Founded in 1930. Starting from the Yaohan Food Department Store in Atami, the company aggressively expanded overseas. Despite its unconventional management—including relocating the group headquarters to Hong Kong—overinvestment and accounting fraud came to light, and the company filed for corporate reorganization in 1997, going bankrupt.
1930
Founded Yaohan Atami branch
1930Founded Yaohan Atami branch
1955
Changed trade name to Yaohan Food Department Store
1955Changed trade name to Yaohan Food Department Store
1956
Strategic Decision
Introduced cash-and-carry fixed-price selling
How abolishing credit sales to inns generated 'accelerated procurement turnover' as a revenue structure
1962
Kazuo Wada (age 33) became president
1962Kazuo Wada (age 33) became president
1965
Opened the Odawara store (expanded into Kanagawa Prefecture)
1965Opened the Odawara store (expanded into Kanagawa Prefecture)
1966
Opened the Ito store
1966Opened the Ito store
1971
Strategic Decision
Opened the Brazil store
The structure in which initial success delayed the withdrawal decision from South America
1972
Group annual revenue surpassed 10 billion yen
1972Group annual revenue surpassed 10 billion yen
1973
Opened the Atami store
1973Opened the Atami store
1973
Opened the Shimizu store
1973Opened the Shimizu store
1974
Opened the Singapore store
1974Opened the Singapore store
1977
Collapse of Yaohan Brazil
1977Collapse of Yaohan Brazil
1981
Opened the Gamagori store (expanded into Aichi Prefecture)
1981Opened the Gamagori store (expanded into Aichi Prefecture)
1982
Listed shares on the Nagoya Stock Exchange
1982Listed shares on the Nagoya Stock Exchange
1982
Opened the Fukuroi Plaza store
1982Opened the Fukuroi Plaza store
1983
Group annual revenue surpassed 100 billion yen
1983Group annual revenue surpassed 100 billion yen
1986
Began issuing warrant bonds and convertible bonds
1986Began issuing warrant bonds and convertible bonds
1989
Operated 22 overseas stores
1989Operated 22 overseas stores
1990
Strategic Decision
Established group headquarters in Hong Kong
The 'future Chinese domestic demand' that the bond issuance far exceeding ordinary income was premised on
1992
Opened the Fujinomiya Plaza store
1992Opened the Fujinomiya Plaza store
1993
Began fictitious booking of management consulting fees (accounting fraud)
1993Began fictitious booking of management consulting fees (accounting fraud)
1994
Opened the Kushigata store
1994Opened the Kushigata store
1994
Interest-bearing debt increased
1994Interest-bearing debt increased
1995
Opened the Numazu Minami Plaza store
1995Opened the Numazu Minami Plaza store
1997
Sold 16 domestic stores to Daiei
1997Sold 16 domestic stores to Daiei
1997
Filed for corporate reorganization and went bankrupt
1997Filed for corporate reorganization and went bankrupt
1998
Former president and directors arrested (accounting fraud)
1998Former president and directors arrested (accounting fraud)
2019
Founding family member Kazuo Wada passed away
2019Founding family member Kazuo Wada passed away
View Performance
RevenueYaohan:Revenue
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: ¥100M)
¥157B
Revenue:1997/3
ProfitYaohan:Net Profit Margin
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: %)
-22.9%
Margin:1997/3
View Performance
PeriodTypeRevenueProfit*Margin
1970/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1971/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1972/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1973/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1974/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1975/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥30B¥0B0.7%
1976/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥35B¥0B1.1%
1977/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥40B¥0B0.2%
1978/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥43B¥0B1.0%
1979/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥47B¥0B0.7%
1980/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥53B¥0B0.9%
1981/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥63B¥1B1.1%
1982/5Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥72B¥1B1.0%
1983/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥84B¥1B1.1%
1984/7Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥92B¥2B1.6%
1985/7Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1986/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1987/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1988/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1989/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1990/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1991/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1992/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥131B¥2B1.6%
1993/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥154B¥3B1.6%
1994/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥153B¥2B0.9%
1995/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥153B¥1B0.5%
1996/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥162B¥1B0.3%
1997/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥157B-¥36B-22.9%
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1930
Founded Yaohan Atami branch
1955
Changed trade name to Yaohan Food Department Store
1956

