Toei Animation: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)
1948From Nihon Doga to Toei’s feature-animation studio
1948Founded as Nihon Doga and begins producing animation
1952Renamed Nichido Eiga
1956Toei buys Nichido Eiga and renames it Toei Doga
1957First short film, Koneko no Rakugaki, completed
1958Hakujaden, Japan’s first colour animated feature, completed
1960Head office moved to Nishi-Ginza, Tokyo
1963First television series, Okami Shonen Ken, begins broadcasting
1966The feature Gulliver’s Travels Beyond the Moon is released in the United States too
1967Television series go out in colour from episode 18 of Mahotsukai Sally
1973Tavac established; production outsourcing overseas begins
1975Overseas sales of television animation series begin
1979Galaxy Express 999, its first self-produced feature, released
Toei Animation began in January 1948 as Nihon Doga, a small post-war studio that Toei bought in 1956 and rebuilt as its own feature-animation arm — the house that made Japan’s first full-colour animated feature and then, from 1963, carried the form into television. For most of three decades it made what its parent distributed, and only in 1979, with a feature it produced itself, did it begin to keep what its work earned.
Japan’s first full-scale post-war animation studio
In January 1948 Nihon Doga Co. was established at Haramachi, Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo. Nihon Doga was founded as a dedicated post-war animation studio, carrying on the pre-war Japanese tradition of making animated films — manga eiga. In August 1952 it was renamed Nichido Eiga Co., and in July 1956 Toei Co., one of the majors of Japanese cinema, bought Nichido Eiga and renamed it Toei Doga Co. With its head office at Kyobashi, Chuo Ward, Tokyo and its production works at Haramachi, Shinjuku Ward, the company started again as Toei’s division for producing feature-length theatrical animation. Okawa Hiroshi (大川博), president of Toei and the man behind the purchase, positioned Toei Doga as Japan’s first full-scale animation production company, one built to stand against Disney, and announced a management policy of running it as a dedicated studio for feature-length theatrical animation.
In January 1957 the production works moved to a studio at Higashi-Oizumi, Nerima Ward, Tokyo — the Oizumi Studio. In May 1957 the company completed its first short animated film, Koneko no Rakugaki (こねこのらくがき). In October 1958 Hakujaden (白蛇伝), Japan’s first full-scale colour animated feature, was completed and released. Hakujaden is counted among the most important works in the history of the Japanese animation industry, and from it Toei Doga took the position of the head temple of the Japanese animation business. In September 1960 the head office moved to Nishi-Ginza — now Ginza — in Chuo Ward, Tokyo. In November 1963 the company’s first television animation series, Okami Shonen Ken (狼少年ケン), began broadcasting, marking its entry into television animation production. From episode 18 of Mahotsukai Sally (魔法使いサリー) in April 1967 its television series went out in colour, the company having moved early to install colour broadcasting equipment during the changeover from black and white.
Overseas expansion, and self-production beginning with Galaxy Express 999
In February 1973 the company established Tavac Co. (タバック) as a subsidiary, splitting off part of its recording and editing operations. In June 1973 it began outsourcing production overseas, building a division of labour that drew on inexpensive drawing staff in the Philippines, Korea and other Asian countries. In February 1975 it began selling its television animation series abroad in earnest, pushing licence sales to broadcasters and distributors in the United States and Europe and setting out to open up overseas markets. Over the same period Toei Doga went through labour disputes that changed its production structure, and the studio moved steadily to running on freelance contracts. In August 1979 it released Galaxy Express 999 (銀河鉄道999), the first theatrical animated feature it produced on its own account, standing up a production and distribution arrangement that did not rest on Toei’s distribution.
