| Period | Type | Revenue | Profit* | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1950/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1951/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1952/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1953/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1954/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1955/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥8B | ¥0B | 4.8% |
| 1956/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥10B | ¥0B | 3.9% |
| 1957/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥16B | ¥1B | 3.7% |
| 1958/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥23B | ¥1B | 6.0% |
| 1959/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥27B | ¥2B | 8.4% |
| 1960/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥31B | ¥3B | 9.0% |
| 1961/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥44B | ¥3B | 7.3% |
| 1962/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥57B | ¥4B | 6.3% |
| 1963/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥74B | ¥4B | 5.5% |
| 1964/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥91B | ¥4B | 4.3% |
| 1965/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥113B | ¥3B | 2.9% |
| 1966/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥137B | ¥3B | 2.0% |
| 1967/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥174B | ¥3B | 1.6% |
| 1968/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥222B | ¥3B | 1.4% |
| 1969/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥281B | ¥4B | 1.5% |
| 1970/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥337B | ¥7B | 2.0% |
| 1971/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥373B | ¥9B | 2.3% |
| 1972/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥403B | ¥5B | 1.1% |
| 1973/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥435B | ¥5B | 1.0% |
| 1974/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥480B | ¥8B | 1.7% |
| 1975/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥633B | ¥7B | 1.0% |
| 1976/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥625B | ¥9B | 1.5% |
| 1977/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥696B | ¥12B | 1.6% |
| 1978/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥763B | ¥6B | 0.7% |
| 1979/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥698B | ¥2B | 0.2% |
| 1980/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥691B | ¥4B | 0.5% |
| 1981/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥681B | ¥6B | 0.8% |
| 1982/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥778B | ¥10B | 1.2% |
| 1983/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥789B | ¥11B | 1.4% |
| 1984/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥911B | ¥11B | 1.1% |
| 1985/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥802B | ¥9B | 1.0% |
| 1986/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1987/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥769B | -¥21B | -2.8% |
| 1988/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥715B | ¥2B | 0.2% |
| 1989/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥615B | ¥11B | 1.7% |
| 1990/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1991/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1992/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥25B | 2.3% |
| 1993/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.0T | ¥18B | 1.7% |
| 1994/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥12B | 1.0% |
| 1995/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.0T | ¥14B | 1.3% |
| 1996/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥20B | 1.7% |
| 1997/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥14B | 1.2% |
| 1998/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥16B | 1.4% |
| 1999/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥6B | 0.5% |
| 2000/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥995B | -¥79B | -8.0% |
| 2001/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥9B | 0.8% |
| 2002/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥6B | 0.5% |
| 2003/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.0T | -¥10B | -1.0% |
| 2004/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.0T | -¥38B | -3.7% |
| 2005/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥2B | 0.1% |
| 2006/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥4B | 0.3% |
| 2007/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.2T | -¥5B | -0.4% |
| 2008/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.4T | ¥25B | 1.8% |
| 2009/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.4T | -¥7B | -0.6% |
| 2010/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.2T | ¥17B | 1.3% |
| 2011/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.2T | ¥30B | 2.5% |
| 2012/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.2T | ¥24B | 1.9% |
| 2013/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.3T | ¥33B | 2.6% |
| 2014/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.3T | ¥33B | 2.5% |
| 2015/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.5T | ¥9B | 0.6% |
| 2016/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.5T | ¥2B | 0.0% |
| 2017/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.5T | ¥5B | 0.3% |
| 2018/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.6T | ¥8B | 0.5% |
| 2019/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.5T | ¥40B | 2.6% |
| 2020/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.3T | ¥8B | 0.6% |
| 2021/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥13B | 1.1% |
| 2022/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.2T | ¥66B | 5.6% |
| 2023/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.4T | ¥45B | 3.2% |
| 2024/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.3T | -¥68B | -5.2% |
Among Japan's heavy industry manufacturers, IHI stands out for having completed a clean exit from shipbuilding — its founding business. While Mitsubishi Heavy Industries suffered massive losses on cruise ship projects and Kawasaki Heavy Industries experienced internal turmoil over shipbuilding division separation, IHI progressively reduced its shipbuilding exposure through a series of structured steps: spinning off the marine division, merging it with Sumitomo Heavy Industries' shipbuilding operations to form IHI Marine United, and ultimately integrating it into Japan Marine United with only a 30% minority stake. By 2013, IHI had effectively exited shipbuilding without a traumatic write-off or internal power struggle.
