Founded in 1954. Established as Takeda Riken Kogyo and pivoted from measurement instruments to IC testers. Rebuilt with Fujitsu's support, the company secured approximately 40% global market share in semiconductor test equipment, overcoming semiconductor market cycles to become a world leader in test systems.
1954
Strategic Decision
Takeda Riken Kogyo is founded
The consequence of technology obsession and management neglect coexisting for 20 years
1957
Headquarters relocated to Tokyo
1957Headquarters relocated to Tokyo
1967
Invested in minicomputer-based instrumentation development
1967Invested in minicomputer-based instrumentation development
1972
Launched Japan's first IC tester 'T320'
1972Launched Japan's first IC tester 'T320'
1975
Computer instrumentation business fails, company falls into the red
1975Computer instrumentation business fails, company falls into the red
1975
Founder Ikuo Takeda ousted (boardroom coup)
1975Founder Ikuo Takeda ousted (boardroom coup)
1976
Strategic Decision
Fujitsu provides rescue support; focus shifts to IC testers
Fujitsu-style restructuring that began with 'zero cost accounting'
1979
Developed '100MHz Test System' for LSI inspection
1979Developed '100MHz Test System' for LSI inspection
1983
Strategic Decision
Listed on TSE Second Section; restructuring completed
¥100 billion+ investment return from rescue stake over 40 years
1984
Established Gunma factory
1984Established Gunma factory
1985
Changed trade name to Advantest Corporation
1985Changed trade name to Advantest Corporation
1990
Established Advantest (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
1990Established Advantest (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
1993
Declared strategic emphasis on Asian markets
1993Declared strategic emphasis on Asian markets
1996
Achieved approximately 40% global share in semiconductor test equipment
1996Achieved approximately 40% global share in semiconductor test equipment
1996
Established Gunma R&D Center
1996Established Gunma R&D Center
2002
Established Kitakyushu R&D Center
2002Established Kitakyushu R&D Center
2009
Market downturn drives company into the red
2009Market downturn drives company into the red
2014
Three consecutive years of losses
2014Three consecutive years of losses
2023
Market recovery drives record profit
2023Market recovery drives record profit
View Performance
RevenueAdvantest:Revenue
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: ¥100M)
¥487B
Revenue:2024/3
ProfitAdvantest:Net Profit Margin
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: %)
16%
Margin:2024/3
View Performance
PeriodTypeRevenueProfit*Margin
1976/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1977/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥8B¥1B7.1%
1978/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥8B¥1B7.2%
1979/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥8B¥0B2.7%
1980/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥12B¥1B4.5%
1981/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥18B¥1B6.9%
1982/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥21B¥1B6.9%
1983/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥27B¥2B7.3%
1984/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥39B¥4B9.7%
1985/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥65B¥8B11.9%
1986/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥67B¥7B10.6%
1987/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥42B¥2B5.5%
1988/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥54B¥3B5.5%
1989/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1990/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1991/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1992/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥81B¥4B4.5%
1993/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥62B¥0B0.0%
1994/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥62B¥0B0.4%
1995/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥80B¥3B3.8%
1996/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥146B¥20B13.6%
1997/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥161B¥25B15.3%
1998/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥257B¥44B16.8%
1999/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥142B¥19B13.2%
2000/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥167B¥22B13.3%
2001/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥262B¥47B17.9%
2002/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥95B-¥23B-24.1%
2003/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥98B-¥13B-13.3%
2004/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥172B¥17B10.0%
2005/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥239B¥38B15.8%
2006/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥254B¥41B16.2%
2007/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥235B¥36B15.1%
2008/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥183B¥17B9.0%
2009/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥77B-¥75B-97.8%
2010/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥53B-¥11B-21.5%
2011/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥100B¥3B3.1%
2012/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥141B-¥2B-1.6%
2013/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥133B-¥4B-2.9%
2014/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥112B-¥36B-31.8%
2015/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥164B¥17B10.1%
2016/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥162B¥7B4.1%
2017/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥156B¥14B9.1%
2018/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥207B¥18B8.7%
2019/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥282B¥57B20.1%
2020/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥276B¥54B19.3%
2021/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥313B¥70B22.2%
2022/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥417B¥87B20.9%
2023/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥560B¥171B30.5%
2024/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥487B¥78B16.0%

