| Period | Type | Revenue | Profit* | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1950/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1951/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1952/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1953/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1954/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1955/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1956/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1957/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1958/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1959/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1960/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1961/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1962/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1963/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1964/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1965/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1966/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1967/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1968/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1969/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1970/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1971/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1972/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1973/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1974/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1975/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1976/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.1T | ¥15B | 0.6% |
| 1977/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.5T | ¥29B | 1.1% |
| 1978/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.3T | ¥16B | 0.6% |
| 1979/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.4T | ¥45B | 1.8% |
| 1980/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.8T | ¥106B | 3.7% |
| 1981/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.1T | ¥71B | 2.2% |
| 1982/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.1T | ¥56B | 1.8% |
| 1983/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.7T | ¥33B | 1.2% |
| 1984/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.7T | ¥4B | 0.1% |
| 1985/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.9T | ¥42B | 1.4% |
| 1986/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1987/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1988/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1989/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1990/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1991/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1992/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.2T | ¥78B | 2.4% |
| 1993/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.0T | ¥2B | 0.0% |
| 1994/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.7T | -¥54B | -2.0% |
| 1995/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.9T | -¥4B | -0.2% |
| 1996/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.1T | ¥55B | 2.6% |
| 1997/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.1T | ¥3B | 0.1% |
| 1998/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.1T | ¥6B | 0.1% |
| 1999/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.8T | ¥11B | 0.4% |
| 2000/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.7T | ¥11B | 0.4% |
| 2001/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.8T | ¥26B | 0.9% |
| 2002/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.7T | -¥28B | -1.1% |
| 2003/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.7T | -¥52B | -1.9% |
| 2004/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.9T | ¥42B | 1.4% |
| 2005/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.4T | ¥221B | 6.5% |
| 2006/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.9T | ¥344B | 8.8% |
| 2007/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.3T | ¥351B | 8.1% |
| 2008/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.8T | ¥355B | 7.3% |
| 2009/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.8T | ¥155B | 3.2% |
| 2010/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.5T | -¥12B | -0.4% |
| 2011/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.1T | ¥93B | 2.2% |
| 2012/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.1T | ¥58B | 1.4% |
| 2013/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.4T | -¥125B | -2.9% |
| 2014/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥5.5T | ¥243B | 4.3% |
| 2015/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥5.6T | ¥214B | 3.8% |
| 2016/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.9T | ¥145B | 2.9% |
| 2017/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.6T | ¥131B | 2.8% |
| 2018/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥5.7T | ¥181B | 3.1% |
| 2019/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥6.2T | ¥251B | 4.0% |
| 2020/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥5.9T | -¥432B | -7.3% |
| 2021/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.8T | -¥32B | -0.7% |
| 2022/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥6.8T | ¥637B | 9.3% |
| 2023/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥8.0T | ¥694B | 8.7% |
| 2024/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥8.9T | ¥549B | 6.1% |
The merger of Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel became the largest-scale merger review case under the postwar Anti-Monopoly Act regime, creating a tripartite confrontation among modern economists, the Japan Fair Trade Commission, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Behind the merger's approval was the political intervention of the LDP's Economic Research Commission suggesting amendments to the Anti-Monopoly Act. This merger served simultaneously as the starting point for domestic steel industry consolidation and as a turning point marking the retreat of economists' voice in industrial policy decision-making, establishing a precedent that shaped the direction of Anti-Monopoly Act enforcement in Japan thereafter.
In the steel industry of the 1960s, the six major companies—Yawata Steel, Fuji Steel, Nihon Kokan (NKK), Kawasaki Steel, Sumitomo Metals, and Kobe Steel—were engaged in a race to build new steelworks equipped with multiple blast furnaces, and the resulting expansion of production capacity heightened concerns about excessive competition. In July 1966, Shigeo Nagano, President of Fuji Steel, advocated the 'Two Great Steelmakers East and West' concept, testing public reaction to industry consolidation through a vision of grouping domestic steelmakers into two regional blocs. Notably, Fuji Steel and Yawata Steel had been operated as a single entity called 'Japan Iron & Steel' during wartime, but were split into separate companies by order of GHQ after the war.
On April 16, 1968, the Mainichi Shimbun ran a front-page headline: 'Yawata-Fuji Steel Merger Planned' / 'Both Presidents Reach Basic Agreement,' bringing the merger plan of the top two steel companies by revenue into public view. Although it took the form of a press scoop prior to any official announcement, in response to the coverage, Shigeo Nagano, President of Fuji Steel, and Yoshihiro Inayama, President of Yawata Steel, commenced formal negotiations toward the merger. On April 21 of the same month, both companies submitted a merger statement of intent to the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), presenting the view that their combined steel market share of 35% did not constitute an oligopoly.
On June 15, 1968, Tadao Uchida and 89 other modern economists submitted an 'Opinion Paper on Large-Scale Mergers' to the Japan Fair Trade Commission. Of the 90 signatories, 86 expressed concerns about the merger, objecting on the grounds that it contravened the competition maintenance policy enshrined in the Anti-Monopoly Act. Furthermore, in May 1969, the JFTC petitioned the Tokyo High Court for an emergency suspension order to block the merger, judging that while the overall steel market share was in the 30% range, oligopolies would form in certain product categories such as railway rails, stalling the merger proceedings.
In August 1968, the LDP's Economic Research Commission published an 'Interim Report on the Current Anti-Monopoly Act System,' suggesting legislative amendments on the grounds that the current Anti-Monopoly Act had been formulated during the immediate postwar occupation period and was no longer suited to new circumstances such as advancing capital liberalization and the emergence of giant global enterprises. The report criticized the JFTC's enforcement of the law as 'insular' and clearly signaled the ruling party's support for the Fuji-Yawata merger. Following such political pressure, in October 1969 the JFTC issued a 'Consent Decision' and approved the merger.
