Founded in 1998. Operates the e-commerce site ZOZOTOWN, which grew into one of Japan's largest fashion e-commerce platforms. In 2019, it came under the umbrella of Z Holdings, strengthening its EC infrastructure through logistics investment and expansion of store listings.
1998
Establishment of Start Today, Ltd.
1998Establishment of Start Today, Ltd.
2000
Launched CD and record EC site 'STMonline'
2000Launched CD and record EC site 'STMonline'
2000
Launched select shop EC site 'EPROZE'
2000Launched select shop EC site 'EPROZE'
2001
Relocated headquarters to Makuhari (World Business Garden)
2001Relocated headquarters to Makuhari (World Business Garden)
2002
Strategic Decision
Reorganization into Start Today, Inc.
The rationality of 'debt-driven management' running at an equity ratio of 11.8%
2004
Strategic Decision
Launch of ZOZOTOWN
The 'agonizing decision' to discontinue 17 brands that became the starting point for mall conversion
2005
Strategic Decision
Commencement of business with United Arrows
The 'handshake between founders' that justified the take rate from 18% to 30%
2006
Strategic Decision
Establishment of ZOZOBASE
The barrier to entry created by 'listing within one day of receipt, shipping within three hours'
2007
Third-party allotment
2007Third-party allotment
2007
Listed on TSE Mothers
2007Listed on TSE Mothers
2010
Strategic Decision
Release of iOS app
The decision to 'not wait and see' that supported the surge in smartphone ratio from 52% to 83%
2012
Listed on TSE First Section
2012Listed on TSE First Section
2013
Strategic Decision
Expansion of ZOZOBASE
The gamble of 'quintupling fixed costs' from 300 million to 1.5 billion yen in annual rent
2016
Launch of deferred payment service
2016Launch of deferred payment service
2017
Completion of Prologis Park Chiba New Town
2017Completion of Prologis Park Chiba New Town
2018
Establishment of ZOZOBASE Tsukuba 1
2018Establishment of ZOZOBASE Tsukuba 1
2018
Trade name changed to ZOZO
2018Trade name changed to ZOZO
2018
Strategic Decision
Decision to rebuild systems
Settling the 'technical debt' of running on VBScript with zero test code for 16 years
2018
Announcement of three-year medium-term management plan
2018Announcement of three-year medium-term management plan
2019
Completion of Prologis Park Tsukuba 1-B
2019Completion of Prologis Park Tsukuba 1-B
2019
Reported profit decline; stock price fell due to poor performance
2019Reported profit decline; stock price fell due to poor performance
2019
Strategic Decision
Z Holdings acquired shares of ZOZO
The outcome of a founder with a 37% stake reaching an impasse on 'equity exit'
2020
Completion of Prologis Park Tsukuba 2
2020Completion of Prologis Park Tsukuba 2
2021
Revenue and profit increase; strengthened collaboration with PayPay Mall
2021Revenue and profit increase; strengthened collaboration with PayPay Mall
2021
Conducted share buyback
2021Conducted share buyback
2023
Establishment of ZOZOBASE Tsukuba 3
2023Establishment of ZOZOBASE Tsukuba 3
View Performance
RevenueZOZO:Revenue
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: ¥100M)
¥213B
Revenue:2025/3
ProfitZOZO:Net Profit Margin
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: %)
30.4%
Margin:2025/3
View Performance
PeriodTypeRevenueProfit*Margin
2004/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥1B¥0B1.4%
2005/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥2B¥0B5.2%
2006/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥3B¥0B3.7%
2007/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥6B¥1B13.4%
2008/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥9B¥2B20.0%
2009/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥11B¥2B20.9%
2010/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥17B¥3B18.9%
2011/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥24B¥6B24.6%
2012/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥32B¥8B23.9%
2013/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥35B¥9B24.4%
2014/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥39B¥12B32.2%
2015/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥41B¥15B36.7%
2016/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥54B¥18B32.7%
2017/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥76B¥26B34.6%
2018/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥98B¥33B33.2%
2019/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥118B¥26B21.7%
2020/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥126B¥28B21.9%
2021/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥147B¥44B30.0%
2022/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥166B¥50B29.8%
2023/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥183B¥57B30.9%
2024/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥197B¥60B30.3%
2025/3 Revenue / Ordinary Income¥213B¥65B30.4%

Author's Insights

Not a fashion EC, but a platform with integrated logistics and data design

ZOZOTOWN is often described as the 'digitization of fashion e-commerce,' but its essence lies in integrating three layers—EC, logistics, and data—under its own control. At ZOZOBASE, established in 2006, the company built a system that completed product photography, measurements, data entry, and site listing within one day of receiving goods, and shipped orders within as little as three hours. By keeping logistics in-house rather than outsourcing it, ZOZO provided brands with the value proposition of 'entrust everything except sales,' which served as the basis for raising consignment sales commissions to the exceptional level of approximately 30%.

