Suntory
Corporate History & Strategy

In the late Meiji 30s (late 1890s), Japan's Western liquor market was centered on imports, with prices and supply dependent on overseas sources. Meanwhile, in urban areas, Western food culture and tastes for Western products were spreading, and demand for Western liquors including grape wine was gradually emerging. Osaka, as a commercial city with concentrated distribution functions, had the conditions for trying new alcoholic beverages.

Shinjiro Torii, then 21 years old, had served as an apprentice at Konishi Gisuke Shoten, a pharmaceutical wholesaler, since age 16, gaining experience handling products including Western liquors and dyes. While mastering the trade channels and price sensitivities of handling imported goods, he also recognized the reality that alcoholic beverages suited to Japanese tastes were limited. The Western liquor market was immature, but entry barriers were not necessarily high.

In 1899, Shinjiro Torii founded 'Torii Shoten' as a sole proprietorship in Nishi-ku, Osaka, and began selling grape wine. This was an entry starting from sales rather than large-scale investment in manufacturing facilities. Leveraging his experience in imported liquor distribution, he aimed to supply products for Japanese consumers while assessing the balance between quality and price.

This decision was an entry method that minimized initial capital investment while confirming market reaction. By directly grasping customer preferences and price acceptance at the point of sale, it left room for future manufacturing and product development. The founding of Torii Shoten was an experimental first step toward transitioning from a position of handling Western liquor as imports to a domestic Western liquor business.

Through sales, Torii Shoten grasped the tendency of Japanese consumers to respond strongly to sweetness. This market insight was directly reflected in the flavor design of Akadama Port Wine in 1907. Customer information obtained from the point of sale defined the direction of subsequent manufacturing investment.

The founding-era procedure of 'sell first, know the customer, then produce' became a pattern repeated in whisky, beer, and soft drinks thereafter. The sole proprietorship of Torii Shoten was the starting point of a corporate culture that placed market understanding, rather than manufacturing capability, at the origin of business design.

In late Meiji-era Japan, the Western liquor market was centered on imports, with a gap from general consumers in terms of both taste and price. Wine was strongly acidic, with limited affinity with Japanese food culture, and had not taken hold as an everyday beverage. On the other hand, Western food culture was permeating urban areas, and interest in Western liquor itself was gradually spreading.

Western liquor consumption at the time was skewed toward foreign settlements and a segment of the upper class. On the distribution side, stable supply of imported products was not secured, and prices were high for general consumers. Latent demand existed, but barriers remained on both the taste and price fronts.

Shinjiro Torii, who was leading Torii Shoten, had grasped through the sales front that Japanese palates responded strongly to sweetness. He recognized that simply importing and selling European liquor would not expand the market—products with adjusted flavors were necessary. The Western liquor market had room for growth, but was at a stage where it would not expand as-is.

In April 1907, Torii Shoten launched 'Akadama Port Wine.' Based on port wine imported from Spain, it was a product with sweetness added to suit Japanese preferences. This was not merely a production technique but a flavor design intended to make Japanese people drink Western liquor on a daily basis.

Simultaneously, aggressive advertising investment was made centered on newspaper advertisements. Even during periods of weak demand, advertising placements continued, serving the role of positioning the act of drinking Western liquor within daily life. It was a decision to concentrate invested capital without separating product development from sales promotion.

Akadama's advertising strategy was not one that appealed to product quality or price, but one that proposed the lifestyle of drinking Western liquor itself. Because the market was immature, there was a need to 'create' rather than 'wait for' demand, and advertising was designed as the means to do so.

Akadama Port Wine won consumer support as a sweet grape wine and grew into Torii Shoten's flagship product. As sales expanded, new barrel-filling factories were built and production systems expanded, leading to capital investment from the 1910s onward.

Continued advertising accumulated brand recognition, forming a sales structure not dependent on price appeals. Advertising using female posters drew both praise and criticism but attracted attention, expanding awareness through buzz. Advertising expenses functioned not as promotional costs but as investment for market formation.

The combination of 'flavor adjustment' and 'market creation through advertising' established with Akadama Port Wine became a pattern repeatedly used in the business development of whisky, beer, and soft drinks. Akadama was not merely a hit product but a product that demonstrated the prototype of Suntory's business model.

