Founded in 1899. Known for 'Rohto Eye Drops,' the company acquired the global Mentholatum brand through the purchase of The Mentholatum Company. Expanding into skincare and health foods, and aggressively expanding into Southeast Asia, it evolved from an OTC drug maker into a comprehensive healthcare company.
1899
Founded Shintendo Yamada Yasutami Yakubo. Launched gastrointestinal medicine 'Ikatsu'
1899Founded Shintendo Yamada Yasutami Yakubo. Launched gastrointestinal medicine 'Ikatsu'
1909
Launched eye drops 'Rohto Eye Drops'
1909Launched eye drops 'Rohto Eye Drops'
1949
Strategic Decision
Established Rohto Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
Shareholder structure of family incorporation where five Yamada brothers held 50%
1954
Strategic Decision
Launched gastrointestinal medicine 'Shiron'
The few-product concentration structure that maintained high profits despite investing 27% of revenue in advertising
1959
Established a new headquarters factory in Ikuno Ward, Osaka
1959Established a new headquarters factory in Ikuno Ward, Osaka
1961
Listed on the Second Section of the Osaka Securities Exchange
1961Listed on the Second Section of the Osaka Securities Exchange
1964
Designated to the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and Osaka Securities Exchange
1964Designated to the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and Osaka Securities Exchange
1975
Strategic Decision
Acquired trademark license for Mentholatum ointment
An entry scheme that acquired only the trademark while avoiding the bankrupt company's 2 billion yen in liabilities
1975
Acquired three companies including Nihon Josephine. Full-scale entry into cosmetics
1975Acquired three companies including Nihon Josephine. Full-scale entry into cosmetics
1983
Strategic Decision
Lost the No. 1 domestic market share in gastrointestinal drugs
Pansiron's insistence on being an 'all-purpose drug' cost it the top position to 'symptom-specific drugs'
1988
Strategic Decision
Acquired The Mentholatum Company of the United States
The binary choice between royalty dependence and a 9.8 billion yen acquisition of the brand's source
1991
Strategic Decision
Established a local subsidiary in China
A foreign premium strategy that captured 90% of the lip care market by pricing at 10 times the Japanese level
1996
Established Rohto Indonesia
1996Established Rohto Indonesia
1997
Established Rohto Mentholatum Indonesia
1997Established Rohto Mentholatum Indonesia
1998
Established Rohto USA
1998Established Rohto USA
1998
Established a new factory in Orchard Park
1998Established a new factory in Orchard Park
1999
Yasukuni Yamada became chairman; Kunio Yamada became president
1999Yasukuni Yamada became chairman; Kunio Yamada became president
2001
Strategic Decision
Full-scale investment in skincare
The 'functionality x low price' design that enabled a pharmaceutical company's entry into skincare
2003
Strategic Decision
Concluded a strategic business alliance with Morishita Jintan
2010
Strategic Decision
Accelerated production investment in Southeast Asia
An irreversible decision to build three factories in Indonesia and shift to 'consumer-market production'
2014
Acquired shares in Yaeyama Farm
2014Acquired shares in Yaeyama Farm
2016
Domestic Hada Labo sales plateaued
2016Domestic Hada Labo sales plateaued
2016
Launched the 'External Challenge Work' program (permitting employee side jobs)
2016Launched the 'External Challenge Work' program (permitting employee side jobs)
2018
President Toshiaki Yoshino passed away suddenly
2018President Toshiaki Yoshino passed away suddenly
2022
Reduced promotional expenses. Improved profit margins for three consecutive fiscal years
2022Reduced promotional expenses. Improved profit margins for three consecutive fiscal years
View Performance
RevenueRohto Pharmaceutical:Revenue
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: ¥100M)
¥239B
Revenue:2023/3
ProfitRohto Pharmaceutical:Net Profit Margin
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: %)
11%
Margin:2023/3
View Performance
PeriodTypeRevenueProfit*Margin
1959/7Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥3B¥1B23.0%
1960/7Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥3B¥1B20.9%
1961/7Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥3B¥1B21.3%
1962/7Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥4B¥1B22.9%
1963/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1964/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥4B¥1B18.9%
1965/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥5B¥1B14.0%
1966/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥4B¥1B14.2%
1967/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥4B¥1B12.3%
1968/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥5B¥1B13.6%
1969/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥5B¥1B16.5%
1970/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥6B¥1B17.2%
1971/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥6B¥1B17.5%
1972/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥7B¥1B17.0%
1973/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥6B¥1B16.5%
1974/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥7B¥1B14.3%
1975/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥8B¥1B14.9%
1976/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥8B¥1B12.5%
1977/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥9B¥1B11.5%
1978/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥9B¥1B10.3%
1979/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥11B¥1B10.4%
1980/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥13B¥2B11.5%
1981/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥15B¥2B10.8%
1982/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥16B¥2B9.5%
1983/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥15B¥1B8.4%
1984/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥16B¥1B8.1%
1985/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥17B¥2B9.4%
1986/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥16B¥1B7.1%
1987/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥17B¥1B7.0%
1988/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥18B¥1B7.4%
1989/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥18B¥2B9.3%
1990/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥19B¥2B9.5%
1991/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥20B¥2B7.9%
1992/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥21B¥1B5.3%
1993/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥20B¥1B3.1%
1994/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥21B¥1B4.2%
1995/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥24B¥1B5.0%
1996/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥28B¥2B6.5%
1997/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥35B¥2B5.2%
1998/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥40B¥2B5.4%
1999/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥42B¥2B4.8%
2000/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥56B¥3B5.1%
2001/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥60B¥3B5.5%
2002/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥63B¥2B3.6%
2003/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥66B-¥1B-2.0%
2004/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥67B¥4B5.5%
2005/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥73B¥5B7.4%
2006/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥86B¥7B7.5%
2007/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥96B¥7B6.9%
2008/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥108B¥8B6.9%
2009/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥111B¥6B5.5%
2010/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥113B¥8B6.8%
2011/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥115B¥8B6.8%
2012/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥120B¥8B6.8%
2013/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥129B¥8B6.2%
2014/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥144B¥9B6.2%
2015/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥152B¥9B5.6%
2016/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥167B¥9B5.4%
2017/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥155B¥10B6.4%
2018/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥172B¥9B5.4%
2019/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥184B¥10B5.3%
2020/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥188B¥15B8.1%
2021/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥181B¥17B9.2%
2022/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥200B¥21B10.5%
2023/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥239B¥26B11.0%
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1899
Founded Shintendo Yamada Yasutami Yakubo. Launched gastrointestinal medicine 'Ikatsu'
1909
Launched eye drops 'Rohto Eye Drops'
1949
9

Established Rohto Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.

