Founded in 1887. Starting as a soap retailer, Kao expanded into synthetic detergents, disposable diapers, and cosmetics. The acquisition of Kanebo Cosmetics made it a major cosmetics player. Through distinctive management approaches including EVA-based management and sales company reform, Kao has maintained a high-profitability structure as a consumer goods and chemical manufacturer.
1887
Strategic Decision
Nagase Tomiro Shoten founded
A founding-era business design entering the market through distribution rather than manufacturing
1890
Strategic Decision
Kao Soap launched
Transformation from distributor to manufacturer
1922
Strategic Decision
Azuma-cho factory established
Building a consumer goods manufacturer's competitive foundation through preemptive investment in mass production
1925
Strategic Decision
Kao Soap Co., Ltd. established
An institutional transition from founder-family management to corporate management driven by business expansion
1940
Strategic Decision
Nihon Yuki (Japan Organic) established
Oleochemical technology assets left by wartime military production
1949
Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
1949Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
1951
Strategic Decision
Synthetic detergent launched
Wartime chemical technology that enabled the transformation of the cleaning agent market
1954
Kao Soap absorbs and merges with Kao Yushi
1954Kao Soap absorbs and merges with Kao Yushi
1957
Strategic Decision
Investment in synthetic detergent factory
Preemptive investment in dedicated equipment that irreversibly fixed the business transformation from soap to detergent
1963
Kawasaki factory established
1963Kawasaki factory established
1964
Strategic Decision
Resale price maintenance contracts signed with retailers
A competitive strategy that redesigned the distribution structure while accepting short-term share loss
1978
Strategic Decision
Capital investment intensified
Three-stage investment sequencing design of distribution, technology, and overseas expansion
1982
Entry into cosmetics business
1982Entry into cosmetics business
1983
Disposable diaper 'Merries' launched
1983Disposable diaper 'Merries' launched
1985
Company name changed to Kao Corporation
1985Company name changed to Kao Corporation
1985
Strategic Decision
Entry into floppy disk business
Organizational experience and management discipline left by the withdrawal from an 80 billion yen business
1986
Strategic Decision
Total Cost Reduction (TCR) campaign launched
Cross-company cost management that opened the transition to numbers-driven management
1993
Local subsidiary established in China
1993Local subsidiary established in China
1999
Strategic Decision
Kao Sales Co., Ltd. established
Completion of a 40-year distribution reform and transition to integrated manufacturing-sales management
1999
Strategic Decision
EVA adopted as management metric
A paradoxical structure where dependence on an excellent metric delayed its own re-examination
2000
Board of directors reform
2000Board of directors reform
2002
John Frieda (US) acquired
2002John Frieda (US) acquired
2006
Strategic Decision
Kanebo Cosmetics acquired
Design failures in organizational integration that delayed the return on a 410 billion yen investment
2011
Strategic Decision
Diaper production commenced in China
Non-permanence of quality advantage and investment recovery design in overseas production
2018
Oribe Hair Care acquired
2018Oribe Hair Care acquired
2018
Washing Systems acquired
2018Washing Systems acquired
2018
Increased severance payments for early retirees
2018Increased severance payments for early retirees
2023
Strategic Decision
Bondi Sands Australia acquired
A shift in overseas expansion methodology from Japan-originated export to local-brand axis
2025
Strategic Decision
Shareholder proposals from Oasis rejected
Structural gap between the time horizon of ESG management and capital market expectations
View Performance
RevenueKao Corporation (Kao):Revenue
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: ¥100M)
¥1.6T
Revenue:2024/12
ProfitKao Corporation (Kao):Net Profit Margin
Non-consol. | Consolidated (Unit: %)
12.1%
Margin:2024/12
View Performance
PeriodTypeRevenueProfit*Margin
1954/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥2B¥0B0.6%
1955/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥3B¥0B0.6%
1956/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥4B¥0B1.9%
1957/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥5B¥0B3.9%
1958/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥6B¥0B4.3%
1959/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥9B¥1B6.3%
1960/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥12B¥1B6.3%
1961/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥15B¥1B6.1%
1962/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥19B¥1B5.3%
1963/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥21B¥1B5.1%
1964/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥24B¥1B4.0%
1965/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥28B¥1B2.8%
1966/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥33B¥1B2.8%
1967/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥39B¥1B2.9%
1968/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥44B¥1B2.7%
1969/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥45B¥1B2.7%
1970/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥50B¥1B2.8%
1971/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥58B¥2B2.7%
1972/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥66B¥2B2.6%
1973/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥84B¥2B2.6%
1974/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥117B¥2B1.9%
1975/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥142B¥2B1.2%
1976/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥147B¥2B1.3%
1977/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥161B¥3B1.7%
1978/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥187B¥3B1.5%
1979/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥214B¥3B1.5%
1980/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥246B¥4B1.4%
1981/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥252B¥4B1.5%
1982/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥281B¥5B1.6%
1983/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥306B¥6B1.8%
1984/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥331B¥6B1.8%
1985/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥370B--
1986/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥406B--
1987/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥441B--
1988/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income¥490B--
1989/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1990/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1991/3Non-consol. Revenue / Net Income---
1992/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥730B¥20B2.7%
1993/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥771B¥20B2.6%
1994/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥774B¥22B2.8%
1995/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥797B¥24B2.9%
1996/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥836B¥25B2.9%
1997/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥901B¥28B3.0%
1998/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥907B¥24B2.6%
1999/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥925B¥35B3.7%
2000/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥847B¥52B6.1%
2001/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥822B¥59B7.2%
2002/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥839B¥60B7.1%
2003/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥865B¥62B7.2%
2004/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥903B¥65B7.2%
2005/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥937B¥72B7.6%
2006/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥971B¥71B7.3%
2007/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.2T¥71B5.7%
2008/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.3T¥67B5.0%
2009/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.3T¥64B5.0%
2010/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.2T¥41B3.4%
2011/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.2T¥47B3.9%
2012/3Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.2T¥52B4.3%
2012/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.0T¥53B5.2%
2013/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.3T¥65B4.9%
2014/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income¥1.4T¥80B5.6%
2015/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income (Parent)¥1.5T¥105B7.1%
2016/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income (Parent)¥1.5T¥127B8.6%
2017/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income (Parent)¥1.5T¥147B9.8%
2018/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income (Parent)¥1.5T¥154B10.1%
2019/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income (Parent)¥1.5T¥148B9.8%
2020/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income (Parent)¥1.4T¥126B9.1%
2021/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income (Parent)¥1.4T¥110B7.7%
2022/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income (Parent)¥1.6T¥86B5.5%
2023/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income (Parent)¥1.5T¥44B2.8%
2024/12Consolidated Revenue / Net Income (Parent)¥1.6T¥198B12.1%
Management Policy: FY2024 (Dec.)FY2027 (Dec.)
Kao Group Mid-Term Management Plan K27

Background to the plan

In the 1960s, Kao carried out a bold sales company reform, breaking away from dependence on wholesalers and building a distribution structure that consolidated pricing control and sales data within the company through direct retailer transactions. This framework established long-term competitive advantage in the consumer goods market, and from the 1970s onward, Kao steadily built up capital investments and R&D capabilities to strengthen its cash flow generation.

In the late 1980s, cost reforms through TCR (Total Cost Reduction) were introduced, followed by EVA adoption in the late 1990s, continually updating management methodologies in response to changing business environments. Capital-efficiency-focused management became deeply embedded throughout the organization.

However, from the 2000s onward, declining overseas profitability and prolonged stagnation in the cosmetics business gradually slowed profit growth. While EVA functioned as a certain level of discipline from a company-wide perspective, situations emerged where it could not sufficiently visualize capital efficiency by business segment or prioritize growth investments. Reflecting on these shortcomings, Kao reassessed its approach to mid-term management planning, centering on structural reform and growth strategy. K27 was formulated in August 2023, with implementation beginning from FY2024.

Core management policy

Under K27, all businesses are re-evaluated using ROIC as the central metric, with improvement in capital efficiency and restoration of value-creation capability positioned as the top priorities. In the consumer goods business, Kao aims to leverage the brands, technologies, and distribution data accumulated over many years in an integrated manner, rebuilding a high-profitability model that does not rely on price competition to strengthen the foundation for stable cash generation.

Simultaneously, for overseas operations and the cosmetics business, a shift has been declared from scale-driven investment to selective investment emphasizing profitability and reproducibility. Management resources are concentrated on areas with growth potential, while structural reforms are pursued for businesses with unclear results, aiming to enhance company-wide cash flow generation. In other words, K27 is not a plan pursuing short-term revenue growth, but rather a management transformation oriented toward sustainably improving capital efficiency and balancing growth investment with shareholder returns.

Author's Questions

  • Why have Kao's past reforms failed to accumulate sufficiently as improvements in corporate value?

    Kao has adopted progressive management methods for each era — including sales company reform, TCR, and EVA adoption — yet from the 2000s onward, declining overseas profitability and stagnation in the cosmetics business meant these did not translate into improvements in ROIC or stock valuation. Compared to past decision-making, what is K27 most trying to change from a corporate value perspective?

  • Can it truly be said that the premises for decision-making have shifted under K27 to see the reform through?

    In past mid-term plans, structural reform and growth strategies were proclaimed while business continuity and incremental improvement remained the underlying assumptions. Can the ROIC-centric approach and business re-evaluation outlined in K27 be definitively stated as being based on premises that will not retreat mid-course, rather than being an extension of past approaches?

  • After an activist challenged K27, does Kao have the foundation to drive management reform through internal pressure rather than external pressure?

    K27 was a plan formulated based on Kao's own problem awareness, yet subsequently an activist presented criticisms regarding capital efficiency and business structure. Rather than merely reacting defensively, can Kao use these criticisms as a catalyst to create internal tension and continuously update its management planning and decision-making going forward?