In the Taisho era, Kotobukiya was achieving revenue growth through the expanding sales of Akadama Port Wine. Akadama had penetrated the national market through advertising investment and distribution network development, becoming the company's flagship product supporting its earnings. On the other hand, Akadama was classified as a synthetic liquor, differing from authentic overseas spirits in terms of raw materials and production methods.

As the Western liquor market expanded, quality comparisons with imported products were unavoidable, and product line expansion was recognized as a medium- to long-term challenge. Whisky consumption in Japan at the time depended on imports, and prices remained high. If domestic production succeeded, there would be room for price adjustment and supply stability, but manufacturing required essential technical knowledge of distillation and aging.

Shinjiro Torii, Kotobukiya's founder, was a businessman who had been involved in Western liquor sales for a long time and understood alcohol distribution and consumption trends from the ground. As the investment capital earned from the Akadama business created room to redirect toward the next growth area, the stage was set for reconsidering the business portfolio.

In October 1923, Kotobukiya made the decision to enter domestic whisky manufacturing. All board members except the founder took an opposing stance. Whisky is not a product that can be sold immediately after distillation; it requires years of aging, making short-term revenue growth and ROI projections impossible.

Moreover, manufacturing techniques and quality evaluation could not be confirmed until completion, and the recovery of invested capital was a long-term and uncertain proposition. Manufacturing whisky outside of Scotland was itself an unprecedented challenge, with no guarantee of technical success.

Torii decided to make a concentrated investment in the whisky business using funds earned from the Akadama business. In 1924, he built a distillery in Yamazaki, Kyoto Prefecture, with some equipment manufactured in-house and some imported from Scotland. Premised on long-term aging after distillation, a business plan was adopted in which no revenue would be generated for several years after entry.

The whisky business continued to generate no revenue for approximately five years after entry. Aging stock was held as work-in-progress, and inventory turnover remained at extremely low levels. During this period, Kotobukiya's profit and loss depended on the Akadama business, and the whisky business was in a state where invested capital was not being recovered.

In 1929, Shirofuda (White Label) Suntory Whisky was launched, followed by products at popular price points, and the domestic whisky market gradually took shape. Initial product evaluations were mixed, but the achievement from a market formation perspective was that the option of domestic whisky became recognized by consumers.

This market entry was a case of sacrificing short-term profits and choosing long-term recovery, and was the first instance of Suntory's capital allocation pattern of 'the earning business supports the developing business.' Without the stable earnings of Akadama, this investment would not have been viable. The condition that enabled enduring five years of blank was not just willpower but the existence of a structure that financially supported it.

In 1930, Kotobukiya acquired a bankrupt brewery in Tsurumi, Kanagawa Prefecture, and entered beer production under the 'Oraga Beer' brand. At the time, incumbent companies like Kirin Beer had secured high market share in the Kanto region, and barriers to entry were high. While the whisky business required long aging periods, beer was identified as an opportunity due to its relatively faster turnover, serving as a business to supplement revenue growth.

However, the gap with incumbent companies in distribution networks and brand recognition was large, and the company could not build advantages in price or sales channels. Additionally, the company lost a trademark lawsuit over the reuse of existing bottles, which placed legal constraints on sales activities. The competitive environment and legal risks materialized simultaneously, and business continuation became economically irrational.

In 1934, Kotobukiya decided to withdraw from the beer business and sold the Tsurumi brewery. It was a withdrawal just four years after entry—a choice to stop investing capital in a business with continuing losses and concentrate management resources on the whisky business.

Behind the withdrawal decision was the realistic recognition that the distribution networks and brand recognition walls built by incumbents could not be breached in a short period. Entry through an acquired brewery, unlike the approach of building facilities, brands, and sales channels from scratch, inherently harbored vulnerabilities in the business foundation.

The prewar beer entry ended in business failure, but it became an opportunity to gain firsthand understanding of market structure, distribution characteristics, and incumbents' competitive advantages. Kotobukiya learned the reality of entry barriers in the beer market not through desk analysis but through business operations.

After the war, Suntory would challenge the beer business again. This time, rather than acquisition, the company simultaneously pursued capital investment under its own brand, sales channel development, and advertising investment, entering under fundamentally different conditions from the prewar attempt. Lessons gained from the prewar withdrawal changed the entry design for the re-challenge 30 years later.