Introduced cash-and-carry fixed-price selling

How abolishing credit sales to inns generated 'accelerated procurement turnover' as a revenue structure

The noteworthy point is that fixed-price selling was not merely a change in pricing but was accompanied by the abolition of credit sales and the enforcement of cash collection. Atami was a commercial zone where credit sales to inns were the norm, and switching to cash settlement in such an environment carried the risk of losing business partners. Behind Ryohei Wada's decision was the guidance of Shogyokai's Choji Kuramoto, and the intent was to transform the revenue structure by increasing the turnover speed of procurement funds to make low-price selling sustainable. As a result, the capital base that supported the chain expansion across the Izu Peninsula in the 1960s was formed.

BackgroundConsumer distrust and pricing practices in the postwar retail market

In Japan's retail market of the mid-1950s, memories of wartime shortages still lingered, and prices were generally determined through negotiation. The prices of food and daily necessities varied from store to store, and consumers were in a position of making purchases without a clear grasp of the prevailing rates. Particularly in provincial cities, the opacity of pricing had accumulated as a source of everyday frustration.

At the time, retail commerce was premised on face-to-face sales practices, and pricing was left to the discretion of shop owners. Discounting and credit sales were commonplace, and in many situations cash settlement was secondary to credit transactions. While this structure offered some convenience to consumers, it also made it difficult to judge total expenditures and the reasonableness of prices.

As postwar recovery progressed and the supply of daily necessities stabilized, consumer interest shifted from 'whether one can buy' to 'at what price one can buy.' However, retail-floor practices did not necessarily adapt to this change, and how to ensure price transparency and reliability was gradually becoming recognized as a challenge.

DecisionIntroduced cash-and-carry fixed-price selling (rejecting bargaining)

Under these conditions, Yaohan decided in 1956 to introduce cash-and-carry fixed-price selling. This marked a shift to a sales method in which all products bore a clearly displayed price, no bargaining was conducted, and cash settlement was the rule. This was an extraordinary undertaking by the standards of prevailing retail practices.

The shift to cash-and-carry fixed-price selling also represented a major change for the seller. Abolishing credit sales and enforcing cash collection meant that the turnover of procurement funds had to be accelerated. Additionally, lowering prices required a review of purchasing terms and inventory management, demanding operations more efficient than before.

Even so, the rationale behind adopting this method was the aim of earning consumer trust through price transparency. By displaying fixed prices to everyone and maintaining low prices consistently, the intent was to establish the store's position as one that could be patronized on a daily basis. The 1956 decision was a shift toward a sales method that prioritized long-term relationship building with customers over short-term sales.

How abolishing credit sales to inns generated 'accelerated procurement turnover' as a revenue structure

The noteworthy point is that fixed-price selling was not merely a change in pricing but was accompanied by the abolition of credit sales and the enforcement of cash collection. Atami was a commercial zone where credit sales to inns were the norm, and switching to cash settlement in such an environment carried the risk of losing business partners. Behind Ryohei Wada's decision was the guidance of Shogyokai's Choji Kuramoto, and the intent was to transform the revenue structure by increasing the turnover speed of procurement funds to make low-price selling sustainable. As a result, the capital base that supported the chain expansion across the Izu Peninsula in the 1960s was formed.

TestimonyKazuo Wada (Yaohan, founding family)

In 1956, when it was said that cash-and-carry sales would not work in Atami, Yaohan, under the guidance of Shogyokai's Master Kuramoto and through the great determination of my father and mother, resolutely introduced cash-and-carry fixed-price selling and made a fresh start as a comprehensive food store. To carry out cash sales, a mountain of issues had to be overcome: would the enormous credit receivables be recoverable, would the inns—the major consumers—continue purchasing as before, the question of abolishing rebates, and many other problems. Yet ultimately, if a store exists for the sake of its customers, in Atami—said to have the highest food prices in Japan, especially for fresh produce—couldn't we find a way to sell at prices comparable to neighboring cities? We earnestly sought the path to implementing the cash-and-carry fixed-price selling system. In the end, founder and president Ryohei Wada courageously abolished the credit sales to inns that had been the norm until then, and resolutely implemented full cash-and-carry fixed-price selling.

