Founded in 1942. Starting as Hino Heavy Industries, the company began with diesel engine and truck manufacturing and formed a capital alliance with Toyota Motor. Specializing in heavy-duty trucks and buses, Hino is a commercial vehicle manufacturer expanding local production in Southeast Asia.
1942
Strategic Decision
Hino Heavy Industries established (wholly owned subsidiary of Isuzu)
A spin-off born from contradictions in the subsidy system
1948
Sales division spun off as Hino Diesel Sales Co., Ltd.; exclusive domestic distributorship agreement concluded
1948Sales division spun off as Hino Diesel Sales Co., Ltd.; exclusive domestic distributorship agreement concluded
1949
Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
1949Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
1959
Company name changed to Hino Motors Industries
1959Company name changed to Hino Motors Industries
1961
Compact passenger car 'Contessa' launched
1961Compact passenger car 'Contessa' launched
1966
Business alliance with Toyota Motor; focused on truck manufacturing
1966Business alliance with Toyota Motor; focused on truck manufacturing
1967
Withdrew from passenger cars
1967Withdrew from passenger cars
1968
Dedicated compact passenger car factory established at Hamura Factory
1968Dedicated compact passenger car factory established at Hamura Factory
1974
Secured top domestic market share in heavy-duty trucks
1974Secured top domestic market share in heavy-duty trucks
1975
Local subsidiary for trucks established in the Philippines
1975Local subsidiary for trucks established in the Philippines
1980
Nitta Factory established in Gunma Prefecture
1980Nitta Factory established in Gunma Prefecture
1982
Local subsidiary established in Indonesia
1982Local subsidiary established in Indonesia
1994
Local subsidiary for trucks established in North America
1994Local subsidiary for trucks established in North America
1999
Fell into the red; voluntary retirement program offered
1999Fell into the red; voluntary retirement program offered
2001
Toyota Motor made Hino Motors a subsidiary
2001Toyota Motor made Hino Motors a subsidiary
2003
Focused on global expansion
2003Focused on global expansion
2004
Revenue exceeded one trillion yen driven by emissions regulation-related special demand
2004Revenue exceeded one trillion yen driven by emissions regulation-related special demand
2011
Closure of headquarters factory announced (Hino City)
2011Closure of headquarters factory announced (Hino City)
2011
Koga Factory construction commenced
2011Koga Factory construction commenced
2019
New truck factory commenced construction in Thailand
2019New truck factory commenced construction in Thailand
2022
Strategic Decision
Fell into the red due to inspection fraud
Two decades of inspection fraud and the parent company's 'cessation of management support'
2023
Management integration with Mitsubishi Fuso announced (postponed)
2023Management integration with Mitsubishi Fuso announced (postponed)
2024
Closure of the Anchoso factory in the U.S. announced
2024Closure of the Anchoso factory in the U.S. announced
View Performance
RevenueHino Motors:Revenue
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: ¥100M)
¥1.5T
Revenue:2024/3
ProfitHino Motors:Net Profit Margin
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: %)
1.1%
Margin:2024/3
View Performance
PeriodTypeRevenueProfit*Margin
1961/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1962/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1963/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1964/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1965/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1966/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1967/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥54B¥2B4.1%
1968/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥60B¥2B3.8%
1969/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥73B¥3B3.7%
1970/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥95B¥3B3.2%
1971/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥122B¥3B2.8%
1972/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥121B¥4B2.8%
1973/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥138B¥4B2.8%
1974/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥195B¥4B2.1%
1975/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥232B¥3B1.2%
1976/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥236B¥3B1.2%
1977/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥255B¥3B1.1%
1978/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥296B¥3B1.0%
1979/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥329B¥4B1.2%
1980/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥365B¥5B1.4%
1981/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥389B¥5B1.1%
1982/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥420B¥6B1.3%
1983/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥396B¥5B1.1%
1984/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥393B¥4B1.0%
1985/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥444B¥4B0.9%
1986/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1987/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1988/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1989/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1990/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1991/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1992/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1993/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1994/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1995/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥651B¥5B0.8%
1996/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥597B¥11B1.7%
1997/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥633B¥7B1.1%
1998/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥589B¥2B0.2%
1999/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥432B-¥37B-8.5%
2000/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥653B-¥22B-3.4%
2001/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥704B-¥13B-1.9%
2002/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income---
2003/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥850B¥5B0.5%
2004/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.1T¥34B3.2%
2005/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.1T¥18B1.5%
2006/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.2T¥29B2.3%
2007/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.3T¥20B1.5%
2008/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.4T¥22B1.6%
2009/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.1T-¥62B-5.8%
2010/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.0T-¥3B-0.3%
2011/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.2T-¥10B-0.9%
2012/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.3T¥16B1.2%
2013/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.5T¥48B3.0%
2014/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.7T¥89B5.2%
2015/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.7T¥75B4.4%
2016/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.7T¥65B3.7%
2017/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.7T¥49B2.9%
2018/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.8T¥51B2.7%
2019/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥2.0T¥55B2.7%
2020/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.8T¥31B1.7%
2021/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.5T-¥7B-0.5%
2022/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.5T-¥85B-5.9%
2023/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.5T-¥118B-7.9%
2024/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.5T¥17B1.1%
Disclaimer
Japan Corporate History & Strategy uses Google Analytics, provided by Google LLC, to improve quality. Information held by visitors (IP address, visited URL, referrer URL, visit timestamp, and device information) is transmitted to Google LLC. This website is compiled from publicly available information by an individual developer and represents personal views. We do not guarantee accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. The developer assumes no liability for any damages arising from the use of information on this website.
1942
4