Author's Insights

Why did Kao become adept at marketing data analysis?
Insight

The origin of Kao's competitive advantage in the consumer goods industry lies in the sales company reform it decided upon more than half a century ago. From the 1960s onward, the company distanced itself from indirect distribution through wholesalers and shifted toward a system centered on direct transactions with retailers. This decision entailed friction with existing distribution practices and increased selling expenses, and wholesalers sided with competitor Lion — making it a clear risk for Kao at the time.

Despite the pain involved, by building its own sales companies, Kao gained the ability to grasp retail sales information in real time. This system, developed through the 1970s and 1980s, functioned as a conduit for reflecting frontline information in headquarters decision-making during the earliest period when POS utilization became widespread in the 1980s. In other words, the competitive advantage lay not in the distribution reform itself, but in the fact that it became a starting point for connecting to subsequent product development.

Thus, the reason Kao could deploy data-analysis-driven marketing was rooted in having removed the wholesaler barrier in advance. The process of linking sales performance and consumer trends to product improvement and demand forecasting would have been difficult to establish while outsourcing distribution. The accumulated information obtained through sales company reform became the foundation for repeated analysis and improvement, ultimately leading to long-term competitiveness.

Therefore, Kao's competitive advantage through distribution reform did not lie in data analysis or marketing methods themselves. The essence was in choosing early on to establish a system without wholesaler intermediaries — a structure where information naturally flowed to the company. While data analysis can be imitated later, restructuring the distribution system itself is not an easy decision. More than half a century ago, Kao established the preconditions that would make analysis possible, and its competitive advantage lay in reorganizing the decision-making process rather than products or tactics.

2026-02-21 | by author
Why couldn't Kao revisit its excellent management metric?
Insight

EVA (Economic Value Added), which Kao had emphasized since the late 1990s, was a highly rational management metric for the business environment of its time. In the mature consumer goods market, capital efficiency mattered more than revenue growth, and EVA — which explicitly deducted the cost of capital — functioned as an effective discipline for curbing excessive investment and maintaining high profitability. EVA was not merely a management metric; it permeated the organization as a foundational premise supporting Kao's management decisions.

However, from the 2000s onward, the business environment gradually changed. As the weight of overseas expansion, R&D, and brand investment grew — projects requiring longer investment recovery periods — EVA, which tended to converge on short-term results, became increasingly difficult to use for capturing changes in business structure. In principle, it had become necessary to reconsider the environmental conditions upon which the metric was premised.

Yet because the values premised on EVA had been embedded in the organization over many years, the idea of questioning those premises was difficult to generate even among senior management. EVA was rational, backed by track record, and therefore the central discussion tended to be 'how to conform to the metric' rather than 'whether the metric is appropriate.' As a result, the very premise that the appropriate evaluation axis could change with shifts in the business environment was not sufficiently questioned, and time passed.

In other words, the delay in transitioning to ROIC was not due to EVA's flaws, but rather to the management's failure to notice changes in underlying conditions by absolutizing EVA. Management metrics are tools that support decision-making, and they are also objects that should be updated alongside the environment. Kao's case illustrates the paradoxical structure in which the more excellent a metric is, the more deeply it takes root in an organization, and its very rationality delays the questioning of its continued relevance.

2026-02-21 | by author
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1887
6

Nagase Tomiro Shoten founded

A founding-era business design entering the market through distribution rather than manufacturing

The founding of Nagase Tomiro Shoten was characterized by entering the soap market through distribution rather than manufacturing. In a market dominated by imports, the choice was made to avoid the risks of leading with manufacturing investment and instead understand demand structure and quality assessment through procurement and sales. The distribution-first business design had the structure of building preconditions for subsequent manufacturing entry through accumulated sales volume and trade relationships, positioning it as the starting point of Kao's business development.

Background: Soap market dominated by imports and formation of consumer goods distribution via railroad development

In mid-Meiji Japan, hygiene awareness was growing primarily in urban areas, and consumption of soap as a daily product was expanding. However, the domestic soap manufacturing base remained immature, with technical challenges persisting from raw material procurement of fats and oils through the production process. The market was dominated by imports from the West, and domestic products faced significant quality gaps compared to imports in terms of quality consistency and fragrance formulation technology. Although soap was a consumer product with expected repeat purchases, conditions for domestic manufacturers to reliably capture demand were not yet in place, and the import-dependent structure was becoming entrenched.

Meanwhile, railroad development by the Meiji government was progressing, and logistics efficiency originating from Tokyo was improving. Nihonbashi-Bakurocho in particular functioned as an intersection of commerce and logistics, serving as a distribution hub for shipments across the country. Soap was lightweight with good storage characteristics and was compatible with rail transport, so conditions for distributing nationwide from a Tokyo base were beginning to emerge. In the process of consumer goods distribution routes being formed, a gap remained between demand expansion and supply systems, creating business rationale for market entry from the distribution side.

Decision: Founding as a household goods retailer based in Nihonbashi, choosing distribution as the business starting point

In June 1887, Tomiro Nagase founded Nagase Tomiro Shoten in Nihonbashi-Bakurocho, Tokyo. Nagase came from a sake brewing family in Nakatsugawa, Gifu Prefecture, and was in a position to secure the capital necessary for starting an independent business. The initial business handled soap and imported stationery as a household goods retailer, entering the market as a distribution business rather than a manufacturer. From the outset, rather than directing invested capital into manufacturing, the choice was made to first understand the market's demand structure and quality assessment through procurement and sales.

The decision to defer manufacturing investment in entering the soap market reflected the market environment of the time. Rather than bearing the risk of leading with manufacturing, accumulating sales volume and trade relationships through distribution, and obtaining information about demand and quality gaps, was more practical as groundwork for subsequent business expansion. The founding of Nagase Tomiro Shoten is positioned as a distribution-first business design that prioritized information accumulation and trade network building, based on the market characteristics of soap as a daily consumer good.

A founding-era business design entering the market through distribution rather than manufacturing

The founding of Nagase Tomiro Shoten was characterized by entering the soap market through distribution rather than manufacturing. In a market dominated by imports, the choice was made to avoid the risks of leading with manufacturing investment and instead understand demand structure and quality assessment through procurement and sales. The distribution-first business design had the structure of building preconditions for subsequent manufacturing entry through accumulated sales volume and trade relationships, positioning it as the starting point of Kao's business development.

1890
10

Kao Soap launched

Transformation from distributor to manufacturer

At the time, the soap market was highly dependent on imports, with exchange rates and procurement conditions affecting profitability. Entering manufacturing was a decision involving capital investment and technology acquisition, but the aim was to partially internalize supply initiative by leveraging demand information accumulated through distribution. The 1890 launch of Kao Soap marked a turning point from a distribution-centered business to a business composition including manufacturing.

In 1890, Nagase Tomiro Shoten entered soap manufacturing and launched domestically produced 'Kao Soap.' This marked the expansion of business scope from distribution to manufacturing for the shop that had handled soap as a distributor. Tomiro Nagase had gained an understanding of quality gaps, supply conditions, and pricing through selling imported soap as a household goods retailer, and leveraged that knowledge to move upstream in the value chain.

Transformation from distributor to manufacturer

At the time, the soap market was highly dependent on imports, with exchange rates and procurement conditions affecting profitability. Entering manufacturing was a decision involving capital investment and technology acquisition, but the aim was to partially internalize supply initiative by leveraging demand information accumulated through distribution. The 1890 launch of Kao Soap marked a turning point from a distribution-centered business to a business composition including manufacturing.

1922
11

Azuma-cho factory established

Building a consumer goods manufacturer's competitive foundation through preemptive investment in mass production

The 1922 establishment of the Azuma-cho factory was an investment decision simultaneously pursuing demand response and cost structure advantage. In the soap market where numerous small manufacturers competed, preemptive investment in mass production facilities had the effect of creating cost-based entry barriers. The location selection accommodating both water and rail transport reflected a philosophy of integrated design of manufacturing and logistics, marking the starting point of Kao's pursuit of economies of scale as a consumer goods manufacturer.

Background: Limitations in supply capacity amid expanding soap demand and the need for mass production facilities

In the Taisho era, soap demand continued to expand against the backdrop of growing urban population and changing lifestyles. Kao Soap had been increasing sales volume through its nationwide distribution network since entering manufacturing in 1890, but constraints in production capacity and process management at existing manufacturing sites were becoming apparent. As repeat purchases of soap as a daily product became established, preventing stockouts at the retail level and ensuring stable supply became pressing issues, leading mass production system development to emerge as a key management priority alongside per-unit cost management.

Additionally, in the post-World War I economic environment, raw material procurement conditions and exchange rate fluctuations had become more likely to affect manufacturing costs. Fats and oils, the primary raw materials for soap, had high import dependence, and external environmental changes carried inherent risks of squeezing profitability. Expanding manufacturing capacity served not only to meet demand but also to improve resilience against raw material price fluctuations through consolidation of production processes and equipment upgrades. Rather than partial expansion of existing factories, the option of establishing a new mass production site was being concretely considered.

Decision: New mass production facility in Azuma-cho, Tokyo with location selected for logistics efficiency

In November 1922, Kao established a new factory in Azuma-cho, Tokyo. The factory was equipped with dedicated facilities for mass soap production, achieving consolidation of manufacturing processes and improved production efficiency compared to previous sites. Azuma-cho was located along the Sumida River, enabling both receipt of raw materials via water transport and product shipment via rail. The site placement, designed to integrate logistics from manufacturing through shipment, was a decision anticipating the increase in logistics burden accompanying production scale expansion.

This investment was positioned not as passive production expansion in response to demand growth, but as equipment consolidation simultaneously achieving per-unit cost reduction and supply stabilization. In the soap market where numerous small manufacturers existed and price competition was intensifying, the cost structure advantage from preemptive investment in mass production equipment became the foundation for market competitiveness. The Azuma-cho factory subsequently functioned as the core production site supporting business expansion, positioned as the starting point of production facilities leading to today's Sumida Business Site.

