| Period | Type | Revenue | Profit* | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1972/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1973/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1974/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1975/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1976/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1977/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1978/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1979/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥875B | ¥16B | 1.7% |
| 1980/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥903B | ¥14B | 1.5% |
| 1981/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥8B | 0.7% |
| 1982/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥13B | 1.2% |
| 1983/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥13B | 1.1% |
| 1984/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.2T | ¥6B | 0.4% |
| 1985/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.4T | ¥7B | 0.4% |
| 1986/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.6T | ¥25B | 1.6% |
| 1987/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.6T | ¥14B | 0.9% |
| 1988/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.8T | ¥11B | 0.6% |
| 1989/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1990/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1991/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1992/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.1T | ¥30B | 0.9% |
| 1993/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.2T | ¥26B | 0.8% |
| 1994/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.9T | ¥6B | 0.1% |
| 1995/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.4T | ¥13B | 0.3% |
| 1996/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.5T | ¥13B | 0.3% |
| 1997/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.7T | ¥12B | 0.3% |
| 1998/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.7T | -¥102B | -2.8% |
| 1999/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.5T | ¥6B | 0.1% |
| 2000/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.3T | -¥23B | -0.7% |
| 2001/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.3T | -¥278B | -8.5% |
| 2002/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.2T | ¥11B | 0.3% |
| 2003/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.9T | ¥37B | 0.9% |
| 2004/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.5T | -¥215B | -8.6% |
| 2005/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.1T | -¥475B | -22.4% |
| 2006/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.1T | -¥92B | -4.4% |
| 2007/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.2T | ¥9B | 0.3% |
| 2008/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.7T | ¥35B | 1.2% |
| 2009/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.0T | -¥55B | -2.8% |
| 2010/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.4T | ¥5B | 0.3% |
| 2011/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.8T | ¥16B | 0.8% |
| 2012/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.8T | ¥24B | 1.3% |
| 2013/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.8T | ¥38B | 2.0% |
| 2014/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.1T | ¥105B | 4.9% |
| 2015/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.2T | ¥177B | 8.1% |
| 2016/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.3T | ¥198B | 8.7% |
| 2017/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.9T | -¥46B | -2.5% |
| 2018/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.2T | ¥120B | 5.4% |
| 2019/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.5T | ¥146B | 5.8% |
| 2020/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.3T | -¥26B | -1.2% |
| 2021/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.5T | -¥312B | -21.5% |
| 2022/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.0T | ¥74B | 3.6% |
| 2023/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.5T | ¥169B | 6.8% |
| 2024/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.8T | ¥155B | 5.5% |
The 'U.S. Distribution Agreement' concluded at the time of Mitsubishi Motors' founding imposed severe constraints: sales limited to two-door vehicles and exclusive distribution in the North American market. While it was rational self-defense on Chrysler's part, it also structurally blocked Mitsubishi Motors' overseas growth. The pattern of management being swayed by the power dynamics with an alliance partner was reproduced in the later relationship with DaimlerChrysler, representing a challenge that runs through Mitsubishi Motors' history and was already embryonic at the time of its founding.
In the late 1960s, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' automotive division handled a wide range of passenger cars, trucks, and buses, but was at a disadvantage in passenger car sales volume compared to Toyota and Nissan. Expanding the automotive business required massive capital investment and sales network development, and operating as a division within Mitsubishi Heavy Industries had limitations in terms of rapid decision-making and raising external capital.
Meanwhile, the major U.S. automaker Chrysler was exploring entry into the Japanese market. In the 1960s, GM of the U.S. had partnered with Isuzu Motors and Ford of the U.S. with Mazda (Toyo Kogyo), making it a priority for Chrysler as well to expand its business through a partnership with a Japanese manufacturer. The interests of both parties aligned, and in May 1969, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Chrysler agreed on a joint venture partnership in the automotive business.
In April 1970, 'Mitsubishi Motors Corporation' was established as a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. In June of the same year, the company received the automotive divisions (Mizushima, Nagoya, Kyoto, and Kawasaki plants) from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and commenced operations. In 1971, Chrysler acquired 15% of Mitsubishi Motors shares, and the management structure was established as a joint venture between Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Chrysler.
In fiscal year 1972, immediately after its founding, domestic sales shares were 6.6% for passenger cars, 11.4% for trucks, and 22.2% for buses, with strengths in large commercial vehicles (34.6% for heavy-duty trucks, 37.3% for large buses). In the passenger car market, the company was far behind Toyota and Nissan, and overseas expansion leveraging the sales network of joint venture partner Chrysler was positioned as the key to growth.
However, the joint venture framework contained serious constraints for Mitsubishi Motors. Under the 'U.S. Distribution Agreement' concluded with Chrysler, Mitsubishi Motors accepted indefinite conditions of 'sales of two-door vehicles only' and 'exclusive distribution by Chrysler' in the U.S. market. Exports of its mainstay four-door compact cars were blocked, and the company was unable to build its own sales network.
For Chrysler, it was a rational contract that used Mitsubishi Motors as a foothold for entering Japan while ensuring the Japanese company would not compete in the North American market. For Mitsubishi Motors, however, it was a constraint described as an 'unequal treaty' that became a barrier to business expansion in North America. This contract continued until its revision in 1981 and was a factor in the deterioration of relations with Chrysler from the outset of the alliance. President Kubo Tomio stated, 'We should abandon alliances that tie us down too much,' and the structural problem of management being constrained by the power dynamics with a joint venture partner would be repeated in the later alliance with DaimlerChrysler.
The 'U.S. Distribution Agreement' concluded at the time of Mitsubishi Motors' founding imposed severe constraints: sales limited to two-door vehicles and exclusive distribution in the North American market. While it was rational self-defense on Chrysler's part, it also structurally blocked Mitsubishi Motors' overseas growth. The pattern of management being swayed by the power dynamics with an alliance partner was reproduced in the later relationship with DaimlerChrysler, representing a challenge that runs through Mitsubishi Motors' history and was already embryonic at the time of its founding.
When I came to this company, the two companies (note: Mitsubishi Motors and Chrysler) were in a state of considerable mutual distrust. The mutual distrust had reached an extreme. After that, we made efforts to capitalize on the merits of the alliance, and at present, the relationship is extremely good in spirit. However, one problem is that Chrysler holds exclusive distribution rights for our products in North America, Africa, Central America, and other regions. They have also become serious about selling, and sales volumes have increased considerably, but...
The thing is, U.S. manufacturers will have no choice but to shift toward smaller cars for energy conservation. Then in the 1980s, Chrysler will naturally put effort into selling its own compact cars, which could impact our car sales in the U.S. market. On this point, we need to revise the contract and somehow find a way to sell our own cars in the United States. (...)
We should abandon alliances that tie us down too much. The environment is constantly changing, so looking 10, 20, 50 years ahead, we should conclude non-exclusive contracts. It would cause problems if I pointed out each instance, but frankly speaking, there are quite a few disadvantageous alliances within the Mitsubishi Group as well. (...)
GM is superior to Chrysler in areas like development. So I think the benefits Isuzu gained from partnering with GM were greater than what we gained from partnering with Chrysler.