The key to understanding why IHI could execute this withdrawal lies in its revenue composition. By the time of the 1960 merger with Harima Shipbuilding, Ishikawajima's land-based business (machinery, engines, turbines) already accounted for approximately 80% of revenue. Shipbuilding was never the dominant profit center — it was structurally a minority business within a diversified portfolio. This meant that the shipbuilding division lacked the organizational weight to resist its own separation. When President Toshio Doko merged with Harima in 1960, the stated rationale was acquiring Harima's large docks, but the underlying structure was that IHI was absorbing a shipbuilder into a land-based machinery company, not the reverse.
This revenue structure created a decisive advantage when the time came to withdraw. In companies where shipbuilding represents the founding identity and a major revenue share — such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, where the Nagasaki Shipyard symbolizes the company's origin — separating the shipbuilding division triggers organizational resistance rooted in identity, not just economics. At IHI, shipbuilding had already been organizationally marginalized by its revenue share long before the formal separation occurred. The withdrawal was a confirmation of existing reality, not a painful restructuring.
Furthermore, IHI's Toyosu shipyard closure in 2001 was converted into one of the company's most profitable decisions through real estate redevelopment. The former shipyard site in Toyosu, Tokyo — which had become prime real estate after the Yurakucho subway line extension — was redeveloped into office buildings and residential towers, generating 12.3 billion yen in operating profit in FY2008 alone. The fact that exiting shipbuilding could be reframed as unlocking real estate value made the decision palatable to all stakeholders.
IHI's successful withdrawal from shipbuilding was not primarily a matter of superior management judgment. It was enabled by a structural condition — the founding business had already become a minority of the portfolio — that made exit organizationally feasible. This case illustrates a broader principle: companies can most cleanly exit businesses that have already been economically marginalized within the organization, before emotional attachment and identity politics make withdrawal impossible.
IHI's current strategy is heavily concentrated on aero engines. The company manufactures components for major commercial engine programs including GE's GE90 and GEnx, Pratt & Whitney's PW1100G (geared turbofan for the A320neo), and Rolls-Royce's Trent series, while also producing the F110 engine for Japan's F-15J fighters. Aero engines now represent IHI's most strategically important business, receiving the lion's share of capital investment including the 24.5 billion yen Tsurugashima factory for engine maintenance.
However, IHI's concentration on aero engines was not the result of a proactive strategic vision. It was the outcome of a process of elimination. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, IHI systematically lost or exited its other major businesses. Shipbuilding was spun off and eventually reduced to a minority stake. The automobile business had been separated as Isuzu Motors decades earlier. The aircraft manufacturing division had been separated as Tachikawa Aircraft in 1929. Construction equipment was divested. Small engines were sold to Caterpillar. Plant engineering was carved out into subsidiaries. One by one, the businesses that could have been alternative strategic pillars were removed from the portfolio.
What remained was aero engines — a business IHI had entered in 1957 with the establishment of the Tanashi factory for jet engine manufacturing. Unlike shipbuilding, which faced structural decline from Korean and Chinese competition, or construction equipment, which required massive scale to compete globally, aero engines operated in a market with extraordinarily high entry barriers. The technology is complex, certification requirements are stringent, and customer relationships with airframe manufacturers and airlines span decades. Once established as a qualified supplier, the recurring revenue from maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) creates a self-reinforcing revenue stream.
IHI's concentration on aero engines thus reflects a structural logic: it was the only remaining business with both defensible competitive positioning and long-term growth potential. The company's investment in the Tsurugashima MRO facility, the Soma factory expansion, and the acquisition of Nissan's aerospace division in 2000 were all moves to deepen commitment to the one business where IHI had a durable competitive advantage.
Yet this concentration also carries risk. When additional inspections were required for aero engine components in FY2021, IHI recorded a net loss of 68.2 billion yen — demonstrating how single-business dependence amplifies the impact of quality issues. IHI's aero engine strategy is a case where concentration was not chosen from a position of strength but arrived at through the exhaustion of alternatives. The question going forward is whether a company that concentrated by elimination can sustain the investment intensity and risk tolerance that a deliberate concentrator would bring.
