Founded in 1889. Starting as a playing card manufacturer in Kyoto, Nintendo created the home video game market with the Family Computer (NES) in 1983. Through a succession of innovative hardware — the DS, Wii, and Nintendo Switch — it became one of the world's most iconic entertainment companies.
1889
Strategic Decision
Nintendo founded as a playing card manufacturer
A founding structure where a cement merchant launched 'entertainment manufacturing' as a side business
1947
Strategic Decision
Nintendo Co., Ltd. established
1949
Strategic Decision
Hiroshi Yamauchi becomes president at age 22
The 22-year-old president everyone dismissed would reign for 53 years
1953
Strategic Decision
Japan's first plastic playing cards launched
The Disney partnership that secured market dominance
1959
Exclusive Disney playing card license acquired for Japan
1959Exclusive Disney playing card license acquired for Japan
1960
Strategic Decision
Diversification into food and taxi businesses
The US trip that revealed 'the ceiling of the playing card industry' — and triggered a decade of drift
1962
Listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange (Second Section)
1962Listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange (Second Section)
1963
Renamed to Nintendo Co., Ltd.
1963Renamed to Nintendo Co., Ltd.
1965
Revenue and profit decline
1965Revenue and profit decline
1966
Strategic Decision
Decision to become a comprehensive indoor game company
The taxi and food failures established the 'never leave entertainment' principle
1975
Leisure equipment slump — excess inventory triggers revenue decline
1975Leisure equipment slump — excess inventory triggers revenue decline
1977
Entered TV games and arcade games
1977Entered TV games and arcade games
1983
Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (First Section)
1983Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (First Section)
1983
Strategic Decision
Family Computer (Famicom/NES) launched
'It was Famicom or nothing' — the ¥14,800 bet with no fallback
1986
Famicom becomes a social phenomenon
1986Famicom becomes a social phenomenon
1990
Established subsidiaries in Europe and North America
1990Established subsidiaries in Europe and North America
1996
Nintendo 64 home console launched
1996Nintendo 64 home console launched
1998
Strategic Decision
The Pokémon Company co-founded
A software invention — 'playing through communication' — that revived aging hardware
2001
GameCube home console launched
2001GameCube home console launched
2002
Hiroshi Yamauchi retires; Satoru Iwata becomes president
2002Hiroshi Yamauchi retires; Satoru Iwata becomes president
2004
Strategic Decision
Nintendo DS portable console launched
'Brain Age' proved that a console's market is defined by software, not specs
2006
Strategic Decision
Wii home console launched
Dropping out of the performance race yielded 50 million units — but Wii U exposed the limits of reproducibility
2009
Record-high revenue achieved
2009Record-high revenue achieved
2014
Strategic Decision
3DS and Wii U underperform — net loss recorded
Eight consecutive years of revenue decline exposed the 'after the hit' problem
2015
Business and capital alliance with DeNA
2015Business and capital alliance with DeNA
2017
Strategic Decision
Nintendo Switch hybrid console launched
Unifying two hardware lines was the structural answer to the 'after the hit' problem
2020
Microsoft discussed acquiring Nintendo
2020Microsoft discussed acquiring Nintendo
2020
ValueAct Capital discloses stake
2020ValueAct Capital discloses stake
2022
Nintendo Switch cumulative sales surpass 100 million units
2022Nintendo Switch cumulative sales surpass 100 million units
View Performance
RevenueNintendo:Revenue
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: ¥100M)
¥1.7T
Revenue:2024/3
ProfitNintendo:Net Profit Margin
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: %)
29.3%
Margin:2024/3
View Performance
PeriodTypeRevenueProfit*Margin
1959/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥0B¥0B7.2%
1960/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥0B¥0B7.7%
1961/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥1B¥0B10.2%
1962/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥1B¥0B11.6%
1963/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥1B¥0B15.5%
1964/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥1B¥0B11.0%
1965/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥1B¥0B8.6%
1966/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥2B¥0B8.2%
1967/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥2B¥0B8.1%
1968/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥2B¥0B8.7%
1969/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥3B¥0B9.6%
1970/6Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥3B¥0B10.2%
1971/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1972/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1973/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥6B¥0B5.4%
1974/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥8B¥0B5.0%
1975/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1976/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1977/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥10B¥0B4.9%
1978/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥11B¥1B5.7%
1979/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥15B¥1B4.5%
1980/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥16B¥1B4.4%
1981/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥23B¥2B7.0%
1982/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥58B¥8B13.4%
1983/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥65B¥12B17.8%
1984/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥65B¥9B14.3%
1985/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥77B¥10B12.6%
1986/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥118B¥16B13.5%
1987/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥140B¥25B17.4%
1988/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥179B¥27B14.8%
1989/8Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥250B¥30B11.8%
1990/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥210B¥28B13.0%
1991/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥451B¥71B15.6%
1992/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥508B¥85B16.7%
1993/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥563B¥87B15.4%
1994/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥467B¥65B14.0%
1995/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥351B¥56B16.0%
1996/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥300B¥51B17.0%
1997/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥345B¥36B10.4%
1998/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥535B¥84B15.6%
1999/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥573B¥86B14.9%
2000/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥531B¥56B10.5%
2001/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥463B¥97B20.8%
2002/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥555B¥106B19.1%
2003/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥504B¥67B13.3%
2004/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥515B¥33B6.4%
2005/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥515B¥87B16.9%
2006/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥509B¥98B19.3%
2007/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥967B¥174B18.0%
2008/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.7T¥257B15.3%
2009/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.8T¥279B15.1%
2010/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.4T¥229B15.9%
2011/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.0T¥78B7.6%
2012/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥648B-¥43B-6.7%
2013/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥635B¥7B1.1%
2014/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥572B-¥23B-4.1%
2015/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥550B¥42B7.6%
2016/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥504B¥17B3.2%
2017/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥489B¥103B20.9%
2018/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.1T¥140B13.2%
2019/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.2T¥194B16.1%
2020/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.3T¥259B19.7%
2021/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.8T¥480B27.3%
2022/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.7T¥478B28.1%
2023/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.6T¥433B27.0%
2024/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.7T¥491B29.3%
Management Policy: No fixed periodNo fixed period
Nintendo: No formal management plan

Historical context

Since its founding in 1889 as a playing card manufacturer, Nintendo has consistently operated in the entertainment business. Entertainment is not a daily necessity — demand fluctuates significantly with trends, technology, and social change. Accordingly, the company's performance has never followed a stable growth trajectory; instead, it has swung dramatically depending on the presence or absence of hit products.