Hino Heavy Industries established (wholly owned subsidiary of Isuzu)

A spin-off born from contradictions in the subsidy system

The establishment of Hino Heavy Industries was directly triggered by the coexistence of subsidy systems from two government bodies: the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Army. While Tokyo Automobile Industries received subsidies under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Automobile Manufacturing Business Act, the Hino Manufacturing Works needed to be covered by the Military Vehicle Protection Act administered by the Army. Spin-off was chosen to resolve the institutional contradiction, and as a result, the company was established as a government-affiliated enterprise with the Wartime Finance Corporation holding 80% of shares.

BackgroundMerger under the Automobile Manufacturing Business Act and establishment of a military factory in Hino City

In 1936, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry enacted the Automobile Manufacturing Business Act, establishing a policy of granting subsidies to companies with annual manufacturing capacity of 3,000 units or more. Tokyo Gas Electric Industry could not independently meet this production scale requirement and merged in 1937 with Automobile Industries Co. (now Isuzu Motors), which also had factories in the Tokyo metropolitan area, to form Tokyo Automobile Industries. By integrating the production capacities of both companies through the merger, the conditions for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's subsidy policy were met. It was an era when securing scale through corporate mergers was required within the framework of national automobile industry development policy.

In September 1938, Tokyo Automobile Industries secured a 200,000-tsubo factory site in Hino City, Tokyo, for the mass production of tanks and armored vehicles, and decided to establish the Hino Manufacturing Works. The geographic proximity to the Army's Sagami Arsenal was considered in site selection. The Hino Manufacturing Works began operations in 1941, functioning as a production base for special vehicles for the Army. Workforce expansion proceeded, and by the end of the war, approximately 7,000 people, including student mobilization workers, were employed at the facility.

DecisionSpin-off to resolve the contradiction between Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Army subsidy systems

In operating the Hino Manufacturing Works, the coexistence of subsidy systems from two government bodies—the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Army—became problematic. While Tokyo Automobile Industries received subsidies under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Automobile Manufacturing Business Act, the Hino Manufacturing Works was a mass-production base for Army vehicles and would have been better served under the Military Vehicle Protection Act administered by the Army. However, a single legal entity receiving subsidies from both systems simultaneously created institutional contradictions, leading to the decision to separate the Hino Manufacturing Works from Tokyo Automobile Industries as an independent entity.

