67 years since founding. 3 key decisions
| Period | Type | Revenue | Profit* | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1970/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1971/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥4B | ¥0B | 2.2% |
| 1972/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥5B | ¥0B | 5.4% |
| 1973/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥8B | ¥0B | 4.1% |
| 1974/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥7B | ¥0B | 2.2% |
| 1975/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥7B | ¥0B | 1.4% |
| 1976/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥11B | ¥0B | 3.3% |
| 1977/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥13B | ¥0B | 3.8% |
| 1978/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | - | - | - |
| 1979/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥14B | ¥1B | 4.8% |
| 1980/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥19B | ¥1B | 4.4% |
| 1981/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥24B | ¥1B | 4.8% |
| 1982/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥28B | ¥1B | 5.3% |
| 1983/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥29B | ¥2B | 5.5% |
| 1984/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥36B | ¥2B | 6.0% |
| 1985/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥47B | ¥3B | 5.7% |
| 1986/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥52B | ¥3B | 5.0% |
| 1987/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥50B | ¥3B | 6.0% |
| 1988/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥59B | ¥4B | 6.8% |
| 1989/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥77B | ¥6B | 7.8% |
| 1990/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥87B | ¥8B | 8.8% |
| 1991/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥103B | ¥8B | 8.0% |
| 1992/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥101B | ¥5B | 5.1% |
| 1993/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥91B | ¥3B | 3.7% |
| 1994/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥91B | ¥4B | 4.4% |
| 1995/3 | Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income | ¥115B | ¥10B | 8.6% |
| 1996/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥148B | ¥16B | 10.8% |
| 1997/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥169B | ¥17B | 10.0% |
| 1998/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥197B | ¥19B | 9.7% |
| 1999/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥165B | ¥16B | 9.3% |
| 2000/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥194B | ¥17B | 8.8% |
| 2001/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥252B | ¥24B | 9.4% |
| 2002/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥184B | ¥14B | 7.6% |
| 2003/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥207B | ¥15B | 7.4% |
| 2004/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥247B | ¥32B | 13.0% |
| 2005/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥280B | ¥49B | 17.5% |
| 2006/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥308B | ¥53B | 17.3% |
| 2007/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥340B | ¥63B | 18.5% |
| 2008/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥358B | ¥56B | 15.6% |
| 2009/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥283B | ¥26B | 9.1% |
| 2010/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥221B | ¥20B | 8.8% |
| 2011/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥325B | ¥48B | 14.6% |
| 2012/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥342B | ¥59B | 17.3% |
| 2013/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥323B | ¥64B | 19.8% |
| 2014/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥395B | ¥86B | 21.8% |
| 2015/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥458B | ¥110B | 23.9% |
| 2016/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥476B | ¥92B | 19.3% |
| 2017/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥488B | ¥113B | 23.1% |
| 2018/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥591B | ¥137B | 23.1% |
| 2019/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥577B | ¥131B | 22.6% |
| 2020/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥526B | ¥111B | 21.0% |
| 2021/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥552B | ¥122B | 22.0% |
| 2022/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥727B | ¥193B | 26.5% |
| 2023/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥825B | ¥225B | 27.2% |
| 2024/3 | Consolidated Revenue / Net Income | ¥777B | ¥178B | 22.9% |
What is noteworthy about SMC's founding period is the speed at which the company—starting from the narrow technical domain of sintered metal filters—brought the major processes of pneumatic control in-house within 12 years. Pneumatic equipment has low technical barriers to entry, making differentiation through individual products structurally difficult. What SMC chose was not differentiation through technological superiority but a strategy of locking in customers through the breadth of a lineup covering all processes. This vertical integration decision, combined with the immediate delivery system and nationwide sales network later constructed, became the foundation of sustainable competitive advantage.
In April 1959, Susumu Omura, who had been employed at Tokyo Tungsten Co., Ltd., established Sintered Metal Industries Co., Ltd. (present-day SMC) in Chiyoda, Tokyo. Omura was an engineer who researched 'the theory of sintering stainless steel and bronze,' and leveraged that expertise to choose the manufacture of filter components for pneumatic equipment as the founding business. The filters used sintered filter media as raw material, serving as components that removed contaminants from compressed air to deliver clean air. The company was founded from the narrow specialized domain of sintering technology.
At the time, factory automation was advancing in manufacturing settings such as chemical plants, automobiles, and machine tools. Pneumatic control equipment was one of the means of automation, used to control the loading and unloading of parts and products on production lines. Compared to hydraulic or mechanical control, it did not require precision motion control but had lower installation costs, giving it the potential to proliferate across a wide range of factory types. This market environment influenced the business direction of SMC, which started out as a component manufacturer.
In 1960, the year after its founding, SMC entered finished pneumatic equipment manufacturing, shifting its business center of gravity from component supply to finished product manufacturing. The pneumatic control process comprises 'compressed air generation, dehumidification, pressure regulation, and directional control,' with each step requiring equipment such as compressors, compressed air purification devices, pneumatic auxiliary equipment, and cylinders. As of 1960, SMC was only handling pneumatic auxiliary equipment and had not yet established a structure to cover the entire control process in-house.