During the war, whisky was subject to sales controls, and Suntory had suspended product sales. Controls continued even after the war's end, but in 1950, sales controls on alcoholic beverages were lifted, making market sales possible again. Through the occupation period, bar culture had taken root in Japanese urban areas, and an environment for consuming Western spirits as luxury goods was forming.

Suntory had continued distilling and aging during the war and held a certain quantity of well-aged whisky inventory. This meant the company was capable of immediate market supply at the point of sales resumption, providing the conditions to secure the market ahead of competitors. The continuation of aging during wartime effectively became an investment that produced postwar competitive advantage.

In 1950, Suntory resumed whisky sales and developed a product lineup across price tiers: Special, First, and Second classes. Rather than launching a single product, this was designed to capture different demand segments by price tier. Simultaneously, advertising centered on newspaper ads was resumed, rebuilding brand recognition from the prewar era.

The high-price segment expanded sales around 'Old,' while the mass-market segment expanded around 'Torys.' Torys captured bar demand as an affordable Western spirit, while Old penetrated high-unit-price consumption occasions such as gift-giving and business entertaining. By dividing price tiers, a structure was adopted to broaden the overall whisky consumer base.

Throughout the 1950s, whisky shipment volumes expanded rapidly, surpassing the sales of the founding business, Akadama Port Wine. Suntory's business portfolio shifted from being centered on synthetic liquor to being centered on whisky, fundamentally changing the earnings structure.

This transformation was achieved approximately 30 years after the 1923 whisky entry. Having overcome five years of zero revenue and wartime sales suspension, the result was pushing the founding-era Akadama business from its position as the mainstay. The precedent was clearly established here for the first time that at Suntory, the main business axis is not permanent but is replaced by the next mainstay.

In the early 1960s, Kotobukiya was growing sales through its Western spirits business centered on whisky. While the 'Suntory' brand had widely permeated the domestic market, the company name 'Kotobukiya' did not immediately convey the business content, and situations arose in distribution and advertising where supplementary explanation was needed.

This problem became more pronounced during the export expansion phase. In overseas markets, the company name serves the role of directly indicating business content and product characteristics, but 'Kotobukiya' had no meaning to non-Japanese speakers and was difficult to convey as a Western spirits maker. In export transactions and overseas advertising, the separation of company name and product brand reduced the efficiency of recognition formation.

In 1963, Kotobukiya changed its company name to 'Suntory Co., Ltd.' Suntory was already used as a product brand for whisky both domestically and internationally, and was a name already deployed on export product labels and advertising. The name change was not the start of a new business but a decision to align the established flagship brand with the corporate identity.

Through this change, the company name itself gained the function of indicating the company was a Western spirits maker in overseas markets. The explanatory burden in export transactions and international exhibitions was reduced, and the effect of accelerating brand recognition formation was anticipated.

The name change was not limited to improving external recognition efficiency; it entailed a redefinition of corporate identity. Abandoning 'Kotobukiya,' the trade name since founding, was also a decision to separate the founding family's history from the company name. That it was executed nonetheless was a manifestation of pragmatism that prioritized the functional value of the brand.

As a result, the company name 'Suntory' came to function as an umbrella not only for Western spirits but for the entire diversifying business encompassing beer, soft drinks, and health foods. The transformation from product brand to corporate brand created a structure in which the company name did not constrain business domain expansion.

Postwar alcohol consumption changed significantly, and from the 1950s onward, beer shipment volumes expanded rapidly. Urbanization and income growth popularized dining out and Western food, and beer—low in alcohol and enjoyable chilled—became established as an everyday alcoholic beverage. Companies expanded their facilities, and price competition premised on mass production systems intensified.

The 1949 corporate breakup created Sapporo Beer and Asahi Beer, and together with prewar Kirin Beer, these three companies occupied the market. The beer business simultaneously required capital investment, sales channel development, and advertising investment, structurally suppressing new entry.

For Suntory, the beer market was a candidate for diversifying a business composition overly dependent on whisky alone. While whisky had product characteristics requiring aging periods that made rapid sales expansion difficult, beer had a relatively short production cycle enabling shipment, and sales growth could be expected during consumption expansion phases.

In 1963, Suntory announced its entry into the beer business. Having experienced withdrawal with Oraga Beer in the 1930s, this was a re-challenge. The decision was led by Keizo Saji, who was president at the time and the executive who had expanded the whisky business. Drawing on lessons from the prewar withdrawal, full-scale entry under the company's own brand was chosen rather than acquisition.

