| Period | Type | Revenue | Profit* | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2004/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥1B | ¥0B | 1.4% |
| 2005/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥2B | ¥0B | 5.2% |
| 2006/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥3B | ¥0B | 3.7% |
| 2007/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥6B | ¥1B | 13.4% |
| 2008/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥9B | ¥2B | 20.0% |
| 2009/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥11B | ¥2B | 20.9% |
| 2010/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥17B | ¥3B | 18.9% |
| 2011/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥24B | ¥6B | 24.6% |
| 2012/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥32B | ¥8B | 23.9% |
| 2013/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥35B | ¥9B | 24.4% |
| 2014/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥39B | ¥12B | 32.2% |
| 2015/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥41B | ¥15B | 36.7% |
| 2016/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥54B | ¥18B | 32.7% |
| 2017/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥76B | ¥26B | 34.6% |
| 2018/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥98B | ¥33B | 33.2% |
| 2019/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥118B | ¥26B | 21.7% |
| 2020/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥126B | ¥28B | 21.9% |
| 2021/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥147B | ¥44B | 30.0% |
| 2022/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥166B | ¥50B | 29.8% |
| 2023/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥183B | ¥57B | 30.9% |
| 2024/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥197B | ¥60B | 30.3% |
| 2025/3 | Revenue / Ordinary Income | ¥213B | ¥65B | 30.4% |
ZOZOTOWN is often described as the 'digitization of fashion e-commerce,' but its essence lies in integrating three layers—EC, logistics, and data—under its own control. At ZOZOBASE, established in 2006, the company built a system that completed product photography, measurements, data entry, and site listing within one day of receiving goods, and shipped orders within as little as three hours. By keeping logistics in-house rather than outsourcing it, ZOZO provided brands with the value proposition of 'entrust everything except sales,' which served as the basis for raising consignment sales commissions to the exceptional level of approximately 30%.
On top of this logistics foundation, a data-driven decision-making framework was layered. The 2018 system replacement overhauled a legacy environment that had been running for 16 years, introducing BigQuery to consolidate and visualize data. What deserves attention is that founder Yusaku Maezawa personally designed the database table structure in the company's early days. An entrepreneur being involved in data structure design is evidence that data was genuinely positioned as a tool for business decision-making from the outset, fundamentally different from retrofitted 'DX initiatives.'
In the fashion industry, EC was often positioned as a supplementary channel to physical stores. What made ZOZO distinctive was its recognition from the very beginning that logistics operations and data infrastructure behind the EC screen were the true sources of competitive advantage. Investment in 'invisible aspects'—photography quality, delivery speed, and inventory turnover accuracy—simultaneously supported brand trust and user convenience. The 30% take rate was compensation for this, and can be viewed not as a mere commission rate but as pricing for integration capability.
What the ZOZO case suggests is that a platform business's competitive strength may reside not in its surface appearance but in its underlying design philosophy. While Rakuten and Amazon pursued scale through a 'space rental' model, ZOZO achieved high profitability by controlling logistics and data in-house. Rather than putting fashion onto EC, ZOZO placed fashion atop an integrated logistics-and-data platform. This difference in sequence produced an entirely different revenue structure from the same EC business.
Yusaku Maezawa maintained a capital policy of minimizing external equity raises from founding through to IPO. Even after incorporating in 2002, he continued debt-centered financial management, with the equity ratio remaining at a low 11.8% as of the end of March 2005. Not relying on VCs in the harsh environment following the dot-com bubble collapse was a deliberate choice to avoid dilution and maintain management control. By building cash flow through business growth and avoiding dependence on outside capital, Maezawa maintained his dominant position as the largest shareholder throughout ZOZOTOWN's rapid growth phase.