SMC therefore adopted a policy of progressively bringing key components in-house. By 1971, it had commenced production of compressed air purification equipment and cylinders, establishing an integrated production system for all major mechanisms except compressors. The company steered toward becoming a comprehensive manufacturer covering the entire pneumatic control process rather than remaining limited to specific components, building a system to supply equipment to customers on a one-stop basis. The transformation from a specialist filter component manufacturer to a comprehensive pneumatic equipment manufacturer was accomplished in just 12 years from founding.
As a result of this policy, at the time of listing on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1988, 90% of SMC's revenue came from pneumatic-related products. A business foundation was formed supplying pneumatic control equipment to diverse manufacturing factories ranging from chemical plants to automobiles and machine tools, with a business model that marketed 'labor cost reduction at customer factories' as the value proposition. A revenue structure capable of stably capturing orders during periods of expanding automation investment was established.
Pneumatic control was a domain where technical barriers to entry were low compared to hydraulic and electric control. Nevertheless, the background to SMC's business growth lay in a vertical integration strategy progressing from components to finished products and further to integrated production of major mechanisms. Rather than technological superiority in individual products, it was the breadth of the lineup covering the entire pneumatic control process with proprietary products that became convenient for customers, resulting in a lock-in effect that made it difficult for them to switch to competitors.
What is noteworthy about SMC's founding period is the speed at which the company—starting from the narrow technical domain of sintered metal filters—brought the major processes of pneumatic control in-house within 12 years. Pneumatic equipment has low technical barriers to entry, making differentiation through individual products structurally difficult. What SMC chose was not differentiation through technological superiority but a strategy of locking in customers through the breadth of a lineup covering all processes. This vertical integration decision, combined with the immediate delivery system and nationwide sales network later constructed, became the foundation of sustainable competitive advantage.
Our company was launched in April 1959 as Sintered Metal Industries Co., Ltd., established in Chiyoda, Tokyo for the purpose of manufacturing and selling sintered metal filters. Since this product was a filter medium for removing contaminants from pneumatic equipment, the company subsequently developed a strong connection with air.
The following year, in 1960, we entered the pneumatic equipment field. Initially, our mainstay was process automation for heavy chemical industries, but from around that time, automation was advancing in processing industries such as automobiles and machine tools due to labor shortages. In response to this demand for pneumatic control equipment, our company has consistently pursued the expansion of its pneumatic control equipment product range since 1961.
In conventional manufacturing, the standard practice is to have distributors hold inventory to build a community-based immediate delivery system, but SMC chose the opposite. Given the characteristics of pneumatic equipment with 240,000 SKUs, dispersing inventory across distribution channels would inflate management costs and actually reduce supply accuracy. The decision to centralize inventory at the manufacturer's headquarters and specialize distributors in sales functions became the prerequisite for the subsequent 48-hour immediate delivery system through online ordering.
The pneumatic control equipment manufactured by SMC encompassed approximately 240,000 SKUs, and the manufacturing factories that constituted its customer base were dispersed nationwide. Since the products were directly linked to production line uptime, responsiveness was critical. However, the sheer number of SKUs made it impractical for distributors to properly manage inventory. A structural challenge existed: unless the manufacturer itself assumed unified responsibility for sales and inventory management, a system for rapidly delivering a wide variety of products could not be sustained.
In 1960s Japan, capital investment in manufacturing was intensifying, and demand for factory automation was rising across regions. Customers for pneumatic equipment spanned a wide geographic range—the Chubu region with its concentration of automotive industry, the Kinki region with heavy chemical industries, and the Chugoku region with shipbuilding and steel. The specific items required by each customer differed, and many projects involved technical consultations and specification confirmations, making it insufficient to simply increase the number of distributors. The need arose for the manufacturer itself to deploy sales offices and respond directly.
Starting with the Osaka sales office in 1960, the company sequentially established the Nagoya sales office in 1963 and the Hiroshima sales office in 1977, covering major industrial zones. By 1988, a sales structure of 5 sales offices, 38 branch offices, and approximately 97 distributors nationwide had been built. Each sales office was given P&L responsibility and managed branch offices under a decentralized organizational structure. Sales through distributors were permitted but positioned strictly as 'partners of the sales office,' consistently prioritizing direct sales.
Particularly notable was the decision to prohibit distributors from holding inventory. If each distributor individually stocked pneumatic equipment spanning approximately 240,000 SKUs, the risk of simultaneous overstock and stockouts would be high. To avoid this problem, inventory management was centralized at SMC headquarters, with the manufacturer controlling the entire flow from order receipt to shipment. By not dispersing inventory to the endpoints of the distribution network but managing it centrally, the system achieved both supply accuracy for multi-variety products and inventory efficiency.