On top of this logistics foundation, a data-driven decision-making framework was layered. The 2018 system replacement overhauled a legacy environment that had been running for 16 years, introducing BigQuery to consolidate and visualize data. What deserves attention is that founder Yusaku Maezawa personally designed the database table structure in the company's early days. An entrepreneur being involved in data structure design is evidence that data was genuinely positioned as a tool for business decision-making from the outset, fundamentally different from retrofitted 'DX initiatives.'

In the fashion industry, EC was often positioned as a supplementary channel to physical stores. What made ZOZO distinctive was its recognition from the very beginning that logistics operations and data infrastructure behind the EC screen were the true sources of competitive advantage. Investment in 'invisible aspects'—photography quality, delivery speed, and inventory turnover accuracy—simultaneously supported brand trust and user convenience. The 30% take rate was compensation for this, and can be viewed not as a mere commission rate but as pricing for integration capability.

What the ZOZO case suggests is that a platform business's competitive strength may reside not in its surface appearance but in its underlying design philosophy. While Rakuten and Amazon pursued scale through a 'space rental' model, ZOZO achieved high profitability by controlling logistics and data in-house. Rather than putting fashion onto EC, ZOZO placed fashion atop an integrated logistics-and-data platform. This difference in sequence produced an entirely different revenue structure from the same EC business.

2026-02-25 | by author
The paradox of a founder who avoided capital increases but reached an impasse on equity exit

Yusaku Maezawa maintained a capital policy of minimizing external equity raises from founding through to IPO. Even after incorporating in 2002, he continued debt-centered financial management, with the equity ratio remaining at a low 11.8% as of the end of March 2005. Not relying on VCs in the harsh environment following the dot-com bubble collapse was a deliberate choice to avoid dilution and maintain management control. By building cash flow through business growth and avoiding dependence on outside capital, Maezawa maintained his dominant position as the largest shareholder throughout ZOZOTOWN's rapid growth phase.

This capital policy functioned rationally in preserving business freedom. Decisions such as the brand screening system and take rate settings—prioritizing worldview consistency over short-term revenue growth—were possible precisely because the founder held management control. Had he accepted dilution through capital increases, shareholder pressure for growth could have distorted management decisions. There was certainly a period when the conservative capital policy served as a breakwater protecting ZOZO's uniqueness.

However, this structure worked in reverse when the founder's departure became an issue. As of the end of March 2018, Maezawa held over approximately 37% of shares, with a portion pledged as collateral to financial institutions. When the intention to step down surfaced in a situation where the founder and equity were inseparable, the method of disposing of the large shareholding materialized as a problem directly linked to corporate value. Selling shares on the market would disrupt supply-demand balance, while continuing to hold them would leave the capital structure unstable. The management control preserved by avoiding capital increases transformed into a liquidity risk at the exit stage.

Ultimately, in 2019, ZOZO resolved the capital issue by accepting a tender offer from Z Holdings. The founder stepped down, and ZOZO became a consolidated subsidiary of ZHD. Not raising capital nurtured the business, and not raising capital constrained the exit. This duality suggests a universal challenge of how founder-led IT companies design the coexistence of growth and succession. A conservative capital policy is not a panacea—unless designed to encompass the 'landing point for equity,' success can become a structure that breeds the next problem.

2026-02-25 | by author
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1998
Establishment of Start Today, Ltd.
2000
Launched CD and record EC site 'STMonline'
2000
Launched select shop EC site 'EPROZE'
2001
Relocated headquarters to Makuhari (World Business Garden)
2002

Reorganization into Start Today, Inc.

The rationality of 'debt-driven management' running at an equity ratio of 11.8%

The decision to expand the business at the dangerous level of 11.8% equity ratio without raising capital beyond the initial 15 million yen appears reckless at first glance. However, in the post-dot-com-bubble VC market, raising capital meant significant dilution of management control. Maezawa's decision to quit band activities and devote himself to management, and his financial policy of avoiding equity raises and getting by on borrowings, were two sides of the same coin—a deliberate choice to 'run his own company himself.' This low-capital, high-debt structure enabled the distinctive approach of screening-based admissions and worldview-focused design in the subsequent launch of ZOZOTOWN.

BackgroundTransition from personal trade to corporate management

Since establishing Start Today, Ltd. in 1998, Yusaku Maezawa had been expanding mail-order sales of CDs and records. However, around 2000, the spread of the internet raised questions about the sustainability of a paper catalog-based sales model. At the same time, as the business grew in scale, management challenges such as inventory management and fundraising became apparent.

Initially running the business in parallel with his band activities, the growth of the enterprise reached a stage where part-time management was no longer feasible. Facing decisions requiring quality and speed—such as transitioning from paper to EC, investing in new businesses, and relocating headquarters—strengthening the corporate structure beyond a personal business extension became indispensable.

