| Period | Type | Revenue | Profit* | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1959/7 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥3B | ¥1B | 23.0% |
| 1960/7 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥3B | ¥1B | 20.9% |
| 1961/7 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥3B | ¥1B | 21.3% |
| 1962/7 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥4B | ¥1B | 22.9% |
| 1963/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1964/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥4B | ¥1B | 18.9% |
| 1965/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥5B | ¥1B | 14.0% |
| 1966/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥4B | ¥1B | 14.2% |
| 1967/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥4B | ¥1B | 12.3% |
| 1968/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥5B | ¥1B | 13.6% |
| 1969/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥5B | ¥1B | 16.5% |
| 1970/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥6B | ¥1B | 17.2% |
| 1971/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥6B | ¥1B | 17.5% |
| 1972/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥7B | ¥1B | 17.0% |
| 1973/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥6B | ¥1B | 16.5% |
| 1974/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥7B | ¥1B | 14.3% |
| 1975/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥8B | ¥1B | 14.9% |
| 1976/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥8B | ¥1B | 12.5% |
| 1977/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥9B | ¥1B | 11.5% |
| 1978/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥9B | ¥1B | 10.3% |
| 1979/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥11B | ¥1B | 10.4% |
| 1980/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥13B | ¥2B | 11.5% |
| 1981/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥15B | ¥2B | 10.8% |
| 1982/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥16B | ¥2B | 9.5% |
| 1983/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥15B | ¥1B | 8.4% |
| 1984/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥16B | ¥1B | 8.1% |
| 1985/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥17B | ¥2B | 9.4% |
| 1986/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥16B | ¥1B | 7.1% |
| 1987/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥17B | ¥1B | 7.0% |
| 1988/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥18B | ¥1B | 7.4% |
| 1989/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥18B | ¥2B | 9.3% |
| 1990/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥19B | ¥2B | 9.5% |
| 1991/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥20B | ¥2B | 7.9% |
| 1992/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥21B | ¥1B | 5.3% |
| 1993/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥20B | ¥1B | 3.1% |
| 1994/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥21B | ¥1B | 4.2% |
| 1995/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥24B | ¥1B | 5.0% |
| 1996/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥28B | ¥2B | 6.5% |
| 1997/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥35B | ¥2B | 5.2% |
| 1998/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥40B | ¥2B | 5.4% |
| 1999/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥42B | ¥2B | 4.8% |
| 2000/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥56B | ¥3B | 5.1% |
| 2001/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥60B | ¥3B | 5.5% |
| 2002/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥63B | ¥2B | 3.6% |
| 2003/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥66B | -¥1B | -2.0% |
| 2004/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥67B | ¥4B | 5.5% |
| 2005/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥73B | ¥5B | 7.4% |
| 2006/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥86B | ¥7B | 7.5% |
| 2007/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥96B | ¥7B | 6.9% |
| 2008/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥108B | ¥8B | 6.9% |
| 2009/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥111B | ¥6B | 5.5% |
| 2010/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥113B | ¥8B | 6.8% |
| 2011/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥115B | ¥8B | 6.8% |
| 2012/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥120B | ¥8B | 6.8% |
| 2013/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥129B | ¥8B | 6.2% |
| 2014/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥144B | ¥9B | 6.2% |
| 2015/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥152B | ¥9B | 5.6% |
| 2016/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥167B | ¥9B | 5.4% |
| 2017/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥155B | ¥10B | 6.4% |
| 2018/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥172B | ¥9B | 5.4% |
| 2019/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥184B | ¥10B | 5.3% |
| 2020/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥188B | ¥15B | 8.1% |
| 2021/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥181B | ¥17B | 9.2% |
| 2022/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥200B | ¥21B | 10.5% |
| 2023/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥239B | ¥26B | 11.0% |
Looking at the shareholder composition as of 1970, founder Teruo Yamada and his five sons held a combined 50.33%, with the remainder held in dispersed ownership by banks including Mitsubishi Bank and Sumitomo Bank. The ability to avoid dilution of management control despite incorporation and listing was due to a design in which shares were allocated to the five brothers in nearly equal ratios, with acceptance of external capital kept to a minimum. This shareholder structure of maintaining family control while establishing a framework for growth represents a typical capital policy approach among family businesses in postwar Japan.