Shareholder structure of family incorporation where five Yamada brothers held 50%

Looking at the shareholder composition as of 1970, founder Teruo Yamada and his five sons held a combined 50.33%, with the remainder held in dispersed ownership by banks including Mitsubishi Bank and Sumitomo Bank. The ability to avoid dilution of management control despite incorporation and listing was due to a design in which shares were allocated to the five brothers in nearly equal ratios, with acceptance of external capital kept to a minimum. This shareholder structure of maintaining family control while establishing a framework for growth represents a typical capital policy approach among family businesses in postwar Japan.

BackgroundDemand for organizational transformation during postwar turmoil

Rohto Pharmaceutical, founded in 1899 as Shintendo Yamada Yasutami Yakubo, had long been operated as a sole proprietorship by the Yamada family. Before the war, the company had expanded its business, including establishing factories not only domestically but also on the Chinese mainland, centering on household medicines, but was severely affected by wartime disruption and the controlled economy.

After the war, the Japanese economy entered a recovery phase, and demand for pharmaceuticals also recovered rapidly. Meanwhile, capital investment, raw material procurement, and distribution expansion required greater financial capacity and creditworthiness than before, and the limitations of the sole proprietorship framework for accommodating business expansion became apparent.

DecisionIncorporation while maintaining family management

In response to these environmental changes, in September 1949, Rohto Pharmaceutical converted from a sole proprietorship to a corporation, establishing Rohto Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. with capital of 10 million yen. Teruo Yamada, a member of the founding family, assumed the presidency, and the management structure continued to be controlled by the Yamada family.

Even after incorporation, capital increases were primarily conducted centered on the founding family, and dilution of management control through acceptance of external capital was deliberately avoided. Incorporation was not a change in management entity but a decision to establish an institutional framework for growth.

ResultEstablishment of capital base and groundwork for listing

Through incorporation, Rohto Pharmaceutical was able to pursue capital procurement and capital investment in earnest, expanding its production system and distribution network throughout the 1950s. Having a corporate entity also stabilized relationships with financial institutions and business partners, greatly increasing operational flexibility.

As an extension of this, the company listed on the Second Section of the Osaka Securities Exchange in 1961, gaining public credibility. Even after listing, the Yamada family occupied most of the major shareholder positions, and the management style of Rohto Pharmaceutical—growing while maintaining family management—was institutionally established at this point.

TableMajor shareholders of Rohto Pharmaceutical: As of March 1970
Shareholder nameRelationshipOwnership ratio
Yasukuni YamadaEldest son of Teruo19.01%
Yasunobu YamadaSecond son of Teruo6.89%
Yasusada YamadaThird son of Teruo (academic)6.57%
Yasumasa YamadaFourth son of Teruo (academic)6.25%
Yasuhiro YamadaFifth son of Teruo5.91%
Teruo Yamada-5.70%
Mitsubishi Bank-3.76%
Sumitomo Bank-2.51%
Daiwa Bank-2.51%
Sanwa Bank-2.19%
Shareholder name
Yasukuni Yamada
Relationship
Eldest son of Teruo
Ownership ratio
19.01%
SourceJapan Corporate Directory 1970 Edition | 1970
Shareholder structure of family incorporation where five Yamada brothers held 50%

Looking at the shareholder composition as of 1970, founder Teruo Yamada and his five sons held a combined 50.33%, with the remainder held in dispersed ownership by banks including Mitsubishi Bank and Sumitomo Bank. The ability to avoid dilution of management control despite incorporation and listing was due to a design in which shares were allocated to the five brothers in nearly equal ratios, with acceptance of external capital kept to a minimum. This shareholder structure of maintaining family control while establishing a framework for growth represents a typical capital policy approach among family businesses in postwar Japan.

TimelineEstablished Rohto Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. — Key Events
9/1949Established Rohto Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
Capital1000ten thousand yen
1/1955Capital increase (raised 30 million yen)
Capital after increase0.4100M JPY
8/1959Capital increase (raised 80 million yen)
Capital after increase1.2100M JPY
11/1961Capital increase (raised 240 million yen)
Capital after increase3.6100M JPY
11/1962Capital increase (raised 360 million yen)
Capital after increase7.2100M JPY
1954

Launched gastrointestinal medicine 'Shiron'

The few-product concentration structure that maintained high profits despite investing 27% of revenue in advertising

The prototype of Rohto Pharmaceutical's profitability structure lies in focusing on a single gastrointestinal medicine shipping over 3 million packets daily, while investing 27–29% of revenue in advertising expenses yet maintaining an operating profit margin of around 19%. By narrowing to a few products, cost reduction through mass production became possible, and concentrating advertising spend on a single product simultaneously captured brand recognition and market share. This model of 'few products, mass sales, high advertising ratio' was subsequently inherited by Pansiron and Hada Labo.

BackgroundPostwar gastrointestinal medicine market and changes in demand structure

Gastrointestinal medicine, Rohto Pharmaceutical's founding business, had seen demand recover along with the improvement of postwar food conditions, but the flagship product 'Ikatsu' had been on the market for an extended period and its commercial appeal was becoming obsolete. As postwar reconstruction progressed, the dietary habits of the Japanese changed both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the role expected of gastrointestinal medicines was beginning to shift.

Entering the 1950s, addressing symptoms closely tied to daily life—such as indigestion caused by overeating and increased dining out—became increasingly important, and conventional stomach medicines could no longer adequately respond. In the OTC drug market, launching new products that combined breadth of symptom coverage with ease of use was becoming a prerequisite for growth.

DecisionNew product launch premised on few-product concentration

In response to these market changes, in 1954, Rohto Pharmaceutical launched a new gastrointestinal medicine called 'Shiron.' Adopting sodium bicarbonate as the antacid, it was positioned as a comprehensive gastrointestinal medicine addressing a wide range of digestive complaints including overeating and stomach heaviness, rather than being limited to specific symptoms.