The 1960s diversification attempts following the maturation of the playing card business failed to take root. Breakthroughs came through specific products that reshaped entire market structures: the Family Computer in 1983, the Nintendo DS in 2004, the Wii in 2006, and the Nintendo Switch in 2017 — each driving major revenue expansions, while intervening periods of underperforming successors brought revenue declines and even operating losses. This history has formed a fundamental premise: for an entertainment company like Nintendo, setting medium-to-long-term numerical plans or targeting specific financial metrics is inherently ill-suited to the reality of its business.

Management philosophy

The core of Nintendo's management philosophy is not about competing on hardware specifications or achieving technical benchmarks, but about conceiving entertainment experiences that anyone can enjoy. Rather than pursuing higher performance or better specs as ends in themselves, the company has consistently prioritized designing play scenarios that are accessible regardless of age or gaming experience.

This philosophy has been embodied in the Family Computer's low-cost, software-centric design, the Nintendo DS and Wii's intuitive controls, and the Nintendo Switch's integration of play contexts. By refusing to separate hardware from software and instead designing the entire experience as a coherent whole, Nintendo has maintained its fundamental approach to entertainment creation — and this is precisely why it does not set fixed management plans or numerical targets.

Author's Questions

  • How can a company with such volatile earnings justify having no management plan to shareholders?

    Nintendo's entertainment business experiences dramatic performance swings depending on hit products, yet the company intentionally sets no medium-to-long-term numerical plans or specific management metrics. How is this management stance explained to shareholders who prioritize stable growth and plan achievement? What does Nintendo point to, if not plans, as the source of its business sustainability and corporate value?

  • Why has Nintendo consistently stayed out of the hardware performance race?

    In the game console market, competition often centers on processing power and visual fidelity, yet Nintendo has consistently avoided leading with performance specifications. Can this choice be explained solely by development cost and pricing considerations, or is it an inevitable consequence of protecting the 'entertainment for everyone' philosophy? What business risks does the choice not to compete on performance entail?

  • Why has the software-and-experience-first approach been sustainable over the long term?

    Nintendo has designed hardware and software as an integrated whole, treating the total play experience as the source of value. Yet this model is inherently hit-dependent and arguably low in reproducibility. Why, then, has the same philosophy been maintained across generations? What aspects of the organization, development structure, and decision-making process — beyond individual title successes — sustain this management style?

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1889

Nintendo founded as a playing card manufacturer

A founding structure where a cement merchant launched 'entertainment manufacturing' as a side business

What is often overlooked about Nintendo's founding is that the Yamauchi family already had a revenue base from cement sales. Hanafuda was not the main business but a side venture, distributed through Murai Brothers' tobacco sales channels. The structure of launching an entertainment product business — backed by existing revenue from a completely different industry — prefigured Nintendo's later ability to tolerate losses on new ventures. The company's risk tolerance was built into its DNA from the very beginning.

Background: A cement merchant's side venture into entertainment

In 1889, Fusajiro Yamauchi began manufacturing hanafuda (flower cards) in Kyoto. This marks Nintendo's founding year, though hanafuda was not the Yamauchi family's first business. The Haikō Honten cement sales business had been established in 1885, giving the family an existing commercial foundation. Amid Kyoto's modernization and rising construction demand, the cement business was in an expansion phase.

The Yamauchi family subsequently signed a contract with Onoda Cement in 1918, and by 1934 was operating as a Mitsui Bussan/Onoda Cement Kyoto agent. This existing business provided not only capital accumulation but also experience in managing trade relationships and distribution. A merchant-family ethos of not depending on a single business line was already forming at this stage.

Decision: Entering hanafuda manufacturing backed by existing revenue

The entry into hanafuda manufacturing was undertaken against the backdrop of revenue and commercial experience from the cement sales business. Hanafuda was an entertainment product with steady demand at the time — not a daily necessity, but a category with continuous consumption potential. Fusajiro positioned hanafuda as a business combining manufacturing and distribution.

For sales, the family leveraged the distribution network of Murai Brothers, a leading domestic tobacco company. Hanafuda and tobacco shared overlapping consumer bases, enabling sales expansion through existing channels. In 1902, Nintendo also entered karuta (Japanese card game) manufacturing, broadening its product range.

Result: Establishing the Nintendo brand in cards and games

Through the manufacture and sale of hanafuda and karuta, Nintendo formed a business model of continuously supplying entertainment as a product. While the scale remained modest, the company accumulated experience in production management, distribution network utilization, and product lineup adjustment.

Under family management, operations were maintained over the long term, establishing an operational structure relatively resilient to short-term performance fluctuations. Hanafuda manufacturing marked the first moment when Nintendo explicitly defined entertainment as its business domain.

A founding structure where a cement merchant launched 'entertainment manufacturing' as a side business

What is often overlooked about Nintendo's founding is that the Yamauchi family already had a revenue base from cement sales. Hanafuda was not the main business but a side venture, distributed through Murai Brothers' tobacco sales channels. The structure of launching an entertainment product business — backed by existing revenue from a completely different industry — prefigured Nintendo's later ability to tolerate losses on new ventures. The company's risk tolerance was built into its DNA from the very beginning.