This capital policy functioned rationally in preserving business freedom. Decisions such as the brand screening system and take rate settings—prioritizing worldview consistency over short-term revenue growth—were possible precisely because the founder held management control. Had he accepted dilution through capital increases, shareholder pressure for growth could have distorted management decisions. There was certainly a period when the conservative capital policy served as a breakwater protecting ZOZO's uniqueness.
However, this structure worked in reverse when the founder's departure became an issue. As of the end of March 2018, Maezawa held over approximately 37% of shares, with a portion pledged as collateral to financial institutions. When the intention to step down surfaced in a situation where the founder and equity were inseparable, the method of disposing of the large shareholding materialized as a problem directly linked to corporate value. Selling shares on the market would disrupt supply-demand balance, while continuing to hold them would leave the capital structure unstable. The management control preserved by avoiding capital increases transformed into a liquidity risk at the exit stage.
Ultimately, in 2019, ZOZO resolved the capital issue by accepting a tender offer from Z Holdings. The founder stepped down, and ZOZO became a consolidated subsidiary of ZHD. Not raising capital nurtured the business, and not raising capital constrained the exit. This duality suggests a universal challenge of how founder-led IT companies design the coexistence of growth and succession. A conservative capital policy is not a panacea—unless designed to encompass the 'landing point for equity,' success can become a structure that breeds the next problem.
The decision to expand the business at the dangerous level of 11.8% equity ratio without raising capital beyond the initial 15 million yen appears reckless at first glance. However, in the post-dot-com-bubble VC market, raising capital meant significant dilution of management control. Maezawa's decision to quit band activities and devote himself to management, and his financial policy of avoiding equity raises and getting by on borrowings, were two sides of the same coin—a deliberate choice to 'run his own company himself.' This low-capital, high-debt structure enabled the distinctive approach of screening-based admissions and worldview-focused design in the subsequent launch of ZOZOTOWN.
Since establishing Start Today, Ltd. in 1998, Yusaku Maezawa had been expanding mail-order sales of CDs and records. However, around 2000, the spread of the internet raised questions about the sustainability of a paper catalog-based sales model. At the same time, as the business grew in scale, management challenges such as inventory management and fundraising became apparent.
Initially running the business in parallel with his band activities, the growth of the enterprise reached a stage where part-time management was no longer feasible. Facing decisions requiring quality and speed—such as transitioning from paper to EC, investing in new businesses, and relocating headquarters—strengthening the corporate structure beyond a personal business extension became indispensable.
In 2002, Maezawa ended his band activities and decided to devote himself to management. That same year, he reorganized from a limited company to a stock corporation, establishing Start Today, Inc. with capital of 15 million yen and assuming the position of representative director himself. The incorporation was an institutional preparation aimed at improving business credibility and enabling business expansion.
Meanwhile, the capital policy was cautious. Under the harsh funding environment following the dot-com bubble collapse, no external equity was raised, and debt-centered financial management continued. As a result, the equity ratio stood at a low 11.8% as of the end of March 2005, but this was also a choice to maintain management control. On the business side, the company withdrew from paper catalogs to concentrate on EC, and also expanded into the fashion sector.
Continuing to expand through borrowings without capital increases after incorporation was financially fragile, but it served as the foundation for maintaining founder-led decision-making. By specializing in EC, the company reduced paper media costs and accumulated inventory turnover and online sales expertise, which led to the subsequent creation of ZOZOTOWN.
In other words, the period around 2002 was a process of transforming the company's character from a music mail-order business to an internet company, and the incorporation was not merely a change of form but an institutional and financial redesign to concentrate management resources on EC.
The decision to expand the business at the dangerous level of 11.8% equity ratio without raising capital beyond the initial 15 million yen appears reckless at first glance. However, in the post-dot-com-bubble VC market, raising capital meant significant dilution of management control. Maezawa's decision to quit band activities and devote himself to management, and his financial policy of avoiding equity raises and getting by on borrowings, were two sides of the same coin—a deliberate choice to 'run his own company himself.' This low-capital, high-debt structure enabled the distinctive approach of screening-based admissions and worldview-focused design in the subsequent launch of ZOZOTOWN.