The company adopted a policy of concentrating management resources on the single product 'Shiron' rather than simultaneously developing multiple new products. On the production side, cost reduction was pursued through low-variety, high-volume manufacturing, and on the sales side, advertising spending was concentrated on a single product to simultaneously achieve brand awareness expansion and market penetration. This decision was exceptional in the OTC drug industry at the time, where multi-product strategies were common.

ResultEstablishment of high-profitability structure and business model

Shiron rapidly expanded sales after launch and grew into Rohto Pharmaceutical's flagship product by the late 1950s. By the early 1960s, it had reached a scale accounting for the majority of the company's revenue, and the company succeeded in maintaining high profit margins while aggressively investing in advertising.

As a result, Rohto Pharmaceutical established a high-turnover profitability model based on few-product concentration and mass sales. The success of Shiron completed the business structure centered on gastrointestinal medicine and eye drops, and this business model strongly influenced the company's decision-making as the fundamental philosophy behind subsequent brand strategy and promotional investment.

TableRohto Pharmaceutical: Advertising expenses
FYRevenueAdvertising expensesOperating profitRevenue-to-advertising expense ratio
FY19602.8B yen760M yen550M yen27.1%
FY19613.22B yen920M yen660M yen28.5%
FY19623.6B yen1.05B yen780M yen29.1%
FY
FY1960
Revenue
2.8B yen
Advertising expenses
760M yen
Operating profit
550M yen
Revenue-to-advertising expense ratio
27.1%
The few-product concentration structure that maintained high profits despite investing 27% of revenue in advertising

The prototype of Rohto Pharmaceutical's profitability structure lies in focusing on a single gastrointestinal medicine shipping over 3 million packets daily, while investing 27–29% of revenue in advertising expenses yet maintaining an operating profit margin of around 19%. By narrowing to a few products, cost reduction through mass production became possible, and concentrating advertising spend on a single product simultaneously captured brand recognition and market share. This model of 'few products, mass sales, high advertising ratio' was subsequently inherited by Pansiron and Hada Labo.

TestimonyTeruo Yamada (Rohto Pharmaceutical, president)

Ours is a company that has grown as a mass-market business from the beginning. We were determined to thoroughly pursue this medicine that new drug manufacturers, who had little interest in household remedies, would not undertake.

Source1962/2 Jitsugyo no Sekai
TestimonyTeruo Yamada (Rohto Pharmaceutical, president)

First, because we have few product types, this kind of rationalization is possible. With this low-variety, ultra-high-volume production, costs are also low. And because they're cheap, the penetration rate is also high.

My principle is that medicine should work well and be affordable. For example, pharmaceutical manufacturers use sugar-coated tablets or capsules to create an appearance, but our Shiron is powder in packets. You might ask whether this doesn't match the current generation, but that's absolutely not the case. There is no other medicine consumed at a rate of over three million packets a day. Stacked up, that would be two and a half times the height of Mt. Fuji.

So I believe that the mission of OTC drugs and household medicines is, first and foremost, to meet the demand for medicines that are affordable and effective.

Source1962/2 Jitsugyo no Sekai
TestimonyIndustry magazine 'Shukan Nihon Keizai'

When you say 'Rohto,' 'Shiron' immediately comes to mind, and 'eye drops' springs right up. Amid fierce competition in the industry, both Shiron and eye drops continue to run at the top of the industry with 40% market share each, and their capability is truly admirable. Even though the products are inherently directly connected to the general public, one can only marvel anew at how deeply they have penetrated among consumers.

TimelineLaunched gastrointestinal medicine 'Shiron' — Key Events
1952Launched eye drops 'Rohto Maipeni Eye Drops'
1954Launched gastrointestinal medicine 'Shiron'
1952Launched eye drops 'New Rohto Eye Drops' (with Vitamin A)
1962Launched gastrointestinal medicine 'Pansiron'
1964Launched eye drops 'V-Rohto'
1967Launched gastrointestinal medicine 'Pansiron G'
1962No. 1 domestic market share in gastrointestinal medicine
Market share40%
1962No. 1 domestic market share in eye drops
Market share40%
1959
Established a new headquarters factory in Ikuno Ward, Osaka
1961
Listed on the Second Section of the Osaka Securities Exchange
1964
Designated to the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange and Osaka Securities Exchange
1975
8

Acquired trademark license for Mentholatum ointment

An entry scheme that acquired only the trademark while avoiding the bankrupt company's 2 billion yen in liabilities

When Omi Brotherhood went bankrupt, Rohto Pharmaceutical chose not to rescue the company but instead acquired only the trademark license from The Mentholatum Company of the United States. This allowed Rohto to acquire the brand without assuming the 2 billion yen in liabilities and approximately 260 employees, at a royalty rate of 7.5% (less than half of the roughly 20% that Omi had effectively been paying). As Vice President Yamada stated, 'We can handle it with just 30 people,' the entry was designed on the premise of cost-structure advantages through automation—an example of a scheme that carved out only brand assets from a bankruptcy situation.

BackgroundExpansion of the ointment market and changing competitive conditions

In the early 1970s in Japan, demand for household medicines expanded alongside rising living standards, and the ointment market was also in a growth phase. In this segment, Otsuka Pharmaceutical's Oronine had established high brand recognition through advertising investment and distribution network expansion, effectively leading the market.

Meanwhile, Omi Brotherhood, which had long manufactured and sold Mentholatum, went bankrupt due to management deterioration and disappeared from the domestic market. As a result, the Mentholatum brand, with its long history, was left in limbo, and uncertainty arose regarding its ownership and future development.

DecisionMarket entry through leveraging an established brand

Rohto Pharmaceutical recognized the need to break away from its business structure dependent on gastrointestinal medicines and eye drops, and was seeking to develop a third revenue pillar. In August 1975, the company acquired the domestic trademark license from The Mentholatum Company of the United States and decided to make a full-scale entry into the ointment market.