Building a consumer goods manufacturer's competitive foundation through preemptive investment in mass production

The 1922 establishment of the Azuma-cho factory was an investment decision simultaneously pursuing demand response and cost structure advantage. In the soap market where numerous small manufacturers competed, preemptive investment in mass production facilities had the effect of creating cost-based entry barriers. The location selection accommodating both water and rail transport reflected a philosophy of integrated design of manufacturing and logistics, marking the starting point of Kao's pursuit of economies of scale as a consumer goods manufacturer.

1925
5

Kao Soap Co., Ltd. established

An institutional transition from founder-family management to corporate management driven by business expansion

Kao Soap's incorporation was an institutional choice to align the management system with business scale expansion. The sole proprietorship framework had reached its limits in fundraising for capital investment and organizational division of multiple functions, and obtaining corporate status was a decision to establish the preconditions necessary for business continuity and utilization of external capital. The significance lies in its structural turning point from dependence on the founding family to organizational management, supporting subsequent diversification and advancement of management systems.

Background: Business scale expansion and the limits of family management becoming apparent

Throughout the Taisho era, Kao Soap had expanded its business scale through the establishment of the Azuma-cho factory and nationwide sales network expansion. Soap was distributed widely as a mass-produced product, and the number of trading partners and sales steadily increased. However, management decision-making, fundraising, and personnel management relied on the framework of personal management centered on the founding Nagase family, and the limitations of this approach were becoming apparent as the business grew. Challenges accumulated that could not be addressed within the sole proprietorship format, including fundraising for capital investment, organizing divisions of manufacturing, sales, and administrative functions, and explaining business continuity to trading partners.

Particularly in the 1920s, business operations utilizing the joint-stock company system were becoming widespread in Japan, and obtaining corporate status directly connected to capital market access and enhanced external credibility. For Kao as well, the need was growing to raise investment funds from external sources and institutionally secure management sustainability. The recognition that if management system evolution could not keep pace with business growth, it would become difficult to stably operate the expanded sales network and manufacturing system prompted the review of organizational format.

Decision: Organizational restructuring to joint-stock company and transition from founder-family management

In May 1925, Kao Soap restructured as a joint-stock company, establishing Kao Soap Co., Ltd. This decision transitioned management from operations based on the founding family's individual discretion to organizational operations premised on the separation of capital and management. Incorporation broadened fundraising options and shifted management decision-making processes toward role-based formats. Corporate status established the preconditions for organizationally sustaining the long-term capital investments necessary for equipment investment and business expansion.

This organizational restructuring was a turning point in Kao's transition from a founding-era sole proprietorship to growth-stage corporate management. Business challenges including manufacturing site operations, nationwide sales network management, and raw material procurement stabilization all required organizational responses, and the joint-stock company system functioned as that foundation. With a system conscious of separating management and execution in place, business continuity independent of specific individuals was secured. The 1925 incorporation is positioned as the institutional starting point supporting Kao's subsequent diversification and advancement of management systems.

An institutional transition from founder-family management to corporate management driven by business expansion

Kao Soap's incorporation was an institutional choice to align the management system with business scale expansion. The sole proprietorship framework had reached its limits in fundraising for capital investment and organizational division of multiple functions, and obtaining corporate status was a decision to establish the preconditions necessary for business continuity and utilization of external capital. The significance lies in its structural turning point from dependence on the founding family to organizational management, supporting subsequent diversification and advancement of management systems.

1940
5

Nihon Yuki (Japan Organic) established

Oleochemical technology assets left by wartime military production

The establishment of Nihon Yuki was a decision to expand a finished goods manufacturer's business scope upstream in response to fats and oils procurement constraints. Through wartime military production, technologies for lubricant and higher alcohol synthesis and refining were accumulated, with technology learning progressing from applications different from soap. These technology assets were directly transferred to postwar synthetic detergent development, becoming the starting point for expanding Kao's business portfolio from soap alone to a composition based on chemical technology.

Background: Constraints on fats and oils procurement and the need for business expansion into the chemical domain under a controlled economy

In the late 1930s, Japan's soap industry faced constraints on fats and oils raw material procurement. Beef tallow and vegetable oils, the primary raw materials for soap, had high import dependence, and supply conditions had become unstable due to deteriorating international relations following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. For Kao Soap, the simultaneous existence of expanding sales volume and raw material constraints presented a structural challenge where demand fluctuations could not be absorbed through increased production of finished products alone. Securing stable raw material supply had emerged as a management priority and precondition for business continuity.

Additionally, with the progression of the wartime regime, fats and oils and chemical products were increasingly positioned as military supplies. As rationing systems were introduced and repurposing demands advanced, soap — while a civilian product — had raw materials and manufacturing processes adjacent to the chemical industry, making procurement and production planning susceptible to national policy influence. Remaining within the scope of a finished goods manufacturer meant limited options for addressing raw material supply fluctuations, and the option of internalizing procurement risk by moving upstream in the value chain gained practical viability.

Decision: Establishment of Nihon Yuki to expand into the chemical domain at the raw material stage

In May 1940, Kao Soap established Nihon Yuki Co., Ltd., expanding its business into the chemical domain at the raw material stage. This was a decision to direct invested capital toward chemical processes upstream of finished products, including fats and oils processing and alcohol production. The aim was to internalize procurement risk and secure stable raw material supply by incorporating supply-constrained areas within the business scope. This marked an expansion from the business image of a soap manufacturer to a business group handling chemical processes.

During the war, Nihon Yuki was involved in producing aviation lubricants and alcohol for military purposes, accumulating technology in synthesis and refining. While the applications differed directly from soap manufacturing, the knowledge of oleochemistry and reaction control was technically adjacent. The technological foundation in higher alcohols and aliphatic compounds gained through this process would be accumulated as assets transferable to postwar synthetic detergent development and surfactant manufacturing.

Oleochemical technology assets left by wartime military production

The establishment of Nihon Yuki was a decision to expand a finished goods manufacturer's business scope upstream in response to fats and oils procurement constraints. Through wartime military production, technologies for lubricant and higher alcohol synthesis and refining were accumulated, with technology learning progressing from applications different from soap. These technology assets were directly transferred to postwar synthetic detergent development, becoming the starting point for expanding Kao's business portfolio from soap alone to a composition based on chemical technology.

1949
Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
1951

Synthetic detergent launched

Wartime chemical technology that enabled the transformation of the cleaning agent market

The entry into synthetic detergents was a decision to transfer higher alcohol and oleochemical technologies accumulated through Nihon Yuki during the prewar and wartime periods to civilian products. While competitors concentrated management resources on soap, Kao ventured early into a new domain involving a fundamental shift in cleaning principles. The entry decision, backed by accumulated technology, in response to the changing demand structure brought by washing machine adoption, led to the formation of market positioning.

Background: Qualitative shift in cleaning agent demand driven by washing machine adoption and the need for technological transformation

In the early 1950s, electric washing machines were spreading across Japanese households, and laundry behavior was transitioning from manual washing to machine use. Conventional laundry soap was designed for hand washing, and machine washing caused excessive foaming and inconsistent cleaning performance. As a new cleaning agent with superior reproducibility of cleaning performance and operability was sought, powdered synthetic detergent attracted attention as a new option for household cleaning agents due to its high compatibility with machine washing in terms of water solubility and cleaning efficiency.

These environmental changes could not be addressed through mere product improvement; they entailed a technological challenge involving a fundamental shift in cleaning principles. Soap is an alkali salt made from animal and vegetable fats and oils, whereas synthetic detergent is a product based on petrochemical surfactants, with fundamentally different manufacturing processes and raw material systems. Existing soap manufacturing technology could not address the new requirements, and proprietary technological foundations in surfactant synthesis and oleochemistry were prerequisites for market entry.

Decision: Launch of synthetic detergent 'Wonderful' by transferring oleochemical technology

In 1951, Kao launched the powdered synthetic detergent 'Wonderful,' making a full-scale entry into the detergent sector. This decision was not an extension of the existing soap business but rather a business domain expansion originating from chemical technology. Behind it lay the production technologies for higher alcohols and oleochemistry accumulated through Nihon Yuki from the prewar through wartime period. The synthesis and refining technologies for alcohol compounds systematized through military production were directly applicable technological foundations for developing synthetic detergents based on surfactants.

In product planning, emphasis was placed on versatility for use both indoors and outdoors. The powder form designed for use in electric washing machines offered superior solubility and cleaning power stability compared to conventional soap, enhancing operability in household use. While most competitors allocated management resources to conventional laundry soap, Kao began early work in the new cleaning agent category of synthetic detergents. This was a decision where prewar and wartime chemical technology was materialized as a civilian market product.

Result: Transformation of business structure from soap manufacturer to detergent manufacturer

After the launch of Wonderful, synthetic detergent demand expanded in tandem with the spread of electric washing machines, and became established as the mainstream product category in household cleaning agents. Powdered synthetic detergent was accepted as a product suited for machine washing, shifting the product composition in laundry applications from soap to detergent. Kao expanded its business portfolio from a soap manufacturer to a detergent manufacturer leveraging oleochemistry and surfactant technology.

This transformation was an instance where chemical technology accumulated during the prewar and wartime periods functioned as product competitiveness in the postwar civilian market. The knowledge of higher alcohols and aliphatic compounds obtained through Nihon Yuki directly served as the technological foundation in synthetic detergent product development. The 1951 launch of Wonderful is positioned as the starting point of transition from a business structure dependent on the single product category of soap to the deployment of multiple products based on chemical technology.

Wartime chemical technology that enabled the transformation of the cleaning agent market

The entry into synthetic detergents was a decision to transfer higher alcohol and oleochemical technologies accumulated through Nihon Yuki during the prewar and wartime periods to civilian products. While competitors concentrated management resources on soap, Kao ventured early into a new domain involving a fundamental shift in cleaning principles. The entry decision, backed by accumulated technology, in response to the changing demand structure brought by washing machine adoption, led to the formation of market positioning.