TimelineNintendo founded as a playing card manufacturer — Key Events
1885Haikō Honten founded (cement sales)
1889Hanafuda sales begin (Nintendo's founding year)
1906Karuta sales begin
1927Card business and cement sales formally separated
1947
11

Nintendo Co., Ltd. established

Background: Postwar reorganization of prewar business structure

In 1933, the Yamauchi family established Yamauchi Nintendo as a general partnership to manufacture and sell hanafuda and karuta. During the prewar period, Nintendo operated as a family business, with the general partnership structure suited to family-controlled management. Through wartime material controls and postwar distribution restrictions, the card business continued.

After the war, Japan's corporate landscape underwent reorganization, with the joint-stock company form becoming standard for business operations. Within the Yamauchi family, asset management and business succession planning became pressing concerns. The prewar general partnership framework required reconsideration from the perspectives of business expansion and succession.

Decision: Establishing Marufuku Co., Ltd. for business succession

On November 20, 1947, the Yamauchi family established Marufuku Co., Ltd. and transferred the hanafuda and karuta sales operations from Yamauchi Nintendo. In 1950, the manufacturing division was also transferred, consolidating all operations under the new joint-stock company.

This corporate reorganization was also a response to succession issues brought into focus by Sekiyo Yamauchi's illness. Consolidating the family's business assets into a single joint-stock company aimed to smooth succession and stabilize management. Marufuku was subsequently renamed Nintendo Playing Card Co., Ltd. in 1951, then Nintendo Co., Ltd. in 1963 — the name it carries today.

TimelineNintendo Co., Ltd. established — Key Events
1933Yamauchi Nintendo established as a general partnership
11/1947Marufuku Co., Ltd. established (business transferred from Yamauchi Nintendo)
1951Renamed from Marufuku to Nintendo Playing Card Co., Ltd.
1952Head office and factory relocated
1963Renamed from Nintendo Playing Card to Nintendo Co., Ltd.
1949

Hiroshi Yamauchi becomes president at age 22

The 22-year-old president everyone dismissed would reign for 53 years

Hiroshi Yamauchi became president at 22 when his grandfather died suddenly — a succession born of crisis, not choice. Observers declared Nintendo finished. But Yamauchi channeled his anger into seizing control, immediately declaring the end of cottage-industry production. A leader chosen for lack of alternatives went on to concentrate all of Nintendo's decision-making in a single person for 53 years. The crisis legitimized one-man rule, and that one-man rule became the source of Nintendo's decision-making speed.

Background: Sudden death of Sekiyo Yamauchi and the absence of a successor

In 1949, Nintendo's president Sekiyo Yamauchi died suddenly at 66. Nintendo was then a company of about 100 employees centered on playing cards and hanafuda, and the sudden death of its leader threatened the very continuity of the business. No clear succession plan existed in what was still essentially a family enterprise.

Sekiyo's son-in-law Shikanojo Yamauchi was considered unsuitable for management due to his spending habits, so the role fell to Sekiyo's grandson Hiroshi Yamauchi, then a student at Waseda University. The decision to appoint a 22-year-old student as president was met with widespread skepticism. 'Nintendo is finished' became a common refrain.

Decision: Becoming president at 22 in 1949

In 1949, Hiroshi Yamauchi assumed the presidency of Nintendo, suddenly thrust into running the family business. Despite his youth and lack of experience, Yamauchi accepted the situation and made clear that all final management decisions would rest with him alone. From this point forward, Nintendo's strategic direction was concentrated in one person's judgment.

After taking office, Yamauchi set about overhauling the traditional cottage-industry production system, signaling a move toward modernizing card manufacturing. He aimed to break away from the subcontracting and manual labor that had characterized production, envisioning a transition to mechanized mass production and consolidation of manufacturing facilities.

The 22-year-old president everyone dismissed would reign for 53 years

Hiroshi Yamauchi became president at 22 when his grandfather died suddenly — a succession born of crisis, not choice. Observers declared Nintendo finished. But Yamauchi channeled his anger into seizing control, immediately declaring the end of cottage-industry production. A leader chosen for lack of alternatives went on to concentrate all of Nintendo's decision-making in a single person for 53 years. The crisis legitimized one-man rule, and that one-man rule became the source of Nintendo's decision-making speed.

Testimony'The Secret of Nintendo's Business Methods'

Sekiyo Yamauchi, the company's president and Hiroshi's grandfather, suddenly fell ill, and the young man was called back from Tokyo to take over the family business. He was 22 years old.

'A 22-year-old president' may sound impressive, but the people around him were cold. Nintendo was still just a company of about 100 employees making playing cards and hanafuda. With the pillar of the company gone, everyone — including relatives — whispered that 'Nintendo is finished now.' Yamauchi himself admitted that he had 'spent his time in Tokyo doing whatever he pleased,' which only reinforced such views. It was a deeply inauspicious start. But being told that Nintendo was finished made Yamauchi furious.

TimelineHiroshi Yamauchi becomes president at age 22 — Key Events
1949Hiroshi Yamauchi becomes president
Age at appointment22
1952Manufacturing consolidated at head office factory
1955Strike occurs
1953

Japan's first plastic playing cards launched

The Disney partnership that secured market dominance

The 1959 partnership with Disney gave Nintendo exclusive rights to character playing cards in Japan. Combined with the mass production system and aggressive advertising, this drove nationwide distribution through wholesalers and department stores. By the early 1960s, Nintendo had secured an overwhelming share of the playing card market.

Background: Handcraft dependency and growth constraints in the early 1950s

In the early 1950s, playing card and hanafuda manufacturing in Japan remained centered on paper-based, handcraft production. Durability and quality inconsistency were persistent challenges. Playing cards, frequently used by children, were particularly vulnerable to damage and could not withstand repeated use.

Nintendo was no exception. While demand was recovering after the postwar upheaval, production remained labor-intensive, with limited scalability. By the early 1950s, the company's manufacturing system — including hanafuda and karuta — was still in transition from cottage industry, and achieving stable product quality and mass production capability had become prerequisites for the next phase of growth.

Decision: Mass production of plastic playing cards in 1953

In 1953, Nintendo began mass-producing Japan's first plastic playing cards. By replacing the conventional paper material with durable plastic, the company aimed to dramatically extend product lifespan. At the time, mass-producing plastic playing cards was considered technically difficult in Japan.