The contract period was 10 years with a royalty rate of 7.5% of net sales. Rather than entering through proprietary development, the company chose to leverage an already recognized brand, designing an approach to reduce time-to-market and investment risk. This was selected as a pragmatic means of entering an established market.

ResultFormation of a foothold for business portfolio expansion

Mentholatum became established as a major brand for Rohto Pharmaceutical after launch, contributing to sales growth in the topical drug and quasi-drug segments through the 1980s. This reduced the company's relative dependence on internal medicines and eye drops, advancing the diversification of revenue sources.

However, competition intensified as Omi Brotherhood returned to the market with the 'Menturm' brand, establishing a three-way competitive structure including Oronine. While Rohto did not achieve a dominant market position, the Mentholatum business came to occupy a stable component of the company's revenue base, serving as a practical foothold for advancing its subsequent diversification strategy.

An entry scheme that acquired only the trademark while avoiding the bankrupt company's 2 billion yen in liabilities

When Omi Brotherhood went bankrupt, Rohto Pharmaceutical chose not to rescue the company but instead acquired only the trademark license from The Mentholatum Company of the United States. This allowed Rohto to acquire the brand without assuming the 2 billion yen in liabilities and approximately 260 employees, at a royalty rate of 7.5% (less than half of the roughly 20% that Omi had effectively been paying). As Vice President Yamada stated, 'We can handle it with just 30 people,' the entry was designed on the premise of cost-structure advantages through automation—an example of a scheme that carved out only brand assets from a bankruptcy situation.

TestimonyZaikai (business magazine)

The deal covered the manufacture and sale of four products—Mentholatum ointment, White, Love, and shaving cream—as well as import and sales rights for lip balm and lipstick. The contract period was 10 years.

The royalty was set at approximately 7.5%, somewhat higher than the 5% that Omi had effectively been paying to the U.S. Mentholatum Company, but all advertising was left entirely to Rohto's discretion. Conversely, the 20% of sales that Omi had been paying was cut by more than half by eliminating the intermediary, and the U.S. Mentholatum Company also saw a slight increase in income.

'If we install automated machinery at our headquarters factory, we can handle the volume Omi was selling with just 30 people,' said Rohto Pharmaceutical Vice President Yamada (Yasukuni Yamada), confidently. 'And if we get prior approval from the U.S. Mentholatum Company, we can even launch Mentholatum products in different colors and formats.' As if channeling President Hyde's intentions, bold statements targeting Oronine kept flowing.

Rohto plans to develop Mentholatum into a third pillar alongside eye drops and gastrointestinal medicines within a few years. Had they moved to rehabilitate Omi, they would have had to take on 2 billion yen in liabilities and all employees—so in the end, they made a bargain purchase.

Source1975/6 Zaikai 23(10)
TestimonyNikkei Business (on the competition between Omi Brotherhood and Rohto Pharmaceutical)

(Note: Omi Brotherhood) had to figure out how to sell 'Menturm.' The idea they came up with was to have all employees visit retail stores. (...)

By making direct visits and improving retailers' impression of them, they thought they might be able to cut into Menthol (note: Rohto's Mentholatum) somewhat—a last-resort strategy. 'It was our competitive spirit against Rohto that made it possible,' says President Iwahara. Of course, if they lost this competition, they would lose their jobs, so they were desperate. (...)

These tactics paid off, and they have now 'caught up to about one-third of Rohto Pharmaceutical's Mentholatum sales.' Furthermore, regarding the lipstick format launched as a new product after the bankruptcy, they claim to be 'competing neck and neck.' However, the reasons for strong sales are not all sentimental. There is also the practical factor that retail margins are set about 20% higher than Mentholatum.

Source1987/12/7 Nikkei Business
TimelineAcquired trademark license for Mentholatum ointment — Key Events
1920Omi Brotherhood founded (contracted with U.S. Mentholatum)
1974Omi Brotherhood went bankrupt. Began rehabilitation under the Corporate Reorganization Act
1975The Mentholatum Company terminated its license agreement with Omi Brotherhood
1975Omi Brotherhood launched 'Menturm' (proprietary brand)
8/1975Acquired domestic trademark license from The Mentholatum Company
Royalty7.5%
1975
Acquired three companies including Nihon Josephine. Full-scale entry into cosmetics
1983

Lost the No. 1 domestic market share in gastrointestinal drugs

Pansiron's insistence on being an 'all-purpose drug' cost it the top position to 'symptom-specific drugs'

Pansiron had dominated the market as a 'comprehensive drug effective for all stomach symptoms,' but in 1978, Taisho Pharmaceutical launched Taisho Kampo Gastrointestinal Medicine, which targeted stress-related stomach pain specifically, and overtook Pansiron within five years of launch. This pattern demonstrates how niche-specific products can surpass general-purpose products in mature markets. Rohto Pharmaceutical's decision to allocate management resources toward business portfolio diversification rather than recapturing the top position is estimated to have been a difficult one, given that gastrointestinal drugs were the company's founding business.

BackgroundGastrointestinal drug market maturation and shifting competitive dynamics

By the late 1970s, the Japanese gastrointestinal drug market had passed the stage of quantitative expansion and entered a maturity phase. Household drug penetration had largely run its course, and growth from new demand was limited, while companies faced a battle for existing demand.

In this phase, advertising appeal, brand recall, and distribution strength—rather than product efficacy itself—became the factors determining competitiveness. In the OTC drug market, increasing TV commercial investment and increasingly sophisticated promotional methods led to an environment where differences in capital and marketing capabilities directly translated into market share.

DecisionContinuation of strategy premised on maintaining core products

Rohto Pharmaceutical continued to position gastrointestinal drugs as one of its core businesses, adopting a basic policy of maintaining and strengthening its existing brands centered on Pansiron. Rather than pursuing a major product overhaul or pricing strategy shift, the company chose to continue addressing the market by leveraging its established formulations and brand assets.

Meanwhile, the company was also concurrently advancing investment into other categories such as eye drops and topical drugs. Decision-making during this period was characterized by an intention to avoid excessive concentration on a single gastrointestinal drug category and to prioritize the stability of the overall business portfolio.

ResultLoss of market leadership and solidification of the competitive landscape

In 1983, Rohto Pharmaceutical ceded its position as the domestic market share leader in gastrointestinal drugs to competitors. As competition intensified in a maturing market, companies with superior advertising spend and promotional capabilities gained share, while legacy flagship brands saw their relative presence diminish.