DecisionIncorporation and EC-focused strategy

In 2002, Maezawa ended his band activities and decided to devote himself to management. That same year, he reorganized from a limited company to a stock corporation, establishing Start Today, Inc. with capital of 15 million yen and assuming the position of representative director himself. The incorporation was an institutional preparation aimed at improving business credibility and enabling business expansion.

Meanwhile, the capital policy was cautious. Under the harsh funding environment following the dot-com bubble collapse, no external equity was raised, and debt-centered financial management continued. As a result, the equity ratio stood at a low 11.8% as of the end of March 2005, but this was also a choice to maintain management control. On the business side, the company withdrew from paper catalogs to concentrate on EC, and also expanded into the fashion sector.

ResultBuilding a growth foundation with low capital

Continuing to expand through borrowings without capital increases after incorporation was financially fragile, but it served as the foundation for maintaining founder-led decision-making. By specializing in EC, the company reduced paper media costs and accumulated inventory turnover and online sales expertise, which led to the subsequent creation of ZOZOTOWN.

In other words, the period around 2002 was a process of transforming the company's character from a music mail-order business to an internet company, and the incorporation was not merely a change of form but an institutional and financial redesign to concentrate management resources on EC.

The rationality of 'debt-driven management' running at an equity ratio of 11.8%

The decision to expand the business at the dangerous level of 11.8% equity ratio without raising capital beyond the initial 15 million yen appears reckless at first glance. However, in the post-dot-com-bubble VC market, raising capital meant significant dilution of management control. Maezawa's decision to quit band activities and devote himself to management, and his financial policy of avoiding equity raises and getting by on borrowings, were two sides of the same coin—a deliberate choice to 'run his own company himself.' This low-capital, high-debt structure enabled the distinctive approach of screening-based admissions and worldview-focused design in the subsequent launch of ZOZOTOWN.

TestimonyYusaku Maezawa (ZOZO, Founder)

It all started with music. I couldn't find the records I wanted anywhere. So I thought, 'Well, I'll just do it myself,' and started a mail-order business for imported records and such. Clothing was similar—I started it because I wanted a convenient way to buy clothes from my favorite shops all in one place.

As more people joined, the fun things and interests of everyone grew. Business growth and going public were just steps along the way to making that happen. Basically, we're a company that revolves around a fun website, trying to do more and more enjoyable things.

Source2008-07-07 Nikkei Business
TimelineReorganization into Start Today, Inc. — Key Events
1/2000Launched CD and record EC site 'STMonline'
10/2000Launched select shop EC site 'EPROZE'
1/2001Relocated headquarters to Makuhari (World Business Garden)
2002Reorganized into Start Today, Inc.
2005Equity ratio remained low
Equity ratio11.8%
2004
12

Launch of ZOZOTOWN

The 'agonizing decision' to discontinue 17 brands that became the starting point for mall conversion

What deserves attention is that the launch of ZOZOTOWN was not a 'new startup' but a 'discontinuation and consolidation of 17 existing brands.' The decision to close all self-operated online shops and consolidate them into a single domain carried the risk of temporarily damaging existing revenue. However, the experience of bearing inventory and honing bestseller instincts during the EPROZE era supported the accuracy of brand screening and worldview design. The transfer of on-the-ground knowledge cultivated through the buy-and-sell model into the design philosophy of a consignment-sales mall became the core of ZOZOTOWN's differentiation.

BackgroundExpansion from music EC to fashion

Start Today began with mail-order sales of CDs and records and made a complete transition from paper catalogs to EC around 2000. Having a clear customer base of music fans, the company naturally expanded into the fashion domain, which had high cultural affinity. In 2000, it launched the self-purchasing fashion EC site 'EPROZE,' selling products by bearing inventory itself. By assuming inventory risk, the company honed its product knowledge and sense of bestsellers, and also built trust with brands.

Meanwhile, the sites were dispersed by taste and operated across multiple domains. As scale expanded, challenges of unifying the worldview and optimizing traffic efficiency emerged. The concept of reconstructing the operation as a single 'town' rather than a mere collection of online shops took concrete form. A navigation design that allowed cross-brand browsing became necessary, and the stage was set for redesigning the business framework itself.

DecisionConsolidation of 17 shops into a mall format

In December 2004, the existing sites were completely revamped, and the EC mall 'ZOZOTOWN,' which aggregated select shops, was launched. The 17 online brands that had been operated in-house were discontinued and consolidated into a single domain. This was not a name change but a business model transformation. While preserving each brand's worldview, the design was switched to create a unified 'town' as a whole.

Listings were made by screening, adopting a policy of managing the lineup of brands and site design rather than indiscriminately increasing stores. Leveraging the discernment cultivated through the inventory-holding model, the company clarified its position as a fashion-specialized platform. This consolidation became the foundation that later attracted major brands, and ZOZOTOWN began to be recognized not just as an EC site but as a platform where brand value could be maintained.