The history of the Ishikawajima Shipyard can be understood as a process of organizational evolution from a shogunate-run government shipyard through sole proprietorship to a joint-stock company. The turning point was Eiichi Shibusawa's participation in management, which secured the enormous capital — difficult to raise under sole proprietorship — through financing from Dai-Ichi Bank, enabling facility expansion. The approach of meeting the heavy capital requirements of shipbuilding through a corporate structure centered on bank financing became a model case of industrial modernization in the Meiji era.
Following Commodore Perry's arrival in June 1853, the Tokugawa shogunate decided to build large vessels and lifted the 218-year-old 'ban on large ship construction.' The pro-exclusionist Mito domain, commissioned by the shogunate, established Japan's first Western-style shipyard on Ishikawajima (Tsukuda district) at the mouth of the Sumida River in 1853. Construction of the Western-style vessel 'Asahi Maru' began in April 1854, and after extensive study of Western ships, the vessel was launched in March 1856 and delivered to the shogunate in November of the same year.
After the Meiji government was established, the shogunate-operated Ishikawajima shipyard was confiscated as a government facility. However, when the Meiji government decided in 1880 to dispose of unprofitable government-owned factories, the Ishikawajima Shipyard became a candidate for sale. The acquirer was Tomiji Hirano. Born into a retainer family, Hirano had worked in ship-related operations at the Nagasaki Magistrate's Office, and the Meiji government, trusting his capabilities, approved the transfer.
Under Hirano's management, the shipyard operated, but shipbuilding was an industry requiring enormous capital for material procurement and equipment investment, and the limits of sole proprietorship in terms of capital capacity became apparent. Hirano therefore sought management support through financing from the prominent businessman Eiichi Shibusawa, and in 1889 carried out an organizational restructuring to establish the 'Limited Liability Ishikawajima Shipyard.' Shibusawa's participation enabled the transition from sole proprietorship to a modern corporate organization.
In 1890, following the enactment of the Commercial Code, the company was reorganized as the joint-stock company 'Tokyo Ishikawajima Shipyard,' with Eiichi Shibusawa appointed as the first chairman. A financing structure was established through Dai-Ichi Bank (later Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank), which Shibusawa had founded, and the company was developed as a shipbuilder through equipment investment leveraging bank capital.
With Shibusawa's capital reinforcement and bank financing in place, the Ishikawajima Shipyard undertook full-scale facility expansion. By 1909, the head office factory (Tokyo First Factory, Tsukuda) had progressively acquired and expanded its land, securing a site area of 30,000 tsubo.
The process of evolving organizational form — from government shipyard sale, through sole proprietorship, to joint-stock company — was a typical example of shipbuilding industry modernization in the Meiji era. By bringing in Eiichi Shibusawa, a titan of the business world, the capital foundation was established that would later support diversification into aero engines and turbochargers.
The history of the Ishikawajima Shipyard can be understood as a process of organizational evolution from a shogunate-run government shipyard through sole proprietorship to a joint-stock company. The turning point was Eiichi Shibusawa's participation in management, which secured the enormous capital — difficult to raise under sole proprietorship — through financing from Dai-Ichi Bank, enabling facility expansion. The approach of meeting the heavy capital requirements of shipbuilding through a corporate structure centered on bank financing became a model case of industrial modernization in the Meiji era.
The Ishikawajima-Harima merger was made possible by the mutual complementarity of each company's challenges. Ishikawajima lacked the docks needed for large vessel construction, while Harima could not escape its shipbuilding-dependent business structure. The arrangement — Ishikawajima gaining Harima's large docks while Harima gained Ishikawajima's land-based divisions — was essentially an exchange of facilities and business portfolio. President Toshio Doko's thoroughness in spending six months investigating Harima's actual condition also contributed to the merger's success.
Throughout the 1950s, oil transportation from Middle Eastern producing countries expanded, and demand for large tanker construction surged. Competitors including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and Hitachi Zosen built new large docks to handle 50,000-GT class vessels. However, Ishikawajima Heavy Industries' main Tokyo factory (Second Factory) was located at the mouth of the Sumida River, making dock expansion difficult, with 22,000-GT class being the maximum buildable size.