It all started with music. I couldn't find the records I wanted anywhere. So I thought, 'Well, I'll just do it myself,' and started a mail-order business for imported records and such. Clothing was similar—I started it because I wanted a convenient way to buy clothes from my favorite shops all in one place.
As more people joined, the fun things and interests of everyone grew. Business growth and going public were just steps along the way to making that happen. Basically, we're a company that revolves around a fun website, trying to do more and more enjoyable things.
What deserves attention is that the launch of ZOZOTOWN was not a 'new startup' but a 'discontinuation and consolidation of 17 existing brands.' The decision to close all self-operated online shops and consolidate them into a single domain carried the risk of temporarily damaging existing revenue. However, the experience of bearing inventory and honing bestseller instincts during the EPROZE era supported the accuracy of brand screening and worldview design. The transfer of on-the-ground knowledge cultivated through the buy-and-sell model into the design philosophy of a consignment-sales mall became the core of ZOZOTOWN's differentiation.
Start Today began with mail-order sales of CDs and records and made a complete transition from paper catalogs to EC around 2000. Having a clear customer base of music fans, the company naturally expanded into the fashion domain, which had high cultural affinity. In 2000, it launched the self-purchasing fashion EC site 'EPROZE,' selling products by bearing inventory itself. By assuming inventory risk, the company honed its product knowledge and sense of bestsellers, and also built trust with brands.
Meanwhile, the sites were dispersed by taste and operated across multiple domains. As scale expanded, challenges of unifying the worldview and optimizing traffic efficiency emerged. The concept of reconstructing the operation as a single 'town' rather than a mere collection of online shops took concrete form. A navigation design that allowed cross-brand browsing became necessary, and the stage was set for redesigning the business framework itself.
In December 2004, the existing sites were completely revamped, and the EC mall 'ZOZOTOWN,' which aggregated select shops, was launched. The 17 online brands that had been operated in-house were discontinued and consolidated into a single domain. This was not a name change but a business model transformation. While preserving each brand's worldview, the design was switched to create a unified 'town' as a whole.
Listings were made by screening, adopting a policy of managing the lineup of brands and site design rather than indiscriminately increasing stores. Leveraging the discernment cultivated through the inventory-holding model, the company clarified its position as a fashion-specialized platform. This consolidation became the foundation that later attracted major brands, and ZOZOTOWN began to be recognized not just as an EC site but as a platform where brand value could be maintained.
What deserves attention is that the launch of ZOZOTOWN was not a 'new startup' but a 'discontinuation and consolidation of 17 existing brands.' The decision to close all self-operated online shops and consolidate them into a single domain carried the risk of temporarily damaging existing revenue. However, the experience of bearing inventory and honing bestseller instincts during the EPROZE era supported the accuracy of brand screening and worldview design. The transfer of on-the-ground knowledge cultivated through the buy-and-sell model into the design philosophy of a consignment-sales mall became the core of ZOZOTOWN's differentiation.
The fact that the key to UA's listing was a direct dialogue between Maezawa and Osamu Shigematsu demonstrates that in early-stage platform businesses, trust between entrepreneurs takes precedence over institutional design. What deserves attention is the trajectory of the take rate. The approximately 18% in fiscal year 2005 already far exceeded the EC industry norm of 10%, and by fiscal year 2011 it reached approximately 30%. The structure of comprehensively handling photography, inventory, and shipping reduced brands' burden to near zero, establishing a model that justified commissions through operational quality rather than price.
Having launched ZOZOTOWN in 2004, Start Today was positioning itself as a fashion-specialized EC, but its name recognition within the industry was limited at the time. For brands, the biggest concern was whether they could sell without undermining their own value, making them cautious about listing on an unknown EC mall. In the real store-centric industry, online sales were positioned as a supplementary channel.
