| Period | Type | Revenue | Profit* | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1950/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1951/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1952/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1953/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1954/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1955/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1956/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1957/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1958/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1959/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1960/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1961/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1962/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1963/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1964/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1965/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1966/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1967/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1968/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1969/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1970/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1971/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1972/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1973/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1974/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1975/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1976/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.1T | ¥15B | 1.3% |
| 1977/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.2T | ¥18B | 1.4% |
| 1978/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.4T | ¥15B | 1.0% |
| 1979/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.3T | ¥10B | 0.7% |
| 1980/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.3T | ¥12B | 0.8% |
| 1981/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.3T | ¥12B | 0.9% |
| 1982/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.7T | ¥13B | 0.7% |
| 1983/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.6T | ¥13B | 0.7% |
| 1984/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥1.9T | ¥27B | 1.4% |
| 1985/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.0T | ¥36B | 1.7% |
| 1986/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1987/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1988/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1989/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1990/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1991/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1992/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.8T | ¥106B | 3.7% |
| 1993/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.8T | ¥81B | 2.8% |
| 1994/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.8T | ¥80B | 2.8% |
| 1995/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.8T | ¥78B | 2.7% |
| 1996/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.0T | ¥104B | 3.4% |
| 1997/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.1T | ¥124B | 3.9% |
| 1998/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.1T | ¥61B | 1.9% |
| 1999/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.9T | ¥18B | 0.6% |
| 2000/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.9T | -¥137B | -4.8% |
| 2001/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.0T | -¥20B | -0.7% |
| 2002/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.9T | ¥26B | 0.9% |
| 2003/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.6T | ¥34B | 1.3% |
| 2004/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.4T | ¥22B | 0.9% |
| 2005/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.6T | ¥4B | 0.1% |
| 2006/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.8T | ¥30B | 1.0% |
| 2007/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.1T | ¥49B | 1.5% |
| 2008/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.2T | ¥61B | 1.9% |
| 2009/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.4T | ¥24B | 0.7% |
| 2010/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.9T | ¥14B | 0.4% |
| 2011/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.9T | ¥30B | 1.0% |
| 2012/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.8T | ¥25B | 0.8% |
| 2013/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥2.8T | ¥97B | 3.4% |
| 2014/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.3T | ¥160B | 4.7% |
| 2015/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.0T | ¥110B | 2.7% |
| 2016/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.0T | ¥64B | 1.5% |
| 2017/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.9T | ¥88B | 2.2% |
| 2018/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.1T | -¥7B | -0.2% |
| 2019/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.1T | ¥101B | 2.4% |
| 2020/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.0T | ¥87B | 2.1% |
| 2021/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.7T | ¥41B | 1.0% |
| 2022/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥3.9T | ¥114B | 2.9% |
| 2023/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.2T | ¥130B | 3.1% |
| 2024/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥4.7T | ¥222B | 4.7% |
MHI's history reveals a recurring pattern of delayed withdrawal decisions. The MU-300 business jet, whose development began in 1975, continued for a decade despite poor sales performance in the U.S. market before the company finally withdrew in 1985. Two large cruise ships ordered in 2011 incurred an estimated 250 billion yen in losses due to cascading design changes and project management breakdown. Mitsubishi Aircraft's SpaceJet (formerly MRJ), established in 2008, suffered six schedule postponements for type certification, accumulated losses on the order of 1 trillion yen, and was cancelled in 2023.
What these ventures share is that in each case, the conviction that 'we should be able to complete this technically' delayed the decision to withdraw. Through manufacturing the battleship Musashi and Zero Fighter, and postwar licensed production of the F-86F, MHI accumulated a track record of completing large-scale, complex products. This track record has taken root as an organizational belief that 'if we see it through to the end, we can complete it,' creating a structure where withdrawal rarely reaches the decision-making table.