Galaxy Express 999, the theatrical version of a popular television series drawn from Matsumoto Leiji’s (松本零士) original, was a large hit and demonstrated that the self-production model made economic sense. From then on Toei Doga, while continuing the contract production that was subordinate to the distribution of Toei itself, built up a library of self-produced works in which it held its own IP — intellectual property — laying the foundations of a produce-in-house, sell-overseas business model across both television and theatrical animation. In March 1980 it began full-scale research into making animated images by computer, starting the technical preparation for digital production.
1980Dragon Ball, Sailor Moon, One Piece — three franchises and a listing
Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2006 · unconsolidated
Revenue$186M
Net income$21M
Net margin11.1%
→
FY2013 · consolidated
Revenue$344M
Net income$34M
Net margin9.8%
1980Full-scale research begins into making animation by computer
1985Computer-controlled camera system introduced
1986Dragon Ball begins broadcasting; first OVA and own game software
1991CATAS, its in-house digital production software, completed
1992Sailor Moon begins broadcasting; EEI-TOEI joint venture in the Philippines
1995Dragon Ball and Sailor Moon begin broadcasting in the United States
1997Television series digitised with RETAS; Hong Kong sales subsidiary set up
1998Renamed Toei Animation
1999One Piece begins broadcasting; head office moves to Oizumi
2000Listed on the over-the-counter market
2004Futari wa Pretty Cure begins; sales subsidiaries in Los Angeles and Paris; JASDAQ listing
2007TV Asahi buys more shares and becomes an other affiliated company
2013Shinjuku and other offices consolidated into the Nakano office
The three decades from 1980 gave Toei Animation the assets it still lives on: Dragon Ball in 1986, Sailor Moon in 1992 and One Piece in 1999, each a franchise that outlived its own broadcast run. Digitisation was written in-house as CATAS, sales subsidiaries opened in Hong Kong, Los Angeles and Paris, and in December 2000 the company went public while staying inside the Toei group — with revenue of $185.8M (¥22bn) in the year to March 2006 rising to $344.3M (¥34bn) by the year to March 2013.
Building the global franchises, and developing CATAS
In October 1985, to diversify and speed up image processing, the company introduced a computer-controlled camera system. In February 1986 the television series Dragon Ball began broadcasting. Drawn from Toriyama Akira’s (鳥山明) manga, it became a long-running hit far beyond what had been assumed at the outset, and it transformed Toei Doga’s earnings base. Broadcast fees, theatrical versions and merchandise licence income from Dragon Ball became the company’s central source of earnings, supporting consolidated results through the late 1980s and across the 1990s. In March 1986 the company began production of its first original video animation, Shonan Bakusozoku (湘南爆走族), and at the same time started selling game software of its own making, moving in earnest into media beyond television and the cinema.
In December 1991 CATAS — Computer Aided TOEI Animation System — the company’s own software for producing images by computer, was completed. CATAS carried the technical passage from hand-painted cels to digital production through on software written in-house, and it was a digitisation move ahead of the industry. In March 1992 the television series Sailor Moon (美少女戦士セーラームーン) began broadcasting. Drawn from Takeuchi Naoko’s (武内直子) manga, it too was a large hit at home and abroad, and became a second global franchise after Dragon Ball. In November 1992 the company set up EEI-TOEI ANIMATION CORPORATION as a joint venture with EEI of the Philippines, incorporating its local outsourced-production arrangement. In September 1995 Dragon Ball and Sailor Moon began broadcasting in the United States; both drove the anime boom in the American market and lifted the share of sales earned overseas.
In February 1997 the company began digitising its television series using the digital production software RETAS. In March 1997 it established the sales subsidiary TOEI ANIMATION ENTERPRISES LTD. in Hong Kong as a joint venture, taking a 60% stake. In October 1998 it changed its name from Toei Doga Co. to Toei Animation Co., switching to an English-language corporate name suited to carrying the brand worldwide. In June 1999 the head office moved to Higashi-Oizumi, Nerima Ward, Tokyo, the site of the Oizumi Studio. In October 1999 the television series One Piece began broadcasting. Drawn from Oda Eiichiro’s (尾田栄一郎) manga, it became a third global franchise after Dragon Ball and Sailor Moon, and through more than twenty years as a series and a continuing run of theatrical versions it is Toei Animation’s largest pillar of earnings to this day.