Meanwhile, Yusaku Maezawa engaged in dialogue with brands not merely as a distributor but as an entrepreneur with fashion understanding. His approach of designing EC as a venue for expressing worldview rather than a arena for price competition gradually gained appreciation. On this trajectory, the commencement of business with United Arrows in 2005 became a realistic prospect.
In 2005, United Arrows listed on ZOZOTOWN. The contract format was consignment sales, with a system where ZOZO handled product photography, inventory storage, packing, and shipping. This was not mere mall listing but a model that took on logistics and operations as an integrated package, allowing brands to focus on sales and planning.
This deal is said to have been concluded through direct dialogue between Maezawa and Osamu Shigematsu. Following United Arrows' listing, BEAMS and SHIPS also joined, and ZOZOTOWN came to be recognized as a venue where prominent select shops were represented. The enrichment of the brand lineup had the effect of elevating the overall credibility of the site.
As of fiscal year 2005, ZOZO's estimated consignment sales commission was approximately 18%, exceeding the general EC level at the time. This was because the model was a value-added type that encompassed logistics, photography, and inventory management. The structure secured revenue through sales floor quality and operational capability rather than price competitiveness.
Subsequently, with the expansion of promotional investment, the take rate rose, reaching approximately 30% by fiscal year 2011. By achieving both prominent brand participation and high commission rates, ZOZOTOWN established its positioning not as a 'low-price EC' but as a 'high-value-added fashion platform.'
The fact that the key to UA's listing was a direct dialogue between Maezawa and Osamu Shigematsu demonstrates that in early-stage platform businesses, trust between entrepreneurs takes precedence over institutional design. What deserves attention is the trajectory of the take rate. The approximately 18% in fiscal year 2005 already far exceeded the EC industry norm of 10%, and by fiscal year 2011 it reached approximately 30%. The structure of comprehensively handling photography, inventory, and shipping reduced brands' burden to near zero, establishing a model that justified commissions through operational quality rather than price.
It all comes down to persistent sales efforts. I would visit manufacturers and brands, and straightforwardly ask them to let us carry their products. At first, almost everyone turned us down. But from there, I kept visiting again and again, negotiating tenaciously. Since I was only approaching brands I personally liked, it wasn't a hardship.
At the root of it is our corporate philosophy: 'Make the world cool, bring smiles to the world.' People call us the 'largest apparel EC company,' but that's just a label others have put on us. I've never said 'We want to become Japan's number one EC site'—the thought even makes me uncomfortable. We buy and consign stylish clothing for sale because we believe that's the most effective way to convey our message.
Models and photographers stationed at the 1,000-tsubo logistics facility completed photography, measurement, data entry, and site listing on the day of receipt, and shipped within as little as three hours after receiving an order. This operational speed was ZOZO's essential competitive advantage. While Rakuten and Amazon left logistics to sellers through a 'space rental' model, ZOZO took logistics into its own hands, reducing the burden on brands to near zero. This structure justified the take rate increase from 18% to 30%, forming a barrier to entry that later EC entrants found difficult to replicate.
The commencement of business with prominent brands such as United Arrows in 2005 drove rapid expansion of ZOZOTOWN's transaction volume. In the consignment sales model, where the company handles everything from product photography and inventory storage to packing and shipping, logistics processing capacity directly determined competitive strength. Initially, inventory was stored within the headquarters building, but the increase in brands and SKUs made physical limitations apparent.
Furthermore, the differentiating factor from other EC sites was not price but operational quality, making it essential to build a swift and accurate shipping system. To maintain a high take rate, it was necessary to refine logistics not merely as a back-office function but as a source of added value. Thus, the establishment of a dedicated logistics facility emerged as a management priority.
In 2006, Start Today established the logistics facility 'ZOZOBASE' in Narashino City, Chiba Prefecture. The facility was secured through a lease from Prologis, a dedicated warehouse of approximately 1,000 tsubo in floor area. By transitioning from in-office storage to a full-scale logistics facility, the company established the infrastructure supporting EC operations.