1962
Kazuo Wada (age 33) became president
1965
Opened the Odawara store (expanded into Kanagawa Prefecture)
1966
Opened the Ito store
1971
9

Opened the Brazil store

The structure in which initial success delayed the withdrawal decision from South America

From Kazuo Wada's visit to Brazil in 1969 to the formal decision to open a store in August of the same year, and the opening of the Pinheiros store in September 1971, the decision-making process was relatively swift. What is noteworthy is that the first store achieved its 2-billion-yen annual sales target in the year following opening, and this initial success spurred the consecutive opening of the 2nd and 3rd stores from 1973 onward. However, the Brazilian government's monetary tightening in 1975 completely changed the environment, leading by 1977 to a halving of the 750-person workforce. The initial success may have delayed the withdrawal decision.

BackgroundLimited options for overseas expansion amid intensifying domestic competition

Kazuo Wada, then president, perceived that from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, the competitive environment in Japan's retail market was undergoing significant change. The proliferation of supermarkets had intensified price-and-assortment-based competition in every region, and competition within the same trade area was clearly increasing. The era when growth could be achieved simply by opening more stores was drawing to a close, and the domestic market was gradually taking on the character of a war of attrition.

Meanwhile, for Japanese companies at the time, overseas expansion was primarily the domain of manufacturers, and cases of retail businesses opening stores abroad were almost nonexistent. The South American market in particular, geographically and culturally distant, was a region that Japanese companies rarely considered as an option. Wada believed that continuing to confine growth opportunities to the domestic market could itself become a factor narrowing management decisions.

DecisionOpened the Brazil store in September 1971, recognized as an exceptional move

Under this conviction, Kazuo Wada decided to open a store in Brazil in September 1971. At the time, it was extremely unusual for a Japanese retail company to open a store in South America, and virtually no successful precedents existed. Even so, Wada judged that it was necessary to gain experience that could not be obtained as an extension of domestic competition.

Brazil was selected as the destination because of the presence of the Japanese-Brazilian community, as well as the country's population scale and its perceived potential as a future consumer market. Wada did not assume that the cash-and-carry fixed-price selling method established in Japan could be applied directly, and he oriented toward management adapted to local needs, setting the goal of becoming 'the Sony of the distribution industry.'

The structure in which initial success delayed the withdrawal decision from South America

From Kazuo Wada's visit to Brazil in 1969 to the formal decision to open a store in August of the same year, and the opening of the Pinheiros store in September 1971, the decision-making process was relatively swift. What is noteworthy is that the first store achieved its 2-billion-yen annual sales target in the year following opening, and this initial success spurred the consecutive opening of the 2nd and 3rd stores from 1973 onward. However, the Brazilian government's monetary tightening in 1975 completely changed the environment, leading by 1977 to a halving of the 750-person workforce. The initial success may have delayed the withdrawal decision.

TimelineOpened the Brazil store — Key Events
1969Formulated a three-year plan
3/1969President Kazuo Wada visited Brazil
8/1969Formally decided on the Brazil store opening
4/1970Store opening staff arrived in Sao Paulo
9/1971Opened the 1st store (Pinheiros) in Brazil
9/1972Pinheiros store achieved annual sales target
Pinheiros store annual sales20100M JPY
1973Opened the 2nd store (Sorocaba) in Brazil
9/1975Opened the 3rd store (Interlagos) in Brazil
10/1975Opened the 4th store (Continental SC) in Brazil
1972
Group annual revenue surpassed 10 billion yen
1973
Opened the Atami store
1973
Opened the Shimizu store
1974
Opened the Singapore store
1977
Collapse of Yaohan Brazil
1981
Opened the Gamagori store (expanded into Aichi Prefecture)
1982
Listed shares on the Nagoya Stock Exchange
1982
Opened the Fukuroi Plaza store
1983
Group annual revenue surpassed 100 billion yen
1986
Began issuing warrant bonds and convertible bonds
1989
Operated 22 overseas stores
1990