The biggest issue was sales channels. The existing three companies controlled their exclusive dealer networks, and the room for a latecomer to enter distribution was limited. In this context, Asahi Beer opened some of its exclusive dealers, securing a sales route. Suntory built the Musashino factory in Fuchu, Tokyo, establishing a mass production system.

The entry plan was not premised on short-term profitability. The approach of 'tolerating long-term losses while nurturing the business,' cultivated in the whisky business, was to be applied to beer as well. Being an unlisted company was the condition that made this long-horizon entry possible.

After entry, production competition continued in the beer market, and Suntory's market share remained around 3% throughout the 1960s. Incumbent companies expanded capital investment, and competition intensified in both price and supply volume. Suntory's beer business failed to achieve profitability, and losses continued over an extended period.

Nevertheless, the company did not choose to withdraw, continuing product development and advertising investment. Cash flow from the whisky business continued to absorb the beer business losses, and the withdrawal decision was deferred. This structure was a reproduction of Suntory's capital allocation pattern of the earning business supporting the developing business.

Beer profitability was achieved in fiscal year 2008, requiring approximately 46 years from entry. As a result, beer was incorporated into the company's business portfolio and served the role of diversifying away from whisky dependence, but the scale of 46 years of cumulative losses and invested capital was at a level difficult to justify by normal investment recovery criteria.

In 1962, Suntory partnered with U.S.-based Royal Crown Company and entered the soft drink business through concentrate imports and domestic bottling. However, throughout the 1960s, Coca-Cola built a national bottler network in the Japanese market and rapidly expanded shipment volumes. As a result, the Royal Crown brand failed to establish a presence in the market.

As of 1972, shipment volumes stood at only 5 million cases versus Coca-Cola's approximately 290 million cases, and market share was at a negligible level. The partnership model limited brand initiative and product development freedom, and advertising investment efficiency also declined.

The soft drink market was expanding centered on cola, but the difficulty of a latecomer brand capturing share in the same category was high, and sales growth through continuing the partnership was unlikely. A strategic reconstruction to avoid direct competition with Coca-Cola was necessary.

In February 1972, Suntory terminated its partnership with Royal Crown Company and established Suntory Foods as a 100% owned subsidiary. Initial capital was 200 million yen, and while inheriting the business from the partnership era, it was effectively positioned as a rebuilding-type new business.

Avoiding direct competition in the cola market, the company developed proprietary brands in soda and fruit juice beverages. On the production side, the parent company bore the capital investment burden, investing approximately 1.8 billion yen in the Tochigi factory to build a combined production system for Western spirits and soft drinks. Suntory Foods concentrated on sales, deploying a sales system that used route sales and wholesalers depending on the region.

Kanji Jimba, who led the management, presented a vision of making this business the third pillar after whisky and beer. This was not merely a new business but a strategic investment aimed at breaking away from an alcohol-dependent business structure.

The 'Suntory Orange 50' launched in 1974 promoted its 50% fruit juice content, differentiating from the low-juice beverages that were mainstream at the time. As consumer interest in synthetic coloring grew, sales expanded, and the product contributed to the formation of a new category in fruit juice beverages.

Meanwhile, as of 1978, shipment volume share remained at approximately 1%, with Coca-Cola and Fanta maintaining high shares across the market overall. Sales expansion was supported by route sales premised on personnel deployment; by 1981, approximately 70% of employees were in sales, with a nationwide 11-branch system in place.

By 1981, standalone revenue reached 39 billion yen, but personnel costs and promotional expenses pressured profit margins, and cumulative losses were handled by the parent company while business continued. The soft drink business, like beer, was operated as a long-term investment of the 'earning business supports the developing business' type.

In April 1989, the Japanese government revised the Liquor Tax Law, implementing the first system change since 1963. Previously, whisky had been classified into Special, First, and Second grades with tax rates set according to quality, but the system's effectiveness had declined due to changes in consumption patterns.

By the late 1980s, special-grade whisky accounted for the majority of consumption volume, and the grade classification had diverged from market reality. The revision abolished the grade system, effectively resulting in a tax reduction for former Special and First grades, and an effective tax increase for former Second grade.