The 'agonizing decision' to discontinue 17 brands that became the starting point for mall conversion

What deserves attention is that the launch of ZOZOTOWN was not a 'new startup' but a 'discontinuation and consolidation of 17 existing brands.' The decision to close all self-operated online shops and consolidate them into a single domain carried the risk of temporarily damaging existing revenue. However, the experience of bearing inventory and honing bestseller instincts during the EPROZE era supported the accuracy of brand screening and worldview design. The transfer of on-the-ground knowledge cultivated through the buy-and-sell model into the design philosophy of a consignment-sales mall became the core of ZOZOTOWN's differentiation.

2005

Commencement of business with United Arrows

The 'handshake between founders' that justified the take rate from 18% to 30%

The fact that the key to UA's listing was a direct dialogue between Maezawa and Osamu Shigematsu demonstrates that in early-stage platform businesses, trust between entrepreneurs takes precedence over institutional design. What deserves attention is the trajectory of the take rate. The approximately 18% in fiscal year 2005 already far exceeded the EC industry norm of 10%, and by fiscal year 2011 it reached approximately 30%. The structure of comprehensively handling photography, inventory, and shipping reduced brands' burden to near zero, establishing a model that justified commissions through operational quality rather than price.

BackgroundFrom unknown EC to gaining trust

Having launched ZOZOTOWN in 2004, Start Today was positioning itself as a fashion-specialized EC, but its name recognition within the industry was limited at the time. For brands, the biggest concern was whether they could sell without undermining their own value, making them cautious about listing on an unknown EC mall. In the real store-centric industry, online sales were positioned as a supplementary channel.

Meanwhile, Yusaku Maezawa engaged in dialogue with brands not merely as a distributor but as an entrepreneur with fashion understanding. His approach of designing EC as a venue for expressing worldview rather than a arena for price competition gradually gained appreciation. On this trajectory, the commencement of business with United Arrows in 2005 became a realistic prospect.

DecisionAttracting prominent brands and establishing the model

In 2005, United Arrows listed on ZOZOTOWN. The contract format was consignment sales, with a system where ZOZO handled product photography, inventory storage, packing, and shipping. This was not mere mall listing but a model that took on logistics and operations as an integrated package, allowing brands to focus on sales and planning.

This deal is said to have been concluded through direct dialogue between Maezawa and Osamu Shigematsu. Following United Arrows' listing, BEAMS and SHIPS also joined, and ZOZOTOWN came to be recognized as a venue where prominent select shops were represented. The enrichment of the brand lineup had the effect of elevating the overall credibility of the site.

ResultForming uniqueness through high take rates

As of fiscal year 2005, ZOZO's estimated consignment sales commission was approximately 18%, exceeding the general EC level at the time. This was because the model was a value-added type that encompassed logistics, photography, and inventory management. The structure secured revenue through sales floor quality and operational capability rather than price competitiveness.

Subsequently, with the expansion of promotional investment, the take rate rose, reaching approximately 30% by fiscal year 2011. By achieving both prominent brand participation and high commission rates, ZOZOTOWN established its positioning not as a 'low-price EC' but as a 'high-value-added fashion platform.'

The 'handshake between founders' that justified the take rate from 18% to 30%

The fact that the key to UA's listing was a direct dialogue between Maezawa and Osamu Shigematsu demonstrates that in early-stage platform businesses, trust between entrepreneurs takes precedence over institutional design. What deserves attention is the trajectory of the take rate. The approximately 18% in fiscal year 2005 already far exceeded the EC industry norm of 10%, and by fiscal year 2011 it reached approximately 30%. The structure of comprehensively handling photography, inventory, and shipping reduced brands' burden to near zero, establishing a model that justified commissions through operational quality rather than price.

TestimonyYusaku Maezawa (ZOZO, Founder)

It all comes down to persistent sales efforts. I would visit manufacturers and brands, and straightforwardly ask them to let us carry their products. At first, almost everyone turned us down. But from there, I kept visiting again and again, negotiating tenaciously. Since I was only approaching brands I personally liked, it wasn't a hardship.

SourceNikkei Associe, 2011/5/3, 'Yusaku Maezawa: Today's Young People Are Soft and Lack a Sense of Crisis'
TestimonyYusaku Maezawa (ZOZO, Founder)

At the root of it is our corporate philosophy: 'Make the world cool, bring smiles to the world.' People call us the 'largest apparel EC company,' but that's just a label others have put on us. I've never said 'We want to become Japan's number one EC site'—the thought even makes me uncomfortable. We buy and consign stylish clothing for sale because we believe that's the most effective way to convey our message.