Meanwhile, Harima Shipbuilding was the industry's third-largest shipbuilder, but with the vast majority of its revenue from shipbuilding, it was heavily impacted by the shipbuilding recession from 1958 onward. Its land-based division (machinery) had lagged in development, leaving the company vulnerable to fluctuations in shipbuilding demand. Both companies faced different challenges but had maintained a friendly relationship through mutual supply of turbine engines and diesel engines.
In July 1960, Ishikawajima president Toshio Doko and Harima president Shuzo Mutsuoka reached a basic agreement on merger. On December 1 of the same year, the merger was executed with Ishikawajima as the surviving entity, establishing 'Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries.' Post-merger headcount was approximately 15,000 (Ishikawajima approximately 9,000 + Harima approximately 6,000), securing the second-largest construction volume in the shipbuilding industry after Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.
For Ishikawajima, acquiring Harima's large docks enabled 40,000-GT class vessel construction, providing the foundation to compete in the vessel upsizing race. For Harima, merging with Ishikawajima — where 70% of revenue came from land-based divisions — achieved business diversification and the management stability benefit of being able to redeploy personnel to land-based divisions during shipbuilding downturns.
The Ishikawajima-Harima merger was made possible by the mutual complementarity of each company's challenges. Ishikawajima lacked the docks needed for large vessel construction, while Harima could not escape its shipbuilding-dependent business structure. The arrangement — Ishikawajima gaining Harima's large docks while Harima gained Ishikawajima's land-based divisions — was essentially an exchange of facilities and business portfolio. President Toshio Doko's thoroughness in spending six months investigating Harima's actual condition also contributed to the merger's success.
At the time, Ishikawajima's shipbuilding facilities were limited to a mere 30,000-ton class, compared to Mitsubishi and Hitachi which had 80,000-ton and 50,000-ton class facilities. From the late 1950s, I had judged that energy would eventually shift from coal to oil and that tanker demand would rise. So we entered tanker construction, but I foresaw that eventually ships of 100,000 tons or more would become essential. However, Ishikawajima was located at the mouth of the Sumida River, and due to site conditions, we simply could not build facilities for large tankers. We had no choice but to seek suitable land elsewhere.
Meanwhile, Harima Shipbuilding, while ranked third as a shipbuilder, had been hit by a prolonged shipbuilding recession from 1958 onward. Over the two years from 1958 to 1960, order backlog fell to two-thirds and revenue halved. For Harima, with its 90% shipbuilding ratio, this recession was particularly devastating, and they were separately pursuing expansion into land-based divisions.
Ishikawajima's land-based division ratio was 80%. In other words, both companies were searching for complementary elements. On top of that, Ishikawajima and Harima had long maintained a friendly relationship, with Ishikawajima supplying turbine engines and Harima supplying diesel engines to each other.
Given this relationship, one day over dinner with President Mutsuoka, our respective concerns came up by chance in conversation. When I learned of President Mutsuoka's intention to expand into land-based divisions, I secretly had Harima's actual condition investigated over six months.
The shipbuilding integration between Ishikawajima-Harima and Kawasaki Heavy Industries was motivated by the rational need to address declining competitiveness under a strong yen, yet was scrapped just five months after the basic agreement. While the reasons were not disclosed, Kawasaki Heavy Industries later experienced presidential dismissal over shipbuilding division separation, indicating that shipbuilding integration and separation was a topic that provoked strong internal resistance. This case demonstrates how management rationality and internal consensus-building can diverge.
Throughout the 1990s, the sustained strong yen significantly eroded the international competitiveness of Japan's labor-intensive domestic shipbuilding industry. Korean and Chinese shipbuilders, benefiting from relatively favorable exchange rates, rapidly gained ground, putting Japanese shipbuilders at a disadvantage in price competition. As momentum for restructuring to address the domestic shipbuilding industry's structural challenges grew, business integration among major manufacturers began to be explored.
In September 2000, three major companies — Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding — signed a shipbuilding business partnership agreement, deepening their cooperation. Building on this partnership, on April 3, 2001, Ishikawajima-Harima and Kawasaki Heavy Industries signed a 'Basic Agreement on Integration of Marine and Shipbuilding Operations,' announcing plans to integrate both companies' marine businesses into a 50-50 joint venture by October 2002.