Nintendo chose to develop manufacturing equipment in-house rather than rely on external procurement. By treating production equipment itself as a development target and accumulating manufacturing technology internally, the company achieved stable supply and consistent quality. Subsequently, in 1959, it developed in-house card-laminating machines and automatic cutting machines, progressively rationalizing playing card production.

Result: Establishing mass-production advantage and market dominance

With the mass production system in place, Nintendo's playing card business achieved production efficiency far exceeding competitors. By the time of the fiscal year ending June 1961, the playing card factory employed 156 workers producing ¥370 million in output, surpassing the karuta factory in production efficiency.

In 1959, Nintendo secured an exclusive license to sell Disney character playing cards in Japan. From 1960 onward, the company used television advertising and direct sales to wholesalers and department stores nationwide to expand distribution. By the early 1960s, Nintendo held approximately 80% of the domestic playing card market share, and in 1962, the company listed its shares on the stock exchange.

The Disney partnership that secured market dominance

The 1959 partnership with Disney gave Nintendo exclusive rights to character playing cards in Japan. Combined with the mass production system and aggressive advertising, this drove nationwide distribution through wholesalers and department stores. By the early 1960s, Nintendo had secured an overwhelming share of the playing card market.

TestimonyNoda Keizai (economic journal)

In playing cards, the company holds a near-monopoly position domestically, with an 80% market share — to the point where 'playing cards' and 'Nintendo' are virtually synonymous. Moreover, 20% growth is expected going forward. In playing cards, as many acknowledge, the keys to sales are ideas and production methods. What has propelled this company to its current position is, above all, its ability to develop new ideas — as demonstrated by the recent ukiyo-e playing cards. The company's goal is to develop playing cards that competitors cannot easily imitate yet generate instant popularity among children. The Disney playing cards, in particular, were launched in 1960 with the company's full confidence.

TimelineJapan's first plastic playing cards launched — Key Events
1953New head office factory constructed (Higashiyama, Kyoto)
1953Japan's first plastic playing cards launched
1959In-house card-laminating and automatic cutting machines developed
11/1959Exclusive Disney playing card license acquired
1960Disney playing cards launched in Japan
1959
Exclusive Disney playing card license acquired for Japan
1960

Diversification into food and taxi businesses

The US trip that revealed 'the ceiling of the playing card industry' — and triggered a decade of drift

During his 1956 US visit, Yamauchi confronted the reality that even America's largest playing card maker operated on a limited scale. With 80% domestic share but no room to grow, seeking opportunities outside the core business was rational. But taxis and food lacked any technological continuity with the existing business and failed to build competitive positions. While Japanese companies surged during the high-growth era, Nintendo spent over a decade in stagnation. This failure made the 1966 pivot — 'never leave entertainment' — inevitable.

Background: Pessimism about the playing card market's ceiling

By the late 1950s, Nintendo had established a revenue base through the mass production and high domestic market share of its playing card business. However, the inherent nature of entertainment cards meant that the total addressable market was limited, creating a structural ceiling on business scale.

In 1956, Hiroshi Yamauchi visited the United States and toured the factory of America's largest playing card manufacturer. The production scale and business size he observed there forcefully impressed upon him the ceiling of the playing card industry as a whole. This experience crystallized the concern that Nintendo could not continue to grow as a playing-card-only company.

Decision: Diversifying beyond entertainment

In 1960, Nintendo began exploring revenue sources outside playing cards, venturing into non-entertainment fields. The company established Daiya Taxi Co., Ltd. as a subsidiary, entering the taxi business — a field with no technological continuity with its existing operations, aimed at building a stable revenue base.

In 1964, Nintendo entered the processed food business through a joint venture with Omi Kenshi, manufacturing and selling character-branded food products. Throughout the early 1960s, Nintendo pursued multiple new businesses in parallel, seeking a corporate structure less dependent on playing cards.

Result: Diversification failed to take root, leading to prolonged stagnation

None of these new ventures established competitive advantages, and none grew into core businesses. From 1965 onward, an economic downturn caused playing card demand to decline, and factory utilization rates dropped sharply.

Ultimately, the strategy of using playing card profits to nurture new businesses proved unviable. In 1969, the taxi business was sold to the Meitetsu Group, and the food business was abandoned. The late 1960s saw Nintendo enter a prolonged period of stagnation, with its core business declining and diversification efforts having failed.

The US trip that revealed 'the ceiling of the playing card industry' — and triggered a decade of drift

During his 1956 US visit, Yamauchi confronted the reality that even America's largest playing card maker operated on a limited scale. With 80% domestic share but no room to grow, seeking opportunities outside the core business was rational. But taxis and food lacked any technological continuity with the existing business and failed to build competitive positions. While Japanese companies surged during the high-growth era, Nintendo spent over a decade in stagnation. This failure made the 1966 pivot — 'never leave entertainment' — inevitable.

TestimonyHiroshi Yamauchi (Nintendo president at the time)

The Showa 40s [1965–1975] were the era of Japan's high economic growth, when various companies achieved tremendous expansion. Our Nintendo was originally a cottage industry in Kyoto making playing cards and karuta, but when cards stopped selling, we were forced to transform into something else. Looking back at that era, while many companies achieved great leaps forward, Nintendo never quite took off — we couldn't escape the tunnel, and it was a long period of stagnation.