However, being able to complete something technically and making it viable as a business are different problems. The MU-300 obtained its type certificate — a technical success — but could not overcome the entry barriers of building a sales network and after-sales service in the civil aviation market. The cruise ships were completed, but there was insufficient recognition that managing customer change requests and schedule control required a fundamentally different project management approach from warships or power plants. The SpaceJet airframe itself flew successfully, but a lack of practical experience with FAA type certification processes became the fundamental bottleneck.
In other words, the structural factor behind MHI's delayed withdrawals is its pride in its own technical capability. 'Can we build it?' and 'Can we sell it, get it certified, and make it profitable?' are different questions, yet confidence in the former postpones verification of the latter. In the defense and energy domains, the customers are the government and power utilities, specifications are defined, and market risk is limited — so this tendency remains latent. But the moment MHI enters a civilian market, market risk, certification risk, and customer management risk are added, exposing the fact that technical capability alone cannot see a business through.
MHI's delayed withdrawal decisions are not a matter of individual executives' judgment. Rather, the organizational conviction in the 'ability to complete things' — inherited from the founding businesses of shipbuilding and military production — structurally excludes withdrawal as a decision. Unless this structure is recognized, the same pattern risks repeating the next time MHI takes on a large-scale project in a civilian market.
In MHI's revenue structure, defense and energy (GTCC and nuclear) serve as stable sources of profit. When MHI achieved record-high profits in March 2024, these two domains were the drivers. The reason MHI has maintained oligopolistic positions in these markets over the long term cannot be explained by technological superiority alone. The essential factor is that these markets possess the characteristic where 'the first to enter structurally remains.'
Take the defense industry as an example. In 1953, MHI entered postwar fighter manufacturing through licensed production of the F-86F. This early entry allowed the company to simultaneously accumulate three assets: an ordering relationship with the Defense Agency (now the Ministry of Defense), technical partnership channels with U.S. manufacturers, and manufacturing know-how. Subsequently, production of successor aircraft continued — the F-104J, F-4EJ, F-15J, F-2, and F-35 — but it was virtually impossible for new entrants to build these three assets from scratch. As a result, domestic fighter production has been a fixed duopoly between MHI and Kawasaki Heavy Industries for more than 70 years.
The same structure operates in the energy domain. MHI obtained PWR (pressurized water reactor) technology under license from Westinghouse and began domestic nuclear plant supply starting with Kansai Electric's Mihama Unit 1 in 1970. Once a reactor type and supplier are adopted in nuclear power, they remain linked for decades through maintenance, fuel supply, and periodic inspections, making switching costs extremely high. In gas turbines for thermal power (GTCC) as well, MHI developed world-class efficiency gas turbines such as the J-type and JAC-type and locks in customers through long-term maintenance contracts with power utilities.
What these markets share is that entry barriers are based not on 'technology' but on 'accumulated relationships and track records.' The Ministry of Defense does not award multi-hundred-billion-yen equipment contracts to manufacturers without a track record. Power utilities do not adopt turbines without operational history for baseload power. In other words, past delivery records themselves become prerequisites for the next order, forming self-reinforcing entry barriers.
This market structure provides MHI with stable cash flow, but it also creates a distinctive bias in the company's management decisions. In defense and energy, 'once you enter, you stay,' reducing the need to rigorously evaluate market risk. However, when this success experience is carried into civilian markets, it leads to underestimation of market risk — as seen with MU-300, cruise ships, and SpaceJet. MHI's strengths and weaknesses are two sides of the same market structure. Stable earnings in oligopolistic markets dull judgment in competitive markets — this structural duality is the most important lens through which to understand MHI as a company.
Mitsubishi's entry into shipbuilding was motivated by the inconvenience of ship repairs in its shipping business. The idea of vertical integration — securing a domestic shipyard to eliminate the inefficiency of sailing vessels to Britain for repairs — was the starting point. Seizing the opportunity of a government shipyard sale, Mitsubishi built a three-site system across Nagasaki, Kobe, and Hikoshima, growing into one of Japan's largest shipyards. This vertical integration from shipping to shipbuilding formed the prototype of what would become the comprehensive heavy industry manufacturer, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.