TimelineSynthetic detergent launched — Key Events
1951Synthetic detergent 'Wonderful (Kao Powdered Laundry)' launched
1950R&D for synthetic detergent initiated
1954
8

Kao Soap absorbs and merges with Kao Yushi

-

TimelineKao Soap absorbs and merges with Kao Yushi — Key Events
5/1935Dainippon Yushi (Great Japan Fats and Oils) established
5/1940Nihon Yuki (Japan Organic) established
5/1949Nihon Yuki renamed to Kao Soap
12/1949Dainippon Yushi and Kao merge (Kao Yushi launched)
8/1954Kao Soap absorbs Kao Yushi
1957
12

Investment in synthetic detergent factory

Preemptive investment in dedicated equipment that irreversibly fixed the business transformation from soap to detergent

The new dedicated synthetic detergent facility at the Wakayama factory was an investment decision to establish a mass production system from product-level success. The characteristic lies in eliminating mixed production with soap and introducing dedicated lines that integrated design from raw material processing through packaging. While competitors operated on the premise of soap equipment, Kao's preemptive investment in dedicated synthetic detergent equipment was a choice that irreversibly fixed the business transformation in terms of facilities.

Background: Rapid expansion of synthetic detergent demand and manufacturing process challenges beyond soap equipment capabilities

In the late 1950s, the spread of electric washing machines accelerated in Japan, and the mainstream of household cleaning agents was shifting from soap to synthetic detergent. 'Wonderful,' launched in 1951, had high compatibility with machine washing as a powdered cleaning agent, and demand was steadily expanding. However, existing soap manufacturing equipment could not adequately handle the reaction processes and powdering required for mass production of synthetic detergent, and limitations in production volume and quality stability were becoming apparent.

Synthetic detergent, unlike soap, was a product premised on chemical processes using higher alcohols and surfactants. While knowledge of higher alcohols and chemical reactions had been accumulated through Nihon Yuki from the prewar through wartime period, efficiency challenges remained in mixed production with existing factories as dedicated mass production equipment for detergent. To meet expanding demand while ensuring quality stability, establishing a production system specialized in synthetic detergent was essential.

Decision: New dedicated synthetic detergent facility within Wakayama factory and mass production system construction

In December 1957, Kao established a new dedicated synthetic detergent factory within its Wakayama factory. This investment signaled the decision to position synthetic detergent not as a transitory product but as a future core business. Rather than extending soap equipment, dedicated facilities were introduced that integrated raw material processing, reaction processes, powdering, and packaging, achieving both production capacity and quality control. The investment amount was approximately 7.5 billion yen.

The Wakayama factory was a site where technological accumulation in fats and oils and the chemical domain had progressed through the prewar and postwar periods, equipped with a manufacturing base suitable for handling higher alcohols and surfactants. The new synthetic detergent factory strengthened the linkage of research, manufacturing, and mass production, establishing a stable supply system. While competitors still centered their operations on soap equipment, Kao's preemptive investment in dedicated synthetic detergent facilities was a decision to fix the business transformation in terms of equipment.

Result: Business structure transformation through capital investment and establishment of the foundation as a detergent manufacturer

With the dedicated synthetic detergent facility at the Wakayama factory in operation, Kao achieved stabilization of mass production quality and expansion of supply capacity. Synthetic detergent production efficiency improved, and a supply system capable of responding to the expanding adoption of electric washing machines was established. The transformation from a soap-centered product composition to a business structure centered on synthetic detergent was backed by capital investment.

This investment was a decision to advance the synthetic detergent business — which began with the 1951 launch of Wonderful — from product-level success to the establishment of a mass production system. Investment in equipment specialized for synthetic detergent eliminated mixed production with soap and clarified the product category's independence. In the process of Kao establishing its business foundation as a detergent manufacturer, the concentrated investment in the Wakayama factory is positioned as the turning point in terms of equipment.

Preemptive investment in dedicated equipment that irreversibly fixed the business transformation from soap to detergent

The new dedicated synthetic detergent facility at the Wakayama factory was an investment decision to establish a mass production system from product-level success. The characteristic lies in eliminating mixed production with soap and introducing dedicated lines that integrated design from raw material processing through packaging. While competitors operated on the premise of soap equipment, Kao's preemptive investment in dedicated synthetic detergent equipment was a choice that irreversibly fixed the business transformation in terms of facilities.

1963
Kawasaki factory established
1964

Resale price maintenance contracts signed with retailers

A competitive strategy that redesigned the distribution structure while accepting short-term share loss

Kao's sales company reform was distinctive in directing invested capital toward redesigning the distribution structure itself, rather than toward advertising or price competition. It accepted friction with wholesalers and three years of share loss as the cost, simultaneously acquiring retail price control and in-house aggregation of sales information. Investment recovery was achieved as price defense capability after the oil crisis, and the reform functioned as a structural entry barrier restraining P&G's share expansion in the Japanese market.

Background: The need to secure pricing control amid foreign entry and structural changes in distribution

Throughout the 1960s, Kao faced a qualitative shift in the competitive environment of the consumer goods industry. Entry of foreign companies into the Japanese market was becoming realistic against the backdrop of capital liberalization. P&G in particular had a track record of eliminating local manufacturers in European markets, and a similar scenario was anticipated for the Japanese market. Comparing 1971 sales, P&G exceeded 1 trillion yen while Kao remained at around 60 billion yen, with significant gaps in invested capital and staying power.

Another change was the rising bargaining power on the distribution side. From the late 1960s, supermarkets represented by Daiei grew rapidly and began demanding price reductions leveraging their bulk purchasing power. Under the conventional multi-layered wholesaler structure, it was becoming difficult for manufacturers to control final selling prices, and signs emerged that pricing power was shifting to the distribution side. With competition from foreign companies and downward price pressure from distributors progressing simultaneously, Kao moved toward the option of redesigning the distribution structure itself, rather than advertising investment or price competition.

Decision: Resale contracts with 270,000 retailers nationwide and departure from wholesaler dependence

Under these circumstances, Yoshiro Maruta, then vice president, chose to break away from wholesaler dependence. In 1964, Kao signed resale price maintenance contracts with approximately 270,000 retail stores nationwide and announced a policy of reorganizing regional wholesalers into consolidated sales companies. The decision was made to discontinue transactions with primary wholesalers and build distribution channels delivering directly to secondary wholesalers and retailers through the sales companies. The design aimed to simultaneously achieve retail price control and sales information aggregation by having the manufacturer seize distribution initiative.

This measure represented a clear change of course toward existing wholesalers and invited strong backlash. In Tokyo, a 'Sales Company Destruction Council' was formed, and some wholesalers began favoring competitor Lion. From 1969 to 1971, Kao lost the top position in detergent market share, but it accepted the short-term share decline and prioritized securing pricing initiative through distribution consolidation. The friction with wholesalers and temporary loss of market share were factored in as the cost of building the sales company system.

Result: Price maintenance capability and sales information competitive advantage demonstrated after the oil crisis

The sales company network development clearly demonstrated its effectiveness after the 1973 oil crisis. Even as retailers resorted to panic selling during the recession, Kao controlled selling prices through its sales companies and successfully maintained profit margins. Detergent market share was reclaimed as the top position by the mid-1970s, confirming the pattern where the sales company system contributed to stabilizing the revenue structure. The decision to place distribution under the company's control achieved investment recovery in the form of price defense capability during an economic downturn.

Additionally, the utilization of sales data aggregated daily from sales companies reinforced Kao's competitive advantage from an information perspective. Improvements in supply-demand adjustment and product development speed through computer adoption crystallized as a system integrating distribution and information operations. This system functioned as a structural factor restraining P&G's share expansion in the Japanese market. The sales company reform was a decision that simultaneously built two competitive advantages — price control and information acquisition — and is positioned as one of the most important decisions in Kao's management history.

A competitive strategy that redesigned the distribution structure while accepting short-term share loss

Kao's sales company reform was distinctive in directing invested capital toward redesigning the distribution structure itself, rather than toward advertising or price competition. It accepted friction with wholesalers and three years of share loss as the cost, simultaneously acquiring retail price control and in-house aggregation of sales information. Investment recovery was achieved as price defense capability after the oil crisis, and the reform functioned as a structural entry barrier restraining P&G's share expansion in the Japanese market.

TestimonyYoshiro Maruta (Kao, then president)

Q (interviewer): So local wholesalers and Kao jointly invested to establish sales companies nationwide?

A (President Maruta): No, Kao barely invested. The wholesalers pooled their existing working capital. But at first, the wholesalers didn't fully understand our vision, so it was difficult. Some sent poor-quality people. Those who thought 'results won't improve anyway, let's dissolve this quickly and return to our companies' ended up managing operations... (laughs)

At one point our share dropped to second place. For three years — 1969, 1970, and 1971 when I became president — we gave up the top position. We were completely rejected by wholesalers across the country. We had anticipated it to some degree, but we pushed through because there was a sense of crisis that if wholesalers continued to fight among themselves, they would be beaten by the rising supermarkets and destroyed. In other words, at least the wholesalers handling Kao products should work together.

Source1979/8/13 Nikkei Business 'Editor-in-Chief Interview: Yoshiro Maruta'
TimelineResale price maintenance contracts signed with retailers — Key Events
1964P&G executives visit Japan; preparations for market entry
12/1964Resale price maintenance contracts signed with retailers
1966Five-year plan for sales company development
1966Tokyo wholesalers revolt (Sales Company Destruction Council formed)
1971Five-year logistics development plan
1972P&G enters Japan (P&G Sun Home established)
1969Detergent market share drops to second place
1972Detergent market share regained as No. 1
1977Online systems developed
1978
3

Capital investment intensified

Three-stage investment sequencing design of distribution, technology, and overseas expansion

The 1978 large-scale capital investment was positioned as the second stage following distribution advantage through sales company development. President Yoshiro Maruta placed European and American market expansion as the third stage, premised on cash flow improvement after depreciation completion, with the sequencing of distribution, technology, and overseas clearly designed. The decision to accept short-term depreciation burden to build medium-to-long-term competitive foundations reflects the same time-horizon investment philosophy as the sales company reform.