Rohto Pharmaceutical, founded in 1899 as Shintendo Yamada Yasutami Yakubo, had long been operated as a sole proprietorship by the Yamada family. Before the war, the company had expanded its business, including establishing factories not only domestically but also on the Chinese mainland, centering on household medicines, but was severely affected by wartime disruption and the controlled economy.
After the war, the Japanese economy entered a recovery phase, and demand for pharmaceuticals also recovered rapidly. Meanwhile, capital investment, raw material procurement, and distribution expansion required greater financial capacity and creditworthiness than before, and the limitations of the sole proprietorship framework for accommodating business expansion became apparent.
In response to these environmental changes, in September 1949, Rohto Pharmaceutical converted from a sole proprietorship to a corporation, establishing Rohto Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. with capital of 10 million yen. Teruo Yamada, a member of the founding family, assumed the presidency, and the management structure continued to be controlled by the Yamada family.
Even after incorporation, capital increases were primarily conducted centered on the founding family, and dilution of management control through acceptance of external capital was deliberately avoided. Incorporation was not a change in management entity but a decision to establish an institutional framework for growth.
Through incorporation, Rohto Pharmaceutical was able to pursue capital procurement and capital investment in earnest, expanding its production system and distribution network throughout the 1950s. Having a corporate entity also stabilized relationships with financial institutions and business partners, greatly increasing operational flexibility.
As an extension of this, the company listed on the Second Section of the Osaka Securities Exchange in 1961, gaining public credibility. Even after listing, the Yamada family occupied most of the major shareholder positions, and the management style of Rohto Pharmaceutical—growing while maintaining family management—was institutionally established at this point.
| Shareholder name | Relationship | Ownership ratio |
| Yasukuni Yamada | Eldest son of Teruo | 19.01% |
| Yasunobu Yamada | Second son of Teruo | 6.89% |
| Yasusada Yamada | Third son of Teruo (academic) | 6.57% |
| Yasumasa Yamada | Fourth son of Teruo (academic) | 6.25% |
| Yasuhiro Yamada | Fifth son of Teruo | 5.91% |
| Teruo Yamada | - | 5.70% |
| Mitsubishi Bank | - | 3.76% |
| Sumitomo Bank | - | 2.51% |
| Daiwa Bank | - | 2.51% |
| Sanwa Bank | - | 2.19% |
Looking at the shareholder composition as of 1970, founder Teruo Yamada and his five sons held a combined 50.33%, with the remainder held in dispersed ownership by banks including Mitsubishi Bank and Sumitomo Bank. The ability to avoid dilution of management control despite incorporation and listing was due to a design in which shares were allocated to the five brothers in nearly equal ratios, with acceptance of external capital kept to a minimum. This shareholder structure of maintaining family control while establishing a framework for growth represents a typical capital policy approach among family businesses in postwar Japan.
The prototype of Rohto Pharmaceutical's profitability structure lies in focusing on a single gastrointestinal medicine shipping over 3 million packets daily, while investing 27–29% of revenue in advertising expenses yet maintaining an operating profit margin of around 19%. By narrowing to a few products, cost reduction through mass production became possible, and concentrating advertising spend on a single product simultaneously captured brand recognition and market share. This model of 'few products, mass sales, high advertising ratio' was subsequently inherited by Pansiron and Hada Labo.
Gastrointestinal medicine, Rohto Pharmaceutical's founding business, had seen demand recover along with the improvement of postwar food conditions, but the flagship product 'Ikatsu' had been on the market for an extended period and its commercial appeal was becoming obsolete. As postwar reconstruction progressed, the dietary habits of the Japanese changed both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the role expected of gastrointestinal medicines was beginning to shift.
Entering the 1950s, addressing symptoms closely tied to daily life—such as indigestion caused by overeating and increased dining out—became increasingly important, and conventional stomach medicines could no longer adequately respond. In the OTC drug market, launching new products that combined breadth of symptom coverage with ease of use was becoming a prerequisite for growth.