Source2008-07-07 Nikkei Business
TimelineCommencement of business with United Arrows — Key Events
2005Decision to commence business with United Arrows
2006

Establishment of ZOZOBASE

The barrier to entry created by 'listing within one day of receipt, shipping within three hours'

Models and photographers stationed at the 1,000-tsubo logistics facility completed photography, measurement, data entry, and site listing on the day of receipt, and shipped within as little as three hours after receiving an order. This operational speed was ZOZO's essential competitive advantage. While Rakuten and Amazon left logistics to sellers through a 'space rental' model, ZOZO took logistics into its own hands, reducing the burden on brands to near zero. This structure justified the take rate increase from 18% to 30%, forming a barrier to entry that later EC entrants found difficult to replicate.

BackgroundNeed for in-house logistics became apparent

The commencement of business with prominent brands such as United Arrows in 2005 drove rapid expansion of ZOZOTOWN's transaction volume. In the consignment sales model, where the company handles everything from product photography and inventory storage to packing and shipping, logistics processing capacity directly determined competitive strength. Initially, inventory was stored within the headquarters building, but the increase in brands and SKUs made physical limitations apparent.

Furthermore, the differentiating factor from other EC sites was not price but operational quality, making it essential to build a swift and accurate shipping system. To maintain a high take rate, it was necessary to refine logistics not merely as a back-office function but as a source of added value. Thus, the establishment of a dedicated logistics facility emerged as a management priority.

DecisionEstablishment of ZOZOBASE in Narashino

In 2006, Start Today established the logistics facility 'ZOZOBASE' in Narashino City, Chiba Prefecture. The facility was secured through a lease from Prologis, a dedicated warehouse of approximately 1,000 tsubo in floor area. By transitioning from in-office storage to a full-scale logistics facility, the company established the infrastructure supporting EC operations.

At the new facility, a system was built to complete product photography, measurement, data entry, and site listing within one day of receiving goods. Furthermore, operations were established to enable shipping within as little as three hours after receiving an order. By keeping logistics in-house and accelerating it, this was a strategic investment to enhance credibility as a fashion-specialized EC.

ResultLogistics enhancement supports take rate increase

The establishment of ZOZOBASE significantly improved inventory processing capacity and shipping speed. For brands, a high-quality logistics system that comprehensively handled photography, measurement, inventory management, and shipping was in place, enabling ZOZO to provide added value akin to 'operational outsourcing' rather than merely serving as a sales channel. This deepened the relationship with brands.

Importantly, this logistics enhancement served as the basis for the take rate increase. The consignment sales commission rose from approximately 18% in fiscal year 2005 to approximately 30% by fiscal year 2011, underpinned by the advancement of integrated operations including photography, storage, and shipping. By positioning logistics as the core of its competitive advantage, ZOZO established a structure that raised profitability while maintaining its high-value-added model.

The barrier to entry created by 'listing within one day of receipt, shipping within three hours'

Models and photographers stationed at the 1,000-tsubo logistics facility completed photography, measurement, data entry, and site listing on the day of receipt, and shipped within as little as three hours after receiving an order. This operational speed was ZOZO's essential competitive advantage. While Rakuten and Amazon left logistics to sellers through a 'space rental' model, ZOZO took logistics into its own hands, reducing the burden on brands to near zero. This structure justified the take rate increase from 18% to 30%, forming a barrier to entry that later EC entrants found difficult to replicate.

TestimonyNikkei Business, 'The Rising Star of Logistics Delivering Fashion'

When products arrive at the logistics facility, samples are immediately sent for measurement and photography. Models and photographers are stationed in the warehouse, and they handle 5 to 10 shots at the photography studio. Once finished, data is sent from a nearby computer to the site's design team. All of this is completed within one day, so shop staff can list products on the site the same day. (...)

Order information is processed in bulk every morning between 8:30 and 9:00 AM. Picking, packing, and shipping are then completed by noon. It is said that products ordered before 9:00 AM can sometimes be shipped in just three hours. It is precisely because of this unique logistics system that ZOZOTOWN can continuously release limited-edition products with short shelf lives. This is also the reason why popular shops such as United Arrows choose to be tenants.

Source2008-07-07 Nikkei Business
2007
Third-party allotment
2007
Listed on TSE Mothers
2010
12

Release of iOS app

The decision to 'not wait and see' that supported the surge in smartphone ratio from 52% to 83%

At a time in 2010 when the majority of the domestic EC industry was taking a wait-and-see approach to smartphone support, ZOZO immediately launched an iOS app. Since fashion EC is a field where image appearance and usability directly drive purchases, the judgment that repurposing PC displays would be insufficient was accurate. As a result, the smartphone ratio reached 52.7% in 2014 and 83.2% in 2018, with the app becoming the main battlefield for user touchpoints. The investment in Kayac to externally source development capabilities was also a pragmatic decision to compensate for the internal engineer shortage at the time.