This loss of the top position was not a single-year event but a turning point that solidified the subsequent market structure. However, because Rohto Pharmaceutical had avoided excessive dependence on gastrointestinal drugs, the impact on overall business performance was limited. As a result, gastrointestinal drugs remained a component of the company's core business but retreated from their position as the absolute growth driver.

Pansiron's insistence on being an 'all-purpose drug' cost it the top position to 'symptom-specific drugs'

Pansiron had dominated the market as a 'comprehensive drug effective for all stomach symptoms,' but in 1978, Taisho Pharmaceutical launched Taisho Kampo Gastrointestinal Medicine, which targeted stress-related stomach pain specifically, and overtook Pansiron within five years of launch. This pattern demonstrates how niche-specific products can surpass general-purpose products in mature markets. Rohto Pharmaceutical's decision to allocate management resources toward business portfolio diversification rather than recapturing the top position is estimated to have been a difficult one, given that gastrointestinal drugs were the company's founding business.

TestimonyNikkei Business 'Can the Ailing Pansiron Recover?'

The reason for Pansiron's defeat was clinging too firmly to the concept of a comprehensive gastrointestinal drug effective for all symptoms. It steadily lost share to competitors' drugs that targeted specific conditions. The mainstream gastrointestinal drugs of the past were 'comprehensive drugs' claiming efficacy for all symptoms—stomach pain, overeating and overdrinking, excess stomach acid, and more. Pansiron was the representative of this category.

However, as times changed, so did modern lifestyles, and stomach pain caused by mental stress became more common. The product that emerged to capture this need was Taisho Kampo Gastrointestinal Medicine, launched in 1978. By its sixth year on the market, in 1983, it had overtaken Pansiron for the top position.

Source1992/1/13 Nikkei Business 'Can the Ailing Pansiron Recover?'
TimelineLost the No. 1 domestic market share in gastrointestinal drugs — Key Events
1960Kowa launched 'Cabagin'
1978Taisho Pharmaceutical launched 'Taisho Kampo Gastrointestinal Medicine'
1990Kowa launched 'Cabagin 2'
1980Launched 'New Pansiron' (discontinued in 1992)
1982Launched 'Pansiron Kampo Gastrointestinal Medicine' (discontinued in 1987)
1980Launched 'Rohto AZ Gastrointestinal Medicine U'
1989Launched 'Pansiron New Gastrointestinal Medicine'
1988
7

Acquired The Mentholatum Company of the United States

The binary choice between royalty dependence and a 9.8 billion yen acquisition of the brand's source

Thirteen years after the 1975 trademark acquisition, Rohto Pharmaceutical faced a choice between continuing to pay 7.5% of sales as royalties or investing 9.8 billion yen to acquire the brand's originating company outright. After the acquisition, the company's financial condition turned out to be worse than expected, and in 2003, Rohto recorded a 3.2 billion yen impairment loss on goodwill. However, the fact that a company with 500 employees gained sovereignty over a global brand enabled expansion into China and Southeast Asia, securing business discretion that exceeded mere royalty savings.

BackgroundBrand-dependent structure and constraints on overseas expansion

Since acquiring the trademark license in the mid-1970s, Mentholatum had become established as Rohto Pharmaceutical's core brand in the topical drug segment. However, this business foundation was dependent on a license agreement with The Mentholatum Company of the United States, creating a structure vulnerable to contract renewals and changes in terms.

By the 1980s, the domestic market had entered a mature phase, and growth opportunities were increasingly sought in overseas markets. However, with brand rights fragmented, there were constraints on product development and overseas expansion flexibility, and the challenge of being unable to chart a long-term growth strategy became increasingly apparent.

DecisionComplete acquisition of the brand's originating company

To resolve these structural constraints, Rohto Pharmaceutical made the decision in July 1988 to acquire The Mentholatum Company of the United States and make it a wholly owned subsidiary. This gave the company unified control over manufacturing, sales, and trademark rights related to the Mentholatum brand.

The decision to acquire the originating company itself, rather than merely extending the license, entailed increased short-term costs but was aimed at securing future business flexibility and strategic discretion. It was a clear decision to internalize the brand as a company asset.

ResultEstablishment of global expansion capability and business leadership

Through the acquisition, Rohto Pharmaceutical established the framework to pursue full-scale global expansion centered on the Mentholatum brand. With the ability to design product development and promotional strategies both domestically and internationally on a unified basis, the topical drug business was clearly positioned as a growth area for the company.

This acquisition was Rohto Pharmaceutical's first major overseas corporate acquisition and became the starting point for subsequent overseas expansion and M&A strategy. As a result, Mentholatum was transformed from a domestic brand into a core asset supporting the company's international business.

The binary choice between royalty dependence and a 9.8 billion yen acquisition of the brand's source

Thirteen years after the 1975 trademark acquisition, Rohto Pharmaceutical faced a choice between continuing to pay 7.5% of sales as royalties or investing 9.8 billion yen to acquire the brand's originating company outright. After the acquisition, the company's financial condition turned out to be worse than expected, and in 2003, Rohto recorded a 3.2 billion yen impairment loss on goodwill. However, the fact that a company with 500 employees gained sovereignty over a global brand enabled expansion into China and Southeast Asia, securing business discretion that exceeded mere royalty savings.

TestimonyKunio Yamada (Rohto Pharmaceutical, founding family)

We acquired The Mentholatum Company, a U.S. ointment manufacturer, in 1988. It happened because the other party's management expressed a desire to sell the company.

At the time, Rohto Pharmaceutical had name recognition but was a compact company. We had about 500 employees. Excluding the factory, logistics, and R&D divisions, only about 100 people worked at the headquarters in Ikuno Ward, Osaka.

Such a company suddenly found itself managing a foreign enterprise, which caused a culture shock within the company. Mentholatum was sold in countries around the world, but its financial condition was not as good as we had expected. My father even suddenly started studying English because of the situation. Also, in the process of expanding Mentholatum's skincare product lineup, we hired people with various backgrounds and experience, which reinvigorated the company.