TimelineDiversification into food and taxi businesses — Key Events
1960Daiya Taxi Co., Ltd. established
1963Sano Foods Co., Ltd. established (joint venture)
1963Renamed to Nintendo Co., Ltd.
1969Taxi business sold to Meitetsu Group
1969Withdrew from processed food business
1962

Listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange (Second Section)

-

TimelineListed on the Osaka Securities Exchange (Second Section) — Key Events
1962Listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange (Second Section)
1970Promoted to the Osaka Securities Exchange (First Section)
1963
Renamed to Nintendo Co., Ltd.
1965
Revenue and profit decline
1966

Decision to become a comprehensive indoor game company

The taxi and food failures established the 'never leave entertainment' principle

The early-1960s diversification failures paradoxically defined Nintendo's business domain. Taxis and food — fields outside entertainment — failed to build competitive advantages and were all abandoned by 1969. This experience redirected diversification from 'outside entertainment' to 'horizontal expansion within entertainment.' The 1966 strategy decision reflected this pivot. The Ultra Hand and Beam Gun achieved limited commercial success, but the organizational habit of developing mechanical play devices in-house became the technical and organizational prerequisite for the later entry into electronic gaming.

Background: Growth stalling after playing card demand plateaued

By the mid-1960s, Nintendo had secured a dominant share of the domestic playing card market, but demand had largely peaked, and revenue growth was decelerating. Even with market monopoly, the product characteristics of entertainment cards imposed inherent limits on volume growth, and business scale had reached a ceiling.

Moreover, the early-1960s diversification attempts into non-entertainment fields like taxis and food had failed to take root, leaving Nintendo without a viable alternative revenue pillar. The company faced a situation where maintaining its playing-card-only framework offered no prospect for medium-to-long-term growth.

Decision: Pivoting to a comprehensive indoor game company

In 1966, Nintendo revised its business strategy, transitioning from a playing-card-centered structure to one encompassing all forms of indoor entertainment devices. Rather than diversifying into non-entertainment fields, the company chose to expand within the entertainment domain — diversifying along the extension of play itself.

Under this new direction, Nintendo released the 'Ultra Hand' toy in 1966, followed by the 'Beam Gun SP' and other home entertainment devices. In 1968, the 'Ultra Machine' home pitching machine was launched, expanding the product line into mechanical indoor games. Nintendo began pursuing a new form of entertainment combining toys and mechanical engineering.

Result: From mechanical games to the foundation for electronics

This strategic pivot gradually freed Nintendo from playing card dependency, forming a product portfolio centered on indoor game devices. Through the early 1970s, the company ventured into products combining mechanical and electronic technologies, including the 'Copilas' office machine and the Laser Clay Shooting System.

These experiments did not all become sustained revenue sources, but they shaped Nintendo's transformation from a card manufacturer into an entertainment device maker incorporating electronics. The 1966 strategy decision became the prerequisite that made the subsequent entry into electronic gaming possible.

The taxi and food failures established the 'never leave entertainment' principle

The early-1960s diversification failures paradoxically defined Nintendo's business domain. Taxis and food — fields outside entertainment — failed to build competitive advantages and were all abandoned by 1969. This experience redirected diversification from 'outside entertainment' to 'horizontal expansion within entertainment.' The 1966 strategy decision reflected this pivot. The Ultra Hand and Beam Gun achieved limited commercial success, but the organizational habit of developing mechanical play devices in-house became the technical and organizational prerequisite for the later entry into electronic gaming.

TimelineDecision to become a comprehensive indoor game company — Key Events
1966Released the 'Ultra Hand' toy
1966Released the 'Beam Gun SP'
1968Released 'Ultra Machine' home pitching machine
1972Released 'Copilas' office machine
1973Developed Laser Clay Shooting System
1975
8

Leisure equipment slump — excess inventory triggers revenue decline

Combined with the post-oil-shock recession, sales stagnated. The end of the Laser Clay Shooting boom in 1975 compounded the decline. With first-half revenue of ¥4.2 billion against accounts receivable of ¥3.1 billion and inventory of ¥2 billion, Nintendo faced a near-insolvency inventory crisis.

1977
Entered TV games and arcade games
1983
Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (First Section)
1983
7

Family Computer (Famicom/NES) launched

'It was Famicom or nothing' — the ¥14,800 bet with no fallback

After the Game & Watch boom ended, Nintendo had no next pillar. Yamauchi later stated the choice was 'bankruptcy or Famicom.' The ¥14,800 price point was achieved through in-house custom CPU design manufactured by Ricoh, with revenue recovered through software sales. The 'Nintendo checkpoint' system — limiting third-party production volumes — prevented the quality collapse that had destroyed the US market. Revenue expanded from ¥23.9 billion in 1981 to ¥291.2 billion by 1989.

Background: Searching for the next growth driver after Game & Watch

In the early 1980s, Nintendo had achieved temporary growth through the hit portable game 'Game & Watch,' but that boom was waning. A business structure dependent on a single product's success was inherently unstable, and establishing a new pillar for growth had become an urgent management challenge.

In 1981, Nintendo identified the home TV game console as its next core product and began internal development of a new system. At the time, home game consoles were priced around ¥30,000, limiting mass adoption. Nintendo began examining a strategy that would achieve both affordability and performance to drive household penetration.

Decision: Entering with a low-cost console and software-revenue model

In July 1983, Nintendo launched the 'Family Computer' (Famicom) at ¥14,800. The strategy was to keep the hardware price low while generating revenue through game cartridge sales, with software retail prices set between ¥4,500 and ¥5,500.

To realize this pricing strategy, Nintendo constructed the Uji factory in 1983 for mass production. With the Game & Watch boom ending, failure of the Famicom would have left the capital investment unrecoverable. Additionally, Nintendo designed a custom CPU specialized for image processing in-house, with manufacturing outsourced to Ricoh, balancing performance with cost.

Result: Creating the home video game market

The Family Computer spread rapidly into households through its combination of low price and high performance, quickly becoming a social phenomenon. Nintendo emphasized software quality control, initially limiting releases to first-party titles. From 1984, third-party developers were admitted under strict production quotas to prevent a flood of low-quality titles.

From 1985 onward, hits like 'Super Mario Bros.' and a growing library of third-party titles expanded the market. By 1986, cumulative Famicom sales exceeded 6 million units. Nintendo's revenue, which stood at ¥23.9 billion in 1981 before the Famicom, reached ¥291.2 billion by 1989, establishing the home video game business as the company's core.