However, on September 19, 2001, Ishikawajima-Harima announced the cancellation of the basic agreement on shipbuilding integration with Kawasaki Heavy Industries. The reasons for cancellation were not disclosed, but at Kawasaki Heavy Industries in 2013, internal conflict — including the dismissal of the president — erupted over the separation of the shipbuilding division, suggesting that internal consensus-building at Kawasaki may have also stalled at this earlier stage.
Following the collapse of the integration plan, Ishikawajima-Harima sought an alternative integration partner for its marine business and began integration negotiations with Sumitomo Heavy Industries. This pivot led to the establishment of IHI Marine United in October 2002, and ultimately to the launch of Japan Marine United, advancing the restructuring of the domestic shipbuilding industry.
The shipbuilding integration between Ishikawajima-Harima and Kawasaki Heavy Industries was motivated by the rational need to address declining competitiveness under a strong yen, yet was scrapped just five months after the basic agreement. While the reasons were not disclosed, Kawasaki Heavy Industries later experienced presidential dismissal over shipbuilding division separation, indicating that shipbuilding integration and separation was a topic that provoked strong internal resistance. This case demonstrates how management rationality and internal consensus-building can diverge.
In October 2002, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries decided to integrate its marine business with Sumitomo Heavy Industries. The shipbuilding business was transferred to and consolidated in 'IHI Marine United (MU),' which had been established in 1995 as a 50-50 joint venture between Ishikawajima-Harima and Sumitomo Heavy Industries for Defense Agency naval vessel contracts.
At the time of IHI Marine United's launch, the ownership ratio was 95.4% for Ishikawajima-Harima versus 4.6% for Sumitomo Heavy Industries, giving IHI controlling interest.
IHI's Toyosu redevelopment was a case of converting idle assets from shipbuilding contraction into a highly profitable real estate business. Leveraging the prime location created by the Yurakucho Line extension — which made the site station-front real estate — IHI led the redevelopment itself. Through condominium sales and office leasing, the company posted 12.3 billion yen in operating profit in FY2008. The fact that a heavy industry manufacturer generated significant real estate earnings is unusual and noteworthy as a successful example of business conversion from shipbuilding.
In September 2000, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries held the final launch ceremony at its Tokyo First Factory (Toyosu, Koto-ku) for the destroyer 'Akebono.' Having fulfilled its role as a shipyard, the Tokyo First Factory was closed in April 2001. The factory had been acquiring land and operating since 1939, functioning as an Ishikawajima shipbuilding base for approximately 60 years.
When the Tokyo Metro Yurakucho Line extended to Toyosu Station in 1988, the Tokyo First Factory site became prime real estate in front of the station. Toyosu is just six minutes from Ginza-itchome on the Yurakucho Line, giving the large-scale site high real estate value with excellent access to central Tokyo. As the structural contraction of shipbuilding progressed, momentum grew to convert this location to non-shipbuilding uses.
IHI decided to redevelop the Tokyo First Factory site into office buildings, commercial facilities, a university, and condominiums. While some parcels were sold, IHI led the overall redevelopment. By 2006, several facilities including the Toyosu IHI Building were completed, securing stable real estate rental income.
Furthermore, by 2008, IHI and Mitsui Fudosan jointly completed 'Park City Toyosu,' a condominium development with 1,476 units. In FY2008 (March), IHI recorded real estate business revenue of 40.7 billion yen and operating profit of 12.3 billion yen. Converting the former shipyard site into a highly profitable real estate business secured an unusual source of real estate earnings for a heavy industry manufacturer, forming one component of a business portfolio that could offset fluctuations in the core business.
IHI's Toyosu redevelopment was a case of converting idle assets from shipbuilding contraction into a highly profitable real estate business. Leveraging the prime location created by the Yurakucho Line extension — which made the site station-front real estate — IHI led the redevelopment itself. Through condominium sales and office leasing, the company posted 12.3 billion yen in operating profit in FY2008. The fact that a heavy industry manufacturer generated significant real estate earnings is unusual and noteworthy as a successful example of business conversion from shipbuilding.
Decided to acquire the prime mover business (diesel engines, gas turbines, etc.) from Niigata Engineering Co., Ltd., which had filed for corporate reorganization.