Source2016/8 Nikkei Top Leader
TimelineAcquired The Mentholatum Company of the United States — Key Events
7/1988Acquired The Mentholatum Company of the United States
Acquisition price98hundred million yen
2003Recorded impairment loss on goodwill
Impairment loss32hundred million yen
1991

Established a local subsidiary in China

A foreign premium strategy that captured 90% of the lip care market by pricing at 10 times the Japanese level

After entering the Chinese market in 1991, Rohto Pharmaceutical sold Mentholatum medicated lip cream at approximately 10 times the Japanese price and secured a 90% market share in China as of 2007. The company became a sponsor of the Chinese diving team at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, and the team's six gold medals helped establish the brand—a prime example of foreign brand price premium formation. The Chinese subsidiary's net sales grew rapidly from 12.4 billion yen in FY2011 to 32.9 billion yen in FY2015, achieving profitability exceeding that of Japan.

BackgroundDomestic maturation and progress of Chinese market liberalization

By the late 1980s, Japan's domestic OTC drug market had matured significantly, making growth through population increase or demand expansion difficult to envision. Meanwhile, Rohto Pharmaceutical had acquired The Mentholatum Company of the United States in 1988, incorporating brand sovereignty and business discretion, and had established a framework to seriously consider overseas expansion.

During the same period, China's reform and opening-up policies were progressing, gradually expanding room for foreign companies to enter the market. Rising living standards, particularly in urban areas, were generating visible demand for pharmaceuticals and hygiene-related products. However, numerous constraints in regulations and business practices made sole foreign entry difficult, and joint ventures with local companies were considered the practical option.

DecisionJoint venture establishment targeting the Chinese market

Based on this environmental assessment, Rohto Pharmaceutical decided in 1991 to establish a joint venture in China together with The Mentholatum Company. The aim was to reduce barriers to market entry by combining the brand power of Mentholatum with the local partner's distribution network and regulatory expertise.

The choice of a joint venture rather than sole entry was driven by prioritizing adaptation to the regulatory environment and certainty in business launch. This was a decision that emphasized long-term market establishment over short-term profit maximization, and served as a clear statement of intent to position China as a future growth base.

ResultFormation of a foothold for the China business

The establishment of the joint venture allowed Rohto Pharmaceutical to build a business foundation in the Chinese market and gradually advance the local deployment of the Mentholatum brand. Recognition of topical drugs and hygiene products grew, centered on urban areas, and the company steadily increased its presence in the Chinese market.

This joint venture establishment became the starting point for Rohto Pharmaceutical's China business, serving as an important stepping stone for subsequent investment expansion and business diversification. As a result, China came to be positioned as a long-term growth market for the company, following Japan and the United States.

TableFinancial results of Mentholatum China
Fiscal yearNet salesOrdinary incomeNet assetsTotal assets
FY201112.4 billion yen1.4 billion yen7.6 billion yen15.5 billion yen
FY201214.8 billion yen1.7 billion yen10.3 billion yen20.8 billion yen
FY201321.0 billion yen2.8 billion yen12.2 billion yen25.2 billion yen
FY201425.4 billion yen3.2 billion yen16.5 billion yen32.0 billion yen
FY201532.9 billion yen3.1 billion yen15.9 billion yen33.1 billion yen
Fiscal year
FY2011
Net sales
12.4 billion yen
Ordinary income
1.4 billion yen
Net assets
7.6 billion yen
Total assets
15.5 billion yen
A foreign premium strategy that captured 90% of the lip care market by pricing at 10 times the Japanese level

After entering the Chinese market in 1991, Rohto Pharmaceutical sold Mentholatum medicated lip cream at approximately 10 times the Japanese price and secured a 90% market share in China as of 2007. The company became a sponsor of the Chinese diving team at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, and the team's six gold medals helped establish the brand—a prime example of foreign brand price premium formation. The Chinese subsidiary's net sales grew rapidly from 12.4 billion yen in FY2011 to 32.9 billion yen in FY2015, achieving profitability exceeding that of Japan.

TestimonyRohto Pharmaceutical Shareholder Report

At the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, we became the official sponsor of the Chinese diving team, and when the team won six gold medals, our product image improved significantly and sales grew substantially. Currently, our products command a premium image as high-quality and reliable compared to domestic Chinese brands. (...)

Despite being priced at approximately 10 times the price of products sold in Japan, 'Mentholatum Medicated Lip Cream' has captured a market share of 90% (2007 Euromonitor survey).

TestimonyToshiaki Yoshino (Rohto Pharmaceutical, president at the time)

For our company to grow in the current challenging domestic market environment, global expansion is essential. (...) The area that deserves the most attention is Asia, particularly the rapid expansion into the Chinese market. Our company has been focused on the Chinese consumer market since the days when China was still growing as the 'world's factory,' developing markets with lip cream, eye drops, and other products. Thanks to these efforts, our eye drops and Mentholatum-branded skincare products such as lip cream have become leading local brands, and the subsidiary has grown to achieve profitability exceeding that of Japan.

TimelineEstablished a local subsidiary in China — Key Events
1991Established Mentholatum China as a joint venture
1996Became a sponsor at the Atlanta Olympics for the Chinese team
1996Began local production and sales of 'New V-Rohto Plus' in China
2010Established Tianjin Rohto
2007No. 1 market share in medicated lip cream in China
China share90%
1996
Established Rohto Indonesia
1997
Established Rohto Mentholatum Indonesia
1998
Established Rohto USA
1998
Established a new factory in Orchard Park
1999
Yasukuni Yamada became chairman; Kunio Yamada became president
2001

Full-scale investment in skincare

The 'functionality x low price' design that enabled a pharmaceutical company's entry into skincare

Rohto Pharmaceutical achieved what 'no pharmaceutical company had ever successfully done—entering the cosmetics market' by converting its dermatological research knowledge into functional product appeal. Hada Labo, launched in 2004, grew from 1.5 billion yen in its first year to a shipment value of 13.6 billion yen in six years, becoming the best-selling lotion brand in the self-service cosmetics market. The 'high functionality, low price' appeal, distinct from department store brands, aligned with the structural change in the retail environment driven by the expansion of drugstore chains, and the alignment of entry timing and distribution channel selection was behind the rapid growth.