Author's Insights

The company that makes the world's most essential equipment yet cannot determine its own financial performance
70 years of surrendering earnings to customers' investment cycles—the consequence of technology specialization born from 'being bad at business'

The thread running through Advantest's 70-year history is a paradox: possessing irreplaceable technology while being unable to control its own financial performance. In 1954, Ikuo Takeda founded Takeda Riken Kogyo with just three people, specializing in the niche measurement instrument market that major corporations ignored. True to the founder's later reflection that 'we had no choice but to rely on technology as our weapon because we were bad at business,' the company built a model of avoiding price competition and selling unique products at premium prices. This technology-obsessed management produced Japan's first IC test system, the T320, in 1972, while simultaneously neglecting the absence of even basic cost accounting. The pattern of technology creating business while eroding management led to the company's first collapse within twenty years of founding.

Following the 1975 slide into losses and a boardroom coup, what Fujitsu-dispatched president Kaiwa discovered was a company with no profitability management systems whatsoever. The core of the restructuring lay not in new product development but in building basic management infrastructure—cost accounting and a ban on sales discounts. On that foundation, the company withdrew from the minicomputer instrumentation business and concentrated investment in IC testers, raising the new product ratio from 4% to 45%. This restructuring worked, but it also definitively shaped Advantest's business structure. Resources were concentrated on a single product category—IC testers—and a customer structure emerged in which Fujitsu and Hitachi, two major semiconductor manufacturers, accounted for over half of revenue. In the process of correcting the flaws of a technology-obsessed venture, a new structural constraint was embedded: earnings that moved in lockstep with semiconductor investment cycles.

This structure continued to govern Advantest's performance for the next fifty years. By 1996, the company had secured approximately 40% global market share, establishing an unassailable position as the global leader in semiconductor test equipment. Yet despite this market dominance, performance remained entirely subordinate to customers' semiconductor investment cycles. In fiscal year 2009, a semiconductor market downturn drove a ¥72.9 billion loss, and from 2012 to 2014, the company recorded three consecutive years of losses. Conversely, fiscal year 2023 saw a record profit of ¥171.2 billion, fueled by semiconductor production expansion in Taiwan, China, and South Korea. The swing between a ¥72.9 billion loss and ¥171.2 billion record profit is extraordinary volatility for a company holding 40% global market share.

What Advantest embodies, then, is the fact that 'being indispensable' and 'being autonomous' are entirely separate concepts. As semiconductor miniaturization advances, the importance of the testing process only increases—no chip can be shipped without a tester. Advantest's products are literally irreplaceable, and customers have no choice but to purchase them. However, the decisions about when and how many semiconductors to produce lie entirely beyond Advantest's reach. TSMC's capital expenditure plans, Samsung's production strategy, AI chip demand forecasts—every variable that determines Advantest's performance is in someone else's hands. From 1954, when the founder described himself as 'bad at business,' to the present day as the world's leading tester manufacturer, the structure of dominating the market through technology while being buffeted by that same market has not changed. The company that makes the world's most essential equipment cannot determine the trajectory of its own earnings. This is the structural fate of technology-specialized companies, as demonstrated by Advantest's 70 years.