Established group headquarters in Hong Kong

The 'future Chinese domestic demand' that the bond issuance far exceeding ordinary income was premised on

Rather than the Hong Kong headquarters decision itself, attention should be directed at the scale of capital procurement that supported it. The approximately 60 billion yen in total bond issuance far exceeded the annual ordinary income at the time, and the procurement was premised on the future growth of the Chinese consumer market. By 1994, interest-bearing debt had ballooned to 120 billion yen, and the plan to fund bond redemptions from Chinese business earnings never materialized. Simultaneously, from 1993 onward, fictitious management consulting fee bookings (accounting fraud) had begun domestically, revealing a structure in which overseas expansion and domestic earnings deterioration were proceeding in parallel.

BackgroundChina's economic turning point and the untapped market for the distribution industry

From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, China was in the process of fundamentally reshaping its economic structure through the advancement of its reform and opening-up policy. Coastal regions were attracting increasing amounts of foreign capital, and Hong Kong was growing in prominence as a financial and logistics hub linking China to international markets. Meanwhile, in the retail and distribution sector, many areas remained underdeveloped, and modern distribution systems had not yet sufficiently penetrated.

Kazuo Wada envisioned that the trajectory Japan experienced during its high-growth era—'rising incomes → expanding consumption → distribution revolution'—would occur in China with a time lag. He believed that China's economy, which had developed under manufacturing-led growth, would eventually transition to a stage centered on domestic demand and consumption, at which point the role of the distribution industry would grow significantly.

At the time, most Japanese companies entering China were manufacturers, and few retailers were seriously considering the Chinese market. Wada viewed this very vacuum as an opportunity and was considering establishing a base in China as a strategic move anticipating the future consumer market.

DecisionEstablished the Hong Kong headquarters in 1990 with a plan for full-scale entry into China

Under this conviction, Kazuo Wada decided in 1990 to establish the Yaohan Group's base in Hong Kong. The intent was to position Hong Kong as a forward base for China operations, consolidating information, talent, and capital to build a structure anticipating full-scale expansion into the Chinese market. This decision was a pioneering move among Japanese distribution companies.

Wada recognized that substantial capital was essential for a phased entry into China. Accordingly, from the early 1990s, the company issued bonds totaling approximately 60 billion yen to fund growth investments. This amount far exceeded the company's annual ordinary income at the time, representing aggressive capital procurement premised on future growth.

The Hong Kong headquarters and the large-scale capital procurement were part of the concept Wada had articulated as 'becoming the Sony of the distribution industry.' Just as manufacturers had gone global through technology, the vision was that distribution companies could also cross borders through systems and operational capabilities, and this thinking underpinned the decision to open stores in China.

The 'future Chinese domestic demand' that the bond issuance far exceeding ordinary income was premised on

Rather than the Hong Kong headquarters decision itself, attention should be directed at the scale of capital procurement that supported it. The approximately 60 billion yen in total bond issuance far exceeded the annual ordinary income at the time, and the procurement was premised on the future growth of the Chinese consumer market. By 1994, interest-bearing debt had ballooned to 120 billion yen, and the plan to fund bond redemptions from Chinese business earnings never materialized. Simultaneously, from 1993 onward, fictitious management consulting fee bookings (accounting fraud) had begun domestically, revealing a structure in which overseas expansion and domestic earnings deterioration were proceeding in parallel.

1992
Opened the Fujinomiya Plaza store
1993
Began fictitious booking of management consulting fees (accounting fraud)
1994
Opened the Kushigata store
1994
Interest-bearing debt increased
1995
Opened the Numazu Minami Plaza store
1997
Sold 16 domestic stores to Daiei
1997
Filed for corporate reorganization and went bankrupt
1998
Former president and directors arrested (accounting fraud)
2019
Founding family member Kazuo Wada passed away
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