BackgroundPharmaceutical-dependent structure and constrained growth potential

By the late 1990s, Rohto Pharmaceutical's core businesses—gastrointestinal drugs, eye drops, and topical drugs—faced limited growth potential as the domestic OTC drug market matured. Price competition and promotional competition intensified, and the growth model based on volume expansion was becoming increasingly dysfunctional.

Meanwhile, the cosmetics market, particularly skincare, was trending upward against the backdrop of growing health consciousness and beauty awareness among consumers. In the dermatological science field, closely related to pharmaceuticals, there was room to leverage R&D capabilities and quality control expertise, and the restructuring of the business portfolio emerged as a key management issue.

DecisionFull-scale investment in the skincare domain

Based on this environmental assessment, Rohto Pharmaceutical began full-scale investment in the skincare field from 2001. The company strengthened its R&D framework and adopted a clear policy of developing products emphasizing functionality by applying dermatological knowledge cultivated through pharmaceutical development.

Simultaneously, the company repositioned its cosmetics business from a supplementary role to a strategic business expected to drive future growth, gradually expanding resource allocation to development, production, and promotion. This was a decision that prioritized building a medium-to-long-term business foundation over short-term profit contribution.

ResultBusiness domain expansion and revenue diversification

The full-scale investment in skincare enabled Rohto Pharmaceutical to advance the transformation away from a pharmaceutical-dependent business structure. Functional cosmetics and dermatology-related products were gradually incorporated into the business portfolio, and their development as new revenue sources began.

While the investment during this period did not yield immediate results, it laid the foundation for subsequent skincare brand development and global business expansion. As a result, Rohto Pharmaceutical reached a critical turning point in its evolution toward a business structure with pharmaceuticals and cosmetics as twin pillars.

The 'functionality x low price' design that enabled a pharmaceutical company's entry into skincare

Rohto Pharmaceutical achieved what 'no pharmaceutical company had ever successfully done—entering the cosmetics market' by converting its dermatological research knowledge into functional product appeal. Hada Labo, launched in 2004, grew from 1.5 billion yen in its first year to a shipment value of 13.6 billion yen in six years, becoming the best-selling lotion brand in the self-service cosmetics market. The 'high functionality, low price' appeal, distinct from department store brands, aligned with the structural change in the retail environment driven by the expansion of drugstore chains, and the alignment of entry timing and distribution channel selection was behind the rapid growth.

TestimonyKunio Yamada (Rohto Pharmaceutical, chairman at the time)

Even when people would normally say 'that's impossible,' we have taken on challenges with a 'we'll show them' spirit, believing that success is not out of the question. Our entry into cosmetics—something no pharmaceutical company had ever successfully done—was one such challenge. Our overseas ventures, too, involve taking on European and American companies more than 10 times our size, sometimes beyond our own scale. By any normal measure, we shouldn't be able to compete, but reality has proven otherwise. By tenaciously sticking with it, results have somehow followed.

SourceWeekly Toyo Keizai, 2016/10/29
TestimonyToshiaki Yoshino (Rohto Pharmaceutical, president at the time)

The driving force behind our growth has been beauty-related products such as 'Hada Labo' and 'Obagi,' which recorded net sales of 21.3 billion yen in the current fiscal year, accounting for approximately 20% of consolidated sales as a growth engine. The cosmetics market is undergoing significant change due to shifts in consumer purchasing behavior that emphasize price and cost-effectiveness.

Our 'Hada Labo' and similar products have matched this change well, gaining support for their high functionality and cost performance. They achieved domestic sales of 10 billion yen, making it the best-selling lotion brand in the self-service cosmetics market.

TimelineFull-scale investment in skincare — Key Events
2001Launched skincare product 'Obagi C'
2003Established Second Factory Building at Ueno Techno Center
2004Launched 'Hada Labo'
First-year sales15100M JPY
2010'Hada Labo' shipment value exceeded 10 billion yen
Shipment value136100M JPY
2003
9

Concluded a strategic business alliance with Morishita Jintan

BackgroundNeed for research domain expansion and differentiation technology

In the early 2000s, while advancing full-scale investment in the skincare field, Rohto Pharmaceutical faced the challenge of where to find sources of differentiation in pharmaceuticals and functional products. The OTC drug market was maturing, and sustained growth was difficult to envision through product improvements and promotional enhancements of existing offerings alone.

Meanwhile, growing health consciousness was driving increased interest in functional ingredients and formulation technologies, and movements to differentiate products based on 'ingredients' and 'technology' were gaining momentum. In this environment, Rohto Pharmaceutical recognized the need to enhance competitiveness by incorporating external technologies and knowledge rather than expanding its research domains independently.

DecisionStrategic alliance centered on formulation technology

Based on this recognition, Rohto Pharmaceutical concluded a strategic business alliance with Morishita Jintan, which possessed proprietary formulation technology, in September 2003. The aim was to leverage the encapsulation and ingredient stabilization technologies that Morishita Jintan had cultivated over many years to enhance development capabilities for pharmaceuticals and health-related products.

This was not a simple product supply agreement but an alliance premised on collaboration from the R&D stage, intended to create new added value by bringing together the strengths of both companies. For Rohto Pharmaceutical, it was a decision that clearly demonstrated a stance of strategically incorporating external technologies.

ResultStrengthening of R&D infrastructure and expansion of options

Through this alliance, Rohto Pharmaceutical was able to broaden the range of formulation design and ingredient utilization that would have been difficult to address with its own technology alone. The number of options in R&D increased, laying the groundwork for advancing product planning that emphasized functionality.

While the alliance did not generate significant short-term revenue, the experience of flexibly utilizing external resources through technology partnerships influenced subsequent business development and alliance strategy. As a result, this business alliance served as an important stepping stone that reinforced Rohto Pharmaceutical's R&D framework and broadened future growth domains.