2026-02-25 | by author
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1954

Takeda Riken Kogyo is founded

The consequence of technology obsession and management neglect coexisting for 20 years

Takeda Riken's founding represents a prototype of the technology-driven venture that exploits gaps left by large corporations. Entering a market dominated by three established players including Yokogawa Electric with just three people, the company secured its survival through premium pricing of niche products—a pattern common to later high-tech ventures. However, the R&D-obsessed model that generated IC testers as the core business also harbored a structural weakness: the complete absence of cost management. The trajectory of pioneering markets through technology while stumbling on management illustrates a classic challenge faced by founder-led R&D-driven companies.

BackgroundA government researcher founds a measurement instrument venture

In 1954, Ikuo Takeda left his position at the Ministry of Communications Electrical Research Laboratory and founded Takeda Riken Kogyo (now Advantest) in Toyohashi, Aichi Prefecture, at the age of 30. The founding team consisted of just three people including Takeda, and the chosen business domain was electronic measurement instruments—a field that major manufacturers such as Hitachi and Mitsubishi were not actively pursuing. Takeda's grandfather was Kenji Takeda, a Meiji-era entrepreneur who founded the Toyohashi Railway and a power company, and it is presumed that family financial support helped make the founding possible.

However, the domestic measurement instrument market already had three established players—Yokogawa Electric, Yamatake Honeywell, and Hokushin Electric—who had been active since before the war, placing Takeda Riken as a late entrant. In this environment, Takeda specialized in niche areas that major companies showed no interest in and built an R&D-driven business model of selling unique products with no substitutes at premium prices. The company's technological capabilities were so highly regarded that a vice president of GE visited from the United States, and the firm also secured substantial R&D subsidies from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

DecisionAn R&D-obsessed business model and the pivot to IC testers

Takeda later reflected that 'we had no choice but to rely on technology as our weapon because we were bad at business,' and this very attitude formed Takeda Riken's competitive advantage. The company rigorously pursued a policy of carving out markets through technological uniqueness rather than price competition, selling measurement instruments with no substitutes at premium prices and growing steadily as a small but R&D-driven venture. In the 1960s, the company also ventured into developing measurement instruments utilizing minicomputers, seeking to pioneer the new domain of computer-based measurement.

In 1972, the company launched the T320, Japan's first IC test system, developed over four years with subsidies from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, entering the semiconductor test equipment field. By capturing testing demand for ICs used in calculators and color televisions, this became a foothold for transforming the business from a measurement instrument maker to an IC tester maker. However, the price of neglecting management while being obsessed with R&D was steep—triggered by the 1975 oil crisis, the company fell into the red, and Takeda himself was ousted from the company he founded through a boardroom coup.

TableCareer of Ikuo Takeda (Advantest founder)
DateCareerNotes
April 1923Born (Aichi Prefecture)Grandfather was Kenji Takeda, who founded railway and electric power companies
September 1945Graduated from Nihon University, Faculty of Science, Electrical Engineering-
October 1945Joined the Ministry of Communications Electrical Research Laboratory-
1948Transferred to NTT Electrical Communications Research Laboratory
1954President, Takeda Riken KogyoFounded present-day Advantest at age 30
1975Chairman, Takeda Riken KogyoOusted from presidency by boardroom coup
July 2012Passed awayDied at age 89
Date
April 1923
Career
Born (Aichi Prefecture)
Notes
Grandfather was Kenji Takeda, who founded railway and electric power companies
SourceNikkei Business | 1983/5/30
The consequence of technology obsession and management neglect coexisting for 20 years

Takeda Riken's founding represents a prototype of the technology-driven venture that exploits gaps left by large corporations. Entering a market dominated by three established players including Yokogawa Electric with just three people, the company secured its survival through premium pricing of niche products—a pattern common to later high-tech ventures. However, the R&D-obsessed model that generated IC testers as the core business also harbored a structural weakness: the complete absence of cost management. The trajectory of pioneering markets through technology while stumbling on management illustrates a classic challenge faced by founder-led R&D-driven companies.