The tax simplification had the effect of lowering entry barriers for imported whisky, and combined with yen appreciation, created an environment where imported products such as Scotch became more price-competitive. Domestic manufacturers were forced into a comprehensive review of pricing strategies and product composition.

Suntory used the liquor tax revision as an opportunity to implement price revisions on former Second-grade whisky. 'Torys' was raised from 670 yen to 1,230 yen, and 'Red' from 900 yen to 1,450 yen, reducing the price competitiveness of mass-market products. Meanwhile, management viewed the effective tax reduction on former Special and First grades as an opportunity for market expansion.

President Keizo Saji at the time judged that the high-end whisky market would expand overall due to the reduced tax burden. While anticipating intensified competition, he indicated an outlook that profit margins could be maintained while preserving brand value.

This decision signified a transformation toward a business portfolio that prioritized unit price and brand over volume expansion. The stance of not avoiding direct competition with imports and competing in the high-end segment was also an expression of confidence in Suntory's whisky business.

Contrary to expectations, the domestic whisky market entered a contraction phase after the liquor tax revision. Shipment volumes declined throughout the 1990s, falling to less than one-third of the peak by the mid-2000s. The decline in former Second-grade product sales could not be compensated by the high-end 'Old' and 'Reserve.'

In the fiscal year ending December 1991, ordinary income was 10.9 billion yen, a year-on-year decline, and the decision was made to cut executive bonuses. Competition with imported whisky also intensified, and the whisky division's sales growth stagnated over an extended period.

Concentration on the high-end was a clear strategy, but it did not produce short-term results due to the external environmental change of overall market contraction. The misreading of the causal relationship—that tax reduction would lead to market expansion—materialized as a business risk.

Until the 1960s, coffee beverages in Japan were centered on bottled coffee milk, and canned coffee was a limited presence. What transformed the market was the canned coffee developed by UCC Ueshima Coffee in 1969, which gained recognition through the 1970 Osaka Expo. In the 1970s, the spread of vending machines coincided with motorization, and canned coffee expanded demand as a conveniently drinkable beverage when out.

On the supply side, hot-and-cold compatible vending machines were introduced in 1973, enabling year-round sales. Market entries multiplied, with over 100 companies competing around 1980, but eventually companies that controlled vending machine networks concentrated market share. Around 1990, Coca-Cola's 'Georgia' dominated the market.

Suntory Foods had launched predecessor products including 'Suntory UCC Coffee' and 'West,' but none established themselves as brands, and the company was clearly a latecomer in the canned coffee category. While vending machine network expansion was progressing, a strong product to place in those machines was lacking.

In 1992, Suntory staked the revival of its canned coffee business on the new brand 'BOSS.' Departing from the previous generic product design, the company focused on high-frequency consumers such as field sales workers and drivers who consumed multiple cans per day. The aim was to increase the turnover rate per vending machine by capturing heavy users.

On the promotional front, a decision was made to invest approximately five times the advertising capital of predecessor products. With TV commercials at the core, Eikichi Yazawa was cast as spokesperson, pushing the image of working men to the forefront. The packaging adopted a person's face, making a sharp distinction from existing canned coffees that had promoted sweetness and relaxation.

BOSS's brand design was conscious of 'instantaneous selection' in the vending machine channel. The time a consumer spends choosing a product in front of a vending machine is limited to a few seconds. It was a design that achieved both the visibility to be chosen in those few seconds and the customer specialization to be chosen repeatedly.

BOSS expanded sales volumes immediately after launch, shipping approximately 10 million cases by the end of 1992. On a production volume basis, its share exceeded 5% for the fiscal year, and Suntory regained its presence in the canned coffee market. Throughout the 1990s, BOSS continued to expand sales, and by the early 2000s, it had established itself as the No. 2 brand after Georgia.

BOSS's success strengthened the position of Suntory's soft drink business as a revenue source, advancing the diversification away from an alcohol-dependent business structure. Placing a high-turnover product on the sales infrastructure of the vending machine network improved profitability across the entire channel.

On the other hand, this model was premised on high advertising costs and vending machine maintenance costs, and profit margin management remained an ongoing challenge. BOSS was a case that secured competitive advantage through clear customer targeting and concentrated investment, but the structure of being unable to stop advertising investment to maintain that advantage was also simultaneously established.