At the new facility, a system was built to complete product photography, measurement, data entry, and site listing within one day of receiving goods. Furthermore, operations were established to enable shipping within as little as three hours after receiving an order. By keeping logistics in-house and accelerating it, this was a strategic investment to enhance credibility as a fashion-specialized EC.
The establishment of ZOZOBASE significantly improved inventory processing capacity and shipping speed. For brands, a high-quality logistics system that comprehensively handled photography, measurement, inventory management, and shipping was in place, enabling ZOZO to provide added value akin to 'operational outsourcing' rather than merely serving as a sales channel. This deepened the relationship with brands.
Importantly, this logistics enhancement served as the basis for the take rate increase. The consignment sales commission rose from approximately 18% in fiscal year 2005 to approximately 30% by fiscal year 2011, underpinned by the advancement of integrated operations including photography, storage, and shipping. By positioning logistics as the core of its competitive advantage, ZOZO established a structure that raised profitability while maintaining its high-value-added model.
Models and photographers stationed at the 1,000-tsubo logistics facility completed photography, measurement, data entry, and site listing on the day of receipt, and shipped within as little as three hours after receiving an order. This operational speed was ZOZO's essential competitive advantage. While Rakuten and Amazon left logistics to sellers through a 'space rental' model, ZOZO took logistics into its own hands, reducing the burden on brands to near zero. This structure justified the take rate increase from 18% to 30%, forming a barrier to entry that later EC entrants found difficult to replicate.
When products arrive at the logistics facility, samples are immediately sent for measurement and photography. Models and photographers are stationed in the warehouse, and they handle 5 to 10 shots at the photography studio. Once finished, data is sent from a nearby computer to the site's design team. All of this is completed within one day, so shop staff can list products on the site the same day. (...)
Order information is processed in bulk every morning between 8:30 and 9:00 AM. Picking, packing, and shipping are then completed by noon. It is said that products ordered before 9:00 AM can sometimes be shipped in just three hours. It is precisely because of this unique logistics system that ZOZOTOWN can continuously release limited-edition products with short shelf lives. This is also the reason why popular shops such as United Arrows choose to be tenants.
At a time in 2010 when the majority of the domestic EC industry was taking a wait-and-see approach to smartphone support, ZOZO immediately launched an iOS app. Since fashion EC is a field where image appearance and usability directly drive purchases, the judgment that repurposing PC displays would be insufficient was accurate. As a result, the smartphone ratio reached 52.7% in 2014 and 83.2% in 2018, with the app becoming the main battlefield for user touchpoints. The investment in Kayac to externally source development capabilities was also a pragmatic decision to compensate for the internal engineer shortage at the time.
Around 2010, smartphones—particularly the iPhone—were rapidly proliferating in Japan, and EC browsing environments were beginning to shift from PCs and feature phones to smartphones. The conventional ZOZOTOWN had been designed with a PC-first approach, and mobile support was limited to simplified displays. This posed a risk of losing the primary touchpoint with younger users. However, among domestic internet companies, smartphone proliferation was not regarded as a certainty, and the majority of companies were taking a wait-and-see approach.
Nevertheless, in fashion EC, the browsing experience directly influenced purchasing behavior, and screen design and usability optimization had entered a phase where they affected sales. Unlike the feature phone-centric era, UI design premised on touch operation was required, and smartphone support emerged as a competitive priority.
In December 2010, ZOZO released its iOS app, marking the beginning of full-scale smartphone support. It quickly gained traction, ranking high in the App Store's free app charts, and the company clarified its policy of making smartphones the primary touchpoint. Moving away from the approach of repurposing PC displays, the transition to a smartphone-dedicated UI was advanced.