In 1887, the Mitsubishi zaibatsu acquired the Nagasaki Shipyard — originally established by the Tokugawa shogunate in 1857 as the 'Nagasaki Ironworks' — through a government sale. Mitsubishi's aim was to secure its own domestic shipyard to eliminate the inconvenience of sending vessels all the way to Britain for repairs, a necessity for its core shipping business. This was the zaibatsu's first shipyard, and it began operations under the name 'Mitsubishi Shipyard.' From this point, shipbuilding became MHI's founding business and Nagasaki its birthplace.
Throughout the Meiji era, the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard built ocean-going vessels for merchant shipping companies as well as naval warships, demand for which surged during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. In 1911, the battlecruiser Kirishima was launched at Nagasaki, and with Mitsubishi's lobbying of the government, the shipyard grew into one of Japan's premier shipbuilding facilities.
To further expand its shipbuilding business, Mitsubishi established the Kobe Mitsubishi Shipyard in 1905 as a second site, followed by the Hikoshima Mitsubishi Shipyard in Shimonoseki in 1914, building a three-site shipbuilding system across Nagasaki, Kobe, and Hikoshima. Dispersing operations across multiple sites enabled parallel construction of warships and merchant vessels, expanding order capacity.
In 1917, Mitsubishi decided to operate each business division as an independent joint-stock company, and the shipbuilding division was launched as 'Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co., Ltd.' The company changed its name to 'Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' in 1934, making it the direct predecessor of today's MHI. The transition from a division within the zaibatsu to an independent corporation increased the shipbuilding business's managerial autonomy and laid the groundwork for subsequent diversification.
Mitsubishi's entry into shipbuilding was motivated by the inconvenience of ship repairs in its shipping business. The idea of vertical integration — securing a domestic shipyard to eliminate the inefficiency of sailing vessels to Britain for repairs — was the starting point. Seizing the opportunity of a government shipyard sale, Mitsubishi built a three-site system across Nagasaki, Kobe, and Hikoshima, growing into one of Japan's largest shipyards. This vertical integration from shipping to shipbuilding formed the prototype of what would become the comprehensive heavy industry manufacturer, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.
Major repairs required relying on the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal, and at times vessels had to be sailed to Shanghai or even distant British shipyards for repair work. Therefore, for the Mitsubishi company, securing larger-scale repair facilities for its own vessels was an urgent priority. Meanwhile, the government also strongly wished to entrust the management of the Nagasaki Shipyard to Yataro Iwasaki (Mitsubishi's founder), who possessed not merely financial resources but rich experience and insight in development enterprises.
The 'lease' was essentially a preparatory process for establishing the management structure, and after approximately three years of preparation, on June 7, 1887, Mitsubishi formally received the Nagasaki Shipyard through government transfer. (...)
The Mitsubishi Shipyard was a pioneer and trailblazer in every aspect of Japan's shipbuilding industry. The 'Yugao Maru,' which holds a place in Japanese shipbuilding history, was completed in May 1887, just before the transfer. Subsequently, the 'Chikugo Maru' built in 1890 opened the steel ship era, the 'Hitachi Maru' pioneered large ocean-going vessels, and the main engine of the volunteer ship 'Sakura Maru' led the way in marine steam turbine production. Additionally, the construction of the battlecruiser 'Kirishima' opened the path for full-scale large warship construction in the private sector.
The birth of Mitsubishi Electric was triggered by the inefficiency of running an electrical business within a shipyard. Workshop equipment was designed for shipbuilding and unsuitable for motor manufacturing, materials procurement prioritized shipbuilding, and engineer allocation skewed toward electrical graduates — all structural problems. Separation resolved these constraints and enabled large-scale investments like the Nagoya Works. The decision to recognize business heterogeneity and promote growth for both sides through separation represents a pioneering case of business portfolio management within a conglomerate.