BackgroundResponding to smartphone proliferation

Around 2010, smartphones—particularly the iPhone—were rapidly proliferating in Japan, and EC browsing environments were beginning to shift from PCs and feature phones to smartphones. The conventional ZOZOTOWN had been designed with a PC-first approach, and mobile support was limited to simplified displays. This posed a risk of losing the primary touchpoint with younger users. However, among domestic internet companies, smartphone proliferation was not regarded as a certainty, and the majority of companies were taking a wait-and-see approach.

Nevertheless, in fashion EC, the browsing experience directly influenced purchasing behavior, and screen design and usability optimization had entered a phase where they affected sales. Unlike the feature phone-centric era, UI design premised on touch operation was required, and smartphone support emerged as a competitive priority.

DecisionFull-scale deployment of iOS/Android apps

In December 2010, ZOZO released its iOS app, marking the beginning of full-scale smartphone support. It quickly gained traction, ranking high in the App Store's free app charts, and the company clarified its policy of making smartphones the primary touchpoint. Moving away from the approach of repurposing PC displays, the transition to a smartphone-dedicated UI was advanced.

In 2011, the company invested in Kayac to strengthen its development capabilities and accelerated app improvements. In May 2012, an Android version was also launched, completing support for both OS platforms. This established the infrastructure for transitioning to smartphone-first EC operations and consolidating the next-generation user touchpoint within the company's own app.

The decision to 'not wait and see' that supported the surge in smartphone ratio from 52% to 83%

At a time in 2010 when the majority of the domestic EC industry was taking a wait-and-see approach to smartphone support, ZOZO immediately launched an iOS app. Since fashion EC is a field where image appearance and usability directly drive purchases, the judgment that repurposing PC displays would be insufficient was accurate. As a result, the smartphone ratio reached 52.7% in 2014 and 83.2% in 2018, with the app becoming the main battlefield for user touchpoints. The investment in Kayac to externally source development capabilities was also a pragmatic decision to compensate for the internal engineer shortage at the time.

TimelineRelease of iOS app — Key Events
12/2010Released iPhone app
4/2011Invested in Kayac
5/2012Released Android app 'ZOZOTOWN'
2014Smartphone ratio in shipments exceeded 50%
Smartphone ratio52.7%
2018Smartphone ratio in shipments exceeded 80%
Smartphone ratio83.2%
2012
Listed on TSE First Section
2013

Expansion of ZOZOBASE

The gamble of 'quintupling fixed costs' from 300 million to 1.5 billion yen in annual rent

The decision to lease approximately 30,000 tsubo of floor space and increase annual rent from 300 million yen to 1.5 billion yen—a fivefold increase—was a preemptive investment premised on surpassing 100 billion yen in transaction volume. The system enabled same-day delivery for 35% of shipments and launched a same-day delivery service (500 yen) for the Tokyo metropolitan area. The key point is that the logistics expansion was not merely a capacity enlargement but a structural investment that raised service quality in the form of delivery speed. The increase in fixed costs carried the risk of immediately compressing profits if GMV growth stalled, but ZOZO won this bet.

BackgroundTransaction volume expansion and logistics strain

In the early 2010s, ZOZOTOWN was expanding its transaction volume through smartphone support and enrichment of prominent brands. The number of listed brands and SKUs continued to increase, and in the consignment sales model where the company handles inventory storage, photography, packing, and shipping, processing capacity was approaching its upper limit. The existing Narashino facility was becoming unable to accommodate future increases in transaction volume.

Furthermore, in fashion EC, delivery speed had entered a phase where it directly influenced customer satisfaction and repeat purchase rates. As competitors advanced their logistics investments, ZOZO also needed to build a system that simultaneously enhanced processing capacity and delivery speed, rather than merely expanding inventory. Logistics was at the stage of being redefined not as a back-office function but as the foundational capability supporting brand value.

DecisionZOZOBASE expansion and large-scale leasing

In 2013, Start Today expanded its logistics facility in Narashino City, deciding to lease the entire floor of approximately 30,000 tsubo at Prologis Park Narashino 4. Annual rent expanded from approximately 300 million yen to approximately 1.5 billion yen, an investment accompanied by fixed cost burden. This was not a short-term efficiency improvement but a structural investment premised on future transaction volume expansion.

The expansion significantly increased inventory storage capacity and concurrent processing volume, strengthening the integrated operational system from photography, measurement, and data entry through to shipping. By advancing logistics processes, the infrastructure was established to maintain the value-added model that encompassed operational outsourcing functions beyond mere mall operation.

ResultLaunch of same-day delivery and improved processing capacity

With the new facility operational, a system was built that enabled same-day delivery for approximately 35% of shipments. Following this, in March 2014, a same-day delivery service targeting the Tokyo metropolitan area was launched. For a 500-yen fee, orders placed by 9:00 AM arrived that evening, and orders placed by 9:00 PM arrived the following morning.