OTC listing, JASDAQ, and the move to the TSE Standard Market
In December 2000 the company listed on the over-the-counter market. Fifty-two years after its founding, the core company of Japan’s post-war animation industry went public for the first time. Toei itself was the largest shareholder at the time of the listing, and the relationship — a listed subsidiary within the Toei group — was made explicit in the context of the public market. In August 2001 the number of shares in one trading lot was changed from 1,000 to 100, becoming one unit from October that year. In December 2004 the shares were listed on the JASDAQ Securities Exchange, and at the same time the company established the sales subsidiary TOEI ANIMATION EUROPE S.A.S. in Paris, France, creating the base from which to open up the European market. In March 2004 it had set up the sales subsidiary TOEI ANIMATION INCORPORATED in Los Angeles, giving it a sales foothold in the United States as well.
In April 2006 the Toei Animation Institute moved to Higashi-Oizumi, Nerima Ward, Tokyo. In July 2006 the Japanese-American co-produced television series Powerpuff Girls Z (出ましたっ!パワパフガールズZ) began broadcasting, and the company opened a representative office in Shanghai, China. In August 2006 it carried out a two-for-one split of its ordinary shares to improve the liquidity of the stock. In May 2007 TV Asahi acquired further Toei Animation shares, taking its holding above 15% and making it an other affiliated company. With that, a capital structure was settled in which Toei and TV Asahi stood side by side as the largest and second-largest shareholders. In October 2009 the company released Kikansha Yaemon (きかんしゃやえもん), its first stereoscopic 3D theatrical animation. Through the merger of JASDAQ with the Osaka Securities Exchange in April 2010 and the market integration with the Tokyo Stock Exchange in July 2013, the company passed through the successive changes of listing venue that came with the market reorganisation of the 2010s.
2014Going fully digital, and the surge that followed the pandemic
Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2014 · consolidated
Revenue$293M
Net income$22M
Net margin7.4%
→
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$674M
Net income$158M
Net margin23.4%
2014Head office established at Nakano, Tokyo; production moves to an interim studio
2018Production moves into the new all-digital Oizumi Studio
2018Three-for-one split of the ordinary shares
2020TOEI ANIMATION ENTERPRISES sets up a Shanghai joint venture
2022Moves to the TSE Standard Market; operating margin reaches a record 32.7%
2023The Toei Animation Drawing Academy opens
2024Five-for-one split of the ordinary shares
2025Revenue passes ¥100bn; the VISION2030 mid-term plan is drawn up
From 2014 Toei Animation rebuilt where and how it worked — head-office functions gathered at Nakano, an all-digital production studio at Oizumi from 2018 — and then the streaming era arrived on top of that rebuilt base. Revenue roughly tripled in a decade to pass ¥100bn, and what the company has set itself in VISION2030 is whether it can build enough capacity to make the work that would double it again.
Consolidating at Nakano, and opening the new Oizumi Studio
In August 2014 the head office was placed at Nakano, Nakano Ward, Tokyo. The move to the Nakano office, which gathered in the Shinjuku office and the various sites around it, was made to streamline head-office functions. In December of the same year, with the redevelopment of the Oizumi Studio, production functions moved temporarily to an interim studio at Hikarigaoka, Nerima Ward, Tokyo. In January 2018 the company moved from the interim Hikarigaoka studio into the new Oizumi Studio, settling into a two-site arrangement of head office — the Nakano office — and production studio, the new Oizumi Studio. Fitted with a modern digital production environment, the new Oizumi Studio became the key site for taking every process digital, with drawing tablets introduced and a 3DCG production environment put in place. In April 2018 the company carried out a three-for-one split of its ordinary shares, improving the liquidity of the stock further.