Background: Need for investment in technology and production areas that emerged after distribution infrastructure completion

In the late 1970s, Kao was in a recovery phase following the oil crisis. Revenues in the detergent market had improved through price control via the sales company system, but P&G continued to invest in R&D and capital expenditure in the West, making it clear that distribution advantages alone could not maintain long-term competitiveness. With sales company development having run its course, technology capability and product quality emerged as the next investment area, and concentrated investment in production and research was recognized as a management priority.

Kao had established a system for understanding market demand trends through sales data aggregated daily from its sales companies, but reflecting that information in product development required advancement of the R&D base and manufacturing equipment as prerequisites. The domestic consumer goods market was heading toward maturity, and with overseas expansion in view, securing international competitiveness on the technology front was essential. The investment sequencing of 'technology after distribution' was being concretized under President Yoshiro Maruta.

Decision: Capital investment of 120-130 billion yen over three years and promotion of vertical integration

In March 1978, Kao decided on a capital investment plan of 120 to 130 billion yen over three years. The content aimed at strengthening quality improvement and R&D capability through vertical integration including the raw materials domain and advancement of production equipment. Pilinas Kao was established in 1977 as a coconut oil raw material procurement base, and the Kashima factory was newly established in 1980, with investments organized to strengthen the integrated system from upstream to downstream.

President Yoshiro Maruta positioned the investment as important at the stage when 'seeds' that competitors could not imitate were beginning to emerge, while acknowledging that technology does not produce results overnight. With depreciation burden expected to reach 60 billion yen over three years, the sequence was designed with European and American market expansion in mind once cash flow improved after depreciation completion. Within the three-stage time design of distribution development, technology investment, and overseas expansion, this represented the second-stage decision.

Three-stage investment sequencing design of distribution, technology, and overseas expansion

The 1978 large-scale capital investment was positioned as the second stage following distribution advantage through sales company development. President Yoshiro Maruta placed European and American market expansion as the third stage, premised on cash flow improvement after depreciation completion, with the sequencing of distribution, technology, and overseas clearly designed. The decision to accept short-term depreciation burden to build medium-to-long-term competitive foundations reflects the same time-horizon investment philosophy as the sales company reform.

TestimonyYoshiro Maruta (Kao, then president)

Technology doesn't develop overnight, you know. But from now on, we can expect bigger results than before. The reason we decided on 50 billion yen in investment this fiscal year is because 'seeds' that competitors can't imitate are beginning to emerge. The next three years starting this fiscal year will be the most critical period, and we're planning 120 to 130 billion yen in investment and financing during this time. The depreciation — including special depreciation and taxable depreciation — will reach 60 billion yen over three years. However, once that depreciation is done, from a cash flow perspective, we'll have a very strong structure. Then we'll finally be ready to execute our plans for the European and American markets. That's the sequence I have in mind.

Source1979/8/13 Nikkei Business 'Editor-in-Chief Interview: Yoshiro Maruta'
TimelineCapital investment intensified — Key Events
1977Pilinas Kao established (coconut oil raw material procurement)
1980Kashima factory established (fatty acid production)
1982
Entry into cosmetics business
1983

Disposable diaper 'Merries' launched

Late entry into disposable diapers. Engaged in fierce competition with P&G and Unicharm.

TimelineDisposable diaper 'Merries' launched — Key Events
12/1975Tochigi factory established
2/1978Tochigi Research Lab established (within Tochigi factory)
1978Sanitary product 'Laurier' launched
1983Disposable diaper 'Merries' launched
1985
10

Company name changed to Kao Corporation

Changed from Kao Soap to Kao Corporation. Full-scale diversification underway.

1985

Entry into floppy disk business

Organizational experience and management discipline left by the withdrawal from an 80 billion yen business

The FD business grew rapidly as a different-industry entry through technology transfer but resulted in withdrawal due to structural changes in the recording media market. Kao's business structure, specialized in media, offered limited means to respond to market changes, leading to the decision to relinquish an approximately 80 billion yen revenue business. The talent developed through global expansion and the experience of withdrawal without clinging to sunk costs were accumulated as organizational preconditions for ROIC-based management and business selection in later years.

Background: Maturation of the consumer goods market and recording media as an application for chemical technology

In the early 1980s, Kao had established a stable revenue base in the consumer goods business. Through sales company development for price control and large-scale capital investment from the late 1970s, production technology and R&D capabilities had accumulated within the company. However, the domestic consumer goods market was heading toward maturity, and it was becoming difficult to foresee long-term revenue growth through extension of existing businesses alone. Management recognized the search for the next growth area as a management priority.

What attracted attention in this process was the potential for applying surfactant technology and polymer technology to different industries. As a chemical manufacturer, Kao possessed foundational technologies in surface treatment and material processing, which were technology assets deployable in industrial domains beyond consumer goods. The recording media market, expanding alongside the proliferation of office automation equipment, was a different industry in terms of technology, yet the manufacturing process of coating magnetic powder onto polymer film was recognized as being on the extension of Kao's material technologies.

Additionally, factory rationalization through TCR activities had generated surplus personnel, and the organizational circumstance of redeploying them to new businesses also served as a factor encouraging market entry. Deploying technologies accumulated in the consumer goods business to different industries was valued by management as an option simultaneously achieving capital efficiency and effective utilization of human resources. Organizational preparation conditions for portfolio expansion were falling into place.

Decision: Full-scale entry into floppy disk business applying surfactant technology

Around 1985, Kao decided on full-scale entry into the floppy disk (FD) business. FDs are products where magnetic powder is uniformly coated onto disc-shaped polymer film, with coating uniformity and surface characteristics determining quality. Kao determined it could achieve quality competitive with established manufacturers by applying surfactant and polymer processing technologies. While it was a different market from consumer goods, the technical requirements of the manufacturing process were adjacent to Kao's existing technologies.

Business development was not limited to the domestic market. Kao moved its FD manufacturing and sales division functions to North America, advancing global expansion through a tri-polar system of Japan, the United States, and Europe. In 1988, it acquired Canada's Didak Corporation, expanding its overseas production system. The integrated operations encompassing research, production, sales, accounting, and procurement represented international expansion at a speed and scale unprecedented for Kao.

The FD business grew rapidly, with revenue exceeding 20 billion yen in FY1990 and reaching approximately 80 billion yen at its peak. Kao invested company-wide management resources to nurture this business, positioning it not as mere technology transfer but as a full-company diversification strategy. FDs became Kao's first experience building a large-scale business in a market outside consumer goods.

Result: Withdrawal due to structural changes in the recording media market and management lessons learned

However, from the 1990s, PC recording media rapidly shifted from FDs to CD-ROMs, DVDs, and other large-capacity media. FDs themselves faced price declines and demand contraction, and market growth came to an end. Kao's information business was specialized in recording media and had not pursued integrated business development including hardware and software, so its options in response to market changes were limited.

In 1998, Kao decided on complete withdrawal from the FD business. Then-president Takuya Goto acknowledged the revenue scale and invested management resources while accepting responsibility for the failure to respond to the speed of market change. Although it did not result in a loss-making fiscal year, some executives were demoted and bonuses were cut to clearly establish management accountability.

The withdrawal from the FD business became an experience that simultaneously demonstrated the limitations and possibilities of business portfolio management for Kao. Entry into a different industry carries market change risk, but the talent developed through global expansion was subsequently valued across Kao's various business divisions. The decision to withdraw from an 80 billion yen revenue business served as an example within the company of management discipline that does not cling to sunk costs, and was accumulated as organizational experience that became a precondition for ROIC-based management and business selection under K27 in later years.

Organizational experience and management discipline left by the withdrawal from an 80 billion yen business

The FD business grew rapidly as a different-industry entry through technology transfer but resulted in withdrawal due to structural changes in the recording media market. Kao's business structure, specialized in media, offered limited means to respond to market changes, leading to the decision to relinquish an approximately 80 billion yen revenue business. The talent developed through global expansion and the experience of withdrawal without clinging to sunk costs were accumulated as organizational preconditions for ROIC-based management and business selection in later years.

TestimonyTakuya Goto (Kao, then president)

There will certainly be views that you can't just suddenly shut down a business that reached 80 billion yen in revenue. For nearly 10 years, we poured company-wide effort into it. But the reality was that market changes were extremely fast. Kao's information business was only in media like floppy disks — we weren't involved in hardware or software. We ended up just being tossed around by changes. (...)

A withdrawal after committing to something this big is the responsibility of top management, who were not farsighted enough. Among employees, there were people who had staked their careers on the information business. There were also employees who joined specifically because 'Kao has an information business,' and we caused them trouble. Fortunately, we didn't end up with a loss-making fiscal year, so we didn't trouble shareholders in terms of dividends. But I felt we should still draw a clear line — so we demoted some executives and cut bonuses.

Source1999/6/14 Nikkei Business 'Editor-in-Chief Interview: Takuya Goto'
TimelineEntry into floppy disk business — Key Events
1/1980Policy to expand basic research formulated
1985FD launched
1988Canada's Didak Corporation acquired
3/1990FD business revenue exceeds 20 billion yen
3/1999FD business revenue exceeds 80 billion yen
1999Withdrawal from FD business
1986

Total Cost Reduction (TCR) campaign launched

Cross-company cost management that opened the transition to numbers-driven management

TCR activities represented Kao's first systematic initiative to manage costs cross-functionally by the numbers. Annual cost reductions of approximately 10 billion yen were sustained for over a decade, executed as structural reform including personnel redeployment and production site consolidation. Through the visualization of cost ratio improvements, a management culture of making decisions by the numbers took root within the company, forming the foundation for EVA introduction and capital efficiency management centered on ROIC in later years.

Background: Growing complexity of cost structure during growth phase and recognition of fixed cost risks

In the mid-1980s, Kao was continuing revenue growth centered on the consumer goods business, but the cost structure was gradually becoming more complex with business domain expansion and equipment enhancement. With production, logistics, and sales processes each being optimized individually, systems for cross-functional cost visibility and improvement management across the entire company were insufficient. The large-scale capital investment of the late 1970s had strengthened the production base, but correspondingly, fixed cost levels had also risen, creating demand for a cost management system not dependent on revenue growth.