The mechanism allowing customers to choose delivery speed was a measure that enhanced convenience in fashion EC. The logistics expansion was not merely a facility enlargement but an investment that expanded the service design itself. It represented a structural turning point in building the processing capacity foundation toward surpassing 100 billion yen in transaction volume.

The gamble of 'quintupling fixed costs' from 300 million to 1.5 billion yen in annual rent

The decision to lease approximately 30,000 tsubo of floor space and increase annual rent from 300 million yen to 1.5 billion yen—a fivefold increase—was a preemptive investment premised on surpassing 100 billion yen in transaction volume. The system enabled same-day delivery for 35% of shipments and launched a same-day delivery service (500 yen) for the Tokyo metropolitan area. The key point is that the logistics expansion was not merely a capacity enlargement but a structural investment that raised service quality in the form of delivery speed. The increase in fixed costs carried the risk of immediately compressing profits if GMV growth stalled, but ZOZO won this bet.

TimelineExpansion of ZOZOBASE — Key Events
2013Expanded ZOZOBASE in Narashino City
Estimated floor area10M sq.m
3/2014Merchandise transaction volume surpassed 100 billion yen
Transaction volume1146hundred million yen
2016
Launch of deferred payment service
2017
Completion of Prologis Park Chiba New Town
2018
Establishment of ZOZOBASE Tsukuba 1
2018
Trade name changed to ZOZO
2018

Decision to rebuild systems

Settling the 'technical debt' of running on VBScript with zero test code for 16 years

A technology stack from 2002—VBScript/IIS/SQL Server—had been running unchanged for 16 years, with business logic concentrated in stored procedures and absolutely no test code. The fact that an EC operation handling transaction volumes of hundreds of billions of yen was being run in this state indicates that technology investment had been significantly deprioritized compared to logistics investment. The introduction of BigQuery and the push toward in-house development were prerequisites for a fashion EC company to transform into a tech company, and the 2018 initiation could even be considered too late.

BackgroundTechnical debt became increasingly apparent

As of 2018, ZOZOTOWN's core system had been operating for approximately 16 years without a major overhaul, running on a stack centered on VBScript, IIS, and SQL Server. Much of the business logic was concentrated in stored procedures on SQL Server, with no test code in existence—quality was maintained through manual testing by a QA team. While the system had supported growth, it had become constrained in terms of changeability and scalability.

Furthermore, the development structure was not fully in-house but was built through delegation to multiple external vendors. The overall system architecture was fragmented, and the speed of understanding specifications and making improvements was limited. As cloud usage expanded, the rising costs of AWS accounts also became an issue, and the system architecture itself came to be recognized as a management bottleneck.

Additionally, the data analytics infrastructure was insufficiently developed, lacking an environment for cross-cutting analysis of business data. While transaction volume expanded as a fashion-specialized EC, there were limits to the speed of analytics-driven initiative planning and improvement cycles. The system overhaul was evolving from a mere development efficiency issue into a structural challenge that determined business competitiveness.

DecisionShift to in-house development and infrastructure rebuild

In response to this situation, ZOZO began system replacement in 2018. Rather than incremental modifications premised on the legacy environment, the company shifted to a policy of reviewing the entire architecture. Instead of life extension premised on technical debt, a fundamental rebuild through redesign was chosen. This decision prioritized medium-to-long-term scalability over short-term efficiency.

In 2020, the engineering organization was restructured, and mid-career hiring was actively pursued to increase the in-house development ratio. By reducing dependence on external vendors, the company transitioned to a structure where product responsibility was consolidated internally. The organization was rebuilt to handle everything from architecture design to operations in an integrated manner, aiming for both development speed and quality.

Simultaneously, BigQuery was introduced as an analytics platform to promote data consolidation and visualization. Fragmented data was integrated, and development of an infrastructure that could be utilized for decision-making was advanced. The pivot was not merely infrastructure renewal but a technology strategy connecting product development and data utilization.

ResultProgress in redefining the technology foundation

As the replacement progressed, the transition from a previously black-boxed structure to a design philosophy with clear areas of responsibility advanced. The progress of in-house development contributed to improving the speed of feature additions and improvements, acting in a direction that enhanced the autonomy of the development organization. Testing and quality management mechanisms were also progressively established, building a foundation for moving away from person-dependent operations.

The development of the data infrastructure enabled cross-business analytics, advancing the sophistication of inventory turnover and purchasing behavior understanding. In EC business, the quality of data utilization determines competitiveness, so the development of the analytics platform brought structural changes that extended to marketing and product strategy.

Technology foundation renewal is not something that completes in a short period, but ZOZO clearly signaled its transition away from legacy dependence. Following logistics investment, by explicitly positioning technology investment as a core of competitive advantage, the company entered a phase of pivoting from a fashion EC company toward a tech company.