TestimonyIkuo Takeda (Advantest founder)

Takeda Riken, which started in 1954 with just three people including myself, grew rapidly as what would now be called an R&D-driven company. In the field of measurement instruments—an area that major corporations paid little attention to—we delved deep into technology and created unique products that could be sold at high prices regardless of cost. If you have a product that exists nowhere else in the world, there is no need to compete on price. The fact that we were bad at business and had no choice but to rely on technology as our weapon actually turned out to be a blessing.

Despite being a tiny company, the vice president of GE in America came to visit us, and we received substantial subsidies from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Takeda Riken's technology was highly regarded.

Source1983/5/30 Nikkei Business: Overconfident in technology, negligent in management
1957
Headquarters relocated to Tokyo
1967
Invested in minicomputer-based instrumentation development
1972
Launched Japan's first IC tester 'T320'
1975
Computer instrumentation business fails, company falls into the red
1975
Founder Ikuo Takeda ousted (boardroom coup)
1976
2

Fujitsu provides rescue support; focus shifts to IC testers

Fujitsu-style restructuring that began with 'zero cost accounting'

What is structurally fascinating about this restructuring is that Fujitsu simultaneously served three roles: equity investor, management advisor, and largest customer. A typical rescue investment would be limited to capital injection and management oversight, but Fujitsu also guaranteed revenue by adopting Takeda Riken's IC testers for its own semiconductor operations. President Kaiwa's discovery that 'cost accounting did not exist' starkly illustrated the structural deficiency of a technology-obsessed venture, revealing that the essence of the restructuring lay not in new product development but in building the basic infrastructure of management.

BackgroundA rescue plea to former mentor Hiroshi Seimiya and Fujitsu's decision to intervene

Following the oil crisis-triggered slide into losses, Takeda Riken fell into a severe management crisis after founder Ikuo Takeda was ousted in a boardroom coup. The main bank flagged the financial risk and refused to lend, making self-funded restructuring untenable. As a last resort, Takeda turned to Hiroshi Seimiya—his former supervisor at the Ministry of Communications Electrical Research Laboratory—to request a rescue. Seimiya was serving as president of Fujitsu at the time but was recuperating at home due to a worsening chronic illness.

A mentor-protégé relationship dating back to the 1950s existed between Seimiya and Takeda, built on years of trust forged through R&D work in the electronics field. Seimiya mediated differing opinions within Fujitsu and decided on a rescue plan under which 'the banks would provide financial support while Fujitsu would provide management guidance.' Fujitsu committed to equity investment and the dispatch of management personnel, enabling Takeda Riken to restore its credit standing and secure rescue financing from banks.

After the rescue was formally decided, Seimiya summoned Takeda from the Fujitsu hospital in Kawasaki and told him, 'It was quite a struggle.' Seimiya passed away in April 1976, the following year, and it was said that it was precisely because he was on his deathbed that his advocacy moved others within Fujitsu. The survival of the company into which Takeda had poured twenty years of his life—from age 30 to 50—had hinged on the final decision of his former mentor.

DecisionEstablishing cost management and concentrating resources on IC testers

In February 1976, Toshimasa Kaiwa, dispatched from Fujitsu, assumed the presidency of Takeda Riken, and the substantive restructuring began. What Kaiwa discovered immediately upon taking office was that cost accounting had never existed at Takeda Riken. The technology obsession of the R&D-driven venture had corroded the very foundations of management in the form of absent profitability management.

President Kaiwa first introduced product-by-product cost management, banned sales staff from offering discounts, and drove reforms in both cost accounting and sales operations. On the business front, he decided to withdraw from the minicomputer instrumentation business—a contributing factor in the company's losses—and concentrate resources on new IC tester development. As IC technology innovation accelerated, improving the new product ratio was designated as the top-priority metric.

The results of this concentrated investment showed in the numbers. The new product ratio (products less than one year since launch) as a share of revenue surged from 4% in 1976 to 45% by fiscal year 1981. By continuously launching new products in the IC tester segment, the company built a structure capable of keeping pace with semiconductor manufacturers' technological innovation, completing the transformation from a mid-tier measurement instrument maker to a dedicated IC tester manufacturer.