Suntory's beer business had been in the red for over 40 years since its 1963 entry. In the domestic market, the three major companies had established oligopolistic positions, and as a latecomer, Suntory was at a disadvantage in price, sales channels, and brand. From the 1990s onward, the beer market itself matured, and demand shifted to happoshu (low-malt beer) and 'third-category' beer.

In the late 2000s, competitors successively raised prices against the backdrop of rising raw material costs. Consumers became more discerning about the difference between price and value, creating an environment where capturing share through volume expansion became difficult. A shift to product composition that could secure profit margins was required.

Suntory concentrated management resources on its premium beer 'The Premium Malt's,' strengthening promotions that emphasized taste and production method. Unlike the mainstream in the beer market of 'crisp refreshment,' the company proposed the drinking experience of 'savoring beer's flavor slowly,' aiming to shift consumption behavior itself.

In 2008, while competitors raised prices in response to rising raw materials, Suntory held the price of The Premium Malt's steady. Despite being a high-end product, a relative sense of value emerged, and the company succeeded in capturing demand. It was a decision that turned the weakness of being a latecomer into an advantage by seizing the timing advantage in pricing strategy.

The Premium Malt's exceeded annual sales of 10 million cases and became established as a core brand. Through the earnings contribution of the high-value-added product, the beer business posted approximately 3 billion yen in operating profit in fiscal year 2008, achieving profitability for the first time in 46 years since entry.

The achievement of profitability was the result of transforming the business model from volume expansion to value-added. It demonstrated that for a latecomer to secure profitability in an oligopolistic market, rather than competing on the same playing field, it was necessary to change the competitive axis itself.

In the late 2000s, Suntory HD had been advancing overseas expansion primarily in the soft drink sector. Starting with the 2009 acquisition of Orangina Schweppes, the beverage business had been accumulating overseas revenue through corporate acquisitions. Meanwhile, the overseas revenue ratio for its core spirits business, particularly whisky, remained low, with continued dependence on the domestic market.

Beer was fiercely competitive globally, with AB InBev and SABMiller dominating the market. With domestic peers already ahead in overseas beer M&A, the room for Suntory HD to make a comeback as a latecomer was limited.

Therefore, Suntory HD focused on distilled spirits, where competition was relatively less intense, and considered a large-scale acquisition in the whisky field. The U.S. bourbon market was experiencing stable growth, with a structure in which a small number of companies with strong brand power divided the market. From around 2012, the company had set its sights on U.S.-based Beam Inc. and spent several years exploring acquisition possibilities.

In January 2014, Suntory HD announced it would acquire Beam Inc. for $16 billion. The acquisition premium was approximately 25% over the recent share price, and the acquisition cost reached approximately 1.42 trillion yen. Beam Inc.'s FY2013 net income was $360 million, and the acquisition valuation multiple was calculated at approximately 44x P/E.

This level was perceived as expensive by the market, but Beam Inc. was a highly profitable company with revenue of $3.14 billion and operating income of $610 million, possessing established brand portfolios in the U.S. market including 'Jim Beam' and 'Maker's Mark.' It was a decision that valued the long-term value of the brands.

In terms of financing, approximately 1 trillion yen was procured through borrowings centered on MUFG Bank. The approximately 390 billion yen obtained from the 2013 listing of Suntory Beverage & Food International shares also indirectly supported the financial capacity for the acquisition. In May 2014, Beam Inc. was made a wholly owned subsidiary through a U.S. subsidiary, and its trade name was changed to Beam Suntory Inc.

Through the Beam Inc. acquisition, Suntory HD newly absorbed approximately 300 billion yen in revenue. The overseas ratio of the spirits business rose significantly, vaulting the company to the world's third-largest position in the distilled spirits sector. By region, revenue from the Americas expanded substantially, advancing geographical diversification of the business portfolio.

Meanwhile, the acquisition resulted in the recognition of 980.3 billion yen in trademark rights and 657.4 billion yen in goodwill as intangible fixed assets. Long-term borrowings increased to 1.47 trillion yen, and the equity ratio declined to 19.4%. The average interest rate was set at 0.92%, with the maximum repayment term at 70 years.

The Beam acquisition was a decision that rapidly advanced spirits globalization, while creating a structure in which impairment risk on goodwill and trademark rights would directly impact finances if brand value were to erode. It was a scale of financial risk that could only have been undertaken by an unlisted company, and its success depends on the long-term maintenance of brand value.