In April 1942, Hino Heavy Industries was established by spinning off the Hino Manufacturing Works from Tokyo Automobile Industries. At the time of establishment, it was a 100% subsidiary of Tokyo Automobile Industries, but the parent company soon indicated its intention to sell its shares, and the Wartime Finance Corporation, a government agency, acquired 80% of the shares. As a result, Hino Heavy Industries was operated not as a private enterprise but as a government-affiliated company in terms of capital. This government-led capital structure was maintained until the company's stock listing in 1949.

ResultDismissal of all employees at war's end and transition to a commercial vehicle manufacturer with a 300-person workforce

With the end of the war in August 1945, tank manufacturing—the core business of Hino Heavy Industries—came to a complete halt. Having lost the foundation for its existence, Hino Heavy Industries decided to dissolve the company in September of the same year and issued termination notices to all approximately 7,000 employees. Of these, 1,500 had been with the company since the predecessor Tokyo Gas Electric Industry era, and job placement assistance and severance pay were provided. Hino Heavy Industries, which had been established as a military factory, was forced to completely cease operations just over three years after its founding.

One month after the company's dissolution, in October 1945, the company was reestablished as Hino Industries with a workforce of 300 employees who wished to remain, aiming to transition to peaceful industries. In March 1946, the company name was changed to Hino Sangyo, and in August of the same year, the large trailer truck 'T10/20' was developed. By converting the diesel engine and vehicle body production technology accumulated through tank manufacturing to truck production, the direction of the business transformation from a military manufacturer to a commercial vehicle manufacturer was established.

A spin-off born from contradictions in the subsidy system

The establishment of Hino Heavy Industries was directly triggered by the coexistence of subsidy systems from two government bodies: the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Army. While Tokyo Automobile Industries received subsidies under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Automobile Manufacturing Business Act, the Hino Manufacturing Works needed to be covered by the Military Vehicle Protection Act administered by the Army. Spin-off was chosen to resolve the institutional contradiction, and as a result, the company was established as a government-affiliated enterprise with the Wartime Finance Corporation holding 80% of shares.

Testimony40-Year History of Hino Motors

The establishment of the 'Hino Manufacturing Works' carried two major purposes. One was to respond to the rapidly increasing military demand as the clouds of war thickened, and the other was to receive designation under the Automobile Manufacturing Business Act promoted by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, thereby furthering the development and expansion of Tokyo Automobile Industries. As mentioned earlier, to receive the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's designation and obtain subsidy support, it was necessary to be supported by the Military Vehicle Act supervised by the Army, or to be manufacturing military vehicles.

After deliberating on how to address this, Matsukata and others devised a strategy: consolidate the military vehicle factories, and then eventually separate and establish them independently to receive the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's subsidies. In other words, this 'Hino Manufacturing Works,' newly established as a specialized factory for Army special vehicles, was destined from the outset to eventually be separated from Tokyo Automobile Industries.

TimelineHino Heavy Industries established (wholly owned subsidiary of Isuzu) — Key Events
4/1942Hino Heavy Industries established (succeeding the Hino Manufacturing Works of what is now Isuzu Motors)
9/1945Hino Heavy Industries dissolved; reestablished the following month
3/1946Company name changed to Hino Sangyo Co., Ltd.
12/1948Company name changed to Hino Diesel Industries
11/1955Invested in Teikoku Automobile Industries
1948
Sales division spun off as Hino Diesel Sales Co., Ltd.; exclusive domestic distributorship agreement concluded
1949
Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
1959
Company name changed to Hino Motors Industries
1961
Compact passenger car 'Contessa' launched
1966
Business alliance with Toyota Motor; focused on truck manufacturing
1967
Withdrew from passenger cars
1968
Dedicated compact passenger car factory established at Hamura Factory
1974
Secured top domestic market share in heavy-duty trucks
1975
Local subsidiary for trucks established in the Philippines
1980
Nitta Factory established in Gunma Prefecture
1982
Local subsidiary established in Indonesia
1994
Local subsidiary for trucks established in North America
1999
Fell into the red; voluntary retirement program offered
2001
Toyota Motor made Hino Motors a subsidiary
2003
Focused on global expansion
2011
Closure of headquarters factory announced (Hino City)
2011
Koga Factory construction commenced
2019
New truck factory commenced construction in Thailand
2022
3