ResultA dependency structure where Fujitsu supported the restructuring as customer too

What was distinctive about the restructuring process was that Fujitsu simultaneously served as equity investor, management advisor, and a major customer of Takeda Riken. In fiscal year 1980, 22.6% of revenue came from Fujitsu, which actively adopted Takeda Riken's IC testers for its own semiconductor operations, supporting the restructuring through product sales as well.

IC tester sales expansion steadily improved performance, and in February 1983, Takeda Riken listed on the Second Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In fiscal year 1982, prior to the listing, 30% of revenue came from Hitachi and 26% from Fujitsu, with two major domestic semiconductor manufacturers established as core customers. The IPO marked a milestone in the Fujitsu-led restructuring.

Through this restructuring, Takeda Riken transformed from an R&D-driven venture into a listed company with proper management systems. While the founding-era deficiency of absent cost accounting was corrected, a customer concentration structure emerged in which over half of revenue depended on Fujitsu and Hitachi. The business structure in which performance moved in sync with customers' semiconductor investment cycles—inherent to the nature of IC testers—was established during this restructuring period.

Fujitsu-style restructuring that began with 'zero cost accounting'

What is structurally fascinating about this restructuring is that Fujitsu simultaneously served three roles: equity investor, management advisor, and largest customer. A typical rescue investment would be limited to capital injection and management oversight, but Fujitsu also guaranteed revenue by adopting Takeda Riken's IC testers for its own semiconductor operations. President Kaiwa's discovery that 'cost accounting did not exist' starkly illustrated the structural deficiency of a technology-obsessed venture, revealing that the essence of the restructuring lay not in new product development but in building the basic infrastructure of management.

TestimonyIkuo Takeda (Advantest founder)

I visited Mr. Seimiya, who was recuperating at home after surgery, and asked him to rescue Takeda Riken. After some time, Mr. Seimiya replied: 'There were various opinions within Fujitsu, but we'll ask the banks for financial cooperation while Fujitsu provides management guidance.' Thanks to Mr. Seimiya's efforts, we were able to secure Fujitsu's cooperation in rebuilding Takeda Riken, including the dispatch of management personnel. Mr. Seimiya went to great lengths to coordinate with the banks on our behalf.

After the rescue was formally decided, Mr. Seimiya summoned me to the Fujitsu hospital in Kawasaki. The warm look in his eyes when he said 'It was quite a struggle' is something I will never forget. Takeda Riken—the company into which I had poured my heart and soul for twenty years, from age 30 to 50—was going to survive. I cannot be grateful enough.

Mr. Seimiya passed away the following year. I heard that it was precisely because he was on his deathbed that his advocacy for helping rebuild Takeda Riken moved the people at Fujitsu.

Source1983/6/27 Nikkei Business: Overconfident in technology, negligent in management
1979
Developed '100MHz Test System' for LSI inspection
1983
2

Listed on TSE Second Section; restructuring completed

¥100 billion+ investment return from rescue stake over 40 years

Fujitsu's total proceeds from selling its Advantest shares amounted to ¥142.9 billion, with estimated gains exceeding ¥100 billion. A rescue investment decided on compassionate grounds by a president on his deathbed generated enormous returns 40 years later, though it was initially a highly uncertain undertaking—restructuring a company that lacked even basic cost accounting. This investment return would have been unachievable without the unique structure in which the investor simultaneously served as largest customer and management advisor; the essence lies in the fact that it was a strategic investment with business synergies, not a pure financial play.