The 1980s also coincided with the entrance to Japan's bubble economy, an environment where capital investment and staffing premised on demand expansion were easily deemed rational. However, within Kao, awareness was emerging that if the external environment changed, fixed costs would risk squeezing profitability. The recognition that a cost reduction mechanism independent of revenue growth was necessary became shared among management, and the need for a cross-company initiative to visualize and improve cost structure emerged.

Decision: Company-wide TCR activities for cost reduction and reallocation of management resources

In 1986, Kao launched 'TCR (Total Cost Reduction)' activities as a company-wide operational innovation initiative. TCR was positioned as an effort spanning development, production, logistics, and sales to fundamentally rethink work methods themselves. The plan was to concentrate productivity improvements and rationalization over five years from 1986 to 1990, targeting annual cost reductions of approximately 10 billion yen.

In this process, approximately 1,000 personnel reductions were implemented, but surplus workers were redeployed to new businesses including the floppy disk business. Including the launch of the Kawasaki Logistics Center and the closure of the Kyushu factory, TCR was executed as a structural decision involving production site reallocation and management resource redistribution, not merely cost cutting. The visualization of cost ratio improvements fostered a management culture of making decisions by the numbers, laying the groundwork for the later introduction of EVA and ROIC-based management methodologies.

Cross-company cost management that opened the transition to numbers-driven management

TCR activities represented Kao's first systematic initiative to manage costs cross-functionally by the numbers. Annual cost reductions of approximately 10 billion yen were sustained for over a decade, executed as structural reform including personnel redeployment and production site consolidation. Through the visualization of cost ratio improvements, a management culture of making decisions by the numbers took root within the company, forming the foundation for EVA introduction and capital efficiency management centered on ROIC in later years.

TimelineTotal Cost Reduction (TCR) campaign launched — Key Events
1985Kawasaki Logistics Center launched
1986TCR campaign launched
1999Kyushu factory closed
1993
Local subsidiary established in China
1999
1

Kao Sales Co., Ltd. established

Completion of a 40-year distribution reform and transition to integrated manufacturing-sales management

The 1999 establishment of Kao Sales was the culmination of approximately 40 years of distribution reform that began with the 1964 sales company development. Through stages — from regional to wide-area sales companies, nationwide consolidation, and then parent company merger — a system was built for in-house management of the entire chain from manufacturing to sales. Not a quick-fix measure but a long-term structural transformation anticipating the shift to large-format and chain-operated retail, the significance lies in the fact that this distribution infrastructure continues to function as Kao's revenue foundation.

Background: Limitations of regionally fragmented sales company system against large-format retail and chain expansion

Throughout the 1990s, Japan's consumer goods distribution underwent structural transformation driven by the rise of convenience stores and drugstores. Drugstores in particular, as a format premised on chain expansion and bulk purchasing, gained strong price negotiating power against consumer goods manufacturers. The 1998 enactment of the Large-Scale Retail Store Location Law accelerated large-format store openings, further increasing retail purchasing power. Manufacturers were increasingly required to negotiate nationwide trading terms and unify promotional measures, and regionally divided sales systems reached their limits.

Since the 1960s, Kao had established regional sales companies in partnership with wholesaler capital, building a unique distribution system centered on direct retailer transactions. This system was the source of competitive advantage in terms of breaking away from wholesaler dependence and in-house aggregation of sales information, but with sales companies divided across many regions, unified response to nationwide chains was difficult. From 1982 to 1992, consolidation into eight regional wide-area sales companies progressed, but the fundamental issue of regionally fragmented sales company structure remained unresolved, leaving challenges in response speed to retail format changes.

Decision: Merger of eight wide-area sales companies to establish Kao Sales Co., Ltd. and build a nationally unified management system

In January 1999, Kao merged its eight wide-area sales companies to establish Kao Sales Co., Ltd. This unified the sales organization that had been dispersed from Hokkaido to Kyushu by region, enabling nationwide trade term negotiation and promotional measure unification. With cross-regional sales responses now possible for major retail chains including drugstores and convenience stores, negotiating power and information aggregation capability as a manufacturer improved dramatically. The sales company consolidation was not merely organizational restructuring but a management decision to respond to structural changes in distribution.

In establishing Kao Sales, the approach maintained regional sales bases and personnel while consolidating head office functions. The design required careful allocation of authority between field and headquarters to penetrate nationwide unified policies without undermining regionally embedded sales capability. Through this consolidation, Kao achieved nationally unified management of sales data, improving the precision of product development and demand forecasting inputs. The sales company consolidation served not only distribution purposes but as an information infrastructure integration supporting enterprise-wide decision-making.

Result: Completion of distribution reform spanning 1964-2004 and transition to integrated manufacturing-sales management

After establishing Kao Sales, Kao made Kao Sales a wholly owned subsidiary in 2004, then merged it into the parent company. This meant that the sales company system originating from wholesaler capital, which began in 1964, was fully absorbed into the parent organization over approximately 40 years. An integrated manufacturing-sales management system — operating manufacturing through sales entirely in-house — was completed, and Kao established its distinctive vertically integrated model as a Japanese consumer goods manufacturer. In 2007, Kao Sales was renamed Kao Customer Marketing, redefining the sales function as a marketing function.

This series of distribution reforms was not a quick-fix measure but a structural transformation progressed over decades. Through stages — sales company establishment through joint investment with wholesalers, consolidation of regional sales companies into wide-area entities, unification of wide-area companies, and absorption into the parent company — Kao restructured its distribution infrastructure ahead of retail format changes. As a result, a system was established where nationwide sales data was aggregated at headquarters, contributing to improved precision in product development, demand forecasting, and inventory management. This distribution foundation continues to function as a structural competitive advantage supporting Kao's profitability.

Completion of a 40-year distribution reform and transition to integrated manufacturing-sales management

The 1999 establishment of Kao Sales was the culmination of approximately 40 years of distribution reform that began with the 1964 sales company development. Through stages — from regional to wide-area sales companies, nationwide consolidation, and then parent company merger — a system was built for in-house management of the entire chain from manufacturing to sales. Not a quick-fix measure but a long-term structural transformation anticipating the shift to large-format and chain-operated retail, the significance lies in the fact that this distribution infrastructure continues to function as Kao's revenue foundation.

TimelineKao Sales Co., Ltd. established — Key Events
11/1982Hokkaido Kao Sales established (beginning of sales company consolidation)
10/1992Eight-region wide-area sales company structure nationwide
4/1999Eight sales companies merged to establish Kao Sales Co., Ltd.
2004Kao makes Kao Sales a wholly owned subsidiary
2007Kao Sales renamed to Kao Customer Marketing
1999
4

EVA adopted as management metric

A paradoxical structure where dependence on an excellent metric delayed its own re-examination

EVA management, as a pioneering initiative to explicitly manage capital cost, became deeply embedded in Kao's management, but over more than 20 years of operation, the structural limitation of being unable to visualize capital efficiency by business segment became apparent. Because the metric itself was rational and backed by past track record, the idea of questioning its premises in response to changes in the business environment was difficult to generate among senior management. Kao's EVA management trajectory illustrates the paradoxical structure in which the more excellent a metric is, the more deeply it takes root in an organization, and its very rationality delays re-examination.

Background: Need for capital efficiency metrics as TCR benefits matured

Kao had sustained annual cost reductions of approximately 10 billion yen for over a decade through TCR activities launched in 1986. Through cost structure reviews spanning all areas of business activity — including raw material commonization, production process efficiency, and logistics network reorganization — a stable revenue base was built. However, as the late 1990s approached, with diminishing room for further reductions, the situation became clear that TCR alone could not answer the question of how to achieve the next stage of growth. Cost reduction provided a floor for profits but did not function as a metric pointing the direction for new investment.

In the late 1990s, management metrics that explicitly managed capital cost had barely gained traction among Japanese companies. Most companies used revenue and operating profit as business performance benchmarks, and systems for systematically evaluating returns on invested capital were uncommon. Within Kao as well, no common metric existed for determining which businesses should receive priority allocation of surplus funds generated by TCR, and individual business divisions continued to make investment decisions independently. The need to unify capital allocation discipline at the enterprise level was being recognized as a management challenge.

Decision: Company-wide introduction of EVA and integration into investment decisions and performance evaluation

In 1999, Kao formally introduced EVA (Economic Value Added) as its company-wide management metric. EVA quantitatively measures the extent to which a business creates shareholder value by deducting capital costs on invested capital from after-tax operating profit. As the next stage beyond TCR, Kao aimed not just to cut costs but to visualize capital usage itself and establish company-wide investment discipline. This was an extremely early adoption among Japanese companies, and the stance of placing capital efficiency at the center of management attracted attention both domestically and internationally.

The introduction of EVA went beyond adoption as a management metric; it was operationalized through integration into investment decision criteria and performance evaluation standards. EVA improvement targets were set by business division, and educational programs were developed to explain how frontline operational improvements translated into EVA. This enabled the concept of capital cost to permeate as a common language from top management to the front lines, becoming deeply rooted in Kao's decision-making process. EVA management was designed not as mere metric introduction but as a mechanism to unify the decision-making criteria of the entire organization.

Result: Limitations revealed through long-term EVA operation and transition to ROIC co-utilization

Through over 20 years of operating EVA management, structural limitations of the metric became apparent. Because EVA was calculated as a company-wide aggregate, it was difficult to visualize differences in capital efficiency by business, making it challenging to individually assess which businesses were generating returns exceeding the cost of capital. EVA, which had been 93.5 billion yen in FY2018, deteriorated to 14.7 billion yen by FY2022, with declines in the cosmetics and overseas businesses dragging down company-wide figures. However, insufficient segment-level factor analysis delayed the speed of identifying and addressing the problems.