'It was Famicom or nothing' — the ¥14,800 bet with no fallback

After the Game & Watch boom ended, Nintendo had no next pillar. Yamauchi later stated the choice was 'bankruptcy or Famicom.' The ¥14,800 price point was achieved through in-house custom CPU design manufactured by Ricoh, with revenue recovered through software sales. The 'Nintendo checkpoint' system — limiting third-party production volumes — prevented the quality collapse that had destroyed the US market. Revenue expanded from ¥23.9 billion in 1981 to ¥291.2 billion by 1989.

TestimonyHiroshi Yamauchi (Nintendo president at the time)

There was no 'major decision' involved. When there's only one path, there's nothing to agonize over. A decision is when you can go right or left and must choose. But in our case, it was either the company might collapse — file for corporate reorganization — or grit our teeth and persevere. There was nowhere else to go. We had no choice but to go with the Famicom.

TimelineFamily Computer (Famicom/NES) launched — Key Events
1983Family Computer launched
Console price14800JPY
1983'Mario Bros.' released by Nintendo
1M units
1983Custom CPU procured from Ricoh
Procurement price2000JPY/unit
1984Platform opened to third-party developers
1984Hudson releases 'Lode Runner'
1M units
1984Namco releases 'Xevious'
1M units
1986

Famicom becomes a social phenomenon

1990

Established subsidiaries in Europe and North America

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TimelineEstablished subsidiaries in Europe and North America — Key Events
1990Nintendo of Europe GmbH established (Germany)
1993Nintendo France S.A.R.L. established (France)
1996

Nintendo 64 home console launched

In response to Sony's launch of the PlayStation in the 1990s, Nintendo released its own 64-bit home console, the Nintendo 64. This marked the beginning of intense competition between Nintendo and Sony in the home console market.

1998
4

The Pokémon Company co-founded

A software invention — 'playing through communication' — that revived aging hardware

What made Pokémon groundbreaking was inventing a new form of play — trading and battling via link cable — on Game Boy hardware nearly a decade old. Software alone re-stimulated demand without any hardware upgrade, extending the platform's life until it surpassed 100 million cumulative units. Furthermore, the multi-media expansion into anime, movies, and trading cards was consolidated under The Pokémon Company (Nintendo's ~32% stake), making it a pioneering case of a game company transitioning to IP management.

Background: Concerns over portable game market maturation

By the mid-1990s, Nintendo's Game Boy had been driving the portable game market for years, but as time passed from its launch, the hardware's novelty had diminished. The portable gaming market was entering a phase where hardware upgrades and next-generation transitions were being anticipated, raising questions about sustaining sales of the existing platform.

Moreover, while Game Boy had established itself as children's entertainment, use cases and play patterns were becoming fixed. Without stimulating new demand, sales would likely plateau. By the mid-1990s, the Game Boy business remained important for Nintendo but its growth outlook was uncertain.

Decision: Expanding through the Pokémon franchise

In 1996, Nintendo released 'Pokémon Red and Green' for Game Boy. The game featured battle and trade mechanics utilizing the link cable, presenting a fundamentally different form of portable gaming. It was followed by 'Pokémon Blue' in the same year.

Subsequently, Pokémon cards launched in 1996, the TV anime began airing in 1997, and Game Boy production was increased in response to surging demand. In 1998, 'Pokémon Yellow' was released, and The Pokémon Center Company (now The Pokémon Company) was co-founded to centrally manage the Pokémon business, with Nintendo holding an estimated 32% stake.

Result: Game Boy sales revival and extended lifecycle

The Pokémon franchise dramatically impacted Game Boy's sales trajectory. The 1998 movie 'Mewtwo Strikes Back' and the 1999 release of 'Pokémon Gold and Silver' maintained continuous demand. This revitalized a hardware platform that was well past its prime.

By 2000, Game Boy sales were thriving, and cumulative units surpassed 100 million — an extraordinary lifespan for a portable gaming device. In 2001, the successor Game Boy Advance was launched, and the Game Boy line transitioned smoothly to its next generation.

A software invention — 'playing through communication' — that revived aging hardware

What made Pokémon groundbreaking was inventing a new form of play — trading and battling via link cable — on Game Boy hardware nearly a decade old. Software alone re-stimulated demand without any hardware upgrade, extending the platform's life until it surpassed 100 million cumulative units. Furthermore, the multi-media expansion into anime, movies, and trading cards was consolidated under The Pokémon Company (Nintendo's ~32% stake), making it a pioneering case of a game company transitioning to IP management.

TimelineThe Pokémon Company co-founded — Key Events
2/1996Pokémon Red & Green released
10/1996Pokémon Blue released
10/1996Pokémon Trading Card Game launched
4/1997Pokémon anime begins airing
6/1997Game Boy production increase decided
9/1998Pokémon Yellow released
4/1998The Pokémon Center Company co-founded (now The Pokémon Company)
Nintendo's estimated equity stake32%
4/1998Pokémon movie 'Mewtwo Strikes Back' released
11/1999Pokémon Gold & Silver released
6/2000Game Boy sales thriving
Cumulative sales100M units
2001Game Boy Advance launched
2001
GameCube home console launched
2002

Hiroshi Yamauchi retires; Satoru Iwata becomes president

Hiroshi Yamauchi, who had served as Nintendo's president since 1949, retired due to advancing age. He appointed Satoru Iwata — a non-family, internally promoted executive — as his successor, ending four generations of family management at Nintendo.

TimelineHiroshi Yamauchi retires; Satoru Iwata becomes president — Key Events
2002Satoru Iwata becomes Nintendo president
Age at appointment42
2015Satoru Iwata passes away (age 55)
Age at death55
2004
12

Nintendo DS portable console launched

'Brain Age' proved that a console's market is defined by software, not specs

The DS's dual-screen, touch-input hardware design did not by itself trigger an explosive hit. The turning point came with 'Brain Age' in 2005, when adults and elderly users — demographics previously unimaginable for game consoles — began purchasing the device. The DS proved that software use-case proposals, not hardware performance, determine market size, surpassing 100 million units. The successor 3DS introduced stereoscopic 3D as a technical novelty but lacked a use-case-expanding title comparable to Brain Age, and sales fell short of the previous generation.