In response to these market changes, in 1954, Rohto Pharmaceutical launched a new gastrointestinal medicine called 'Shiron.' Adopting sodium bicarbonate as the antacid, it was positioned as a comprehensive gastrointestinal medicine addressing a wide range of digestive complaints including overeating and stomach heaviness, rather than being limited to specific symptoms.
The company adopted a policy of concentrating management resources on the single product 'Shiron' rather than simultaneously developing multiple new products. On the production side, cost reduction was pursued through low-variety, high-volume manufacturing, and on the sales side, advertising spending was concentrated on a single product to simultaneously achieve brand awareness expansion and market penetration. This decision was exceptional in the OTC drug industry at the time, where multi-product strategies were common.
Shiron rapidly expanded sales after launch and grew into Rohto Pharmaceutical's flagship product by the late 1950s. By the early 1960s, it had reached a scale accounting for the majority of the company's revenue, and the company succeeded in maintaining high profit margins while aggressively investing in advertising.
As a result, Rohto Pharmaceutical established a high-turnover profitability model based on few-product concentration and mass sales. The success of Shiron completed the business structure centered on gastrointestinal medicine and eye drops, and this business model strongly influenced the company's decision-making as the fundamental philosophy behind subsequent brand strategy and promotional investment.
| FY | Revenue | Advertising expenses | Operating profit | Revenue-to-advertising expense ratio |
| FY1960 | 2.8B yen | 760M yen | 550M yen | 27.1% |
| FY1961 | 3.22B yen | 920M yen | 660M yen | 28.5% |
| FY1962 | 3.6B yen | 1.05B yen | 780M yen | 29.1% |
The prototype of Rohto Pharmaceutical's profitability structure lies in focusing on a single gastrointestinal medicine shipping over 3 million packets daily, while investing 27–29% of revenue in advertising expenses yet maintaining an operating profit margin of around 19%. By narrowing to a few products, cost reduction through mass production became possible, and concentrating advertising spend on a single product simultaneously captured brand recognition and market share. This model of 'few products, mass sales, high advertising ratio' was subsequently inherited by Pansiron and Hada Labo.
Ours is a company that has grown as a mass-market business from the beginning. We were determined to thoroughly pursue this medicine that new drug manufacturers, who had little interest in household remedies, would not undertake.
First, because we have few product types, this kind of rationalization is possible. With this low-variety, ultra-high-volume production, costs are also low. And because they're cheap, the penetration rate is also high.
My principle is that medicine should work well and be affordable. For example, pharmaceutical manufacturers use sugar-coated tablets or capsules to create an appearance, but our Shiron is powder in packets. You might ask whether this doesn't match the current generation, but that's absolutely not the case. There is no other medicine consumed at a rate of over three million packets a day. Stacked up, that would be two and a half times the height of Mt. Fuji.
So I believe that the mission of OTC drugs and household medicines is, first and foremost, to meet the demand for medicines that are affordable and effective.
When you say 'Rohto,' 'Shiron' immediately comes to mind, and 'eye drops' springs right up. Amid fierce competition in the industry, both Shiron and eye drops continue to run at the top of the industry with 40% market share each, and their capability is truly admirable. Even though the products are inherently directly connected to the general public, one can only marvel anew at how deeply they have penetrated among consumers.
When Omi Brotherhood went bankrupt, Rohto Pharmaceutical chose not to rescue the company but instead acquired only the trademark license from The Mentholatum Company of the United States. This allowed Rohto to acquire the brand without assuming the 2 billion yen in liabilities and approximately 260 employees, at a royalty rate of 7.5% (less than half of the roughly 20% that Omi had effectively been paying). As Vice President Yamada stated, 'We can handle it with just 30 people,' the entry was designed on the premise of cost-structure advantages through automation—an example of a scheme that carved out only brand assets from a bankruptcy situation.
In the early 1970s in Japan, demand for household medicines expanded alongside rising living standards, and the ointment market was also in a growth phase. In this segment, Otsuka Pharmaceutical's Oronine had established high brand recognition through advertising investment and distribution network expansion, effectively leading the market.
Meanwhile, Omi Brotherhood, which had long manufactured and sold Mentholatum, went bankrupt due to management deterioration and disappeared from the domestic market. As a result, the Mentholatum brand, with its long history, was left in limbo, and uncertainty arose regarding its ownership and future development.