Reflecting on this, Kao transitioned to a financial strategy co-utilizing ROIC (Return on Invested Capital) alongside EVA. ROIC is a metric measuring capital efficiency at the business unit level, enabling comparison of profitability and investment appropriateness across businesses. Under the K27 mid-term management plan, ROIC of 11% or above was set as the company-wide target, clearly articulating business portfolio review and capital allocation optimization. EVA management was an important milestone that instilled the concept of capital cost in Kao and advanced numbers-driven management, but it also served as a case demonstrating the need to update the metric itself in response to environmental changes.

A paradoxical structure where dependence on an excellent metric delayed its own re-examination

EVA management, as a pioneering initiative to explicitly manage capital cost, became deeply embedded in Kao's management, but over more than 20 years of operation, the structural limitation of being unable to visualize capital efficiency by business segment became apparent. Because the metric itself was rational and backed by past track record, the idea of questioning its premises in response to changes in the business environment was difficult to generate among senior management. Kao's EVA management trajectory illustrates the paradoxical structure in which the more excellent a metric is, the more deeply it takes root in an organization, and its very rationality delays re-examination.

2000
Board of directors reform
2002
John Frieda (US) acquired
2006

Kanebo Cosmetics acquired

Design failures in organizational integration that delayed the return on a 410 billion yen investment

The acquisition of Kanebo Cosmetics was a rational decision to break through the structural constraints of late entry, but challenges remained in PMI design and execution. Kao attempted to proceed with integration using the logic of a consumer goods manufacturer focused on efficiency and reproducibility, but there was a deep gulf with Kanebo's organizational culture, which was grounded in specialty store networks and sensory value. The fact that harmonizing people and cultures took more time than integrating systems and production sites was the factor that prolonged the return on the 410 billion yen investment.

Background: Lack of specialty store channels and brand power as a late entrant in the cosmetics business

Kao entered the cosmetics business in 1982 with the launch of its basic cosmetics brand 'Sofina.' However, in the cosmetics industry, established companies such as Shiseido, Kanebo, and Kose had built brands over the long term through department store and specialty store channels, and it was not easy for late-entrant Kao to break into this structure. Kao had a trading base with mass retailers and drugstores in the consumer goods domain, but lacked the face-to-face counseling-type specialty store network essential for cosmetics sales, remaining dependent on a GMS-centered distribution structure.

From the late 1980s through the 1990s, emerging brands like Fancl and Orbis achieved growth through mail-order and self-service channels, but Kao's cosmetics business was unable to sufficiently capture these trends. Entering the 2000s, revenue scale remained fourth in the industry, with the gap to top-tier companies unclosed in both brand recognition and distribution. The recognition that organic growth through in-house development alone was insufficient to scale the cosmetics business gradually strengthened among Kao's management.

Decision: Acquisition of Kanebo's cosmetics business for 410 billion yen after its descent into insolvency

Meanwhile, Kanebo fell into insolvency in September 2003 due to long-term decline of its textile business and accounting fraud. As reconstruction proceeded under the Industrial Revitalization Corporation, the sale of its cosmetics business — the profit pillar — was determined as a means to secure reconstruction funds. Kanebo's cosmetics business held the second-largest domestic market share and brand power through its specialty store network, but became a divestiture target due to the parent's financial crisis. For Kao, an opportunity arose to acquire in one stroke the specialty store channels and brand assets that were difficult to build independently.

Under President Takuya Goto, Kao decided on the acquisition policy and agreed on an acquisition price of 410 billion yen. Negotiations aimed for agreement within 2003 but required time for stakeholder coordination, with the final acquisition completed in January 2006. Through the acquisition, Kao rose from fourth to second in the domestic cosmetics market, gaining approximately 12% market share. The strategic rationale was explained as building channel complementarity by combining Kao's mass retailer channel in the consumer goods domain with Kanebo's specialty store channel.

Result: Prolonged PMI and cosmetics business stagnation compounded by the Rhodenol skin whitening incident

Kao's cosmetics business after the acquisition failed to achieve the expected results. Kao maintained the separation of 'Kao's cosmetics business' and 'former Kanebo's cosmetics business' for an extended period after acquisition, and integration of logistics, production, R&D, and marketing proceeded at a sluggish pace. The fundamental differences in business origins and organizational cultures between Kao — which valued efficiency and reproducibility as a consumer goods manufacturer — and Kanebo — which had developed around specialty store networks and sensory value — made integration difficult. Brand division integration required approximately 15 years, and PMI delays prolonged the impact on business performance.

Furthermore, in July 2013, a skin whitening product incident (Rhodenol/leukoderma issue) occurred at Kanebo Cosmetics, resulting in cumulative operating losses of 47.6 billion yen from FY2013 to FY2015. While there was a temporary revenue recovery from inbound tourism demand, the overall cosmetics business revenue structure was not improved, and sales stagnated over the long term. The acquisition achieved a certain result in terms of scale acquisition, but the inability to swiftly integrate organizations with different histories and cultures became the primary factor delaying investment recovery.

Design failures in organizational integration that delayed the return on a 410 billion yen investment

The acquisition of Kanebo Cosmetics was a rational decision to break through the structural constraints of late entry, but challenges remained in PMI design and execution. Kao attempted to proceed with integration using the logic of a consumer goods manufacturer focused on efficiency and reproducibility, but there was a deep gulf with Kanebo's organizational culture, which was grounded in specialty store networks and sensory value. The fact that harmonizing people and cultures took more time than integrating systems and production sites was the factor that prolonged the return on the 410 billion yen investment.

TestimonyTakuya Goto (Kao, then president)

We've always said that if a good domestic partner comes along, we would naturally consider it. As long as there's synergy with what we've done so far and mutual benefit, we had no objection to domestic deals. The negotiation counterparts and results are confidential, but we've made several approaches, and some have come to us. Regarding (Kanebo's cosmetics business) strengths and weaknesses, I think we'll gain deeper understanding through discussions going forward, but they excel in the emotional aspects compared to us, and they've built a specialty store network. We have strength in GMS (general merchandise stores). Since our approaches to business are different, synergies can be expected.

Source2003/11/3 Nikkei Business 'The truth behind the Kanebo-Kao cosmetics mega-merger, told by both CEOs'
TimelineKanebo Cosmetics acquired — Key Events
2003Acquisition of Kanebo cosmetics business considered
1/2006Kanebo cosmetics business acquisition completed
2009Kanebo Cosmetics logistics integration (annual cost savings of 10-15 billion yen)
7/2013Kanebo Cosmetics skin whitening incident (quality defect)
-476100M JPY
2014Kanebo Cosmetics R&D division transferred to Kao
2014Kanebo Cosmetics production division transferred to new subsidiary
2016Kanebo Cosmetics sales division transferred to Kao Group Customer Marketing
2021Kanebo Cosmetics brand divisions integrated into Kao
2011
4

Diaper production commenced in China

Non-permanence of quality advantage and investment recovery design in overseas production

Kao's China diaper business was a case where investment recovery failed due to the absence of a premise that quality advantage is not permanent. Japanese manufacturers' technological capability functioned as a differentiator at the time of entry, but competitive conditions changed with rapid catch-up by Chinese manufacturers. Investment decisions relying on market growth potential carry inherent risk of underestimating the speed of competitive environment change, demonstrating the need to incorporate business lifespan and capital recovery design from the initial stage.

Background: Rapid expansion of the Chinese diaper market and limitations of the Japan-export model

In the late 2000s, rising income levels and growing hygiene awareness in China drove rapid expansion of the disposable diaper market. Kao had been selling Japan-made 'Merries' in China since 2009, but exported products were kept at elevated prices due to tariffs and logistics costs, limiting the customer base to high-income households in coastal areas. Capturing the overall market growth required price reductions to gain access to middle-income consumers.

Meanwhile, competitors including P&G and Unicharm had already established production bases within China, using local production-based price competitiveness as leverage to develop the middle-income segment. Under the export model, tariffs and transportation costs were layered on top, and the price gap with locally producing competitors was widening. For Kao, local production in China was becoming an unavoidable choice to maintain market presence.

Kao had established quality advantages through Merries in terms of breathability and skin gentleness, but in the Chinese market, this quality differential had not yet achieved sufficient brand recognition to justify the price premium. Having concluded that local production was essential to reduce prices while maintaining quality, Kao decided to establish its first overseas production site for the diaper business.

Decision: Factory construction in Hefei, Anhui Province and launch of products targeting middle-income consumers

In April 2011, Kao established a local subsidiary in Hefei, Anhui Province, and invested approximately 6 billion yen to begin diaper factory operations by the end of 2012. While Hefei is located inland, it had well-developed logistics networks, and compared to coastal areas, lower land and labor costs made it a rational location from both cost competitiveness and inland market access perspectives. As Kao's first overseas diaper production site, it became a symbolic investment in the full-scale pursuit of the Chinese market.

With local production enabling price reductions, Kao launched 'Merries Shunshao Touqi' targeting middle-income consumers. The product incorporated breathability and skin-feel technologies cultivated in Japan while seeking differentiation from local manufacturers. On the distribution front, expansion into baby product specialty store networks and e-commerce channels was pursued, targeting market penetration in China from both product and distribution perspectives. The policy clearly prioritized market share acquisition over short-term profitability.

In May 2021, an additional investment of approximately 6 billion yen was made in the Hefei factory with a new building completion, expanding production capacity. Over approximately 10 years since the start of local production, Kao maintained its stance of continued investment in the Chinese market. The premise behind the additional investment was the judgment that if scale could be secured through preemptive investment while the diaper market growth rate remained high, medium-to-long-term profitability could be expected.

Result: Rise of local manufacturers and production withdrawal with 60 billion yen in restructuring costs

However, from the late 2010s onward, quality improvement by Chinese domestic diaper manufacturers progressed rapidly, and the technological advantage of Japanese manufacturers narrowed. Government policies nurturing domestic industry also provided tailwinds, and Chinese manufacturers achieved catch-up in quality on top of price competitiveness. Consumer preferences shifted toward domestic brands, and Kao's Merries experienced a declining market share trend. While the market itself continued to grow, Kao's profitability deteriorated.

