause cannot be separated out. Even so, Wachi's design for earning — funding the advanced work out of the base businesses — can be seen as the foundation of the period in which Terumo went on to widen its treatment areas through repeated acquisitions. How the reform of the culture connected to the turn in the structure of the business is a question still worth watching through the full history.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →


References & sources

This English edition follows the Japanese one chapter by chapter. The Japanese edition remains the edition of record: it carries the source-by-source citations, the financial tables and the shareholder and executive records. 日本語版(詳細)— Terumo full history in Japanese →

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →



Data API

Terumo’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET. Full specification →

/api/4543/manifest.json ·/api/4543/history.json ·/api/4543/timeline.json ·/api/4543/decisions.json ·/api/4543/executives.json ·/api/4543/shareholders.json ·/api/4543/financials.json ·/api/4543/financials-longterm.json ·/api/4543/segments.json ·/api/4543/regions.json ·/api/4543/workforce.json · /api/4543/decisions/{slug}.json

/api/companies.json ·/api/decisions.json