Rohto Pharmaceutical recognized the need to break away from its business structure dependent on gastrointestinal medicines and eye drops, and was seeking to develop a third revenue pillar. In August 1975, the company acquired the domestic trademark license from The Mentholatum Company of the United States and decided to make a full-scale entry into the ointment market.
The contract period was 10 years with a royalty rate of 7.5% of net sales. Rather than entering through proprietary development, the company chose to leverage an already recognized brand, designing an approach to reduce time-to-market and investment risk. This was selected as a pragmatic means of entering an established market.
Mentholatum became established as a major brand for Rohto Pharmaceutical after launch, contributing to sales growth in the topical drug and quasi-drug segments through the 1980s. This reduced the company's relative dependence on internal medicines and eye drops, advancing the diversification of revenue sources.
However, competition intensified as Omi Brotherhood returned to the market with the 'Menturm' brand, establishing a three-way competitive structure including Oronine. While Rohto did not achieve a dominant market position, the Mentholatum business came to occupy a stable component of the company's revenue base, serving as a practical foothold for advancing its subsequent diversification strategy.
When Omi Brotherhood went bankrupt, Rohto Pharmaceutical chose not to rescue the company but instead acquired only the trademark license from The Mentholatum Company of the United States. This allowed Rohto to acquire the brand without assuming the 2 billion yen in liabilities and approximately 260 employees, at a royalty rate of 7.5% (less than half of the roughly 20% that Omi had effectively been paying). As Vice President Yamada stated, 'We can handle it with just 30 people,' the entry was designed on the premise of cost-structure advantages through automation—an example of a scheme that carved out only brand assets from a bankruptcy situation.
The deal covered the manufacture and sale of four products—Mentholatum ointment, White, Love, and shaving cream—as well as import and sales rights for lip balm and lipstick. The contract period was 10 years.
The royalty was set at approximately 7.5%, somewhat higher than the 5% that Omi had effectively been paying to the U.S. Mentholatum Company, but all advertising was left entirely to Rohto's discretion. Conversely, the 20% of sales that Omi had been paying was cut by more than half by eliminating the intermediary, and the U.S. Mentholatum Company also saw a slight increase in income.
'If we install automated machinery at our headquarters factory, we can handle the volume Omi was selling with just 30 people,' said Rohto Pharmaceutical Vice President Yamada (Yasukuni Yamada), confidently. 'And if we get prior approval from the U.S. Mentholatum Company, we can even launch Mentholatum products in different colors and formats.' As if channeling President Hyde's intentions, bold statements targeting Oronine kept flowing.
Rohto plans to develop Mentholatum into a third pillar alongside eye drops and gastrointestinal medicines within a few years. Had they moved to rehabilitate Omi, they would have had to take on 2 billion yen in liabilities and all employees—so in the end, they made a bargain purchase.
(Note: Omi Brotherhood) had to figure out how to sell 'Menturm.' The idea they came up with was to have all employees visit retail stores. (...)
By making direct visits and improving retailers' impression of them, they thought they might be able to cut into Menthol (note: Rohto's Mentholatum) somewhat—a last-resort strategy. 'It was our competitive spirit against Rohto that made it possible,' says President Iwahara. Of course, if they lost this competition, they would lose their jobs, so they were desperate. (...)
These tactics paid off, and they have now 'caught up to about one-third of Rohto Pharmaceutical's Mentholatum sales.' Furthermore, regarding the lipstick format launched as a new product after the bankruptcy, they claim to be 'competing neck and neck.' However, the reasons for strong sales are not all sentimental. There is also the practical factor that retail margins are set about 20% higher than Mentholatum.
Thirteen years after the 1975 trademark acquisition, Rohto Pharmaceutical faced a choice between continuing to pay 7.5% of sales as royalties or investing 9.8 billion yen to acquire the brand's originating company outright. After the acquisition, the company's financial condition turned out to be worse than expected, and in 2003, Rohto recorded a 3.2 billion yen impairment loss on goodwill. However, the fact that a company with 500 employees gained sovereignty over a global brand enabled expansion into China and Southeast Asia, securing business discretion that exceeded mere royalty savings.