TableRohto Pharmaceutical: Internal medicine segment results
FYNet salesOperating incomeAssetsEmployees
2001/39.2 billion yen-260 million yen8.3 billion yen213
FY
2001/3
Net sales
9.2 billion yen
Operating income
-260 million yen
Assets
8.3 billion yen
Employees
213
SourceSecurities Report
TableRohto Pharmaceutical: Internal medicine segment results
FYNet salesOperating incomeAssetsEmployees
2005/38.6 billion yen-260 million yen7.1 billion yen-
2006/39.2 billion yen-320 million yen8.9 billion yen176
2007/39.9 billion yen-70 million yen14.2 billion yen294
FY
2005/3
Net sales
8.6 billion yen
Operating income
-260 million yen
Assets
7.1 billion yen
Employees
-
SourceSecurities Report
TableRohto Pharmaceutical: Valuation of Morishita Jintan shares
FYShares heldBalance sheet valuePrice per share
2006/34,025,000 shares1.73 billion yen429 yen/share
2007/34,025,000 shares1.562 billion yen388 yen/share
2008/34,025,000 shares1.143 billion yen283 yen/share
2009/34,025,000 shares917 million yen227 yen/share
2010/34,025,000 shares1.082 billion yen268 yen/share
2011/34,025,000 shares1.304 billion yen323 yen/share
2012/31,759,309 shares663 million yen376 yen/share
2013/31,759,309 shares721 million yen409 yen/share
FY
2006/3
Shares held
4,025,000 shares
Balance sheet value
1.73 billion yen
Price per share
429 yen/share
SourceSecurities Report
TimelineConcluded a strategic business alliance with Morishita Jintan — Key Events
2003Rohto Pharmaceutical acquired shares in Morishita Jintan (19.4% ownership)
Estimated investment18hundred million yen
2005Established joint sales company 'Medicare Systems' with Morishita Jintan
2006Three consecutive fiscal years of losses in the internal medicine segment
2011Partially sold shares in Morishita Jintan (19.40% to 8.55%)
Reduction ratio10.55%
2010

Accelerated production investment in Southeast Asia

An irreversible decision to build three factories in Indonesia and shift to 'consumer-market production'

From the first Indonesian factory in 1997 to the third factory in 2012, Rohto Pharmaceutical progressively built production facilities in Southeast Asia. The decision to shift from exporting domestically produced goods to local production was a structural transformation that enabled not only foreign exchange risk reduction and lead time shortening, but also adaptation to each country's regulations and preferences. However, as Chairman Kunio Yamada himself acknowledged, 'Asia's growth has plateaued and it's becoming a fight for share,' the company has entered a phase where investment recovery will be tested as the tailwind subsides.

BackgroundDomestic maturation and emerging-market demand materialization

By the late 2000s, Japan's domestic pharmaceutical and skincare markets had matured significantly, and growth through volume expansion was increasingly difficult to envision amid demographic structural changes. While Rohto Pharmaceutical had been advancing investment in skincare and overseas expansion, the business structure premised on domestic production was gradually revealing constraints in terms of costs and supply.

Meanwhile, economic growth and the expansion of the middle-income population in Southeast Asian countries were driving rapidly increasing demand for pharmaceutical and skincare products. Due to differences in climate and living environments, there was high demand for eye drops, topical drugs, and skincare products, and the region was recognized by Rohto Pharmaceutical as a promising growth market.

DecisionProduction investment premised on local demand

Based on this environmental assessment, Rohto Pharmaceutical accelerated its production investment in Southeast Asia from around 2010. Rather than merely expanding sales offices, the company adopted a clear policy of establishing manufacturing facilities locally to build a supply structure close to demand centers.

The decision to pursue local production was motivated not only by reducing transportation costs and foreign exchange risk, but also by the aim to rapidly develop products suited to each country's regulations and consumer preferences. This was a strategic decision to shift the overseas business from quantitative expansion to sustainable growth by establishing a structure not dependent on domestic production.

ResultEstablishment of a locally rooted business model

Through production investment in Southeast Asia, Rohto Pharmaceutical enhanced its supply capacity to local markets and built a framework capable of supporting sales expansion. Local production contributed not only to improved cost competitiveness but also to shorter lead times for product launches, enhancing the company's responsiveness to competitive conditions.

Through these efforts, Rohto Pharmaceutical came to position Southeast Asia not merely as an export destination but as an integral part of its business foundation. As a result, the region developed into a key base supporting the company's overseas growth, becoming a core area for advancing subsequent global expansion.

An irreversible decision to build three factories in Indonesia and shift to 'consumer-market production'

From the first Indonesian factory in 1997 to the third factory in 2012, Rohto Pharmaceutical progressively built production facilities in Southeast Asia. The decision to shift from exporting domestically produced goods to local production was a structural transformation that enabled not only foreign exchange risk reduction and lead time shortening, but also adaptation to each country's regulations and preferences. However, as Chairman Kunio Yamada himself acknowledged, 'Asia's growth has plateaued and it's becoming a fight for share,' the company has entered a phase where investment recovery will be tested as the tailwind subsides.

TestimonyKunio Yamada (Rohto Pharmaceutical, chairman and CEO at the time)

However, over the past one to two years, I have felt that we are at a major crossroads—whether we will continue to grow or contract. Until now, the wind was at our back in many ways. China, Vietnam, and other markets were developing rapidly, and with few competitors, we were able to grow the business significantly. But now, Asia's growth has reached a plateau, and going forward it will become a fight for share. Domestically, we rode the wave of the drugstore opening boom successfully, but drugstores are now said to be saturated. Other companies, seeing our success, have launched similar products, and when you go to stores, there are now competing products that are nearly indistinguishable. What has been our strength until now is about to become our challenge. We cannot afford to be complacent.

SourceWeekly Toyo Keizai, 2016/5/28
TimelineAccelerated production investment in Southeast Asia — Key Events
1997Established Indonesian subsidiary and first factory (intraocular lenses)
1999Established Vietnamese subsidiary and began local production
2005Expanded production in China (increased factory workforce)
2009Established Indonesian subsidiary's second factory (skincare)
2011Vietnamese subsidiary launched new factory production line
2012Established Indonesian subsidiary's third factory (skincare)
2014
Acquired shares in Yaeyama Farm
2016
Domestic Hada Labo sales plateaued
2016
Launched the 'External Challenge Work' program (permitting employee side jobs)
2018
President Toshiaki Yoshino passed away suddenly
2022
Reduced promotional expenses. Improved profit margins for three consecutive fiscal years
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