Consolidated results grew from revenue of $413.6M (¥33bn) and operating profit of around $62.7M (¥5bn) in FY11, the year to March 2012, to $308.7M (¥34bn) of revenue and $69.8M (¥8bn) of operating profit in FY15, the year to March 2016; $362.9M (¥41bn) and $90M (¥10bn) in FY16, the year to March 2017; $416.7M (¥46bn) and $102.4M (¥11bn) in FY17, the year to March 2018; and $511M (¥56bn) and $144M (¥16bn) in FY18, the year to March 2019 — high growth that multiplied revenue by 1.7 and operating profit by three in seven years. Licence income from the theatrical versions and streaming rights of the core franchises — Dragon Ball, Sailor Moon, One Piece, Pretty Cure and Digimon — expanded, and the business turned into a structure in which copyright income, that is licence income, rather than television broadcast fees was the main driver of results. In FY19, the year to March 2020, revenue was $513.2M (¥55bn) and operating profit $150.8M (¥16bn); in FY20, the year to March 2021, revenue was $470M (¥52bn) and operating profit $141.2M (¥16bn) — an operating margin held at the 28 to 30 per cent level even in the phase that took the early impact of Covid.
The streaming boom, the Standard Market and a five-for-one split
In April 2022, with the review of the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s market segments, the company moved to the TSE Standard Market. Its ratio of tradable shares did not meet the Prime Market criteria, and continued listing on the Standard Market was the course chosen. From revenue of $433.9M (¥57bn) and operating profit of $137.8M (¥18bn) in FY21, the year to March 2022, the company grew sharply to revenue of $622.7M (¥88bn) and operating profit of $204.3M (¥29bn) in FY22, the year to March 2023 — revenue up 53 per cent and operating profit up 58 per cent — carried by licence contracts with the global streaming platforms, Netflix, Disney+, Amazon Prime Video, Crunchyroll and others, during the pandemic, and by the boom running through the whole anime industry, including Demon Slayer (鬼滅の刃) and Jujutsu Kaisen (呪術廻戦). The operating margin reached 32.7 per cent, the highest level in the company’s history.
In April 2023 the company opened the Toei Animation Drawing Academy, bringing the training of people in-house and responding to the exhaustion of talent across the industry. In April 2024 it carried out a five-for-one split of its ordinary shares. In FY23, the year to March 2024, revenue was $585.5M (¥89bn), operating profit $154.5M (¥23bn) and net profit $124.1M (¥19bn); in FY24, the year to March 2025, revenue was $673.6M (¥101bn), operating profit $216.5M (¥32bn) and net profit $157.7M (¥24bn) — a highly profitable business of ¥100bn annual revenue at an operating margin around 32 per cent. Under Takagi Katsuhiro (高木勝裕), who became president in FY11 and came out of Toei CM, the centre of management strategy is the maximisation of IP value — on three axes of theatrical earnings, streaming licences and character merchandising — and the strengthening of the overseas business through a sales network at four world poles, Tokyo, Los Angeles, Paris and Shanghai. The management questions of the next era come down to three: diversifying an earnings structure that leans too heavily on the three big franchises, introducing AI to make the animation production process more efficient, and designing a governance that secures autonomy within the group while maintaining the two-large-shareholder structure of Toei and TV Asahi.
The turning points, read in full: what was at stake, what was chosen and what the revenue did around it. The Japanese edition is the edition of record and carries the sourced dossier behind each decision — background, options weighed, outcome — linked under every decision.
Key decision · 1956
Buying the short-film subcontractor Nichido Eiga and remaking it as a dedicated feature studio (1956)
What it means to buy people and skills
What Toei acquired in this purchase was twenty-three animators and the production experience they had built up on short films. The equipment, the distribution network and the money were all on Toei’s side; what Nichido Eiga held was people and skill, and nothing besides. Even so, Toei chose to buy the company entire rather than carry on a relationship of repeated commissions. For a product such as feature-length animation, which cannot be finished without pouring labour and time into a single work, leaving the ability to produce in the hands of a counterparty with whom terms had to be negotiated work by work made both cost and schedule hard to read. Moving the capacity to produce inside the company can be seen as the precondition for turning out one feature a year for close to a decade.