Since acquiring the trademark license in the mid-1970s, Mentholatum had become established as Rohto Pharmaceutical's core brand in the topical drug segment. However, this business foundation was dependent on a license agreement with The Mentholatum Company of the United States, creating a structure vulnerable to contract renewals and changes in terms.
By the 1980s, the domestic market had entered a mature phase, and growth opportunities were increasingly sought in overseas markets. However, with brand rights fragmented, there were constraints on product development and overseas expansion flexibility, and the challenge of being unable to chart a long-term growth strategy became increasingly apparent.
To resolve these structural constraints, Rohto Pharmaceutical made the decision in July 1988 to acquire The Mentholatum Company of the United States and make it a wholly owned subsidiary. This gave the company unified control over manufacturing, sales, and trademark rights related to the Mentholatum brand.
The decision to acquire the originating company itself, rather than merely extending the license, entailed increased short-term costs but was aimed at securing future business flexibility and strategic discretion. It was a clear decision to internalize the brand as a company asset.
Through the acquisition, Rohto Pharmaceutical established the framework to pursue full-scale global expansion centered on the Mentholatum brand. With the ability to design product development and promotional strategies both domestically and internationally on a unified basis, the topical drug business was clearly positioned as a growth area for the company.
This acquisition was Rohto Pharmaceutical's first major overseas corporate acquisition and became the starting point for subsequent overseas expansion and M&A strategy. As a result, Mentholatum was transformed from a domestic brand into a core asset supporting the company's international business.
Thirteen years after the 1975 trademark acquisition, Rohto Pharmaceutical faced a choice between continuing to pay 7.5% of sales as royalties or investing 9.8 billion yen to acquire the brand's originating company outright. After the acquisition, the company's financial condition turned out to be worse than expected, and in 2003, Rohto recorded a 3.2 billion yen impairment loss on goodwill. However, the fact that a company with 500 employees gained sovereignty over a global brand enabled expansion into China and Southeast Asia, securing business discretion that exceeded mere royalty savings.
We acquired The Mentholatum Company, a U.S. ointment manufacturer, in 1988. It happened because the other party's management expressed a desire to sell the company.
At the time, Rohto Pharmaceutical had name recognition but was a compact company. We had about 500 employees. Excluding the factory, logistics, and R&D divisions, only about 100 people worked at the headquarters in Ikuno Ward, Osaka.
Such a company suddenly found itself managing a foreign enterprise, which caused a culture shock within the company. Mentholatum was sold in countries around the world, but its financial condition was not as good as we had expected. My father even suddenly started studying English because of the situation. Also, in the process of expanding Mentholatum's skincare product lineup, we hired people with various backgrounds and experience, which reinvigorated the company.
After entering the Chinese market in 1991, Rohto Pharmaceutical sold Mentholatum medicated lip cream at approximately 10 times the Japanese price and secured a 90% market share in China as of 2007. The company became a sponsor of the Chinese diving team at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, and the team's six gold medals helped establish the brand—a prime example of foreign brand price premium formation. The Chinese subsidiary's net sales grew rapidly from 12.4 billion yen in FY2011 to 32.9 billion yen in FY2015, achieving profitability exceeding that of Japan.
By the late 1980s, Japan's domestic OTC drug market had matured significantly, making growth through population increase or demand expansion difficult to envision. Meanwhile, Rohto Pharmaceutical had acquired The Mentholatum Company of the United States in 1988, incorporating brand sovereignty and business discretion, and had established a framework to seriously consider overseas expansion.
During the same period, China's reform and opening-up policies were progressing, gradually expanding room for foreign companies to enter the market. Rising living standards, particularly in urban areas, were generating visible demand for pharmaceuticals and hygiene-related products. However, numerous constraints in regulations and business practices made sole foreign entry difficult, and joint ventures with local companies were considered the practical option.
Based on this environmental assessment, Rohto Pharmaceutical decided in 1991 to establish a joint venture in China together with The Mentholatum Company. The aim was to reduce barriers to market entry by combining the brand power of Mentholatum with the local partner's distribution network and regulatory expertise.
The choice of a joint venture rather than sole entry was driven by prioritizing adaptation to the regulatory environment and certainty in business launch. This was a decision that emphasized long-term market establishment over short-term profit maximization, and served as a clear statement of intent to position China as a future growth base.