Background: A turning point for the Game Boy successor

By the early 2000s, Nintendo's portable gaming business had achieved long-term success through the Game Boy series. The Game Boy Advance was performing adequately, but the portable gaming market was moving toward competition based on higher performance and resolution, making differentiation through incremental upgrades increasingly difficult.

Additionally, the proliferation of mobile phones and portable electronic devices had diversified entertainment options. Portable game consoles were strongly associated with children's entertainment, and expanding the user base had become a key challenge. Nintendo needed to stimulate new demand along an axis different from the conventional gaming experience.

Decision: Launching the Nintendo DS in 2004

In December 2004, Nintendo released the 'Nintendo DS.' The DS featured two screens, one incorporating touch input — a configuration fundamentally different from conventional portable game consoles. This design was not about competing on processing power but about presenting new forms of play through changes in control and experience.

At launch, the DS attracted attention but did not immediately become an explosive hit. Nintendo continued developing software premised on use cases beyond the traditional gamer demographic, planning titles that leveraged the unique control characteristics of the hardware.

Result: Demographic expansion and a long-running portable hit

The release of 'Brain Age' in May 2005 was a turning point. It expanded the portable console's user base from children to adults and elderly users, driving rapid demand growth for the DS.

The Nintendo DS went on to surpass 100 million cumulative units sold by 2009, incorporating the improved DSi model along the way. However, the 2011 successor 'Nintendo 3DS' — despite introducing stereoscopic 3D as a new feature — lacked the definitive hit software that had characterized the DS era, and its sales fell short of the previous generation. The DS remains a landmark case of demographic expansion in portable gaming.

'Brain Age' proved that a console's market is defined by software, not specs

The DS's dual-screen, touch-input hardware design did not by itself trigger an explosive hit. The turning point came with 'Brain Age' in 2005, when adults and elderly users — demographics previously unimaginable for game consoles — began purchasing the device. The DS proved that software use-case proposals, not hardware performance, determine market size, surpassing 100 million units. The successor 3DS introduced stereoscopic 3D as a technical novelty but lacked a use-case-expanding title comparable to Brain Age, and sales fell short of the previous generation.

TimelineNintendo DS portable console launched — Key Events
12/2004Nintendo DS launched
2008Nintendo DSi launched
3/2009Nintendo DS surpasses 100 million cumulative units
Cumulative sales100M units
2011Nintendo 3DS launched
2006

Wii home console launched

Dropping out of the performance race yielded 50 million units — but Wii U exposed the limits of reproducibility

The Wii deliberately distanced itself from processing power competition, drawing non-gamers through intuitive controls to achieve 50 million cumulative units. It was the home console version of the DS's 'use-case expansion,' forming Nintendo's peak era (¥1.8 trillion in revenue). But the successor Wii U failed because 'the difference from Wii wasn't communicated' (President Iwata), compounded by delays in first-party software. The fact that the same approach did not work a second time demonstrated a structural limit to Nintendo's success model.

Background: Shifts in the home console market

By the mid-2000s, the home console market had seen competition increasingly driven by higher performance, leading to more complex controls and rising prices. Meanwhile, the gaming population was not necessarily expanding, and a divide had emerged between dedicated gamers and everyone else. High-performance consoles appealed to enthusiast users, but their positioning as family-wide entertainment was weakening.

Nintendo had achieved some success in expanding its user base through the DS in portable gaming, but had not replicated this in the home console space. A recognition formed that the company needed to step away from the processing power competition and redefine the very concept of home entertainment usage.

Decision: Launching the Wii in 2006

In 2006, Nintendo released the 'Wii' home console. The Wii adopted a dedicated controller enabling intuitive motion-based controls, designed so that anyone could participate regardless of gaming experience. Nintendo positioned families as the primary user segment and launched the console alongside first-party titles like 'Wii Sports' that showcased the hardware's capabilities.

By taking this approach, the Wii carved out a position distinct from high-performance individual-use consoles. By designing for multi-player family scenarios, the system appealed to people who did not normally play games.

Result: Wii's success and Wii U's struggles

The Wii gained strong support among families, with cumulative sales reaching 50 million units by 2009. Together with the DS, it drove Nintendo's performance during this period, creating a structure where both portable and home platforms had hit products simultaneously.

However, the 2012 successor 'Wii U' failed to carry forward the Wii's success. Delays in first-party software releases prevented the platform from maintaining momentum, and the distinction between 'Wii' and 'Wii U' was not adequately communicated to consumers. As a result, Wii U struggled commercially and became a contributing factor to the performance decline from 2012 onward.

Dropping out of the performance race yielded 50 million units — but Wii U exposed the limits of reproducibility

The Wii deliberately distanced itself from processing power competition, drawing non-gamers through intuitive controls to achieve 50 million cumulative units. It was the home console version of the DS's 'use-case expansion,' forming Nintendo's peak era (¥1.8 trillion in revenue). But the successor Wii U failed because 'the difference from Wii wasn't communicated' (President Iwata), compounded by delays in first-party software. The fact that the same approach did not work a second time demonstrated a structural limit to Nintendo's success model.

TestimonySatoru Iwata (Nintendo president)

Regarding Wii U, the intervals between our own major software releases have been longer than the outlook I presented at the January management policy briefing, and we have been unable to maintain the platform's momentum.

In addition, our biggest challenge is that we have not yet adequately conveyed the product value of Wii U. There are misunderstandings that Wii U is 'just a Wii with a GamePad attached,' and some people even think the GamePad is a peripheral for the Wii. We have not been able to communicate what we need to, and we deeply feel our own lack of effort.