In August 2023, Kao announced the termination of local diaper production in China and closure of the Hefei factory. Approximately 60 billion yen in restructuring costs were recorded, and the company shifted from complete withdrawal to export sales from Japan. The decline in ROIC impacting company-wide management metrics served as the trigger for the withdrawal decision, making it an instance where Kao's management reform of transitioning from EVA to ROIC functioned as the driving force for business exit.

In February 2024, the sale of Kao's closed Hefei factory to China's Hangzhou Haoyue Nursing Products was announced. The production facilities Kao had built ended up in the hands of a competitor. This case illustrates that even in high-growth markets, technological advantage is not permanent when local manufacturers catch up, and demonstrates the magnitude of costs incurred when investment recovery periods and the pace of competitive environment change are misjudged.

Non-permanence of quality advantage and investment recovery design in overseas production

Kao's China diaper business was a case where investment recovery failed due to the absence of a premise that quality advantage is not permanent. Japanese manufacturers' technological capability functioned as a differentiator at the time of entry, but competitive conditions changed with rapid catch-up by Chinese manufacturers. Investment decisions relying on market growth potential carry inherent risk of underestimating the speed of competitive environment change, demonstrating the need to incorporate business lifespan and capital recovery design from the initial stage.

TimelineDiaper production commenced in China — Key Events
4/2011Kao (Hefei) Co., Ltd. established
12/2012Hefei factory operations commenced (planned)
Planned investment60100M JPY
5/2021New building completed at Hefei factory
Investment amount60100M JPY
8/2023Local production of baby diapers in China terminated
2/2024Sale of Hefei factory to Hangzhou Haoyue Nursing Products announced
2018
Oribe Hair Care acquired
2018
Washing Systems acquired
2018
11

Increased severance payments for early retirees

In response to downsizing of production operations in Japan and China, Kao announced a human capital structural reform. The company decided to increase severance payments for early retirees, recording 25 billion yen in restructuring costs for FY2023 (Dec.).

2023
11

Bondi Sands Australia acquired

A shift in overseas expansion methodology from Japan-originated export to local-brand axis

The acquisition of Bondi Sands is a decision symbolizing a transformation in Kao's overseas expansion methodology. The conventional model of exporting Japan-developed technologies and brands has shown its limitations as demonstrated by the China diaper business withdrawal. The approach of pursuing growth from an already-established local market brand as the starting point is a new touchstone for Kao's overseas strategy, and the extent to which lessons from the prolonged Kanebo acquisition PMI are reflected will determine the success or failure of this deal.

Background: Global Sharp Top strategy and prioritization of the skin protection domain

Under the K27 mid-term management plan, Kao adopted a growth strategy called 'Global Sharp Top.' Rather than broadly pursuing global market share, this concept aims to deliver unique value through differentiated brands and technologies for specific customer needs. It represented a clear shift from overseas expansion originating from the domestic market to viewing the entire world as the market, seeking to raise the overseas revenue ratio through a fundamentally different approach.

The growth area prioritized was skin protection. Product lines that protect skin from UV rays and external environmental factors were seeing expanding global demand driven by rising climate change awareness. Kao had a long track record of refining UV care technology in the Japanese market, but in the global skin protection market including self-tanning, it lacked an established brand, and building a business organically would have required considerable time.

Decision: Acquisition of Australian premium brand Bondi Sands for approximately 41.2 billion yen

In July 2023, Kao acquired Australian skincare brand Bondi Sands through a subsidiary for approximately 41.2 billion yen. The company operates in 32 countries centered on self-tanning and sunscreen products across Australia, the UK, the US, and other markets, holding the number-one self-tanning market share in Australia. Through this acquisition, Kao obtained a brand with immediate global competitiveness in the skin protection domain.

Behind Kao's focus on Bondi Sands was the complementary relationship between the company's brand power and sales network and Kao's UV care technology accumulated domestically in Japan. By combining Kao's UV defense technology with Bondi Sands' brand recognition, a plan was conceived to accelerate global expansion in both sunscreen and self-tanning. This decision represents a shift from the conventional approach of deploying Japan-originated technology overseas to a strategy of attacking the global market using a brand established overseas as the axis.

Result: Transition from Japan-originated technology export to a global-brand-centric growth strategy

The Bondi Sands acquisition is positioned as embodying a new methodology in Kao's global strategy. Kao's conventional overseas expansion was primarily a model of exporting domestically developed technologies and brands to each country, but as seen in the China diaper business withdrawal, this model inherently contained vulnerabilities to local market adaptation and competitive environment changes. The acquisition of Bondi Sands signifies a shift to an approach of pursuing growth from an already-established local brand as the starting point.

In post-acquisition integration, the extent to which lessons from the prolonged PMI of the Kanebo Cosmetics acquisition are reflected is a point of attention. Bondi Sands is a company that has built distinctive brand value in a different market and channel from Kao's existing businesses, and integration requires a design that leverages Kao's technology assets while maintaining the brand's uniqueness. The feasibility of K27's Global Sharp Top growth strategy will be tested by the integration results of this acquisition.

A shift in overseas expansion methodology from Japan-originated export to local-brand axis

The acquisition of Bondi Sands is a decision symbolizing a transformation in Kao's overseas expansion methodology. The conventional model of exporting Japan-developed technologies and brands has shown its limitations as demonstrated by the China diaper business withdrawal. The approach of pursuing growth from an already-established local market brand as the starting point is a new touchstone for Kao's overseas strategy, and the extent to which lessons from the prolonged Kanebo acquisition PMI are reflected will determine the success or failure of this deal.

2025
4

Shareholder proposals from Oasis rejected

Structural gap between the time horizon of ESG management and capital market expectations

Kao's policy of placing ESG at the core of management was rational from the perspective of long-term business sustainability, but the capital market asks when that judgment will manifest as revenue growth or ROIC improvement. The fact that Oasis's shareholder proposals were defeated preserved management's discretion, but unless growth drivers beyond domestic price increases become visible, similar pressure can arise again. Kao is positioned in a transitional period until its values-based management aligns with the time horizon of capital markets.

Background: ESG-focused management challenged by changes in the competitive environment and capital markets

From the 2010s onward, Kao — conscious of the significant environmental impact inherent in its consumer goods business — placed ESG at the core of its management decisions. From recycled plastic packaging for detergent containers to usage reduction and raw material design review, ESG-oriented capital investment was accumulated from the product development stage. These were positioned not as measures aimed at short-term cost reduction but as choices questioning the sustainability of the business itself.

Meanwhile, global consumer goods majors were accelerating revenue growth through brand portfolio streamlining and concentrated marketing investment. As Unilever and P&G raised their overseas revenue ratios, Kao's remained at a relatively low level. While profit margin recovery progressed domestically through price increases, overseas revenue growth — which investors prioritized — was not easily visible, and the stock price remained at a level divergent from the corporate value envisioned by management.

Under these circumstances, Hong Kong-based activist fund Oasis Management acquired approximately 5% of Kao's shares and published management improvement proposals. In addition to the point that brand count was excessive compared to competitors, the proposals encompassed both business strategy and governance, including brand streamlining and concentration of marketing investment, appointment of personnel with overseas experience, and review of board composition.

Decision: Opposition to all four shareholder proposals and choice to maintain the existing system

In February 2025, Kao made clear its opposition to all four shareholder proposals submitted by Oasis. Against wide-ranging proposals including additional appointment of outside directors, remuneration system review, and marketing strategy changes, Kao took the position that business performance recovery and ROIC improvement were progressing under the current system. Rapid expansion of marketing investment was assessed as potentially increasing overproduction and inventory risk, and a stance prioritizing gradual reform was adopted.

The basis for rebuttal included the track record of ROIC improvement progressing under K27 and profit recovery from domestic price increase penetration. Kao oriented toward medium-to-long-term growth through brand value reconstruction centered on high-functionality products and selective overseas expansion in the skin protection domain, rather than the short-term structural reform demanded by the activist. The policy selected was to maintain existing direction without major changes and demonstrate results sought by investors over time.

Behind this decision was Kao's ESG-focused management philosophy. For Kao, which had positioned ESG initiatives as a source of long-term competitive advantage, measures biased toward brand reduction and marketing expansion were seen as incompatible with comprehensive corporate value creation. Between the demands of shareholder value maximization and maintaining management philosophy, Kao prioritized the latter.

Result: Structural tension with capital markets persists even after shareholder proposal rejection

At the annual general meeting in March 2025, all of Oasis's shareholder proposals were defeated. Formally, management's direction was supported, but investor evaluation had not fully converged. The primary driver of performance recovery was domestic price increase penetration, which was not accompanied by overseas business growth or fundamental improvement in capital efficiency. Some of the issues raised by the activist remained as matters of market interest.

Additionally, the environment surrounding ESG investing itself was changing. The ESG-focused trend that had gained momentum globally in the early 2020s entered a correction phase from 2024 onward, with growing movement to re-examine the relationship between ESG and investment returns. Kao's stance of placing ESG at the center of management is in a position where the compatibility of ideals and profitability is being questioned anew. The structural challenge has become apparent that the timeframe for ESG-oriented capital investment to crystallize as competitive advantage does not align with market expectations.

Kao continues to pursue overseas expansion centered on high-functionality products and ROIC improvement, but unless revenue growth and capital efficiency improvement become visible, there remains room for similar shareholder pressure to arise again. The rejection of shareholder proposals is only a temporary settlement, and the structural tension between ESG-focused management and the returns demanded by capital markets is at a stage where it will be tested by future management performance.

Structural gap between the time horizon of ESG management and capital market expectations

Kao's policy of placing ESG at the core of management was rational from the perspective of long-term business sustainability, but the capital market asks when that judgment will manifest as revenue growth or ROIC improvement. The fact that Oasis's shareholder proposals were defeated preserved management's discretion, but unless growth drivers beyond domestic price increases become visible, similar pressure can arise again. Kao is positioned in a transitional period until its values-based management aligns with the time horizon of capital markets.

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