Settling the 'technical debt' of running on VBScript with zero test code for 16 years

A technology stack from 2002—VBScript/IIS/SQL Server—had been running unchanged for 16 years, with business logic concentrated in stored procedures and absolutely no test code. The fact that an EC operation handling transaction volumes of hundreds of billions of yen was being run in this state indicates that technology investment had been significantly deprioritized compared to logistics investment. The introduction of BigQuery and the push toward in-house development were prerequisites for a fashion EC company to transform into a tech company, and the 2018 initiation could even be considered too late.

TestimonyMasayuki Imamura (ZOZO, Executive Officer CTO)

In April 2018, the engineering organization at ZOZO had an enormous number of challenges. (...) ZOZOTOWN's primary architecture had been operating unchanged from 16 years ago to the present. The technology stack consisted of VBScript / IIS / SQL Server / on-premises, with all logic written in stored procedures on SQL Server. There was no testing, and quality was maintained through manual testing by the quality management team.

2018
Announcement of three-year medium-term management plan
2019
Completion of Prologis Park Tsukuba 1-B
2019
Reported profit decline; stock price fell due to poor performance
2019
9

Z Holdings acquired shares of ZOZO

The outcome of a founder with a 37% stake reaching an impasse on 'equity exit'

The outcome in which Maezawa, who had protected management control by avoiding capital increases, ultimately handed over his 37%+ stake through a tender offer by ZHD is suggestive. A portion of his holdings had been pledged as collateral to financial institutions; selling on the market would have caused supply-demand disruption, while continuing to hold would have left the capital structure unstable. The double bind—not raising capital nurtured the business, not raising capital constrained the exit—resulted in a 'resolution through external capital' via ZHD's 50.1% acquisition. This is a case that symbolizes the succession challenges of founder-led IT companies.

BackgroundTurning point for founder-dependent structure

In the latter half of the 2010s, ZOZO had grown into one of Japan's largest fashion EC platforms centered on ZOZOTOWN, but the management structure was highly dependent on founder Yusaku Maezawa. As of the end of March 2018, Maezawa held over approximately 37% of shares as the largest shareholder, with management and capital in an integrated state. Meanwhile, the slowdown of business growth and changes in the market environment became apparent, and how to design the next growth strategy became an issue.

Additionally, Maezawa had pledged a portion of his shares as collateral to financial institutions, and the stability of the capital structure emerged as a discussion point. As the founder's intention to step down became clear, the method of disposing of his large shareholding became a problem directly linked to corporate value. The situation had entered a phase requiring not merely a management transition but capital restructuring involving the transfer of the controlling shareholder.

DecisionAcceptance of ZHD's majority acquisition

In 2019, Z Holdings (formed through the business integration of LINE and Yahoo) launched a tender offer for ZOZO shares, announcing a policy to acquire 50.1%. ZOZO accepted this and decided to become a consolidated subsidiary of ZHD. This was not a choice to maintain independent management but a decision that prioritized capital stability and expansion of growth opportunities.

Simultaneously, the company chose to maintain its listing, accepting the parent-subsidiary listing format. The founder stepped down, and Kotaro Sawada, promoted from within, assumed the presidency. While overhauling the management structure, a framework was adopted that maintained a certain degree of autonomy in brand and business operations. While capital shifted to ZHD, the design kept business expertise within ZOZO.

ResultCapital stabilization and growth platform redesign

By coming under the ZHD umbrella, ZOZO resolved the uncertainty on the capital side and gained an environment more conducive to long-term investment decisions. Amid intensifying EC competition, rather than fundraising and making investment decisions independently, the company chose to leverage group resources. This opened up scope for collaboration in areas such as logistics, systems, and advertising.

On the other hand, the parent-subsidiary listing structure also contained new issues regarding the relationship with minority shareholders. The transition from an independent company to a group company was also a process of redefining the balance between management freedom and capital efficiency. The most significant structural change at this point was the shift in positioning from a founder-led structure to a specialized operating company under a holding company.

The outcome of a founder with a 37% stake reaching an impasse on 'equity exit'

The outcome in which Maezawa, who had protected management control by avoiding capital increases, ultimately handed over his 37%+ stake through a tender offer by ZHD is suggestive. A portion of his holdings had been pledged as collateral to financial institutions; selling on the market would have caused supply-demand disruption, while continuing to hold would have left the capital structure unstable. The double bind—not raising capital nurtured the business, not raising capital constrained the exit—resulted in a 'resolution through external capital' via ZHD's 50.1% acquisition. This is a case that symbolizes the succession challenges of founder-led IT companies.

2020
Completion of Prologis Park Tsukuba 2
2021
Revenue and profit increase; strengthened collaboration with PayPay Mall
2021
Conducted share buyback
2023
Establishment of ZOZOBASE Tsukuba 3
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