The capacity placed inside, however, also became something to be managed. Work that a workshop of twenty-odd people had run on individual trust turned, in a divided organisation of 284, into questions of pay scales and performance appraisal. The formation of a labour union, and the outflow of young animators, cannot be separated from the increase in scale the acquisition brought. A transaction to buy people’s skills was also a transaction that took on how those people worked. Inside the decade in which Toei Doga flew the flag of the Disney of the East, the expression it modelled on Disney and the labour conditions that supported it became problems at one and the same time.
Going public on the OTC market while staying Toei’s subsidiary, to hold its own means of raising money (2000)
The ¥4bn that never passed through Toei’s hands
What was chosen in the offering of 2000 was not whether to become independent of Toei but whether to add one more entrance for money. All one million shares were a public offering of new stock; Toei sold none of its holding. Toei remained the largest shareholder after the offering, holding 32.00% at the end of March 2006. Even so, the roughly $37.1M (¥4bn) that came in at an underwriting price of ¥4,042 a share entered the company without passing through Toei’s hands, and went out to the digitisation of the drawing process and to the American and French sales subsidiaries placed in 2004.
Look at the shareholders who lined up, though, and the character of that ¥4bn shows through. Among the large shareholders at the end of March 2006 were TV Asahi with 14.29%, Fuji Television with 7.14% and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone East with 3.71% — the broadcasters that carry the works, and the telecommunications company that laid the wide-area LAN linking twenty-one production studios. Outside money had been let in, but it was not money from outside the business. A design that adds only one entrance for capital is inexpensive for as long as the parent and the outside shareholders want the same thing. How the minority’s share is to be treated once those wants diverge remains, in a day when parent-subsidiary listings are being questioned again, an open point at Toei Animation.
VISION2030, a mid-term plan targeting ¥200bn of revenue and ¥50bn of operating profit (2025)
A plan that bets on supply, not demand
Look only at the figure — doubling revenue in five years — and it reads as a bullish plan riding worldwide demand for animation. What the breakdown of the investment shows, though, is a constraint on the supply side. $467.8M (¥70bn) to works, $160.4M (¥24bn) to studio development and $100.2M (¥15bn) to the base of people: more than half of the ¥200bn goes to the capacity to make things itself. Whether a company of 1,048 consolidated employees can add several hundred production staff and raise its output capacity by half is what the ¥200bn of revenue rests on.
That the attempt has only just been set going shows in the company’s own numbers as well. In the first year of the plan, the year to March 2027, operating profit is planned to fall 19.4%, with the extra staff and the investment in works coming out first. The year to March 2026 has turned to a fall in revenue on the reaction against overseas streaming and game rights for the Dragon Ball series, and the earnings from existing works swing from year to year. The ¥50bn allocated to M&A has, as of this writing, got no further than narrowing candidates to a shortlist. Whether the doubling happens will be decided less by the strength of demand than by whether the company can keep sowing for five years.
This English edition follows the Japanese one chapter by chapter. The Japanese edition remains the edition of record: it carries the source-by-source citations, the financial tables and the shareholder and executive records. 日本語版（詳細）— Toei Animation full history in Japanese →
Toei Animation Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports), including the 沿革 corporate-history section, the large-shareholder tables and the consolidated results from the year to March 2006 onward.
Toei Animation Co., Ltd. — 決算短信 (consolidated earnings releases) and results-briefing materials, and the medium-term management plan VISION2030 (2025).
Toei Animation Co., Ltd. — the corporate history and works chronology published by the company (東映アニメーション).