Mitsubishi Shipbuilding's electrical business originated as a byproduct of its shipbuilding operations. In 1898, when the Nagasaki Shipyard completed the European-route passenger vessel 'Hitachi Maru,' it employed cutting-edge technology by using incandescent lights rather than oil lamps for onboard illumination. As 'ship electrification' became decisive, by 1904 the Mitsubishi Shipyard had begun producing marine generators, entering electrical equipment manufacturing as a subsidiary business of shipbuilding.
The Kobe Shipyard, established in 1905, also set up an 'Electrical Division,' which together with the Nagasaki Shipyard's 'Electrical Section' manufactured electrical equipment as a department within the shipyards. However, shipbuilding — centered on assembling steel components — and electrical equipment manufacturing — requiring precision engineering — differed fundamentally in workshop equipment, material procurement, and personnel allocation. The inefficiency of running an electrical business within a shipyard gradually became apparent.
In response to these challenges, Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha planned the independence of Mitsubishi Shipbuilding's electrical division. In 1918, an 80,000-tsubo site was secured in Nagoya, and preparations began for a dedicated electrical factory. In November 1919, as the first step toward independence, the Kobe Shipyard's Electrical Division was separated to form the 'Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. Electrical Works.'
On January 15, 1921, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation was established. It inherited Mitsubishi Shipbuilding's electrical business and was designated as the dedicated electrical company within the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. The former Electrical Division of the Kobe Shipyard became Mitsubishi Electric's Kobe factory. The Nagasaki Shipyard's Electrical Section, being primarily engaged in producing shipbuilding-related equipment, was transferred to Mitsubishi Electric's Nagasaki factory several years later in 1924.
The Kobe factory's product range was diverse, including DC generators, AC generators, transformers, switchboards, and electric locomotives, primarily manufacturing electrical equipment for power companies. Independence from the shipyard enabled the free introduction of workshop equipment suited for electrical manufacturing and the recruitment of electrical engineers, improving both product quality and production efficiency.
In 1924, the long-planned Nagoya Works was established, commencing operations as a mass production factory for general-purpose motors. This was an investment in equipment that would have been impossible had the division remained within the shipyard, and the spin-off of the electrical division provided the impetus for establishing Mitsubishi Electric's growth foundation.
The birth of Mitsubishi Electric was triggered by the inefficiency of running an electrical business within a shipyard. Workshop equipment was designed for shipbuilding and unsuitable for motor manufacturing, materials procurement prioritized shipbuilding, and engineer allocation skewed toward electrical graduates — all structural problems. Separation resolved these constraints and enabled large-scale investments like the Nagoya Works. The decision to recognize business heterogeneity and promote growth for both sides through separation represents a pioneering case of business portfolio management within a conglomerate.
As the Electrical Section at the Nagasaki Shipyard and the Electrical Division at the Kobe Shipyard were established, the weight of the electrical division gradually increased, and the variety and volume of products grew. Along with this, various problems arising from the electrical equipment manufacturing being housed within a shipyard began to be recognized.
First, the majority of workshop equipment was suited for shipbuilding but unsuitable for making motors. Manufacturing precision machinery-like electrical products within a shipyard was approaching its limits. It was like 'using an ox-cleaver to carve a chicken.'
Regarding materials, the only items the electrical division could freely procure were specialized electrical materials such as electrical steel sheets and insulating materials — everything from bolts and nuts to iron bars and other components had to use items prepared for shipbuilding purposes.
Personnel issues were also serious. When new engineers joined, mechanical engineering graduates were assigned to the shipbuilding division, and only electrical engineering graduates came to the electrical division, causing a chronic shortage of mechanical engineers. As national missions in electricity grew, including promoting domestic production, the frustrations of being part of a shipyard deepened.