In conventional manufacturing, the standard practice is to have distributors hold inventory to build a community-based immediate delivery system, but SMC chose the opposite. Given the characteristics of pneumatic equipment with 240,000 SKUs, dispersing inventory across distribution channels would inflate management costs and actually reduce supply accuracy. The decision to centralize inventory at the manufacturer's headquarters and specialize distributors in sales functions became the prerequisite for the subsequent 48-hour immediate delivery system through online ordering.
(Note: Regarding SMC's 'holon management') It is a system where the company's organization is divided into small groups, each working independently and autonomously. (Omitted) For example, even a single order slip—with products numbering 300,000 items—is difficult to process organizationally. So it made sense to directly connect the user with the relevant department and have that department handle it. In sales, for many years now, we have expanded from a 4-office system to a 15-office system, with regional branch offices underneath, allowing each group to operate autonomously.
Pneumatic equipment is a domain where technical differentiation is difficult, and delivery time and product range become the primary axes of competition. What SMC chose was a semi-finished goods inventory method that maintains 5,000 base forms in stock and processes them after order receipt to accommodate hundreds of thousands of SKUs. The dilemma where finished goods inventory would explode the SKU count while made-to-order production would extend lead times was resolved through inventory at the intermediate stage of base forms. Statistical demand forecasting by mathematics graduates supports the precision of the system, functioning not as mere inventory accumulation but as a controlled inventory strategy.
Pneumatic control equipment was a critical component directly linked to customers' production lines, yet it was a product category where technical differentiation was difficult. While there was little meaningful difference in product performance among manufacturers, the number of required SKUs ballooned from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands as factory automation progressed, and customers were pressed to procure a wide variety of parts quickly. If technology could not create differentiation, then how quickly a wide variety of products could be delivered became the axis of competition.
However, achieving immediate delivery of a wide variety was not straightforward. Each SKU had its own demand fluctuations, and holding all items as finished goods inventory would inflate overstock risk. Conversely, manufacturing from scratch after receiving an order would extend lead times. Resolving this dilemma required building a system that integrated manufacturing and sales, with the company itself assuming inventory risk. SMC made its policy explicit: securing P&L profitability in exchange for bearing inventory risk on the balance sheet.
Starting with the establishment of the Soka plant in 1968, multiple factories were added in the Kanto region through the 1980s. SMC adopted a method of maintaining inventory of 5,000 base forms that would be processed into final products, producing hundreds of thousands of final product varieties by processing the base forms as soon as orders arrived from sales offices by FAX. By holding inventory at the base form stage rather than as finished products, the system limited the number of inventory items while accommodating final product variations.
For demand forecasting, the company assigned dedicated staff with mathematics degrees, who calculated inventory levels for the 5,000 base forms using statistical methods. In 1983, an online ordering system was put into operation, establishing a structure for centralized computer management of production, sales, and logistics. Order data from sales offices was linked to factories in real time, with production priorities determined based on inventory status. Through this comprehensive system, immediate delivery averaging within 48 hours from order to customer delivery was achieved.
The track record of delivery within 48 hours positioned SMC as 'the manufacturer that guarantees immediate delivery.' For customers, the criteria for selecting a pneumatic equipment supplier, given the small performance differences between products, came down to delivery time and product range. SMC's superiority on both fronts meant that once a customer commenced business, there was little reason to switch to a competitor, creating a structure where the customer base accumulated stably.
This immediate delivery system was accompanied by an increase in inventory assets on the balance sheet. However, SMC maintained its policy of securing high profit margins in exchange for tolerating inventory risk, transforming the inventory-holding business model into a structural competitive advantage. The precision of demand forecasting and production management based on mathematical methods underpinned this decision, and the key to achieving both goals was an operating structure that controlled inventory levels based on scientific evidence rather than simply piling up stock.
Pneumatic equipment is a domain where technical differentiation is difficult, and delivery time and product range become the primary axes of competition. What SMC chose was a semi-finished goods inventory method that maintains 5,000 base forms in stock and processes them after order receipt to accommodate hundreds of thousands of SKUs. The dilemma where finished goods inventory would explode the SKU count while made-to-order production would extend lead times was resolved through inventory at the intermediate stage of base forms. Statistical demand forecasting by mathematics graduates supports the precision of the system, functioning not as mere inventory accumulation but as a controlled inventory strategy.
I believe that when undertaking anything, one must prepare in advance, or it cannot be done. The same applies to a company's structure—if you can project how much will sell, you invest ahead of time to build the capacity to produce those products. We have actually done this, and I believe we have been successful in that regard. Our capital investment has been ahead of our competitors, which has been very advantageous.
I think what worked well was our approach of being scientific about forecasting. We have a department that manages this, with four or five people, all mathematics majors, who use mathematical statistics and other methods to make forecasts more reliable. They forecast with remarkable accuracy. So based on those forecasts, we were able to prepare with confidence.