TimelineWii home console launched — Key Events
2006Wii home console launched
2009Wii surpasses 50 million cumulative units
Cumulative sales50M units
12/2012Wii U home console launched
2013Wii U sales struggle
2009
3

Record-high revenue achieved

Driven by strong Wii and DS sales, Nintendo recorded all-time-high consolidated revenue of ¥1.8 trillion for the fiscal year ending March 2009.

2014
3

3DS and Wii U underperform — net loss recorded

Eight consecutive years of revenue decline exposed the 'after the hit' problem

The fact that both successors to the exceptional DS-Wii dual hit underperformed their predecessors made visible the structural risk inherent in Nintendo's growth model. The non-gamer demographics acquired through use-case expansion did not automatically migrate to next-generation hardware, and no mechanism existed to guarantee hit continuity. Eight consecutive years of revenue decline and two net losses demonstrated that maintaining two separate hardware lines — portable and home — had reached its limit, directly establishing the precondition for the Switch's integrated approach.

Through 2010, Nintendo secured revenue through the dual hits of DS and Wii. However, their respective successors — the 3DS and Wii U — both struggled commercially.

As a result, from the peak in fiscal year ending March 2009, Nintendo suffered eight consecutive years of revenue decline through March 2017. Net losses were recorded in fiscal years ending March 2012 and March 2014.

Eight consecutive years of revenue decline exposed the 'after the hit' problem

The fact that both successors to the exceptional DS-Wii dual hit underperformed their predecessors made visible the structural risk inherent in Nintendo's growth model. The non-gamer demographics acquired through use-case expansion did not automatically migrate to next-generation hardware, and no mechanism existed to guarantee hit continuity. Eight consecutive years of revenue decline and two net losses demonstrated that maintaining two separate hardware lines — portable and home — had reached its limit, directly establishing the precondition for the Switch's integrated approach.

Timeline3DS and Wii U underperform — net loss recorded — Key Events
2011Nintendo 3DS launched
2013Wii U sales struggle
3/2014Net loss recorded
Net income-232100M JPY
3/2017Eight consecutive years of revenue decline
Consecutive decline8years
2015

Business and capital alliance with DeNA

Nintendo formed a business and capital alliance with DeNA for collaboration on mobile gaming. Nintendo acquired 10% of DeNA's shares for ¥22 billion, while DeNA acquired 1.24% of Nintendo's shares.

2017
3

Nintendo Switch hybrid console launched

Unifying two hardware lines was the structural answer to the 'after the hit' problem

The essence of the Switch was merging the portable and home console lines into one, eliminating the dispersal of development resources and software assets. Learning from the failure of DS and Wii successors to replicate their predecessors' success, Nintendo designed a structure that would make the 'valley between hits' shallower by unifying the platform. The systematic deployment of Zelda, Mario, and Animal Crossing broke the eight-year revenue decline and drove cumulative sales past 100 million units. It was a transition from 'hit dependency' to 'platform consolidation.'

Background: The portable-home split reaches its limit

By the mid-2010s, Nintendo was operating both portable and home console lines, each facing challenges. In portable gaming, the 3DS maintained reasonable sales but growth potential was shrinking as smartphone gaming expanded. In home consoles, the Wii U had underperformed due to software delays and inadequate communication of its value proposition.

Nintendo was confronting the reality that the traditional 'portable' versus 'TV' console distinction was diverging from how users actually played. The inability to deliver the same gaming experience across home and on-the-go contexts constrained not only user experience but also hardware development efficiency and software asset utilization, necessitating a fundamental redesign of the business structure.

Decision: Launching the hybrid Nintendo Switch

In March 2017, Nintendo released the 'Nintendo Switch,' a hybrid console. The Switch connected to a dock for TV output and functioned as a portable device when undocked, eliminating the boundary between the previously separate portable and home console lines and consolidating them into a single platform.

The Switch served as the de facto successor to both the 3DS and Wii U, priced at approximately ¥33,000. At launch, Nintendo systematically deployed its strongest first-party titles to demonstrate platform value, adopting a strategy of launching hardware and software as an integrated package.

Result: Hit titles in sequence drive performance recovery

The Switch built market presence rapidly through successive first-party title launches. In 2017 alone, 'The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild,' 'Splatoon 2,' and 'Super Mario Odyssey' were released, driving steady hardware sales. The fiscal year ending March 2018 broke the eight-year revenue decline streak, with revenue increasing substantially year-over-year.

In March 2020, 'Animal Crossing: New Horizons' launched, amplified by stay-at-home demand during the pandemic, driving a massive sales increase. The Switch's cumulative sales continued to grow, and an OLED model was introduced in 2021. The Nintendo Switch became the core product that transformed Nintendo's long stagnation into a recovery phase.

Unifying two hardware lines was the structural answer to the 'after the hit' problem

The essence of the Switch was merging the portable and home console lines into one, eliminating the dispersal of development resources and software assets. Learning from the failure of DS and Wii successors to replicate their predecessors' success, Nintendo designed a structure that would make the 'valley between hits' shallower by unifying the platform. The systematic deployment of Zelda, Mario, and Animal Crossing broke the eight-year revenue decline and drove cumulative sales past 100 million units. It was a transition from 'hit dependency' to 'platform consolidation.'

TimelineNintendo Switch hybrid console launched — Key Events
2017Nintendo Switch hybrid console launched
MSRP32798JPY
4/2017'Mario Kart 8 Deluxe' released for Switch
Units sold (as of Oct 2024)62.9M units
2018'Nintendo Switch Online' service launched
3/2020'Animal Crossing: New Horizons' released for Switch
Units sold (as of Oct 2024)45.85M units
2021Nintendo Switch OLED Model launched
2020
Microsoft discussed acquiring Nintendo
2020

ValueAct Capital discloses stake

ValueAct Capital Management disclosed a stake in Nintendo worth approximately $1.1 billion. The activist investor was expected to push for stronger governance and enhanced corporate value.

2022
3

Nintendo Switch cumulative sales surpass 100 million units

Driven by strong sales of 'Animal Crossing: New Horizons' and other titles, the Nintendo Switch surpassed 100 million cumulative units sold.

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