The establishment of the joint venture allowed Rohto Pharmaceutical to build a business foundation in the Chinese market and gradually advance the local deployment of the Mentholatum brand. Recognition of topical drugs and hygiene products grew, centered on urban areas, and the company steadily increased its presence in the Chinese market.
This joint venture establishment became the starting point for Rohto Pharmaceutical's China business, serving as an important stepping stone for subsequent investment expansion and business diversification. As a result, China came to be positioned as a long-term growth market for the company, following Japan and the United States.
| Fiscal year | Net sales | Ordinary income | Net assets | Total assets |
| FY2011 | 12.4 billion yen | 1.4 billion yen | 7.6 billion yen | 15.5 billion yen |
| FY2012 | 14.8 billion yen | 1.7 billion yen | 10.3 billion yen | 20.8 billion yen |
| FY2013 | 21.0 billion yen | 2.8 billion yen | 12.2 billion yen | 25.2 billion yen |
| FY2014 | 25.4 billion yen | 3.2 billion yen | 16.5 billion yen | 32.0 billion yen |
| FY2015 | 32.9 billion yen | 3.1 billion yen | 15.9 billion yen | 33.1 billion yen |
After entering the Chinese market in 1991, Rohto Pharmaceutical sold Mentholatum medicated lip cream at approximately 10 times the Japanese price and secured a 90% market share in China as of 2007. The company became a sponsor of the Chinese diving team at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, and the team's six gold medals helped establish the brand—a prime example of foreign brand price premium formation. The Chinese subsidiary's net sales grew rapidly from 12.4 billion yen in FY2011 to 32.9 billion yen in FY2015, achieving profitability exceeding that of Japan.
At the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, we became the official sponsor of the Chinese diving team, and when the team won six gold medals, our product image improved significantly and sales grew substantially. Currently, our products command a premium image as high-quality and reliable compared to domestic Chinese brands. (...)
Despite being priced at approximately 10 times the price of products sold in Japan, 'Mentholatum Medicated Lip Cream' has captured a market share of 90% (2007 Euromonitor survey).
For our company to grow in the current challenging domestic market environment, global expansion is essential. (...) The area that deserves the most attention is Asia, particularly the rapid expansion into the Chinese market. Our company has been focused on the Chinese consumer market since the days when China was still growing as the 'world's factory,' developing markets with lip cream, eye drops, and other products. Thanks to these efforts, our eye drops and Mentholatum-branded skincare products such as lip cream have become leading local brands, and the subsidiary has grown to achieve profitability exceeding that of Japan.
Rohto Pharmaceutical achieved what 'no pharmaceutical company had ever successfully done—entering the cosmetics market' by converting its dermatological research knowledge into functional product appeal. Hada Labo, launched in 2004, grew from 1.5 billion yen in its first year to a shipment value of 13.6 billion yen in six years, becoming the best-selling lotion brand in the self-service cosmetics market. The 'high functionality, low price' appeal, distinct from department store brands, aligned with the structural change in the retail environment driven by the expansion of drugstore chains, and the alignment of entry timing and distribution channel selection was behind the rapid growth.
By the late 1990s, Rohto Pharmaceutical's core businesses—gastrointestinal drugs, eye drops, and topical drugs—faced limited growth potential as the domestic OTC drug market matured. Price competition and promotional competition intensified, and the growth model based on volume expansion was becoming increasingly dysfunctional.
Meanwhile, the cosmetics market, particularly skincare, was trending upward against the backdrop of growing health consciousness and beauty awareness among consumers. In the dermatological science field, closely related to pharmaceuticals, there was room to leverage R&D capabilities and quality control expertise, and the restructuring of the business portfolio emerged as a key management issue.
Based on this environmental assessment, Rohto Pharmaceutical began full-scale investment in the skincare field from 2001. The company strengthened its R&D framework and adopted a clear policy of developing products emphasizing functionality by applying dermatological knowledge cultivated through pharmaceutical development.
Simultaneously, the company repositioned its cosmetics business from a supplementary role to a strategic business expected to drive future growth, gradually expanding resource allocation to development, production, and promotion. This was a decision that prioritized building a medium-to-long-term business foundation over short-term profit contribution.