On March 31, 1970, the merger of Fuji Steel and Yawata Steel was completed, and Nippon Steel Corporation was established. A steelmaker ranking first in the world by crude steel production was born, with a workforce of 82,000 employees. Domestically, the company held a 44% share of pig iron production and a 35% share of crude steel, establishing an overwhelming leading position in the domestic steel industry. The management structure placed Shigeo Nagano (former President of Fuji Steel) as Chairman and Yoshihiro Inayama (former President of Yawata Steel) as President, supported by 6 Executive Vice Presidents, 6 Senior Managing Directors, 14 Managing Directors, and 12 Directors.
During the course of the merger proceedings, JFTC Chairman Seiichi Yamada resigned in November 1969. Yamada passed away in 1991 without ever commenting on his reasons for resignation, attesting to the magnitude of the merger review's impact on the JFTC's organizational governance. Moreover, the fact that the merger was consummated despite the submission of an opposition paper signed by 90 modern economists positioned this merger as a turning point indicating the relative decline of the political influence that economists had wielded in postwar industrial policy.
The merger of Yawata Steel and Fuji Steel became the largest-scale merger review case under the postwar Anti-Monopoly Act regime, creating a tripartite confrontation among modern economists, the Japan Fair Trade Commission, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Behind the merger's approval was the political intervention of the LDP's Economic Research Commission suggesting amendments to the Anti-Monopoly Act. This merger served simultaneously as the starting point for domestic steel industry consolidation and as a turning point marking the retreat of economists' voice in industrial policy decision-making, establishing a precedent that shaped the direction of Anti-Monopoly Act enforcement in Japan thereafter.
It was in July 1966 that I proposed the 'Two Great Steelmakers East and West' concept, but in truth, I had the merger with Yawata in mind all along. Instead of saying 'Yawata-Fuji merger,' I used the phrase 'two great steelmakers' as a trial balloon. Steel capacity adjustments are a perpetual source of friction. And as blast furnaces are built one after another, market prices fall. I spoke out of a feeling that something had to be done. I wanted to see how the public would react. (...)
Without a critical mass of people who had (during the wartime era) eaten from the same pot at Japan Iron & Steel, this merger could not have happened. If either I or Inayama had been absent, this merger would not have been possible.
Ninety active modern economists including Ryuichiro Tachi, Ryutaro Komiya, Tadao Uchida, and Masahiro Tatémoto have issued an opinion paper opposing recent large-scale mergers including the Yawata-Fuji merger, causing ripples not only among the merger parties but across government, the business community, and the Fair Trade Commission.
The opinion paper does not use the words 'oppose the merger,' but its contents and survey results are permeated with severe criticism. What it emphasizes most strongly is a warning that 'competition among enterprises has served as a driving force of Japan's postwar economic development, and if the Anti-Monopoly Act were to be amended or rendered meaningless to restrict competition or permit private monopoly, the engine of the Japanese economy would ultimately decline, and its sound and democratic development going forward would face grave obstacles,' expressing a deep sense of crisis about the future of the Japanese economy. (...)
The opinions coming from the government, business community, and government advisory bodies are all uniformly in support of the merger, and given the serious risk that this could distort both the importance of large-scale mergers for Japan's economic future and the fair judgment of the JFTC, the organizers say they 'felt compelled to act,' explaining the motivation behind releasing the opinion paper.
(1) While the role played by the ideal of free and fair competition among enterprises in contributing to the democratization and development of the Japanese economy should naturally be acknowledged,
(2) On the other hand, given the remarkable changes in socioeconomic realities and the international environment today, including the progress of capital liberalization, the emergence of giant global enterprises, and the necessity of fostering so-called systems industries requiring broad integration of technology and industrial capabilities, the numerous deficiencies that have arisen in the current legal framework in response to these new circumstances cannot be overlooked.
(3) Therefore, if the current Anti-Monopoly Act system is maintained as is, there is concern that it will become an obstacle to the restructuring of Japan's industrial configuration and future economic development as it seeks to adapt to the demands of the new era. (...)
The fact that law enforcement is often left to the insular judgment of the Fair Trade Commission means that important guidelines for industrial economics are sometimes swayed by the rigid views of the JFTC, and this constitutes a matter of national governance concern that must be rectified.
Among postwar economic issues, few have captured the public's attention as intensely as the Yawata-Fuji merger. From the moment Presidents Inayama of Yawata and Nagano of Fuji Steel indicated their intent to merge in April 1968, public opinion boiled over and scholarly debate flared fiercely over the propriety of the merger and the application of the Anti-Monopoly Act.
The business community sought to use this merger as a challenge to the Anti-Monopoly Act and a breakthrough for industrial restructuring, large-scale mergers, and the transition to an oligopolistic economy. The government, meanwhile, took a supportive posture through cabinet agreements welcoming the birth of a bona fide world-class enterprise in the era of internationalization.
On the other hand, a group of modern economists rose in opposition, arguing that the merger's realization would deal a fatal blow to the competition maintenance policy enshrined in the Anti-Monopoly Act and undermine the sound growth capacity of the Japanese economy. The JFTC labor union, too, motivated by a sense of mission as guardians of the Anti-Monopoly Act, took the unprecedented step of petitioning the Fair Trade Commission for strict enforcement—also an extraordinary move. Woven between these positions were the concerns of small and medium enterprises fearful of the mammoth's power and the voices of consumers worried about the emergence of administered prices from giant industry.