In 2011, the company invested in Kayac to strengthen its development capabilities and accelerated app improvements. In May 2012, an Android version was also launched, completing support for both OS platforms. This established the infrastructure for transitioning to smartphone-first EC operations and consolidating the next-generation user touchpoint within the company's own app.
At a time in 2010 when the majority of the domestic EC industry was taking a wait-and-see approach to smartphone support, ZOZO immediately launched an iOS app. Since fashion EC is a field where image appearance and usability directly drive purchases, the judgment that repurposing PC displays would be insufficient was accurate. As a result, the smartphone ratio reached 52.7% in 2014 and 83.2% in 2018, with the app becoming the main battlefield for user touchpoints. The investment in Kayac to externally source development capabilities was also a pragmatic decision to compensate for the internal engineer shortage at the time.
The decision to lease approximately 30,000 tsubo of floor space and increase annual rent from 300 million yen to 1.5 billion yen—a fivefold increase—was a preemptive investment premised on surpassing 100 billion yen in transaction volume. The system enabled same-day delivery for 35% of shipments and launched a same-day delivery service (500 yen) for the Tokyo metropolitan area. The key point is that the logistics expansion was not merely a capacity enlargement but a structural investment that raised service quality in the form of delivery speed. The increase in fixed costs carried the risk of immediately compressing profits if GMV growth stalled, but ZOZO won this bet.
In the early 2010s, ZOZOTOWN was expanding its transaction volume through smartphone support and enrichment of prominent brands. The number of listed brands and SKUs continued to increase, and in the consignment sales model where the company handles inventory storage, photography, packing, and shipping, processing capacity was approaching its upper limit. The existing Narashino facility was becoming unable to accommodate future increases in transaction volume.
Furthermore, in fashion EC, delivery speed had entered a phase where it directly influenced customer satisfaction and repeat purchase rates. As competitors advanced their logistics investments, ZOZO also needed to build a system that simultaneously enhanced processing capacity and delivery speed, rather than merely expanding inventory. Logistics was at the stage of being redefined not as a back-office function but as the foundational capability supporting brand value.
In 2013, Start Today expanded its logistics facility in Narashino City, deciding to lease the entire floor of approximately 30,000 tsubo at Prologis Park Narashino 4. Annual rent expanded from approximately 300 million yen to approximately 1.5 billion yen, an investment accompanied by fixed cost burden. This was not a short-term efficiency improvement but a structural investment premised on future transaction volume expansion.
The expansion significantly increased inventory storage capacity and concurrent processing volume, strengthening the integrated operational system from photography, measurement, and data entry through to shipping. By advancing logistics processes, the infrastructure was established to maintain the value-added model that encompassed operational outsourcing functions beyond mere mall operation.
With the new facility operational, a system was built that enabled same-day delivery for approximately 35% of shipments. Following this, in March 2014, a same-day delivery service targeting the Tokyo metropolitan area was launched. For a 500-yen fee, orders placed by 9:00 AM arrived that evening, and orders placed by 9:00 PM arrived the following morning.
The mechanism allowing customers to choose delivery speed was a measure that enhanced convenience in fashion EC. The logistics expansion was not merely a facility enlargement but an investment that expanded the service design itself. It represented a structural turning point in building the processing capacity foundation toward surpassing 100 billion yen in transaction volume.
The decision to lease approximately 30,000 tsubo of floor space and increase annual rent from 300 million yen to 1.5 billion yen—a fivefold increase—was a preemptive investment premised on surpassing 100 billion yen in transaction volume. The system enabled same-day delivery for 35% of shipments and launched a same-day delivery service (500 yen) for the Tokyo metropolitan area. The key point is that the logistics expansion was not merely a capacity enlargement but a structural investment that raised service quality in the form of delivery speed. The increase in fixed costs carried the risk of immediately compressing profits if GMV growth stalled, but ZOZO won this bet.