The full-scale investment in skincare enabled Rohto Pharmaceutical to advance the transformation away from a pharmaceutical-dependent business structure. Functional cosmetics and dermatology-related products were gradually incorporated into the business portfolio, and their development as new revenue sources began.
While the investment during this period did not yield immediate results, it laid the foundation for subsequent skincare brand development and global business expansion. As a result, Rohto Pharmaceutical reached a critical turning point in its evolution toward a business structure with pharmaceuticals and cosmetics as twin pillars.
Rohto Pharmaceutical achieved what 'no pharmaceutical company had ever successfully done—entering the cosmetics market' by converting its dermatological research knowledge into functional product appeal. Hada Labo, launched in 2004, grew from 1.5 billion yen in its first year to a shipment value of 13.6 billion yen in six years, becoming the best-selling lotion brand in the self-service cosmetics market. The 'high functionality, low price' appeal, distinct from department store brands, aligned with the structural change in the retail environment driven by the expansion of drugstore chains, and the alignment of entry timing and distribution channel selection was behind the rapid growth.
Even when people would normally say 'that's impossible,' we have taken on challenges with a 'we'll show them' spirit, believing that success is not out of the question. Our entry into cosmetics—something no pharmaceutical company had ever successfully done—was one such challenge. Our overseas ventures, too, involve taking on European and American companies more than 10 times our size, sometimes beyond our own scale. By any normal measure, we shouldn't be able to compete, but reality has proven otherwise. By tenaciously sticking with it, results have somehow followed.
The driving force behind our growth has been beauty-related products such as 'Hada Labo' and 'Obagi,' which recorded net sales of 21.3 billion yen in the current fiscal year, accounting for approximately 20% of consolidated sales as a growth engine. The cosmetics market is undergoing significant change due to shifts in consumer purchasing behavior that emphasize price and cost-effectiveness.
Our 'Hada Labo' and similar products have matched this change well, gaining support for their high functionality and cost performance. They achieved domestic sales of 10 billion yen, making it the best-selling lotion brand in the self-service cosmetics market.
In the early 2000s, while advancing full-scale investment in the skincare field, Rohto Pharmaceutical faced the challenge of where to find sources of differentiation in pharmaceuticals and functional products. The OTC drug market was maturing, and sustained growth was difficult to envision through product improvements and promotional enhancements of existing offerings alone.
Meanwhile, growing health consciousness was driving increased interest in functional ingredients and formulation technologies, and movements to differentiate products based on 'ingredients' and 'technology' were gaining momentum. In this environment, Rohto Pharmaceutical recognized the need to enhance competitiveness by incorporating external technologies and knowledge rather than expanding its research domains independently.
Based on this recognition, Rohto Pharmaceutical concluded a strategic business alliance with Morishita Jintan, which possessed proprietary formulation technology, in September 2003. The aim was to leverage the encapsulation and ingredient stabilization technologies that Morishita Jintan had cultivated over many years to enhance development capabilities for pharmaceuticals and health-related products.
This was not a simple product supply agreement but an alliance premised on collaboration from the R&D stage, intended to create new added value by bringing together the strengths of both companies. For Rohto Pharmaceutical, it was a decision that clearly demonstrated a stance of strategically incorporating external technologies.
Through this alliance, Rohto Pharmaceutical was able to broaden the range of formulation design and ingredient utilization that would have been difficult to address with its own technology alone. The number of options in R&D increased, laying the groundwork for advancing product planning that emphasized functionality.
While the alliance did not generate significant short-term revenue, the experience of flexibly utilizing external resources through technology partnerships influenced subsequent business development and alliance strategy. As a result, this business alliance served as an important stepping stone that reinforced Rohto Pharmaceutical's R&D framework and broadened future growth domains.