BackgroundShareholder structure at IPO: founder at 5.68%, Fujitsu at 28%

In February 1983, Takeda Riken listed on the Second Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, completing the Fujitsu-led restructuring. The pre-IPO shareholder structure as of June 1982 showed Fujitsu as the largest shareholder at 28.00%, while founder Ikuo Takeda held a mere 5.68%. This was the result of being forced to relinquish most of his shares during the 1975 coup—he had already lost control of the company he founded before it went public.

On the business front at the time of listing, as of fiscal year 1981, Takeda Riken held a 9.5% global market share (third place) in the LSI tester market, which had a global market size of approximately ¥100 billion. Fairchild held the top share, but Takeda Riken had steadily moved up from fourth place in 1975, establishing its presence in the global market as a dedicated IC tester manufacturer.

DecisionBuilding a customer base centered on two major domestic semiconductor manufacturers

The revenue composition for fiscal year 1982, prior to the IPO, showed Hitachi accounting for 30% and Fujitsu for 26%, with two major domestic semiconductor manufacturers comprising over half of sales. IC testers are essential inspection equipment in the semiconductor manufacturing process, with an inherent business characteristic of performance tracking customers' semiconductor investment cycles. This customer base was formed during the Fujitsu-led restructuring period.

Among domestic electronic measurement instrument manufacturers, five other companies existed alongside Takeda Riken: Yokogawa Electric, Anritsu, Ando Electric, Iwatsu Electric, and Matsushita Communication Industrial. Takeda Riken differentiated itself by specializing in IC testers—a growth market—and carved out a unique position within the electronic measurement instrument industry. In September 1985, the company was promoted to the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.

ResultFujitsu's share divestiture and ¥100 billion+ investment return

Fujitsu remained Advantest's largest shareholder after the IPO but in 2005 sold a portion of its 20.45% stake, recovering ¥89.9 billion. In 2017, it sold the remaining 11.35% for ¥53.0 billion, fully dissolving the capital relationship that had lasted approximately 40 years since 1976. While the acquisition cost is undisclosed, the combined proceeds of ¥142.9 billion suggest gains exceeding ¥100 billion.

For Fujitsu, the investment in Advantest began as a rescue decided by a president on his deathbed. The phased share divestiture after overseeing both the restructuring and business growth through approximately 40 years of capital ties represents one model of long-term investment by an operating company. For Advantest, the departure of its largest shareholder accelerated the transition to a genuinely independent management structure.

TableAdvantest shareholder structure (pre-IPO, June 1982)
ShareholderOwnershipNotes
Fujitsu28.00%Supported Takeda Riken's restructuring
Kanematsu-Gosho10.80%-
Saitama Electronics Research9.79%-
Tokyo Leasing8.00%-
Takeda Riken Employee Shareholding Association6.09%
Ikuo Takeda5.68%Advantest founder
Shareholder
Fujitsu
Ownership
28.00%
Notes
Supported Takeda Riken's restructuring
SourceSecurities 35(3)(408) | 1983/3
¥100 billion+ investment return from rescue stake over 40 years

Fujitsu's total proceeds from selling its Advantest shares amounted to ¥142.9 billion, with estimated gains exceeding ¥100 billion. A rescue investment decided on compassionate grounds by a president on his deathbed generated enormous returns 40 years later, though it was initially a highly uncertain undertaking—restructuring a company that lacked even basic cost accounting. This investment return would have been unachievable without the unique structure in which the investor simultaneously served as largest customer and management advisor; the essence lies in the fact that it was a strategic investment with business synergies, not a pure financial play.

TimelineListed on TSE Second Section; restructuring completed — Key Events
2/1983Listed on the Second Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
9/1985Listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
1984
Established Gunma factory
1985
Changed trade name to Advantest Corporation
1990
Established Advantest (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
1993
Declared strategic emphasis on Asian markets
1996
Achieved approximately 40% global share in semiconductor test equipment
1996
Established Gunma R&D Center
2002
Established Kitakyushu R&D Center
2009
Market downturn drives company into the red
2014
Three consecutive years of losses
2023
Market recovery drives record profit
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