A technology stack from 2002—VBScript/IIS/SQL Server—had been running unchanged for 16 years, with business logic concentrated in stored procedures and absolutely no test code. The fact that an EC operation handling transaction volumes of hundreds of billions of yen was being run in this state indicates that technology investment had been significantly deprioritized compared to logistics investment. The introduction of BigQuery and the push toward in-house development were prerequisites for a fashion EC company to transform into a tech company, and the 2018 initiation could even be considered too late.
As of 2018, ZOZOTOWN's core system had been operating for approximately 16 years without a major overhaul, running on a stack centered on VBScript, IIS, and SQL Server. Much of the business logic was concentrated in stored procedures on SQL Server, with no test code in existence—quality was maintained through manual testing by a QA team. While the system had supported growth, it had become constrained in terms of changeability and scalability.
Furthermore, the development structure was not fully in-house but was built through delegation to multiple external vendors. The overall system architecture was fragmented, and the speed of understanding specifications and making improvements was limited. As cloud usage expanded, the rising costs of AWS accounts also became an issue, and the system architecture itself came to be recognized as a management bottleneck.
Additionally, the data analytics infrastructure was insufficiently developed, lacking an environment for cross-cutting analysis of business data. While transaction volume expanded as a fashion-specialized EC, there were limits to the speed of analytics-driven initiative planning and improvement cycles. The system overhaul was evolving from a mere development efficiency issue into a structural challenge that determined business competitiveness.
In response to this situation, ZOZO began system replacement in 2018. Rather than incremental modifications premised on the legacy environment, the company shifted to a policy of reviewing the entire architecture. Instead of life extension premised on technical debt, a fundamental rebuild through redesign was chosen. This decision prioritized medium-to-long-term scalability over short-term efficiency.
In 2020, the engineering organization was restructured, and mid-career hiring was actively pursued to increase the in-house development ratio. By reducing dependence on external vendors, the company transitioned to a structure where product responsibility was consolidated internally. The organization was rebuilt to handle everything from architecture design to operations in an integrated manner, aiming for both development speed and quality.
Simultaneously, BigQuery was introduced as an analytics platform to promote data consolidation and visualization. Fragmented data was integrated, and development of an infrastructure that could be utilized for decision-making was advanced. The pivot was not merely infrastructure renewal but a technology strategy connecting product development and data utilization.
As the replacement progressed, the transition from a previously black-boxed structure to a design philosophy with clear areas of responsibility advanced. The progress of in-house development contributed to improving the speed of feature additions and improvements, acting in a direction that enhanced the autonomy of the development organization. Testing and quality management mechanisms were also progressively established, building a foundation for moving away from person-dependent operations.
The development of the data infrastructure enabled cross-business analytics, advancing the sophistication of inventory turnover and purchasing behavior understanding. In EC business, the quality of data utilization determines competitiveness, so the development of the analytics platform brought structural changes that extended to marketing and product strategy.
Technology foundation renewal is not something that completes in a short period, but ZOZO clearly signaled its transition away from legacy dependence. Following logistics investment, by explicitly positioning technology investment as a core of competitive advantage, the company entered a phase of pivoting from a fashion EC company toward a tech company.
A technology stack from 2002—VBScript/IIS/SQL Server—had been running unchanged for 16 years, with business logic concentrated in stored procedures and absolutely no test code. The fact that an EC operation handling transaction volumes of hundreds of billions of yen was being run in this state indicates that technology investment had been significantly deprioritized compared to logistics investment. The introduction of BigQuery and the push toward in-house development were prerequisites for a fashion EC company to transform into a tech company, and the 2018 initiation could even be considered too late.
In April 2018, the engineering organization at ZOZO had an enormous number of challenges. (...) ZOZOTOWN's primary architecture had been operating unchanged from 16 years ago to the present. The technology stack consisted of VBScript / IIS / SQL Server / on-premises, with all logic written in stored procedures on SQL Server. There was no testing, and quality was maintained through manual testing by the quality management team.