| FY | Net sales | Operating income | Assets | Employees |
| 2001/3 | 9.2 billion yen | -260 million yen | 8.3 billion yen | 213 |
| FY | Net sales | Operating income | Assets | Employees |
| 2005/3 | 8.6 billion yen | -260 million yen | 7.1 billion yen | - |
| 2006/3 | 9.2 billion yen | -320 million yen | 8.9 billion yen | 176 |
| 2007/3 | 9.9 billion yen | -70 million yen | 14.2 billion yen | 294 |
| FY | Shares held | Balance sheet value | Price per share |
| 2006/3 | 4,025,000 shares | 1.73 billion yen | 429 yen/share |
| 2007/3 | 4,025,000 shares | 1.562 billion yen | 388 yen/share |
| 2008/3 | 4,025,000 shares | 1.143 billion yen | 283 yen/share |
| 2009/3 | 4,025,000 shares | 917 million yen | 227 yen/share |
| 2010/3 | 4,025,000 shares | 1.082 billion yen | 268 yen/share |
| 2011/3 | 4,025,000 shares | 1.304 billion yen | 323 yen/share |
| 2012/3 | 1,759,309 shares | 663 million yen | 376 yen/share |
| 2013/3 | 1,759,309 shares | 721 million yen | 409 yen/share |
From the first Indonesian factory in 1997 to the third factory in 2012, Rohto Pharmaceutical progressively built production facilities in Southeast Asia. The decision to shift from exporting domestically produced goods to local production was a structural transformation that enabled not only foreign exchange risk reduction and lead time shortening, but also adaptation to each country's regulations and preferences. However, as Chairman Kunio Yamada himself acknowledged, 'Asia's growth has plateaued and it's becoming a fight for share,' the company has entered a phase where investment recovery will be tested as the tailwind subsides.
By the late 2000s, Japan's domestic pharmaceutical and skincare markets had matured significantly, and growth through volume expansion was increasingly difficult to envision amid demographic structural changes. While Rohto Pharmaceutical had been advancing investment in skincare and overseas expansion, the business structure premised on domestic production was gradually revealing constraints in terms of costs and supply.
Meanwhile, economic growth and the expansion of the middle-income population in Southeast Asian countries were driving rapidly increasing demand for pharmaceutical and skincare products. Due to differences in climate and living environments, there was high demand for eye drops, topical drugs, and skincare products, and the region was recognized by Rohto Pharmaceutical as a promising growth market.
Based on this environmental assessment, Rohto Pharmaceutical accelerated its production investment in Southeast Asia from around 2010. Rather than merely expanding sales offices, the company adopted a clear policy of establishing manufacturing facilities locally to build a supply structure close to demand centers.
The decision to pursue local production was motivated not only by reducing transportation costs and foreign exchange risk, but also by the aim to rapidly develop products suited to each country's regulations and consumer preferences. This was a strategic decision to shift the overseas business from quantitative expansion to sustainable growth by establishing a structure not dependent on domestic production.
Through production investment in Southeast Asia, Rohto Pharmaceutical enhanced its supply capacity to local markets and built a framework capable of supporting sales expansion. Local production contributed not only to improved cost competitiveness but also to shorter lead times for product launches, enhancing the company's responsiveness to competitive conditions.
Through these efforts, Rohto Pharmaceutical came to position Southeast Asia not merely as an export destination but as an integral part of its business foundation. As a result, the region developed into a key base supporting the company's overseas growth, becoming a core area for advancing subsequent global expansion.
From the first Indonesian factory in 1997 to the third factory in 2012, Rohto Pharmaceutical progressively built production facilities in Southeast Asia. The decision to shift from exporting domestically produced goods to local production was a structural transformation that enabled not only foreign exchange risk reduction and lead time shortening, but also adaptation to each country's regulations and preferences. However, as Chairman Kunio Yamada himself acknowledged, 'Asia's growth has plateaued and it's becoming a fight for share,' the company has entered a phase where investment recovery will be tested as the tailwind subsides.
However, over the past one to two years, I have felt that we are at a major crossroads—whether we will continue to grow or contract. Until now, the wind was at our back in many ways. China, Vietnam, and other markets were developing rapidly, and with few competitors, we were able to grow the business significantly. But now, Asia's growth has reached a plateau, and going forward it will become a fight for share. Domestically, we rode the wave of the drugstore opening boom successfully, but drugstores are now said to be saturated. Other companies, seeing our success, have launched similar products, and when you go to stores, there are now competing products that are nearly indistinguishable. What has been our strength until now is about to become our challenge. We cannot afford to be complacent.