Fell into the red due to inspection fraud

Two decades of inspection fraud and the parent company's 'cessation of management support'

The fact that fraud continued for two decades indicates the hollowing out of the internal quality control system and the structural organizational problems that failed to detect the fraud. Particularly noteworthy is that the parent company Toyota Motor clearly decided to cease management support, demonstrating that when trust within a group breaks down, a parent company will abandon responsibility for a subsidiary's survival. This is a case where, in response to a subsidiary's scandal, the parent company chose separation rather than continued support.

BackgroundTwo decades of engine certification fraud and discovery in North America

Starting in 2003, Hino Motors began engaging in fraudulent practices in engine certification applications for commercial vehicles. Certification testing is a procedure to prove to national agencies that vehicles meet emissions and fuel efficiency standards, and the application data was intentionally manipulated. The fraud continued internally for approximately two decades but was concealed without being exposed externally for an extended period. In 2020, fraudulent engine certification applications were identified in North America, bringing the issue to light for the first time.

Following the discovery in North America, engine certification fraud was also confirmed in the domestic market in March 2022. The fraud involved falsification of emissions and fuel efficiency data and affected a wide range of commercial vehicle models manufactured by Hino Motors. As the scope of the fraud expanded, trust in Hino Motors' quality control system was severely shaken, with effects including administrative sanctions from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and loss of credibility among business partners.

DecisionShipment suspensions and certification losses eroded the company's management foundation

Following confirmation of the fraud, Hino Motors decided on global shipment suspensions and recalls of affected models. From FY2020 through FY2022, 'certification losses' were recorded as extraordinary losses, resulting in three consecutive years of net losses. The cumulative certification losses reached a massive amount, damaging Hino Motors' financial foundation. The decline in revenue from shipment suspensions combined with rising costs from recall responses and damages, pushing the company into a situation where continuation of business operations itself became difficult.

Toyota Motor, the parent company, decided to cease management support for Hino Motors following the revelation of certification fraud. Although Hino Motors had been positioned to carry the Toyota Group's commercial vehicle business, the certification fraud destroyed the foundation of trust. With the parent company's support cut off, Hino Motors was placed in a situation where standalone survival was difficult, transitioning into a phase of exploring management integration or merger with other commercial vehicle manufacturers.

Two decades of inspection fraud and the parent company's 'cessation of management support'

The fact that fraud continued for two decades indicates the hollowing out of the internal quality control system and the structural organizational problems that failed to detect the fraud. Particularly noteworthy is that the parent company Toyota Motor clearly decided to cease management support, demonstrating that when trust within a group breaks down, a parent company will abandon responsibility for a subsidiary's survival. This is a case where, in response to a subsidiary's scandal, the parent company chose separation rather than continued support.

TimelineFell into the red due to inspection fraud — Key Events
2003Fraudulent engine certification applications commenced
2020Fraudulent engine certification applications confirmed in North America
3/2022Fraudulent engine certification applications confirmed domestically
3/2021Certification losses recorded as extraordinary losses
Extraordinary loss (certification losses)-145100M JPY
3/2022Certification losses recorded as extraordinary losses
Extraordinary loss (certification losses)-673100M JPY
3/2022Certification losses recorded as extraordinary losses
Extraordinary loss (certification losses)-911100M JPY
2023
Management integration with Mitsubishi Fuso announced (postponed)
2024
Closure of the Anchoso factory in the U.S. announced
Back to Home