Throughout the 1930s, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries intensified mass production of military products for the Navy and Army. In 1934, Mitsubishi Aircraft and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding merged to form Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, becoming one of Japan's foremost military-industrial enterprises capable of mass-producing warships, aircraft, and tanks.
In shipbuilding, the battleship 'Musashi' was completed at the Nagasaki Shipyard in 1938. In aviation, production of the Zero Fighter began in 1943. In vehicles, the Maruko factory was established in Kanagawa Prefecture in 1937 to build a tank mass production system.
Postwar zaibatsu dissolution mandated the breakup of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The company was split into three entities: Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy Industries, and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding.
MHI's resumption of fighter production was enabled by the shift in U.S. policy toward Japan triggered by the Korean War. While the knockdown production format for the F-86F meant technological dependence on the United States, it provided an opportunity to accumulate ordering relationships with the Defense Agency and manufacturing know-how. Early market entry secured first-mover advantages, and the subsequent fighter market became a duopoly between MHI and Kawasaki Heavy Industries. The initial decision to enter licensed production determined the competitive structure of the defense industry for decades.
After World War II, GHQ had completely prohibited aircraft production in Japan. However, following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, U.S. policy toward Japan shifted. In 1953, the U.S. government expressed support to the Japanese government for aircraft production (military), and a plan was launched for domestic production of the F-86F 'Sabre,' the U.S. military's primary fighter aircraft.
MHI decided to resume its aircraft business, centered on the Nagoya Works which had handled wartime aircraft production. In 1953, a new factory was established in Komaki, Aichi Prefecture, and preparations began to develop the manufacturing base needed for fighter production. The technology and experience in aircraft manufacturing cultivated during wartime became the foundation for entering licensed production of U.S. military fighters.
In 1955, domestic aircraft production was formally decided through intergovernmental agreement between Japan and the United States. In August of the same year, MHI received the adoption decision and production order for the F-86F from the Defense Agency. With technical support from North American Aviation, the manufacturer, MHI commenced knockdown assembly production from 1956. F-86F contracts were executed in three phases through 1961, with the company producing a cumulative total of approximately 300 aircraft worth approximately 18 billion yen.
Through F-86F production, MHI built a relationship with the Defense Agency (now the Ministry of Defense) and subsequently secured orders for successor aircraft including the F-104J, scaling up licensed fighter production. By entering early in the market's infancy, MHI secured first-mover advantages, and the domestic licensed production market for military aircraft became an oligopoly shared between MHI and Kawasaki Heavy Industries.
MHI's resumption of fighter production was enabled by the shift in U.S. policy toward Japan triggered by the Korean War. While the knockdown production format for the F-86F meant technological dependence on the United States, it provided an opportunity to accumulate ordering relationships with the Defense Agency and manufacturing know-how. Early market entry secured first-mover advantages, and the subsequent fighter market became a duopoly between MHI and Kawasaki Heavy Industries. The initial decision to enter licensed production determined the competitive structure of the defense industry for decades.
The three companies separated from the former Mitsubishi Heavy Industries under zaibatsu dissolution — Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy Industries, and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding — began studying remerger. In July 1963, the boards of directors of all three companies resolved to conduct joint deliberations on merger, and in August a merger preparation office was established.
Since the merger would create a major enterprise with revenue of approximately 300 billion yen, the Fair Trade Commission conducted a review of whether it would violate the Antimonopoly Act, concluding by January 1964 through an 'attached request letter' that there were no issues except regarding paper-making machines.
On June 1, 1964, Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Nippon Heavy Industries, and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding merged to establish Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
From FY1971 through FY1981, a total of 140 F-4EJ fighters were ordered from the Defense Agency across six phases. Total contract value was approximately 170 billion yen.
Fell into losses due to delays in overseas plant projects.
Strong order intake in GTCC, nuclear, and defense/space drove record-high profits. Defense-related sales (aircraft, naval vessels, etc.) were particularly robust, with sales to the Ministry of Defense in FY2023 reaching 489.7 billion yen (10.5% of total company revenue).